PRESIDING JUSTICE O'MALLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, LP XXVI, LLC, appeals the order of the circuit court of Lake County grantingdefendant Michael Goldstein's motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2--619 of the Code of CivilProcedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2--619 (West 2002)). Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred infinding that plaintiff's complaint seeking to recover about $74,000 in a deficiency judgment againstdefendant was barred by res judicata. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

On June 11, 1999, defendant and certain nonparties to this cause executed a promissory noteto plaintiff's predecessor in interest in the principal amount of $1,050,000, which was secured by amortgage on certain real property. In addition, defendant executed a personal "CommercialGuaranty," which provided:

"[Defendant] also waives any and all rights or defenses arising out of (a) any 'one action' or'anti-deficiency' law or any other law which may prevent [plaintiff] from bringing any action,including a claim for deficiency, against [defendant], before or after [plaintiff's]commencement or completion of any foreclosure action ***; or (f) any defenses given toguarantors at law or in equity other than actual payment and performance of theindebtedness."

After the execution of the note, mortgage, and guaranty, the primary obligors on the notedefaulted and, on November 13, 2001, plaintiff's predecessor in interest filed suit (in Cook County)to foreclose upon the mortgage. The property was eventually liquidated at a sheriff's sale, after whichthe circuit court of Cook County approved the sale, leaving a deficiency of just over $74,000. Plaintiff's predecessor in interest thereafter obtained an in rem deficiency judgment in the amount ofthe deficiency. On February 11, 2003, plaintiff was assigned all interests in the note, the guaranty,and the deficiency judgment.

On July 9, 2003, plaintiff filed the instant action against defendant based on the "CommercialGuaranty" of the note. Pursuant to section 2--619 of the Code, defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff'scomplaint, arguing that plaintiff was barred from maintaining this action under the doctrine of resjudicata or election of remedies. The trial court granted defendant's motion and dismissed thecomplaint. Plaintiff timely appeals.

On appeal, plaintiff contends that, by executing the guaranty, defendant waived his defenses,including res judicata and election of remedies, to plaintiff's attempt to collect the deficiencyjudgment. In addition, plaintiff contends that res judicata does not apply to this cause, as it is an inpersonam contract action on the guaranty executed by defendant, whereas the foreclosure action wasa different cause of action. As we find the arguments regarding res judicata to be dispositive, we turnto this issue first.

Before delving into the substance of plaintiff's contentions, we note that a section 2--619motion to dismiss a cause or a claim admits the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's allegations, butasserts the existence of an affirmative matter sufficient to defeat or avoid the claim presented. Minerv. Fashion Enterprises, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 3d 405, 413 (2003). The purpose of section 2--619 is toallow the litigants to dispose of easily proved factual issues and issues of law during the early stagesof a case. Miner, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 413. Because of this purpose, the questions on appeal aresimilar to those presented in a summary judgment, namely, whether a genuine issue of material factexists and whether the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Miner, 342 Ill. App. 3dat 413. We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to section 2--619 of the Code. Miner, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 413.

Section 2--619(a)(4) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2--619(a)(4) (West 2002)) incorporates thedoctrine of res judicata and allows a trial court to dismiss an action on the grounds that it is barredby a previous judgment. Marvel of Illinois, Inc. v. Marvel Contaminant Control Industries, Inc., 318Ill. App. 3d 856, 863 (2001). The essential elements that need be satisfied in order to invoke thedoctrine of res judicata are "(1) a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competentjurisdiction; (2) an identity of cause of action; and (3) an identity of parties or their privies." Marvelof Illinois, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 863. It is only where all three elements are satisfied that the prioraction will be "conclusive as to all issues that were, or properly might have been, raised in thataction." Marvel of Illinois, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 863.

In determining whether there is an identity of the cause of action, Illinois now adheres to thetransactional test (as distinguished from the same-evidence test). River Park, Inc. v. City of HighlandPark, 184 Ill. 2d 290, 310 (1998). When analyzed pursuant to the transactional test, "separate claimswill be considered the same cause of action for purposes of res judicata if they arise from a singlegroup of operative facts, regardless of whether they assert different theories of relief." River Park,184 Ill. 2d at 311. Thus, under the transactional test, so long as the claims arise from the sametransaction, they will be considered to be the same cause of action, even if there is not a substantialoverlap of evidence between the claims. River Park, 184 Ill. 2d at 311.

Here, defendant focuses on the Cook County action, noting that, while it was a foreclosureon the property that was mortgaged to secure the $1,050,000 promissory note, defendant was madea party to the suit. As such, defendant contends that the current action on the guaranty was one thatcould have been raised in the Cook County action. As a result, defendant concludes that, becausethe instant claim could have been raised in the Cook County action, the principle of res judicatashould bar it being raised in this separate suit. Plaintiff, by contrast, focuses on the gravamen of eachclaim in order to demonstrate that they do not constitute the same cause of action. Plaintiff notes thata mortgage foreclosure is an in rem proceeding that operates directly on the property and binds therights of all persons who hold ownership of lien interests in the property. Plaintiff's action againstdefendant, on the other hand, is an in personam action to adjudicate defendant's liability under the"Commercial Guaranty." Plaintiff concludes that, while the mortgage and the guaranty may berelated, they are sufficiently distinct to support separate causes of action.

