PRESIDING JUSTICE O'MALLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs, Muirfield Village-Vernon Hills, LLC, and Muirfield, LLC, appeal from the circuitcourt of Lake County's dismissal with prejudice of their third amended complaint and the denial oftheir motion to reinstate and for leave to file a fourth amended complaint. Plaintiffs argue that thethird amended complaint stated a claim for contribution against defendants K. Reinke, Jr., & Co.,Denk & Roche Builders, Inc., Air-Rite Heating & Cooling, Inc., JMB Electric, Inc., KeystoneMechanical Industries, Inc., and R.M. Sellergren & Associates, Inc., and that the trial court abusedits discretion in denying plaintiffs leave to file a fourth amended complaint against defendants. Weaffirm in part and reverse in part.

The following facts are taken from plaintiffs' third amended complaint and the record. Muirfield, LLC, acted as the general contractor in the construction of a home for Kerry and JodiStrain in the subdivision known as Gregg's Landing. Muirfield Village-Vernon Hills, LLC, was theowner of the project. Defendants, as subcontractors, all provided services to Muirfield, LLC, in theconstruction of the Strain home. Reinke provided insulation installation, Denk & Roche providedsiding and carpentry services, Sellergren provided drywall and drywall installation, Air-Rite providedheating, ventilation, flashing, and air conditioning installation, JMB Electric provided services relatedto the electrical systems, and Keystone provided services related to the plumbing systems.

During the construction of the Strains' home, one or more of defendants allowed an excessof moisture into the interior areas of the home. They either failed to close up the house duringconstruction or failed to keep the materials dry prior to installation. This led to the growth of moldand bacteria within the Strains' home. On January 13, 2000, the Strains took possession of the homeand moved in. About two months later, the Strains detected a putrid odor in their home. On July 26,2000, the Strains were advised to vacate the home due to the presence of abnormally high levels ofmold and bacteria in the home. In addition to moving out of their home, the Strains experienceddamages to their personal effects.

On June 19, 2000, the Strains filed suit against Reinke and Denk & Roche, alleging that theyhad negligently installed wet or saturated insulation or carpentry materials in their home, which ledto the growth of unacceptably high levels of mold and bacteria. The Strains and various Muirfieldentities and agents entered into mediation in an attempt to resolve the suit. On September 22, 2000,the Strains, plaintiffs, Zale Homes, and Hearthstone Advisors entered into a handwritten settlementagreement whereby plaintiffs, Zale Homes, and Hearthstone Advisors would buy back the Strains'home, pay $59,000 for other costs and damages to the Strains, and pay Amica Insurance Company,the Strains' insurer, $49,200 in exchange for the release from liability of Muirfield, LLC, MuirfieldVillage-Vernon Hills, LLC, Zale Homes, and Hearthstone Advisors, and the assignment to thoseentities of all of the Strains' legal rights. (Zale Homes and Hearthstone Advisors are not parties tothis appeal.)

On October 25, 2001, plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint. This complaint added Air-Rite, JMB Electric, Sellergren, and Keystone as parties defendant, and substituted plaintiffs, bothindividually and as assignees of the Strains, as parties plaintiff. The first amended complaint set forththree claims against each of the six defendants, alleging the negligence of each individual defendantin the performance of its particular work, alleging negligence against all defendants for failing toproperly secure and protect the home from the intrusion of moisture, and alleging breach of contractagainst each defendant for failing to procure insurance. The settlement agreement between plaintiffsand the Strains was not attached to the first amended complaint. Instead, plaintiffs alleged theexistence of the settlement agreement, that it was confidential, and that the Strains had assigned theirrights to "Muirfield."

On April 25, 2002, plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint. This complaint allegedthree counts against each defendant, namely, negligent construction, breach of contract for failing toprocure insurance, and "contractual contribution." In addition, plaintiffs again did not attach thesettlement agreement to the complaint. Instead, plaintiffs alleged the existence of a confidentialsettlement agreement with the Strains, and quoted language from the agreement by which the Strainsreleased "Muirfield [sic]-Vernon Hills, LLC, Muirfield, LLC, Zale Homes and Hearthstone Advisors"and their subcontractors. Defendants filed motions to dismiss the second amended complaint. Inaddition, defendants sought to compel plaintiffs to disclose the terms of the settlement agreement withthe Strains.

