JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Marty W. King, appeals from the order of the trialcourt granting the motion to dismiss of defendants, Senior ServicesAssociates (SSA) and Bette Schoenholtz. We reverse in part, affirmin part, and remand.

In October 2001, King filed a two-count complaint allegingretaliatory discharge against SSA (count I) and Schoenholtz (countII). Both defendants filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant tosection 2--615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2--615(West 2000)), which the trial court granted. This appeal followed.

King contends that the trial court erred in grantingdefendants' motion to dismiss. When the legal sufficiency of acomplaint is challenged by a section 2--615 motion to dismiss, allwell-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint are taken as true. T&SSigns, Inc. v. Village of Wadsworth, 261 Ill. App. 3d 1080, 1083(1994). On review of a section 2--615 dismissal, this court mustdetermine whether the allegations of the complaint, wheninterpreted in a light most favorable to the plaintiff,sufficiently set forth a cause of action on which relief may begranted. T&S Signs, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 1083. The motion shouldbe granted only if the plaintiff can prove no set of facts tosupport the cause of action. T&S Signs, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 1083. This process does not require the court to weigh findings of factor determine credibility; therefore, this court is not required todefer to the trial court's judgment, and we will review the matterde novo. T&S Signs, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 1084.

In her complaint, King alleged that Schoenholtz was theexecutive director of SSA, a not-for-profit corporation engaged ininvestigating allegations of elder abuse. SSA was an "Elder AbuseProvider Agency" charged with implementing "the public policy ofthe State of Illinois, to provide for the protection of the seniorcitizens of the State of Illinois, and to provide for a reportingof abuse cases, all as reflected in the Elder Abuse and Neglect Act[(Act) (320 ILCS 20/1 et seq. (West 2000))] of the State ofIllinois." King was hired by SSA as a protective servicecoordinator in June 1996. In February 1999, King received a reportthat a senior citizen named Elsie Ottens was being abused andfinancially exploited by Jacqueline Swaney, another employee ofSSA. King and other SSA employees began an investigation, whichled to an investigation by the Kane County sheriff's department. Swaney was subsequently indicted and convicted of criminal charges.

SSA and Schoenholtz continued Swaney's employment after herindictment, expanded her duties, "and otherwise provided protectionand assistance" to Swaney. King and other employees advisedSchoenholtz that Swaney's continued employment was inappropriateand "compromised" SSA. As a "direct and proximate result" ofKing's investigation of Swaney, Schoenholtz "began a course ofconduct designed to harass and drive" King from her employment atSSA. Schoenholtz's conduct included: (1) searching King's files"solely for the purpose of trying to determine sufficientstandards" to terminate King; (2) "[a]rbitrarily" criticizing Kingand announcing that she was going to take "punitive measures"against King and anyone else involved in the investigation ofSwaney; (3) writing a memo suggesting that King should seek otheremployment; (4) demoting King to the position of ombudsman; and (5)otherwise engaging "in a course of conduct designed to drive [King]from her employment." King refused to resign, and she wasterminated in June 2001, allegedly for failure to properlydischarge her duties. However, this was only a cover, and she wasactually terminated for " 'blowing the whistle' " on Swaney.

King alleged that Illinois has a public policy to provide forthe protection of senior citizens and to provide for the reportingof abuse cases. This policy is reflected in the Act. SSA was anElder Abuse Provider Agency charged with implementing this policy.

In order to establish a cause of action for retaliatorydischarge, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she was discharged inretaliation for her activities and that the discharge violated aclear mandate of public policy. Fiumetto v. Garrett Enterprises,Inc., 321 Ill. App. 3d 946, 949 (2001). Retaliatory dischargeactions have traditionally been allowed in two situations: (1) whenan employee is discharged for seeking workers' compensationbenefits; and (2) when an employee is discharged for reportingmisconduct by the employer. Fiumetto, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 949. Our supreme court has consistently sought to restrict the common-law tort of retaliatory discharge, emphasizing that an employer maydischarge an at-will employee for any or no reason, except when thedischarge violates a clearly mandated public policy. See Fisher v.Lexington Health Care, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 455, 467 (1999).

There is no public policy more basic, and nothing moreimplicit in the concept of ordered liberty, than the enforcement ofthe state's criminal code. Palmateer v. International HarvesterCo., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 132 (1981); Vorpagel v. Maxell Corp. ofAmerica, 333 Ill. App. 3d 51, 54 (2002). King alleged thatSchoenholtz "began a course of conduct designed to harass and drive[King] from her employment" as a direct and "proximate result of[King's] having promoted, encouraged and aided" the investigationof Swaney. Eventually, King was terminated for allegedly failingto properly discharge her duties; however, these allegations werea "cover for the purpose of penalizing [King] for 'blowing thewhistle' " on Swaney. Taking these allegations as true, anddrawing all reasonable inferences in King's favor, we conclude thatKing clearly stated a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. King was terminated for "blowing the whistle" on a co-employee whowas eventually convicted of criminal offenses.

