JUSTICE CALLUM delivered the opinion of the court:

In July 2000, plaintiff, Michelle A. Magee, filed a smallclaims complaint against defendant, Janice M. Garreau, seeking$3,500 in damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accidenton July 27, 1999. The complaint alleged that defendant's vehiclerear-ended plaintiff's vehicle. Plaintiff's amended complaintsought over $5,000 in damages. Plaintiff and defendant were eachrepresented by counsel at the arbitration hearing on January 9,2001. The arbitration panel awarded plaintiff $3,500 plus costs,and the award was filed with the clerk of the circuit court onJanuary 16, 2001. The parties were notified that they had 30 daysfrom that date to reject the award or judgment would be enteredon the award. The matter was set for the entry of judgment onFebruary 21, 2001, at 1:30 p.m. On that date, the trial courtentered judgment for plaintiff.

On March 22, 2001, defendant, through counsel, Brian Russell,of the law firm of Parrillo, Weiss & O'Halloran (Parrillo), filedan undesignated "Motion" (the Motion) seeking to vacate thejudgment entered on February 21 and seeking to enforce asettlement in the amount of $2,100 alleged to have been reachedby the parties on February 5, 2001. On April 4, 2001, the trialcourt found "no legal basis" for defendant's Motion and denied it. Defendant appeals, arguing that there was an enforceablesettlement agreement; that defendant complied with its terms anddid not materially breach the agreement; and that the agreementshould be enforced. Alternatively, defendant seeks a remand forfurther proceedings. We affirm.

Defendant's unverified Motion alleged that, on February 5,2001, the parties reached a settlement wherein defendant "agreedto tender a draft for $2,100 on the award call date in exchangefor an executed release and a dismissal with prejudice of thematter"; that defendant's counsel sent plaintiff's counsel aletter confirming the settlement and asked plaintiff's counsel toinform him if the described settlement did not conform with hisunderstanding; and that defendant's counsel never heard fromplaintiff's counsel that this was not his understanding.

The Motion further alleged that, on February 21, 2001, thematter came before the court for the award call and defendant'scounsel tendered plaintiff's counsel a draft for $2,100. However,plaintiff's counsel refused the tender, and the court enteredjudgment on the arbitration award. The Motion alleged thatplaintiff's counsel indicated that he would not accept the draftbecause it included as payee a lienholder he was unaware of. TheMotion concluded that defendant was now "severely prejudiced" andwas facing a judgment for $1,400 more than the agreed settlementand an order requiring the payment of costs. The Motion prayedfor a vacatur of the February 21 order and an extension of timefor filing a rejection, or a vacatur of the order and an orderenforcing the alleged settlement, or an order allowing defendantto tender to the clerk of the court the $2,100 draft in exchangefor an order fully satisfying the February 21 judgment and fullyreleasing defendant.

Russell's affidavit supporting defendant's Motion stated thatthe settlement was reached with plaintiff's counsel, James Magee,on February 5, 2001; that the settlement consisted of defendanttendering a draft for $2,100 on the "award call" date in exchangefor a full release of defendant and a dismissal with prejudice;and that no discussion of liens took place. Magee would not agreeto send Russell a release and dismissal in advance of the awardcall date. Russell sent Magee a letter on February 6, 2001,confirming the agreement and asked him to notify Russell if thisagreement was not his understanding. Russell's affidavit furtherstated he "never received any notification that he [Magee] did notunderstand the agreement to be stated above."

The affidavit of Marny Berridge stated that Berridge was anattorney who appeared for defendant at the February 21 award call;that on that date she tendered a draft to plaintiff's counsel for$2,100; and that the tender of the draft was refused byplaintiff's counsel because the draft included a lienholder aspayee.

Plaintiff moved to strike or otherwise deny the Motion. Plaintiff argued that the Motion was not a true 30-day posttrialmotion pursuant to section 2--1203 of the Code of Civil Procedure(735 ILCS 5/2--1203 (West 2000)). Section 2--1203 provides that,in a nonjury case, within 30 days after the entry of judgment, aparty may file a motion for a rehearing, a retrial, a modificationof the judgment, a vacatur of the judgment, or other relief. 735ILCS 5/2--1203 (West 2000)). To be valid and to extend the timefor appeal, such a motion must be directed against the judgmentand must contain specific grounds warranting relief such asreconsideration or vacatur. Robertson v. Winnebago County ForestPreserve District, 301 Ill. App. 3d 520, 522-26 (1998).