The trial court dismissed the second amended complaint in its entirety, but gave plaintiffs theopportunity to file a third amended complaint. In addition, the trial court ordered plaintiffs toproduce the settlement agreement to defendants. The parties agreed to the entry of a protective orderagainst the disclosure of any settlement agreements, releases, or other settlement documents. OnOctober 1, 2002, after plaintiffs failed to file their third amended complaint within the trial court'soriginal time limit, they were granted leave, over defendants' objections, to file the third amendedcomplaint.

This complaint contained only one count for contribution against each defendant. Additionally, plaintiffs attached a typed document entitled "settlement release," which was executedin July and August of 2002. The document was signed by the Strains and their insurer, but not byplaintiffs. The parties released in this document included "Muirfield-Vernon Hills, LLC, sometimesreferred to as Muirfield Village-Vernon Hills, LLC, and Muirfield, LLC, their related companies ***including Zale Homes and Hearthstone Advisors, Inc." In addition, each defendant was expresslyreleased by name. Defendants moved to dismiss the third amended complaint on the grounds that (1)substituting the 2002 settlement release document for the September 22, 2001, settlement agreementwas contrary to the "mend-the-hold" doctrine, (2) plaintiffs did not allocate the amounts that eachpaid in the settlement with the Strains, making it impossible to determine whether any plaintiff orother Muirfield entity paid more than its pro rata share of liability, and (3) plaintiffs could not recoverin tort any of the amounts paid to the Strains for the buyback of their home as these sums constitutedeconomic losses. On December 3, 2002, the trial court expressly denied the portions of the motionsto dismiss relying on the "mend-the-hold" doctrine, and granted with prejudice the portions of themotions to dismiss based on plaintiffs' failure to plead a claim in contribution and on the economicloss rule. Apparently, at that point, plaintiffs orally moved for leave to file a fourth amendedcomplaint. This oral motion was denied.

On January 2, 2003, plaintiffs filed a motion to reinstate their cause of action and for leaveto file a fourth amended complaint. Plaintiffs attached a copy of the proposed fourth amendedcomplaint to their motion. The proposed fourth amended complaint contained two counts againsteach defendant, one for contribution and one for breach of contract. The contribution counts allegedthat "liability is apportioned 100% to plaintiffs due to the fact they are the same entity," and thatplaintiffs had paid more than their proportionate share of the liability. The breach of contract countsalleged that defendants had failed to perform their services in a workmanlike manner.

On January 14, 2003, Reinke filed a suggestion of record that plaintiffs had not filed apostjudgment motion sufficient to toll the 30-day period following the entry of a final order and thatthe trial court's jurisdiction had lapsed. Additionally, Reinke filed a response in opposition toplaintiffs' motion, requesting that the trial court deny the motion and seeking sanctions againstplaintiffs pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137). The other defendants also filedor adopted responses in opposition to plaintiffs' motion. On February 4, 2003, the trial court deniedplaintiffs' motion to reinstate and for leave to file a fourth amended complaint. In addition, theFebruary 4, 2003, order stated that Reinke's "Motion For Sanctions Is Not Ruled Upon." On March5, 2003, plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal.

Before turning to the issues raised on appeal, we must first contend with what could betermed a "housekeeping" issue. After this cause was briefed and submitted to this court fordeliberation, plaintiffs and Reinke entered into a settlement agreement among themselves. Plaintiffsand Reinke submitted a joint motion to dismiss with prejudice Reinke from this action, with eachparty representing that it had dropped all claims against the other. Denk & Roche filed an objectionto the motion, raising concerns that, as it had adopted Reinke's briefs and arguments on appeal, itcould be prejudiced by Reinke's dismissal from this action. Denk & Roche further suggested thatgranting the motion could be construed as this court's approval of the settlement agreement amongplaintiffs and Reinke (which those parties did not submit to this court), and that it could prejudiceDenk & Roche's rights to contribution against Reinke and the other defendants. Due to the timingof plaintiffs' and Reinke's joint motion to dismiss, we choose to resolve it with the case.

Upon consideration of the joint motion to dismiss, we grant it, but with the followingqualifications. First, our grant of the motion to dismiss is not a finding in any way concerning thegood faith of the settlement agreement or the fairness of its terms. Our order also does not disturbany rights any of defendants may have to set-off or contribution from Reinke or each other. We alsoallow the briefs on appeal submitted by Reinke to stand as Denk & Roche's briefs and arguments onappeal and note that Reinke's dismissal from this action does not prejudice Denk & Roche's rights inthis appeal in any way.