SSA and Schoenholtz argue that, for several reasons, King isnot a "whistleblower." Defendants argue that King could not be awhisteblower because she did not bring allegations of abuse tolight; she merely received a report from someone else and passed italong. This argument has no merit. We note that there is norequirement that a whistleblower be the first person to discover orreport a violation; she only has to cooperate in a criminalinvestigation. See Vorpagel, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 54. Kingreceived a report that Swaney was abusing and financiallyexploiting Ottens, investigated the report, then notified lawenforcement authorities. These actions are clearly cooperation ina criminal investigation.

Defendants also argue that King is not a whistleblower becauseshe did not report any misconduct by SSA or Schoenholtz. Defendants cite no authority for the proposition that the subjectof the report must be the employer or the plaintiff's supervisor. Indeed, in the seminal Palmateer case, the supreme court found acause of action to exist but informed the reader only that theplaintiff supplied information that "an IH [InternationalHarvester] employee might be involved in a violation of theCriminal Code." Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 127. Presumably, thesupreme court would have provided more information on the "IHemployee" had that employee's identity been a factor. We find thatno such identity of the parties is required.

Similarly unavailing is defendants' argument that awhistleblower's report must allege wrongdoing connected withemployment. In Vorpagel, the plaintiff cooperated with a criminalinvestigation into a sexual relationship between his supervisor andthe supervisor's daughter, which led to various criminal charges. This court held that the importance of enforcing criminal lawsapplies "with equal force whether or not the alleged crime isconnected with a plaintiff's employment." Vorpagel, 333 Ill. App.3d at 54. King's report of Swaney's misconduct was the action ofa whistleblower, and we find no merit to defendants' contention.

Assuming arguendo that a common-law cause of action did notlie in this case, the legislature may provide a right of action forretaliatory discharge through the enactment of a statute, and sucha right may be either expressly granted or implied in the languageof the statute. See Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 459-60. An impliedright of action may be found where: (1) the plaintiff is a memberof the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) theplaintiff's injury is one that the statute was designed to prevent;(3) a private right of action is consistent with the underlyingpurpose of the statute; and (4) implying a private right of actionis necessary to provide an adequate remedy for violations of thestatute. Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 460. In interpreting alegislative enactment, a court must read the statute as a whole andnot as isolated provisions. Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 463.

The Act gives to the Department on Aging of the State ofIllinois (Department) the responsibility to:

"[E]stablish, design and manage a program of response andservices for persons 60 years of age and older who have been,or are alleged to be, victims of abuse, neglect, or financialexploitation." 320 ILCS 20/3(a) (West 2000).

To achieve these ends, the Department may contract with and/orfund, among others, a provider agency, which is defined as:

"[A]ny public or nonprofit agency in a planning andservice area appointed by the regional administrative agencywith prior approval by the Department on Aging to receive andassess reports of alleged or suspected abuse, neglect, orfinancial exploitation." 320 ILCS 20/2(h) (West 2000).

It is the responsibility of provider agencies to:

"[A]ssist, to the extent possible, eligible adults whoneed agency services to allow them to continue to functionindependently. Such assistance shall include but not belimited to receiving reports of alleged or suspected abuse,neglect, or financial exploitation, conducting face-to-faceassessments of such reported cases, determination ofsubstantiated cases, referral of substantiated cases fornecessary support services, referral of criminal conduct tolaw enforcement in accordance with Department guidelines, andprovision of case work and follow-up services on substantiatedcases." 320 ILCS 20/3(c) (West 2000).

Such an agency, upon the receipt of a report, is to "conduct aface-to-face assessment with respect to such report." 320 ILCS20/5(a) (West 2000). If the agency determines that the report issubstantiated, it is to develop a service care plan for the victim. 320 ILCS 20/5(a) (West 2000). Evidence of crimes is to be referredto the appropriate law enforcement agency. 320 ILCS 20/5(b) (West2000).

Section 4.2 of the Act provides, in part:

"Any mandated reporter who makes a report or any person whoinvestigates a report under this Act shall testify fully inany judicial proceeding resulting from such report ***." (Emphasis added.) 320 ILCS 20/4.2 (West 2000).

Thus, the provision of services to elders under the Act includestestifying in any legal proceeding that arises from a report ofelder abuse, and it is part of the job description of an employeeat a provider agency to so testify. Section 4.1 of the Actprovides:

"Employer discrimination. No employer shall discharge,demote or suspend, or threaten to discharge, demote orsuspend, or in any manner discriminate against any employeewho makes a good faith oral or written report of suspectedelder abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation or who is orwill be a witness or testify in any investigation orproceeding concerning a report of suspected elder abuse,neglect, or financial exploitation." (Emphasis added.) 320ILCS 20/4.1 (West 2000).

