May 10, 2001

Plaintiff, Knolls Condominium Association, appeals from thetrial court's sua sponte order dismissing plaintiff's complaintagainst defendant, Robert L. Czerwinski. We reverse and remand.

On October 18, 1999, plaintiff filed a complaint in forcibleentry and detainer against defendant. The complaint alleges thatplaintiff is entitled to possession of a certain condominium unit,defendant has unlawfully withheld possession of the unit, and plaintiff is entitled to recover $2,573.26 for unpaid maintenanceassessments. On November 8, 1999, plaintiff served the summons andthe complaint upon defendant.

On November 23, 1999, the return date on the summons, plaintiff's counsel appeared in court, but defendant did not. Counsel for plaintiff tendered to the trial court the 30-day noticeplaintiff served upon defendant. The 30-day notice bore a stampedsignature of plaintiff's attorney. Appearing directly below thestamped signature, the proof of service contained the handwrittensignature of another person and was notarized. The trial courtexpressed concern about whether a stamped signature is authenticand can properly be notarized. Accordingly, the trial courtrefused to accept the notice and dismissed the complaint suasponte.

On December 10, 1999, plaintiff moved for reconsideration ofthe dismissal. Plaintiff noted that the notary verified thesignature on the proof of service, not the signature on the 30-daynotice. Also, plaintiff asserted that the stamped facsimilesignature was sufficient to comply with section 9--104.1 of theCode of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/9--104.1 (West 1998)). On December 21, 1999, the trial court stated that it would notaccept stamped signatures and denied the motion. Plaintiff timelyappealed.

Defendant has not filed an appellee's brief here. Because therecord is short and the claimed error is such that we can easilydecide the issue without the aid of an appellee's brief, we willaddress the merits of the appeal pursuant to First Capitol MortgageCorp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976).

Although the trial court did not state the legal basis for itsdismissal, it essentially concluded that plaintiff's claim wasbarred by other affirmative matter (an invalid 30-day notice) avoiding the legal effect of the claim. Therefore, the order hereis akin to a dismissal pursuant to section 2--619(a)(9) of the Code(735 ILCS 5/2--619(a)(9) (West 1998)). Accordingly, we will reviewthe trial court's ruling de novo. Downey v. Wood Dale ParkDistrict, 286 Ill. App. 3d 194, 200 (1997).

Section 9--102(a)(7) of the Code provides that a forcibleentry and detainer action may be maintained when the owner of acondominium unit fails or refuses to pay when due his or herproportionate share of the common expenses of the property. 735ILCS 5/9--102(a)(7) (West 1998). Section 9--104 of the Coderequires the person seeking possession of the property in questionto serve the occupant of the property with a demand for possessionand further provides that the "demand shall be signed by the personclaiming such possession, his or her agent, or attorney." 735 ILCS5/9--104 (West 1998).

Section 9--104.1(a) of the Code contains the 30-day noticerequirement. It states that, "in case of condominium property, thedemand shall give *** the condominium unit owner *** at least 30days to satisfy the terms of the demand before an action is filed.*** The demand shall be signed by the person claiming suchpossession, his or her agent, or attorney." 735 ILCS 5/9--104.1(a)(West 1998).

The pertinent statutory provisions require only that thedemand and notice be signed. The basis for the trial court'sruling is that "signed" must be construed solely as the equivalentof "subscribed," i.e., handwritten. There is no requirement thatthe signature on the 30-day notice be handwritten, however. Moreover:

"[I]n a variety of contexts, the law has consistentlyinterpreted 'signed' to embody not only the act ofsubscribing a document, but also anything which canreasonably be understood to symbolize or manifest thesigner's intent to adopt a writing as his or her own andbe bound by it. This may be accomplished in a multitudeof ways, only one of which is a handwrittensubscription." Just Pants v. Wagner, 247 Ill. App. 3d166, 173-74 (1993).

We have upheld the validity of a stamped signature in adifferent context. People v. Stephens, 12 Ill. App. 3d 215, 217-18(1973) (search warrant was authentic even though it bore onlystamped signature of magistrate). See also Alpine State Bank v.Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 733 F. Supp. 60, 63 (N.D. Ill. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 941 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1991) (use of stampconstituted signature endorsement). As the recent enactment of theElectronic Commerce Security Act (5 ILCS 175/1--101 et seq. (West1998)) reveals, alternative forms of signatures are increasinglyaccepted. See 5 ILCS 175/5--120(a) (West 1998) ("[W]here a rule oflaw requires a signature, *** an electronic signature satisfiesthat rule").

Because there was no evidence to show that the signature wasnot the intended act of plaintiff's attorney, that the attorneyused a stamp does not affect the validity of plaintiff's 30-daynotice. See Stephens, 12 Ill. App. 3d at 218. Therefore, thetrial court should not have dismissed plaintiff's action.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court ofDu Page County and remand the cause for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

GEIGER and CALLUM, JJ., concur.