Next, we turn to the actual issues raised by this appeal. However, before we can addressplaintiffs' arguments on appeal, we must first resolve two issues regarding our jurisdiction over thisappeal. Defendants Air-Rite, Denk & Roche, and Sellergren all urge that plaintiffs' postjudgmentmotion to reinstate and for leave to file an amended complaint be held to be insufficient to toll the 30-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal. These defendants argue that plaintiffs' motion was not apostjudgment motion within the meaning of section 2--1203(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code)(735 ILCS 5/2--1203(a) (West 2002)).

Supreme Court Rule 303(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)) provides:

"[A] notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 daysafter the entry of the final judgment appealed from, or, if a timely post-trial motion directedagainst the judgment is filed, whether in a jury or a nonjury case, within 30 days after theentry of the order disposing of the last pending post-judgment motion."

Section 2--1203(a) of the Code provides:

"In all cases tried without a jury, any party may, within 30 days after the entry of thejudgment or within any further time the court may allow within the 30 days or any extensionsthereof, file a motion for a rehearing, or a retrial, or modification of the judgment or to vacatethe judgment or for other relief." 735 ILCS 5/2--1203(a) (West 2002).

Substantively, plaintiffs' motion to reinstate and for leave to file an amended complaint seeksonly leave to file a fourth amended complaint. The caption states that the motion is to reinstateplaintiffs' cause of action, and the prayer for relief requests that the trial court reinstate the cause andallow plaintiffs to file their fourth amended complaint. The issue is simple: is a motion thatsubstantively seeks only leave to file an amended pleading, yet requests the relief that the matter bereinstated following a dismissal with prejudice, sufficiently directed against the judgment to comewithin the ambit of section 2--1203(a) of the Code? We hold that it is.

Our resolution of this issue is guided by the recent case of Kingbrook, Inc. v. Pupurs, 202 Ill.2d 24 (2002). There, our supreme court addressed the issue of what degree of detail must beincluded in a motion to reconsider for such a motion to qualify as a postjudgment motion. Kingbrook, 202 Ill. 2d at 25. Our supreme court held that neither the Code nor the supreme courtrules requires any degree of specificity in a postjudgment motion. Kingbrook, 202 Ill. 2d at 31. Thecourt supported its decision with practical reasons; for example, an obvious error by the trial courtcould be corrected merely by asking for a rehearing, but if some specificity were required, then themotion might not qualify as a postjudgment motion, which could cause the trial court to losejurisdiction to enter any order. Kingbrook, 202 Ill. 2d at 32.

This case presents a step beyond Kingbrook--what happens when a party presents a motionwith considerable detail, but the motion substantively is directed only at securing leave to file anamended complaint. Ordinarily, we would find that this would not be directed at the judgment and,therefore, would not be a postjudgment motion for purposes of the Code and supreme court rules. See Andersen v. Resource Economics Corp., 133 Ill. 2d 342, 346 (1990) (motion for leave to amendpleading not a valid postjudgment motion capable of extending the time for filing a notice of appeal). However, in addition to requesting leave to amend their complaint, plaintiffs also specifically requestthat the trial court reinstate their cause of action. We interpret plaintiffs' request to reinstate theircause to be a request to modify or vacate the trial court's judgment of dismissal with prejudice, so asto allow the cause to continue. Indeed, "reinstate" is defined as "to instate again : place again (as inpossession or in a former position)"; and "to restore to a proper condition : replace in an original orequivalent state." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1915 (1986). Under section 2--1203(a) of the Code, a motion seeking a modification or vacation of the judgment qualifies as apostjudgment motion. Thus, plaintiffs' motion possesses no proper substance or detail, but properlyrequests appropriate relief to qualify as a postjudgment motion. Under Kingbrook, a motion thatdoes no more than request to strike or vacate the "with prejudice" portion of the order would besufficient to toll the 30-day time period in which to file a notice of appeal. Kingbrook, 202 Ill. 2d at33. We believe that it would be contrary to the supreme court's intent in Kingbrook to hold that amotion with no detail but requesting the appropriate relief is sufficient to toll the 30-day time period,while a motion with plenty of irrelevant detail requesting the same relief is insufficient to qualify asa postjudgment motion. We will not penalize plaintiffs for incorporating more than they needed toin the motion, where they have at least requested the appropriate relief specified in section 2--1203(a)of the Code. We find, therefore, that plaintiffs' motion to reinstate and for leave to file an amendedcomplaint was sufficient to toll the 30-day period to file a notice of appeal.