From this statutory scheme, we conclude that a private rightof action for retaliatory discharge is implied for employees ofprovider agencies. The legislature has clearly imbued theDepartment with the responsibility for providing services forpersons 60 years and older who have been abused, neglected, orfinancially exploited. This provision of services is the publicpolicy of the State of Illinois. The Department has been given theoverall responsibility for the design and management of thisprogram; however, it is the provider agencies with which theDepartment contracts that actually implement the program andprovide services to the people who have been abused, neglected, orexploited. Chief among these services is the investigation andpossible referral for prosecution of reports of abuse, neglect, andexploitation.

However, while the overall purpose of the Act is to provideservices for abused, neglected, or exploited persons aged 60 andover, the Act does not provide any remedies for such persons. TheAct merely provides for the apparatus necessary to help suchpersons seek remedies, such as criminal prosecution, that alreadyexist elsewhere. The Act was not designed to protect elders fromabuse, neglect, and exploitation; the central purpose of the Act isto put in place a system to provide services to such persons. Thus, any protections provided in the Act are applicable, not toabused, neglected, or exploited elders, but to the personsproviding the services to such elders.

The legislature has seen fit to specifically include in theAct protection from employer discrimination for those personsinvolved in the reporting and investigation of abuse, neglect, andexploitation. See 320 ILCS 20/4.1 (West 2000). While thisprohibition against employer discrimination is expressly given,nowhere does the Act provide for a specific mechanism for enforcingthis protection. Without such a mechanism, an implied privatecause of action is the only method by which an employee involved inproviding services to victims of elder abuse and neglect can seeka remedy for discrimination by her employer. The right to be freefrom employer discrimination is no right at all if there is noremedy for such discrimination. Thus, we conclude that the Actcontains an implied private cause of action for retaliatorydischarge for employees of provider agencies.

The trial court, in granting the motion to dismiss, reliedupon the supreme court's Fisher decision. In Fisher, two nursinghome employees alleged that they were harassed and either fired ordriven to resign after they refused to prepare a false report andcooperated with authorities in investigating the death of a nursinghome resident. The supreme court concluded that no private rightof action existed for nursing home employees who were retaliatedagainst by their employers. The court reasoned that the NursingHome Care Act (210 ILCS 45/1--101 et seq. (West 2000)) was designedto protect nursing home residents, not nursing home employees. SeeFisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 462. Even the inclusion of a provisionprohibiting retaliation against residents, representatives ofresidents, employees, or agents who reported violations, filedcomplaints, or testified in actions brought pursuant to thatlegislation did not persuade the court that such a private cause ofaction existed for employees. The court, viewing the Nursing HomeCare Act as a whole, concluded that employees were protected only"to advance the Act's central purpose of protecting residents byencouraging employees who become aware of mistreatment to reportthat mistreatment." Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 463. Furthermore, thecourt found that the protections applied to residents and theirrepresentatives, in addition to employees, and that employees mightthemselves be the perpetrators of retaliation. Fisher, 188 Ill. 2dat 463-64. Thus, even the specific protections of section 3--608of the Nursing Home Care Act (210 ILCS 45/3--608 (West)) soughtfirst and foremost to protect nursing home residents. Fisher, 188Ill. 2d at 464.

While the analysis provided in Fisher is useful, the outcomeof the case is not controlling here, as Fisher did not involve theElder Abuse and Neglect Act. Furthermore, Fisher did not involvethe reporting of criminal conduct, as the case before us does, butthe reporting of tortious conduct. We have already noted thestrong public policy of enforcing the state's criminal code; we areunaware of any such public policy regarding the reporting oftortious acts. We conclude that the protections provided insection 4.1 of the Elder Abuse and Neglect Act imply a privatecause of action for retaliatory discharge for employees of provideragencies. Thus, the trial court erred in dismissing count I ofKing's complaint.

King also contends that the trial court erred in dismissingcount II of her complaint, which alleged retaliatory dischargeagainst Schoenholtz. We disagree.

This court had previously held that claims of retaliatorydischarge could lie against a supervisor in addition to theemployer. See, e.g., Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 190 Ill. App. 3d592 (1989). However, our supreme court has overruled Fellhauer andhas held "that the only proper defendant in a retaliatory dischargeaction is the plaintiff's former employer." Buckner v. AtlanticPlant Maintenance, Inc., 182 Ill. 2d 12, 22 (1998). We declineKing's invitation to "reconsider and re-examine" the supremecourt's ruling in Buckner, and conclude that the trial court didnot err in dismissing count II of King's complaint.

For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court ofMcHenry County is reversed in part and affirmed in part, and thecause is remanded.