In her motion, plaintiff argued that defendant's Motion didnot state any grounds for relief from the judgment; that theMotion on its face indicated that defendant did not tender paymentpursuant to the agreement; and that the appropriate procedurewould have been to reject the judgment pending settlement. Plaintiff further stated that the Motion improperly asserted theexistence of a settlement that was not performed; that the alleged settlementprovided for payment to plaintiff no later than February 21 at1:30 p.m.; and that the tender was made after that time and in aform payable to plaintiff and a third party and was not negotiableby plaintiff.

Magee's affidavit stated that, before arbitration, herepeatedly sought a settlement offer from defendant and no offerwas ever made; that defendant's attorney advised that a settlementwould not be considered until after the arbitration decision wasannounced; and that Russell first offered a settlement of $2,100on February 1. On or about February 5, 2001, Magee informedRussell that the offer would be accepted if full payment wasactually received before February 16. Russell advised that hecould not assure payment before that date. Magee advised Russellthat Magee's perception was that defendant's insurance carrier waslikely to delay or otherwise frustrate payment; that anysettlement would be absolutely conditioned upon full, prompt, andunconditional payment presented in the amount of $2,100 no laterthan 1:30 p.m. on February 21; that the tender must be made inadvance of the issuance of any dismissal or release; and that anydelay or contingency would mean there was no settlement. Theaffidavit incorporated "true" copies of Russell's letter ofFebruary 6 and Magee's letter of February 13.

According to Magee's affidavit, at 1:40 p.m. on February 21,he received from Berridge the tender of a check for $2,100 payableto plaintiff and Humana. Magee advised Berridge that the tenderwas technically late and included a payee not previously agreedto. Magee noted that the check was dated February 13, 2001. UponMagee's inquiry, Berridge advised that she did not know when thecheck was received but that Magee must accept the check aspresented because of a subrogation claim by Humana. Magee advisedBerridge that he was not aware of a subrogation claim; that therewas no agreement to accept a check subject to such claims; thatthis made it impossible to determine the value of the settlement;and that the form of the check meant that any actual payment wouldbe delayed. Magee advised Berridge that the tender did not conform with the conditional settlement agreement, was notimmediately negotiable in the form presented, and was rejected.

Russell's letter of February 6 to Magee stated:

"This letter is to confirm our settlement of this matter for$2,100. Pursuant to our agreement we will exchange the draftfor an executed release on February 21, 2001 at the awardcall date. At that time we will also dismiss this matterwith prejudice. If this letter does not conform with yourunderstanding please inform me immediately."

Magee's letter of February 13 to Russell stated:

"I write to confirm that we have agreed to acceptsettlement in the amount of $2,100.00 if paid no later thanFebruary 21, 2001 at 1:30 P.M. [the court status call]. Ifpayment is made by then, we will dismiss the case; if payment is not made by then, we have no agreement. If any questions exist, please call."

The terse bystander's report of proceedings merely statesthat the cause came before the court on April 4, 2001, ondefendant's Motion to vacate the judgment. The court heard thearguments of counsel but did not take evidence. The respectiveparties made the same arguments set forth in the Motion and theresponse, and the court denied the Motion. A supplement to thebystander's report states that, although no evidentiary hearingwas held, the parties agreed that both would testify as set outin their respective affidavits. The court further found that theMotion stated no appropriate grounds for relief as to the meritsof the judgment or to compel settlement.

In response to defendant's arguments on appeal, plaintifffirst argues that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider thejudgment on the award because no valid posttrial motion was filedthat effectuated an extension of time to file a notice of appeal.The nature of defendant's Motion is unclear. It is inartfullydrafted and fails to state the legal authority, rule, or statuteunder which it was brought. It is doubtful that it satisfies theusual requirements of a motion to vacate the judgment undersection 2--1203 of the Code. Such a 30-day postjudgment motionmust be directed against the judgment and must be based onspecific grounds that would provide a form of relief availableunder section 2--1203. The Motion did not allege that the trialcourt's judgment was in error. See Robertson, 301 Ill. App. 3dat 524-26. We need not decide whether the Motion was an impropermotion to vacate as there was another legal basis for the Motion,as we shall explain.

However, we first point out that there is but one procedurefor challenging an award entered in a mandatory arbitrationproceeding: a party must file a timely notice of rejection of theaward and request a trial. As a limited exception, a party whofails to appear at the arbitration hearing may file a petition tovacate the judgment pursuant to sections 2--1301 and 2--1401 ofthe Code (735 ILCS 5/2--1301, 2--1401 (West 2000); 145 Ill. 2d R.91(a); Mrugala v. Fairfield Ford, Inc., 325 Ill. App. 3d 484, 490(2001)). The role of the circuit court in such a proceeding islimited, and, once the arbitration panel has made its award, theaward is deemed an all-or-nothing proposition and the parties mustaccept or reject the award in its entirety. If none of theparties files a notice of rejection of the award and requests toproceed to trial within the time specified, the circuit court hasno real function beyond entering judgment on the award. Althoughthe court can correct an obvious and unambiguous error inmathematics or language, it cannot modify the substantiveprovisions of the award. Mrugala, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 492; 155Ill. 2d R. 92. In this case, the court had no choice but to enterjudgment on the award.