This, however, does not end our inquiry. Our review of the record shows another hurdle toappellate jurisdiction, although none of the parties raise it in their arguments. We note that Reinkefiled a response to plaintiffs' motion to reinstate and for leave to file a fourth amended complaint. Inthat response, Reinke asked the trial court to impose sanctions on plaintiffs for making a frivolouspleading. The trial court did not rule upon Reinke's request for sanctions. Following the denial ofplaintiffs' motion to reinstate, Reinke did not raise further the issue of sanctions, either by a separatemotion or by requesting a ruling by the trial court.

This presents the question of whether there is an open motion for sanctions. Ordinarily, " 'noappeal may be taken from an otherwise final judgment entered on a claim when a section 2--611 claim[motion for sanctions] remains to be resolved, absent a finding pursuant to Rule 304(a) [(155 Ill. 2dR. 304(a))] that there is no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal.' " John G. Phillips &Associates v. Brown, 197 Ill. 2d 337, 340 (2001), quoting Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church,138 Ill. 2d 458, 468 (1990). We find the present circumstances, however, to be sufficiently differentfrom those in Phillips to render Phillips and its line of cases distinguishable.

Here, the trial court did not rule upon Reinke's request for sanctions. No reason wasspecified. We cannot say whether the trial court felt that the request was without merit, whetherReinke had not properly raised the issue as it did not file a separate motion for sanctions, or whetherthere was any other reason. We do know that Reinke never pressed the trial court for a ruling or fileda separate motion for sanctions. The party filing a motion has the responsibility to bring it to the trialcourt's attention and have it resolved. Twardowski v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 321 Ill.App. 3d 509, 512 (2001). Unless there is some indication to the contrary, where no ruling has beenmade on a motion, we will presume that the motion was waived or abandoned. Twardowski, 321Ill. App. 3d at 512-13. Here, Reinke was aware that the trial court declined to address its request forsanctions. Reinke and the other defendants let the matter drop and did not either notice up themotion (if motion it was) or file a separate motion for sanctions. Further, defendants have not raisedthis issue as a bar to our jurisdiction over this appeal. Our review of the record convinces us thatReinke and the other defendants interpreted the trial court's refusal to rule on the motion as a de factodetermination that it was meritless and acquiesced in that determination. Thus, Reinke's failure topursue its request for sanctions supports and confirms the presumption that it abandoned its requestfor sanctions. Twardowski, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 512-13. Accordingly, we find that Reinke abandonedits request for sanctions and that plaintiffs' motion to reinstate was a proper postjudgment motion,so that its notice of appeal was timely filed. As a result, we find that we have jurisdiction to considerplaintiffs' contentions on appeal.

We now turn to the issues plaintiffs raise on appeal. Plaintiffs contend that the trial courterred in dismissing their third amended complaint. Specifically, plaintiffs maintain that the thirdamended complaint stated a claim for contribution and did not run afoul of the economic loss rule. Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their motion for leave to filea fourth amended complaint. Plaintiffs maintain that the proposed fourth amended complaint wouldhave cured any deficiencies in their preceding complaint and, therefore, should have been allowed.

We first address plaintiffs' contentions regarding their third amended complaint. This causecomes before us following the trial court's dismissal with prejudice of plaintiffs' third amendedcomplaint pursuant to defendants' motions to dismiss brought under section 2--615 of the Code (735ILCS 5/2--615 (West 2002)). A motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2--615 of the Code challengesthe legal sufficiency of the complaint. Wakulich v. Mraz, 203 Ill. 2d 223, 228 (2003). The trial courtmust determine whether the allegations of the complaint, when viewed in a light most favorable tothe plaintiff, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Wakulich, 203 Ill. 2dat 228. In making this determination, the trial court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in thecomplaint. Wakulich, 203 Ill. 2d at 228. We review the trial court's determination de novo. Wakulich, 203 Ill. 2d at 228.

Plaintiffs bring their claim for contribution under the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act (Act)(740 ILCS 100/0.01 et seq. (West 2002)). Section 2(a) of the Act provides that, "where 2 or morepersons are subject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury to person or property, or the samewrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them, even though judgment has not beenentered against any or all of them." 740 ILCS 100/2(a) (West 2002). Section 2(b) of the Actprovides:

"The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more thanhis pro rata share of the common liability, and his total recovery is limited to the amount paidby him in excess of his pro rata share. No tortfeasor is liable to make contribution beyond hisown pro rata share of the common liability." 740 ILCS 100/2(b) (West 2002).