At first blush, a transactional analysis may appear to lead to the conclusion that the action onthe guaranty is the same cause of action as the mortgage foreclosure, because the note, mortgage,and guaranty were all executed concurrently and, apparently, as components of a related deal. Sucha result, however, overlooks the practical aspects of the interrelated transactions comprising theexecution of the note, mortgage, and guaranty, as well as long-settled precedent, and reduces thetransactional analysis to the most cursory and formalistic level. The note was executed to providecapital, the mortgage to secure the note. Defendant personally provided the guaranty in order toassure the lender that any shortfall in the security provided by the mortgaged property would be madegood. While the three transactions are related, we do not believe that their mere proximity in timeand the overlap of some of the parties render them a single transaction, especially in light of thepurpose of each of the transactions.

As plaintiff correctly notes, the Cook County mortgage foreclosure action was an action inrem that adjudicated only the rights and interests in the property that was the subject of the mortgage. See Killebrew v. Killebrew, 398 Ill. 432, 437 (1947) (judgment in rem "operates directly uponproperty and is binding upon all persons in so far as their interest in the property is concerned"). TheCook County action did not encompass the guaranty. Further, defendant's rights under the guarantywere not placed in issue or adjudicated. This action, by contrast, is an in personam action againstdefendant to adjudicate his liability under the "Commercial Guaranty"; nothing in this action touchesupon the subject matter of the Cook County action, namely, the property that was the subject of themortgage foreclosure. As such, this action is separate and distinct from the Cook County action, andthe principle of res judicata is inapplicable to the facts of this case.

This view is supported by well-settled precedent. Because a mortgage and an accompanyingpromissory note securing the mortgage constitute separate contracts, they give rise to legally distinctremedies that cannot be pursued in a single-count foreclosure suit. Hickey v. Union National Bank& Trust Co. of Joliet, 190 Ill. App. 3d 186, 190 (1989). Here, the same logic obtains with greaterforce: the guaranty is a third contract, which is the subject of this action. If the note accompanyinga mortgage that is being foreclosed cannot be used as a basis for relief in a single-count foreclosureaction, then the guaranty accompanying the mortgage and note likewise cannot be used as a basis forrelief in a single-count foreclosure action.

It is also settled that, upon default, the mortgagee is allowed to choose whether to proceedon the note or guaranty or to foreclose upon the mortgage. "These remedies may be pursuedconsecutively or concurrently." Farmer City State Bank v. Champaign National Bank, 138 Ill. App.3d 847, 852 (1985). Here, foreclosure on the mortgage was chosen as the first action; thereafter,plaintiff was entitled to proceed upon the guaranty. Farmer City, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 852.

More specifically, a mortgage foreclosure expressly has been held not to bar a subsequent suiton a guaranty. In Citicorp Savings of Illinois v. Ascher, 196 Ill. App. 3d 570, 574 (1990), the courtheld that a judgment of foreclosure did not adjudicate the defendant's rights and liabilities under aguaranty contract, and, therefore, the doctrine of res judicata did not apply. Likewise, in Du QuoinState Bank v. Daulby, 115 Ill. App. 3d 183, 186 (1983), the court held that a previous foreclosuredid not settle the defendant's liability stemming from a personal guaranty. These cases illustrate thata suit on a personal guaranty is expressly allowed where a previous mortgage foreclosure and saleresulted in a deficiency. In such a situation, res judicata will not bar the subsequent suit on theguaranty contract.

Defendant attempts to distinguish the cases cited above, arguing that there the action on theguaranty was brought in the same proceeding as the foreclosure action. This, defendant asserts, isthe "appropriate way to pursue the claims." Significantly, however, defendant does not offer, and ourresearch has not uncovered, any authority stating that the failure to pursue an action on a guarantycontract concurrently with a foreclosure action will result in a later attempt to pursue the action onthe guaranty contract being deemed to be barred by res judicata. In fact, the Farmer City courtexplicitly stated that "[t]hese remedies may be pursued consecutively or concurrently." Farmer City,138 Ill. App. 3d at 852. Accordingly, we reject defendant's argument.

Defendant also asserts that res judicata should apply here, because the action on the guarantycould have been raised in the Cook County foreclosure action. We disagree. Properly considered,Citicorp, Farmer City, and Du Quoin hold that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to notesand guaranties accompanying mortgages. See, e.g., Citicorp, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 574; Farmer City,138 Ill. App. 3d at 852; Du Quoin, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 186. Thus, defendant's contention isimmaterial and we reject it.

Because of our resolution of this issue, we need not address plaintiff's arguments concerningwhether defendant contractually waived his ability to claim res judicata as a defense to plaintiff'saction on the "Commercial Guaranty." For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit courtof Lake County is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with thisopinion.

Reversed and remanded.

BOWMAN and KAPALA, JJ., concur.