JUSTICE BYRNE delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendants Richard DeCarlo and Elaine DeCarlo appeal thejudgment of the circuit court of Du Page County, which granted themotion of plaintiff, La Salle Bank, N.A., to set aside the transfer of property into tenancy by the entirety. We affirm.

This appeal arose from an action in which FreightforceWorldwide, Ltd., and Freightforce International, Inc.(Freightforce), had obtained a judgment against defendant RichardDeCarlo and his company, Freight Force Overseas, Inc., for $81,242. Plaintiff succeeded to Freightforce's interest in the judgment. OnSeptember 3, 1999, we affirmed the judgment against Richard(Freightforce Worldwide, Ltd. v. DeCarlo, No. 2--98--1502 (1999)(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). On September 20,1999, Richard transferred his title to his home, which he had ownedwith his wife, Elaine, as joint tenants since 1977, into tenancy bythe entirety. In order to collect on the judgment, plaintiff fileda motion to set aside the transfer pursuant to section 12--112 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/12--112 (West1998)).

Richard and Elaine were represented by counsel and eachappeared and gave testimony at the evidentiary hearing concerningplaintiff's motion. At the time of the transfer, defendants hadmore than $200,000 of equity in their property.

Richard testified that, excluding his residential property, heowned less than $4,000 of assets at the time of the transfer. Hetransferred the title into tenancy by the entirety in September1999 because a family lawyer suggested it to him in late 1997 orearly 1998. According to Richard, the advice given by the attorneywas received prior to the judgment in the underlying suit and wasgiven without any awareness of the present litigation. A realtoralso suggested it to him sometime in 1997. Richard stated that thepurpose of the transfer was "to protect the estate" and his wife. Richard further stated that he was told that his residence would"transfer easier" upon his death because "[our] assets are tied upin the business and we don't really have a business agreement." Richard stated that the advice from the family attorney was theprime motivating factor to transferring title and that it was neverhis intent to defraud a creditor. Richard claimed that he waiteduntil September 1999 to effect the transfer because he waspreoccupied by an illness and a death in his family.

Elaine testified that she first began discussing a possibletransfer sometime before 1998 when defendants were taking care ofher parents' affairs. She stated that she had no intent to defraudany creditor and that, at the time of the transfer, she had nocredit problems or judgments pending against her. Elaine firstbecame aware of the underlying litigation around May 2001. Elainefurther testified that Richard had "never discussed business athome" and he failed to disclose that a judgment had been attainedagainst him until she was asked to sign documents in connectionwith this case.

The trial court first construed section 12--112 of the Codeand held that the statute looks to the intent of the transferor whohad the debt at the time the transfer was made. Because at issuewas Richard's transfer of his interest in the property as a jointtenant, the court found Elaine's transfer of the property to beirrelevant. The court then found that Richard's reasons for thetransfer were "vague, inarticulate, specious and totallyincredible," and concluded that the transfer of the title toRichard's residence into tenancy by the entirety "was made with thesole intent to avoid the payment of debts existing at the time oftransfer beyond [Richard's] ability to pay those debts as theybecome due." As a result of the finding, the trial court set asidethe transfer into tenancy by the entirety as being fraudulent andin derogation of the rights of plaintiff and held that the title tothe property remains vested in Richard and Elaine "as joint tenantsand not as tenants in common." The trial court did not make anyfinding as to Elaine's intent with respect to the transfer. Defendants timely appeal.

Plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the transfer undersection 12--112, which states in relevant part:

"Any real property, or any beneficial interest in a landtrust, held in tenancy by the entirety shall not be liable tobe sold upon judgment entered on or after October 1, 1990against only one of the tenants, except if the property wastransferred into tenancy by the entirety with the sole intentto avoid the payment of debts existing at the time of thetransfer beyond the transferor's ability to pay those debts asthey become due." (Emphasis indicates language added byamendment.) Pub. Act 90--514, eff. August 22, 1997.

See also 735 ILCS 5/12--112 (West 1998)

On appeal, defendants first contend that the trial court erred in finding that section 12--112 applies to the debtor and not thedebtor's spouse. Defendants assert that the intent of the debtor'sspouse is just as relevant in cases where property is transferredinto tenancy by the entirety because, in enacting section 12--112,the legislature clearly intended to protect the property of marriedcouples from judgment creditors and, more specifically, to protectthe unsuspecting wife from the improper actions of her spouse.

Defendants raise an issue of statutory construction, to whichwe apply a de novo standard of review. See Paris v. Feder, 179Ill. 2d 173, 177-78 (1997). Well-established principles guide usin resolving an issue of statutory construction. The primary ruleof statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to thelegislature's intent. Lieb v. Judges' Retirement System, 314 Ill.App. 3d 87, 92 (2000). To determine the legislature's intent, acourt should look first to the statute's plain language and shouldaccord the language its plain and commonly understood meaning. Thecourt must not read into the plain language exceptions,limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not intend. Davis v. Toshiba Machine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181, 184-85(1999).

