June 15, 2001

JUSTICE RAPP delivered the opinion of the court:

Petitioner, Victoria M. Matson, filed a charge of handicapdiscrimination with respondent Illinois Department of Human Rights(the Department) against her employer, respondent Ameritech. TheDepartment issued a notice of dismissal with respect to five ofpetitioner's nine counts, finding a lack of substantial evidence. At the same time, the Department issued a notice of substantialevidence with respect to petitioner's four other counts. The chieflegal counsel of the Department affirmed the dismissal of the fivecounts, and petitioner seeks review of that order. On appeal,petitioner contends (1) that the dismissal of petitioner's claimswas against the manifest weight of the evidence, arbitrary andcapricious, and included abuses of discretion; and (2) that theDepartment's policies and procedures violated petitioner's dueprocess rights. For the reasons set forth below, we dismiss theappeal.

In her discrimination charge filed with the Department onMarch 4, 1998, petitioner alleged that she was handicapped withinthe meaning of section 1--103(I) of the Illinois Human Rights Act(the Act) (775 ILCS 5/1--103(I) (West 1998)) due to trigeminalneuralgia, a painful nerve disorder. Petitioner alleged that heremployer, Ameritech, discriminated against her due to her handicapin the following ways: (A) removed her from the position ofmarketing support specialist (MSS); (B) failed to promote her tothe position of MSS; (C) denied her formal training for the MSSposition; (D) harassed her; (E) applied unequal terms of employmentto her; (F) failed to accommodate her handicap by denying herintermittent family and medical leave status; (G) denied her a dayoff due to serious distress; (H) denied her sick pay; and (I)failed to accommodate her handicap by granting her a late startingtime. Ameritech filed a verified response to petitioner's charge,denying the allegations of handicap discrimination.

The Department investigated petitioner's charge, and theinvestigator submitted a report to the Director of the Department. Based on the investigator's report, the Director filed a notice ofsubstantial evidence as to counts B, D, E, and I. The Directoralso filed a notice of dismissal of counts A, C, F, G, and H due toa lack of substantial evidence. On December 22, 1999, petitionerfiled a request for review of the Director's dismissal of counts A,C, F, G, and H by the chief legal counsel (775 ILCS 5/7--101.1(West 1998)). On February 15, 2000, the Department filed a formalcomplaint with the Illinois Human Rights Commission (Commission),alleging counts B, D, E, and I.

On July 17, 2000, the chief legal counsel sustained theDepartment's dismissal of counts A, C, F, G, and H. Petitionerfiled a timely petition for direct review of the chief counsel'sorder (775 ILCS 5/8--111(A)(1) (West 1998)).

The Act provides a comprehensive scheme to "secure for allindividuals within Illinois the freedom from discrimination ***because of *** race, color, religion, sex, national origin,ancestry, age, marital status, physical or mental handicap,military status, or unfavorable discharge from military service inconnection with employment, real estate transactions, access tofinancial credit, and the availability of public accommodations." 775 ILCS 5/1--102(A) (West 1998). The Act creates a uniformprocedure for the enforcement of its substantive provisions. Bakerv. Miller, 159 Ill. 2d 249, 254 (1994). A brief review of theinitial stages of the administrative process is relevant.

First, the complainant files a charge of discrimination withthe Department. 775 ILCS 5/7A--102(A)(1) (West 1998). Next, theDepartment conducts a full investigation of the allegations setforth in the charge. 775 ILCS 5/7A--102(C)(1) (West 1998). Oncethe investigation is complete, the Department investigator submitsa written report to the Department Director. 775 ILCS 5/7A--102(D)(1) (West 1998). Based on the report, the Directordetermines whether there is "substantial evidence" that a civilrights violation has been committed. 775 ILCS 5/7A--102(D)(2)(West 1998).

If the Director finds substantial evidence of a violation, theDepartment attempts to conciliate the charge. 775 ILCS 5/7A--102(D)(2)(b) (West 1998). If that attempt fails, the Departmentfiles a formal complaint with the Commission, where the claim isadjudicated before an administrative law judge in a formal hearing. 775 ILCS 5/7A--102(F)(1), (F)(2) (West 1998). On the other hand,if the Director finds no substantial evidence, and thereforedismisses the charge, the complainant may file a request for reviewby the Department's chief legal counsel. 775 ILCS 5/7--101.1 (West1998).

When this appeal was originally briefed, petitioner assertedthat this court had jurisdiction to review the order of the chieflegal counsel pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 335 (155 Ill. 2d R.335) and section 8--111(A)(1) of the Act (775 ILCS 5/8--111(A)(1)(West 1998)). Ameritech and the Department did not dispute thiscourt's jurisdiction.

The order appealed from dismissed some but not all ofpetitioner's claims. The claims that were not dismissed were filedwith the Commission. In light of our duty to dismiss an appealwhere jurisdiction is lacking (see Sho-Deen, Inc. v. Michel, 263Ill. App. 3d 288, 290 (1994)), we ordered the parties to brief theissue of whether Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a))applies to this appeal and, if so, whether this court hasjurisdiction to review the chief legal counsel's order. This is anissue of first impression in this state. Petitioner and theDepartment argue that Rule 304(a) is inapplicable to this appealand therefore this court has jurisdiction to review the chief legalcounsel's order. Ameritech argues that Rule 304(a) applies andtherefore jurisdiction is lacking. We agree with Ameritech.