In response to plaintiff's jurisdictional argument, defendantasserts that there was a legal basis for the Motion because aparty may file a motion to enforce a settlement agreement withina lawsuit. Defendant cites, for example, Kim v. Alvey, Inc., 322Ill. App. 3d 657 (2001). In Kim, the filing of such a motion wasproper because it could be deemed a supplementary or anenforcement proceeding to satisfy the judgment rather than tomodify or vacate it. Kim, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 666-67. Undoubtedly, the trial court in the present case could havebenefitted from a clearer articulation of the legal basis for theMotion. In any case, it appears that a motion to enforce asettlement agreement can be made within 30 days of the entry ofthe judgment while the trial court still retains jurisdiction ofthe cause.

In Brewer v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 165 Ill. 2d 100(1995), a nonarbitration case, the trial court held a pretrialsettlement conference and the parties' attorneys reached asettlement agreement. As a result, the trial court dismissed thelawsuit with prejudice; the order incorporated the defendant'sagreement to pay the plaintiff. Within 9 days of the order, thedefendant moved to enforce its version of the agreement, andwithin 29 days of the order the plaintiff timely moved to vacatethe dismissal order. The trial court denied the plaintiff'smotion to vacate and granted the defendant's motion to enforce thesettlement agreement. In a subsequent appeal, the supreme courtnoted that a trial court retains jurisdiction over a cause for 30days after the entry of a final order or judgment and that theplaintiff's timely section 2--1203 motion properly brought beforethe trial court the issue of the validity of the settlementagreement. The Brewer court noted that a trial court has thepower to enforce a settlement agreement while the suit is stillpending before the court; the supreme court held that the trialcourt retained jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. Brewer, 165Ill. 2d at 105. To the extent that defendant asserts that herMotion was in the nature of a supplementary or enforcementproceeding to satisfy the judgment while the trial court stillretained jurisdiction, we consider whether the Motion presented a meritorious claim toenforce the alleged settlement agreement. We conclude that it didnot.

Defendant argues that this court should review the issue ofthe purported agreement de novo. Defendant relies on Solar v.Weinberg, 274 Ill. App. 3d 726, 731 (1995), which states that,in the absence of any material question of fact, the constructionof a contract and its legal effect present questions of law thatmay be independently determined by the reviewing courtunrestrained by the trial court's judgment. Defendant notesthat the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing andasserts that an error of law and a question whether a pleadingfails to state a cause of action are reviewable de novo. Weagree. Here, as in the trial court, defendant relies on theaffidavits, exhibits, and matters of record, at least to theextent that they might support her position. Defendant did notrequest an evidentiary hearing. Thus, such a hearing was waivedwhere the court relied on the pleadings, affidavits, and othermatters of record. See Kellett v. Roberts, 276 Ill. App. 3d 164,175 (1995); Smith v. Cole, 256 Ill. App. 3d 806, 810 (1993). Furthermore, where, as here, there are no questions as to thefacts essential to a purported contract, the existence of thecontract is a question of law. Ogle v. Hotto, 273 Ill. App. 3d313, 320 (1995). Defendant, as movant, had the burden of proofto show that she was entitled to the relief requested. See Brightv. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 210 (1995).

Defendant begins with the assumption that there was anenforceable settlement agreement, but defendant failed toestablish by clear, specific analysis, both here and in the trialcourt, that all of the elements of a valid contract were met. Asettlement agreement is binding only if there is an offer, anacceptance, and a meeting of the minds as to the terms of thesettlement. Sementa v. Tylman, 230 Ill. App. 3d 701, 705 (1992). The acceptance must comply strictly with the terms of the offer. An acceptance requesting modification or containing terms thatvary from those offered constitutes a rejection of the originaloffer and becomes a counterproposal that must be accepted by theoriginal offeror before a valid contract is formed. Hills ofPalos Condominium Ass'n v. I-Del, Inc., 255 Ill. App. 3d 448, 477(1993).