We agree with defendants that section 12--112 clearly setsforth the legislative goal of creating a veil of protection for themarital property from prospective creditors by preventing land heldin tenancy by the entirety to be sold to satisfy a judgment. SeeHarris Bank St. Charles v. Weber, 298 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1077(1998). In 1997, however, the legislature amended the statute,creating an exception when creditors may force the sale of suchproperty to satisfy a judgment. See Pub. Act 90--514, eff. August22, 1997. By creating the exception, the legislature unambiguouslyexpressed its intent to allow a creditor to break through the veilof protection when the transfer into tenancy by the entirety ismade to avoid the payment of debts which existed at the time of thetransfer beyond the transferor's ability to pay those debts as theybecome due. See Premier Property Management, Inc. v. Chavez, 191Ill. 2d 101, 109 (2000). Because the exception is clearly directedto avoiding the payment of debts existing at the time of thetransfer, we believe that the legislature intended that the focusis on the debtor's intent in transferring the property. See HarrisBank, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 1081 (property may be excluded from theprotection of tenancy by the entirety, depending on transferor'sintent).

However, because the legislature could have used the words"with the sole intent of the debtor" if it had so chosen, we mustlook to legislative history to interpret the statute (see HarrisBank, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 1072). The legislature was concernedabout an unsuspecting wife or husband who found herself or himselfin a position of losing the family residence as a result of someclandestine or inappropriate action by her or his spouse dealingwith the equity in that residence. On the other hand, thelegislature was cognizant of the rights of creditors and oflimiting a debtor from circumventing a judgment debt. In balancingthese concerns, the legislature set forth one instance when acreditor can avoid a transfer of property into a tenancy by theentirety. Senator Cullerton voiced this concern. He stated that"only in a very limited situation, where after there is literallya judgment entered against you, you can't transfer your propertyinto -- from joint tenancy into tenancy by the entirety; you shoulddo it beforehand." 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings,March 17, 1997, at 32 (statements of Senator Cullerton). SenatorCullerton further suggested that the factors listed in the UniformFraudulent Transfer Act (Fraudulent Transfer Act) (see 740 ILCS160/5(b) (West 1998)) would be helpful in determining the intent tohinder, delay, or defraud creditors. 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., SenateProceedings, March 17, 1997, at 33.

While there is no specific interface between the two statutes,it is apparent that the amendment to section 12--112 of the Codewas gleaned, in part, from section 5 of the Fraudulent TransferAct. Under that section, a transfer made or obligation incurred bya debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor if the debtor made thetransfer or incurred the obligation with the intent to hinder,delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor. 740 ILCS 160/5(a)(1)(West 2000). We believe that the legislature similarly intendedthat we look to the debtor's intent in determining whether thedebtor transferred the property into tenancy by the entirety toescape judgment creditors. Our interpretation is consistent with the goal of protecting a judgment creditor's rights. Accordingly,we hold that the "sole intent" standard in section 12--112 appliesto the debtor, not the debtor's spouse.

Defendants assert that the court's analysis in the case ofPremier supports their argument. In Premier, the court found thatthe "sole intent" standard of section 12--112 requires that "ifproperty is transferred to tenancy by the entirety to place itbeyond the reach of the creditors of one spouse and to accomplishsome other legitimate purpose, the transfer is not avoidable." (Emphasis in original.) Premier, 191 Ill. 2d at 110. Defendantsinterpret this to mean that the focus must be on the intent of boththe debtor and his or her spouse. Otherwise, the court would nothave added the alternative legitimate reason. We find defendants'reliance on Premier to be misplaced.

In Premier, the court did not address whose intent the court should focus on in determining when a creditor may avoid a transferinto tenancy by the entirety under section 12--112. Rather, thecourt determined which statute should govern cases in which acreditor attempts to void a transfer into tenancy by the entirety. In reaching this conclusion, the court compared the "actual intent"standard set forth in section 5 of the Fraudulent Transfer Act withthe "sole intent" standard set forth under section 12--112 of theCode. Premier, 191 Ill. 2d at 110-11. By adopting the "soleintent" standard, the court found that the legislature made itclear that its aim was to provide spouses holding homesteadproperty in tenancy by the entirety with greater protection fromthe creditors of one spouse than that provided by the FraudulentTransfer Act's "actual intent" standard. The court thereforeconcluded that, in cases where property is transferred into tenancyby the entirety, a judgment creditor must challenge the transferunder section 12--112 of the Code and not section 5 of theFraudulent Transfer Act. Premier, 191 Ill. 2d at 109-111.