Section 7--101.1 of the Act provides in pertinent part, "Anyfinal order entered by the Chief Legal Counsel under this Sectionis appealable in accordance with paragraph (A)(1) of Section8--111." 775 ILCS 5/7--101.1 (West 1998). Section 8-111(A)(1) ofthe Act states:

"Any complainant or respondent may apply for and obtainjudicial review of any final order entered under this Act byfiling a petition for review in the Appellate Court within 35days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to bereviewed was served upon the party affected by the decision." 775 ILCS 5/8--111(a)(1) (West 1998).

A decision of the chief legal counsel sustaining a dismissalof a complaint under section 7--101.1(A) is a final order. Kalushv. Department of Human Rights Chief Legal Counsel, 298 Ill. App. 3d980, 988-89 (1998). Accordingly, the order appealed from in thiscase is a final administrative order with respect to the fivedismissed counts. However, the Director concluded that there issubstantial evidence to support the other four counts.

Supreme Court Rule 335 (155 Ill. 2d R. 335) establishes theprocedures for the direct review of orders of an administrativeagency by the appellate court. Rule 335(i)(1) specificallyprovides that "Insofar as appropriate, the provisions of Rules 301through 373 (except for Rule 326) are applicable to proceedingsunder this rule." 155 Ill. 2d R. 335(i)(1).

Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) governsappeals from final judgments that do not dispose of the entireproceeding and is intended to permit an appeal to be taken beforethe final disposition of the case only where the circuit courtconsiders an immediate appeal appropriate. Seef v. IngallsMemorial Hospital, 311 Ill. App. 3d 7, 14 (1999). Rule 304(a)provides, in relevant part:

"If *** multiple claims for relief are involved in anaction, an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to oneor more but fewer than all of the *** claims only if the trialcourt has made an express written finding that there is nojust reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both.*** In the absence of such a finding, any judgment thatadjudicates fewer than all the claims * * * is not enforceableor appealable and is subject to revision at any time beforethe entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights,and liabilities of all the parties." 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a).

The supreme court rules are applicable to proceedings in thecircuit courts of this state. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 1. Our supremecourt has also decided that, "insofar as appropriate," theprovisions of Rule 304 are applicable to appeals fromadministrative agencies. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 335(i)(1).

Petitioner argues that it is not appropriate to incorporateRule 304(a) into Rule 335, as the chief legal counsel does notoperate in a manner similar to the circuit courts. Morespecifically, petitioner claims that the Department does not act asan adjudicatory body because the Department and the chief legalcounsel do not resolve credibility issues or questions of fact. See Marinelli v. Human Rights Comm'n, 262 Ill. App. 3d 247, 253(1994).

We do not believe the fact that the chief legal counsel actsin a nonadjudicatory capacity precludes the application of Rule304(a) to orders of the chief legal counsel that dismiss some butnot all of a petitioner's claims of discrimination. Rule 304(a)applies when claims are dismissed solely on a legal basis. Forexample, a circuit court that dismisses some but not all of theclaims in a multicount complaint pursuant to section 2--615 of theCode of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2--615 (West 1998)) does notresolve credibility issues or questions of fact, because a section2--615 motion admits the truth of the factual allegations in thecomplaint. Provenzale v. Forister, 318 Ill. App. 3d 869, 878(2001). However, in such a case, the circuit court must find "nojust reason to delay appeal" before the appellate court hasjurisdiction to review the order dismissing some but not all of theclaims. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a).

The Department argues that it is not appropriate to apply Rule304(a) to this appeal because the chief legal counsel's order wasnot "a judgment as to fewer than all of the claims" where only thedecision dismissing five of petitioner's nine counts was before thechief legal counsel. We reject this argument.

Once again, an analogy to a circuit court ruling on a motionto dismiss is instructive. Where a motion to dismiss seeks thedismissal of some but not all of the counts in a complaint, thecircuit court, in ruling on that motion, has before it only some ofthe counts in the complaint. In this situation, the appellatecourt does not have jurisdiction to review the judgment grantingthat motion without a Rule 304(a) finding by the circuit court. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a).

Rule 304(a) prevents piecemeal appeals involving fewer thanall of the parties or claims, which are to be discouraged. SeeWaters v. Reingold, 278 Ill. App. 3d 647, 656 (1996). It isappropriate to allow an appeal where the entire proceeding has notbeen disposed of when the appeal would have the effect ofexpediting the resolution of the controversy, would be fair to theparties, and would conserve judicial resources. Schal Bovis, Inc.v. Casualty Insurance Co., 314 Ill. App. 3d 562, 570 (1999).Whether to grant Rule 304(a) relief is a matter within the sounddiscretion of the trial court. Schal Bovis, 314 Ill. App. 3d at570.