Russell's letter to Magee manifested an offer to settle thatinvited response. Magee's response, as stated both in hisaffidavit and in his letter, was that he agreed to accept thesettlement in the amount of $2,100 if paid no later than February21, at 1:30 p.m. The letter clearly stated that, "if payment isnot made by then, we have no agreement." A careful examinationof Russell's terse affidavit shows that it did not directlycontradict Magee's. Defendant attempts to "spin" the facts inher brief by denying receipt of Magee's letter wherein Mageedemanded payment by 1:30 p.m. There is no direct support in therecord for such a denial. In his highly qualified statement inhis affidavit, Russell merely stated that he "never received anynotification that he [Magee] did not understand the agreement tobe stated above." This is not the same as saying that he neverreceived any letter at all. In any case, defendant failed toestablish this specific fact in the trial court and cannot createa disputed question of fact merely by stating unfounded facts inher brief. We have absolutely no reason to question the veracityof Magee's affidavit, which incorporated his letter,notwithstanding defendant's innuendos.

Defendant also claims that nothing in Magee's letter indicates that a payment after 1:30 p.m. was untimely. However,the letter clearly and unequivocally made payment at that time anessential condition precedent to the existence of an agreement. This condition is also stated in Magee's affidavit.

Defendant also introduced new terms into the purportedagreement by adding an unknown third-party payee lienholder. Yet,the issue of liens, by Russell's own admission in his affidavit,was never discussed. It is clear from the undisputed facts thatthere was no meeting of the minds to support the formation of anenforceable contract. The trial court properly denied theMotion.

A similar result was reached in Poole v. Mosley, 307 Ill.App. 3d 625 (1999). Poole was an arbitration case arising froma vehicular collision. Defendant was represented by the Parrillolaw firm. A judgment for $7,000 was entered for plaintiff on thearbitration award. Defendant moved unsuccessfully to set asidethe judgment based on a purported settlement agreement. Onappeal, the reviewing court held that the judgment on the awardwas not subject to vacatur even though defendant contended thatthe parties had entered into a settlement agreement after theaward was entered but before the entry of judgment. Based on theparties' affidavits filed in the trial court following the entryof judgment on the award, the reviewing court concluded that theparties disagreed as to a material "factor" so that there was noenforceable agreement.

In Poole, plaintiff's counsel believed that he was to receivea $7,000 draft no later than September 25, 1998, seven days afterdefendant received an executed release, but defense counselbelieved that payment was not required until after a dismissalorder had been entered. According to plaintiff's counsel,defense counsel first mentioned the need for a dismissal order onthe eve of the entry of judgment even though there had been noprior discussion that payment would be conditioned on the entryof a dismissal order. The reviewing court noted that defensecounsel's inaction in ignoring plaintiff's counsel's inquiriesuntil late in the business day preceding the entry of judgmentforced plaintiff's counsel to protect his client's interest byseeking the entry of judgment. The reviewing court affirmed thedenial of defendant's motion.

Finally, plaintiff contends that this appeal is frivolous andrequests this court to impose sanctions, in the form of attorneyfees, against defense counsel pursuant to Supreme Court Rule375(b) (155 Ill. 2d R. 375(b)). Plaintiff argues that the primarypurpose of the appeal is to delay, harass, or cause needlessexpense and that defendant has failed to consider this court'sjurisdiction or to present sufficient argument on the merits. Weagree.

Under Rule 375(b), a reviewing court may sanction a party foran appeal that is frivolous or is taken for an improper purpose. An appeal is frivolous if it is not reasonably well grounded infact and is not warranted by existing law or a good-faith argumentto extend, modify, or reverse existing law, or if a reasonable andprudent attorney would not have taken the appeal. An appeal istaken for an improper purpose if it is designed to delay, harass,or cause needless expense. Belfour v. Schaumburg Auto, 306 Ill.App. 3d 234, 244 (1999).

Beyond the salient jurisdictional concerns, this appeal isutterly without merit. Defense counsel argued that the partieshad an enforceable settlement agreement when the undisputed factsclearly revealed no meeting of the minds. Furthermore, in anattempt to manufacture some inkling of merit, counsel tookliberties with the facts that bordered on outrightmisrepresentations. We have no choice but to conclude that thisappeal is frivolous and was taken for an improper purpose.

Thus, we direct plaintiff to submit within 14 days anaffidavit and detailed statement of reasonable expenses andattorney fees incurred as a result of defending this appeal. Parrillo will have 14 days thereafter to respond to thereasonableness of the expenses and fees. We then will file anorder determining the amount of the sanction to be imposed onParrillo. See Belfour, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 245.

For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuitcourt of Lake County, and we impose sanctions against Parrillounder Supreme Court Rule 375(b).

Affirmed; sanctions imposed.

GEIGER and O'MALLEY, JJ., concur.