Defendants argue that, in adopting the "sole intent" standard,the legislature clearly intended to provide spouses holdinghomestead property in tenancy by the entirety with greaterprotection from the creditors of the other spouse, and therefore,as long as any legitimate purpose exists for the transfer, even ifit exists alongside a clear purpose to defraud a creditor, thetransfer should not be deemed avoidable. We agree that this is therule enunciated in Premier, but we limit its application by lookingonly to the sole intent of the debtor and not to the spouse indetermining whether a legitimate purpose exists for the transfer. While the trial court found Elaine's testimony regarding her lackof knowledge of the underlying judgment to be credible, we agreewith the trial court that the ignorance of one spouse should notshield a transfer made to avoid the payment of a legal obligation. Defendants' misinterpretation of the statute would allow thedebtor, however fraudulent his or her intent, to shield a transferof an asset behind an uninformed spouse. This could not be thelegislature's intent. Thus, if a legitimate purpose exists for thetransfer, then the debtor would not have the "sole intent" totransfer the property to place it beyond judgment creditors. Defendants next contend that the trial court erred in findingthat the sole intent of the transfer was to defraud creditors. Defendants argue that Richard legitimately wanted to protect theproperty against future creditors in general, not specifically fromplaintiff, and he was following "sound estate planning advice [he]received in 1997 and early 1998 from the family's lawyer." Thequestion of intent must be resolved by the trier of fact, which involves the weighing of evidence and the credibility of thewitnesses. Harris Bank, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 1081.

In a bench trial, the trial court must weigh the evidence andmake findings of fact. Where findings of fact depend on thecredibility of witnesses, a reviewing court will defer to thefindings of the trial court unless they are against the manifestweight of the evidence. Chicago Investment Corp. v. Dolins, 107Ill. 2d 120, 124 (1985). A decision is against the manifest weightof the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is apparent orwhen the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or notbased on the evidence. Rhodes v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 172Ill. 2d 213, 242 (1996). We will not substitute our judgment forthat of the trier of fact. Kalata v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 144 Ill.2d 425, 434 (1991).

Here, the evidence shows that, excluding the residentialproperty, Richard owned less than $4,000 of assets at the time hetransferred the property into tenancy by the entirety. Richardtestified that he made the transfer because he was advised to do soby a family attorney and a realtor some time around 1998 and hewanted to protect the estate and make the "transfer easier" uponhis death, since his assets were tied up in the business. Perhaps,as plaintiff points out, if Richard had owned his residenceindividually or as a tenant in common with Elaine, there may havebeen a legitimate reason to transfer the property to tenancy by theentirety other than to avoid a judgment debt. Similarly, thetransfer may not have been so suspect if Richard had completed itat a time when it would not have rendered him insolvent. We agreethat the reasons provided by Richard appear to be "vague,inarticulate," and "specious." Moreover, given that the transferwas made within days after we affirmed the judgment entered againsthim, we cannot say that the trial court's decision that thetransfer to tenancy by the entirety was made with the sole intentto avoid the payment of debts existing at the time of the transferwas against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Defendants last contend that the trial court had nojurisdiction to enter a judgment against Elaine's interest in theproperty because she was never properly joined as a partydefendant. Initially, we observe that Elaine failed to citeauthority in support of this argument. Such failure violatesSupreme Court Rule 341(e)(7), which governs appellate briefs. Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 21 (October 17, 2001), R.341(e)(7) eff. October 1, 2001. It is well settled that thefailure to cite authority in support of an argument waives theissue. Scoggin v. Rochelle Community Hospital, 176 Ill. App. 3d648, 650 (1988).

We note further that on February 6, 2001, plaintiff filed amotion for default in which it named Elaine as a party defendantfor the first time but did not request leave to add her as a partydefendant. Elaine never objected to plaintiff's failure toproperly join her as a party defendant. In fact, she entered anappearance on April 17, 2001, and participated in the hearingbefore the trial. Elaine did not object to plaintiff's failure toproperly join her as a party defendant until she filed a motion toreconsider the judgment. Generally, the requirement of priorservice of process is waived where a person participates in thecourt proceeding, thereby recognizing the case as being in court. In re Marriage of Gorman, 284 Ill. App. 3d 171, 178 (1996). Regardless, Elaine was clearly aware of the proceedings thatultimately affected her property. She cannot at trial assert aninterest in the property and on appeal claim that the court had nojurisdiction to enter the order. See In re Marriage of Verdung,126 Ill. 2d 542, 552 (1989).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of thecircuit court of Du Page County.

Affirmed.

GROMETER and KAPALA, JJ., concur.