We believe that avoiding piecemeal appeals is just asimportant when the appeal is from an order of the chief legalcounsel under the Act as it is when the appeal is from an order ofthe circuit court. Therefore, we hold that Rule 304(a) applies tothe order from which this appeal is taken.

The Department stresses the fact that the Department and theCommission are separate administrative agencies with distinctduties and powers and that the chief legal counsel's order was aseparate and final administrative decision as to the Department. This fact does not change our conclusion. While it is true thatthe Department and the Commission are separate agencies (see Webbv. Lustig, 298 Ill. App. 3d 695, 703 (1998)), for Rule 304(a)purposes, the whole administrative process dealing with claims ofdiscrimination must be considered one comprehensive scheme. Inthis way, the purposes of Rule 304(a) are accomplished and noappeals are taken before the final disposition of the case in theadministrative process except where they are deemed appropriate.

Petitioner contends that, even if Rule 304(a) applies to thisappeal, the order of the chief legal counsel satisfies therequirements of Rule 304(a). The order of the chief legal counselprovides in pertinent part:

"This is a final order as to Counts A, C, F, G, and H. A final order may be appealed to the Appellate Court by filinga petition for review, naming 1) the Chief Legal Counsel, 2)the Department, and 3) Respondent appellees, with the Clerk ofthe Appellate Court within 35 days after the date of serviceof this order. The Department deems "service" complete 5 daysafter mailing."

Petitioner argues that, where dismissals are at issue, an explicitstatement that the order of the case is immediately appealableshould be sufficient. We do not agree.

While it is true that the absence of Rule 304(a)'s precisewording from the order appealed does not conclusively precludeappellate jurisdiction, it must be clear that Rule 304(a) isintended to be invoked. In re Application of Du Page CountyCollector, 152 Ill. 2d 545, 549-50 (1992). "[W]here appeal issought pursuant to Rule 304(a) from a judgment which defeats aclaim or is in the nature of a dismissal, the written finding issufficient only if it refers to appealability." Du Page CountyCollector, 152 Ill. 2d at 551. In Coryell v. Village of La Grange,245 Ill. App. 3d 1 (1993), the court held that Rule 304(a)'srequirements were not satisfied where the order dismissing some butnot all of plaintiff's claims merely stated that " 'said order isfinal and appealable.' " Coryell, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 5. Thecourt explained that no request was made for a finding pursuant toRule 304(a), no reference was made to Rule 304(a) in the order, andno language tracking Rule 304(a) was included in the order. Coryell, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 5.

The order appealed from in this case states that it isappealable because it is final, not because the chief legal counseldecided that in her discretion there is no just reason to delay theappeal of the dismissal of five of petitioner's nine claims. Moreover, there is no indication in the record or in the order thatthe appeal was sought pursuant to Rule 304(a) or that Rule 304(a)was intended to be invoked.

Rule 304(a) requires the chief legal counsel to determine, inher discretion, whether it is appropriate for the final orderdisposing of some but not all of petitioner's claims to beimmediately appealed rather than waiting until the remainder ofpetitioner's claims have run their course in the administrativeprocess. An express finding that "there is no just reason fordelaying appeal" assures that the issue was decided in light offairness to the parties, the conservation of judicial resources,and the expedition of the resolution of the controversy. See SchalBovis, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 570.

The chief legal counsel should consider that petitioner willeither be successful with her remaining four claims in theproceedings before the Commission or she will not. In the eventpetitioner is successful and obtains an acceptable remedy, she maynot wish to appeal the dismissal of the five claims by the chieflegal counsel. On the other hand, if petitioner is unsuccessfulbefore the Commission, she may wish to appeal the adjudication ofthose four claims in addition to the dismissal of the five claimsby the chief legal counsel. It seems to us that one appeal is moreefficient than two. However, these are considerations for thechief legal counsel, not this court.

The Department also argues that there is nothing in thelanguage of the Act that would toll the time for seeking review ofthe chief legal counsel's decision to dismiss some of petitioner'sclaims until after the Commission renders a decision as to theremaining claims. We believe that Rule 304(a) itself is authorityfor appellate review of the chief legal counsel's order under thosecircumstances. Rule 304(a) authorizes review of such an order inthe same way it authorizes review of an order of the circuit court,dismissing some but not all claims in a multicount complaint onlyafter the other counts are adjudicated in the circuit court.

This court lacks jurisdiction to review the chief legalcounsel's order because it did not contain an express finding "thatthere is no just reason for delaying appeal" pursuant to Rule304(a). If an order adjudicating fewer than all the claims doesnot state "that there is no just reason for delaying appeal," theappellate court has no jurisdiction over an appeal from suchjudgment, and it is proper for the appellate court to dismiss theappeal on its own motion. See Peesel v. Peesel, 11 Ill. App. 3d76, 77 (1973).

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that this court doesnot have jurisdiction to review the order of the chief legalcounsel of the Department of Human Rights, and we therefore dismissthe appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

BOWMAN and BYRNE, JJ., concur.