Reversed in part and affirmed in part; cause remanded.

GROMETER, J., concurs.

JUSTICE KAPALA, specially concurring:

While I agree with the majority on the reversal as to count Ibased on the common-law tort of retaliatory discharge and theaffirmance as to count II, I respectfully disagree as to that partof the opinion in which we recognize an implied private right ofaction under the Act.

My analysis is guided by two supreme court cases that Ibelieve control the issue. In Fisher v. Lexington Health Care,Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 455 (1999), our supreme court reiterated the fourfactors to be considered when determining whether an impliedprivate right of action under a statute is appropriate. Fisher,188 Ill. 2d at 460. These factors are: (1) is the plaintiff amember of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted? (2)is the plaintiff's injury one the statute was designed to prevent?(3) is a private right of action consistent with the underlyingpurpose of the statute? and (4) is implying a private right ofaction necessary to provide an adequate remedy for violation of thestatute? Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 460.

As to factor one, I believe it is clear that the Act'sintended purpose was to protect elder citizens from abuse. Thereis nothing in the legislative history to indicate otherwise. Additionally, the legislative debates mention support by eldergroups while there is no mention of any interest by employees ofany organizations involved in addressing elder abuse issues. Further, in this court's opinion in Fisher v. Lexington HealthCare, Inc., 301 Ill. App. 3d 547 (1998), we expressly recognizedthat the Act is "intended to safeguard the rights of vulnerablepersons of our society (i.e., *** elderly persons ***)." Fisher,301 Ill. App. 3d at 554. Thus, I do not believe the Act in generalwas intended to protect persons such as plaintiff in this case.

Further, my reading of section 4.1 does not alter thisconclusion as to the first factor. While section 4.1 does prohibitdiscrimination against employees who report elder abuse, I believeits intended purpose was, consistent with the overall purpose ofthe Act, to protect elders by encouraging reporting of abusewithout fear of retaliation. In my opinion, any protectionemployees might receive under section 4.1 is merely ancillary tothe purpose of the Act, which is the protection of our elderly fromabuse.

I also consider the second factor under Fisher to weigh infavor of not implying a private right of action. I believe theinjury that the Act, including section 4.1, is designed to preventis abuse of the elderly. Perhaps a stronger argument could be madein this case had a plaintiff who is an abused elder sought topursue an implied private right of action. In our case, however,we have an employee whose injury, being terminated from heremployment, in no way relates to the type of injury with which theAct is concerned, abuse of the elderly.

Moving to factor four, I am particularly persuaded by thesupreme court case of Abbasi v. Paraskevoulakos, 187 Ill. 2d 386(1999). In that case, the court stated it was unnecessary toanalyze in detail all four of the factors because there was no"clear need" to imply a private remedy to effectuate the purpose ofthe act at issue there. Abbasi, 187 Ill. 2d at 393. The Abbasicourt further stated that an "application of the fourth factor tothis case leads to the same conclusion." Abbasi, 187 Ill. 2d at393.

The court in Abbasi went on to conclude that it was notappropriate to recognize an implied right of action because it wasnot necessary to provide an adequate remedy for violation of theact. It so held because there was a common-law cause of action toprovide such a remedy. Abbasi, 187 Ill. 2d at 393.

Here, as in Abbasi, plaintiff has an adequate remedy, thatbeing the tort of retaliatory discharge. Thus, to the extent oneconcludes that there is a need to provide an adequate remedy for aviolation of section 4.1, there is no "clear need" to recognize animplied private right of action under the Act. Similarly, it isunnecessary to do so within the meaning of factor four.

As for factor three, I concede that an implied private rightof action would be consistent with the underlying purpose of theAct, as it would discourage employers from violating section 4.1,and thus promote the discovery and prevention of elder abuse. Nonetheless, I believe the other three factors outweigh factorthree in assessing the propriety of whether to recognize an impliedprivate right of action under the Act.

Finally, I would point to the cautionary language in Fisherwherein the supreme court stated that it has "consistently soughtto restrict the common law tort of retaliatory discharge." Fisher,188 Ill. 2d at 467. The court further stated that while the casebefore it did not involve the common-law tort of retaliatorydischarge, it found such restrictive language "instructive on thequestion presented in this case." Fisher, 188 Ill. 2d at 468. Thus, the court stated that it "must also hesitate to imply suchactions under a statute without legislative authority." Fisher,188 Ill. 2d at 468.

I read this language from Fisher as another reason not torecognize an implied private right of action under the Act. It isapparent the supreme court strongly disfavors doing so except inthe most compelling situations. I do not consider the situationhere, when viewed in light of Fisher and Abbassi, to be socompelling.

For all of these reasons, I believe we should not take theadditional step of recognizing an implied private right of actionunder the Act.