Plaintiffs argue that they properly alleged a claim for contribution under the Act. Plaintiffspoint out that they alleged that there was a contractor-subcontractor relationship between themselvesand defendants. Plaintiffs alleged that they reasonably settled the Strains' claim and received theassignment of the Strains' claims against defendants. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants' tortiousacts gave rise to the liability against both plaintiffs and defendants. According to plaintiffs, theseallegations sufficiently stated a claim for contribution. Defendants counter by arguing that, becauseplaintiffs did not apportion the payments made to the Strains among the four entities listed in thesettlement document attached to the third amended complaint, it is impossible to determine by howmuch each plaintiff exceeded its pro rata share of the common liability. According to defendants, thisfailure renders the claim legally insufficient. We agree with defendants.

In order to properly state a claim for contribution, the plaintiff in contribution must allege thatit and the defendant in contribution are both subject to liability in tort to the injured party, and thatthe liability of the plaintiff and the defendant in contribution arises out of the same injury. Alper v.Altheimer & Gray, 257 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2001). In addition, the plaintiff in contribution mustplead the amount it paid to the injured party, so that, ultimately, the fact finder can determine whatamount, if any, was paid by the plaintiff in contribution over its fair share of the common liability. Victory Memorial Hospital Ass'n v. Schmidt, Garden & Erickson, 158 Ill. App. 3d 931, 935 (1987). Here, plaintiffs have not pleaded what amount each plaintiff paid to the Strains. Accordingly,plaintiffs have failed to plead the essential elements necessary to state a claim for contribution. Wehold, therefore, that the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs' third amended complaint.

Plaintiffs appear to argue generally that, because they provided the total amount they paid tothe Strains, the fact finder would be able to assign the parties their proportionate liabilities followingthe presentation of evidence. It then would become a simple mathematical exercise to determine theamount each plaintiff paid in excess of its pro rata share of the common liability. It is precisely thisargument that was rejected by the court in Victory Memorial. There, a hospital contracted with anarchitectural firm to design the interiors of the fifth and sixth floors of the hospital. Among theservices the architect provided was the design and specifications for a fire detection system. Thearchitect retained a general contractor to manage the project, an electrician, and an air conditioningcontractor to install the components of the fire detection system. Victory Memorial, 158 Ill. App.3d at 932. At some time after the installation was completed, a fire occurred on the sixth floor of thehospital. The architect and the general contractor jointly paid $160,000 to the hospital to settle thehospital's negligence claim against them and the other defendants. The architect and the generalcontractor maintained a claim for contribution against the electrician. Victory Memorial, 158 Ill.App. 3d at 932-33. The architect presented evidence regarding the amount of the damages that thehospital sustained and evidence showing that the fire detectors had not been properly installed. Theelectrician presented no evidence and received a directed verdict in its favor, as the architect had notestablished a prima facie case. Victory Memorial, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 933-34.

The architect argued to the appellate court:

"[T]he Act requires the jury to assess only fault, not dollar damages, and to assign apercentage figure of fault to each party to the contribution action. Then, according to [thearchitect,] the court may, as a matter of law, apply the percentages to the amount paid to theinjured party by the plaintiff and enter judgment accordingly." Victory Memorial, 158 Ill.App. 3d at 935.

The court rejected this argument, holding:

"[B]oth the language and the purpose of the Act anticipate that a plaintiff in contribution mustplead and offer evidence of the amount he paid to the injured party, along with evidence ofthe joint tortfeasors' fault, so the fact finder has a basis for determining what, if any, amountwas paid by plaintiff over and above his fair share of the joint liability." Victory Memorial,158 Ill. App. 3d at 935.

Here, plaintiffs did not plead the amount each paid in the settlement with the Strains. This situationis identical to that in Victory Memorial, where the architect did not plead or offer evidence on theamount that it and the general contractor paid in the settlement with the hospital. Therefore, VictoryMemorial compels us to reject plaintiffs' argument.

We also note that, although Victory Memorial involved a directed verdict, this does not serveto distinguish its holding from application in this case. The issue in Victory Memorial involvedwhether the plaintiff had established a prima facie case, or in other words, had presented evidenceestablishing all of the essential elements of its claim. Here, the issue is whether plaintiffs pleaded allof the essential elements of their claim. Thus, the court's holding on what elements are necessary toestablish a prima facie case also sets forth the requirements necessary to plead the essential elementsof the claim.

Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Victory Memorial. They point to Sands v. J.I. Case Co., 239Ill. App. 3d 19, 25 (1992), for the proposition that a settling plaintiff in contribution is not requiredto prove its own liability to the injured party with whom it has settled, but it merely need present thefact finder with a factual basis showing that liability was reasonably anticipated. Plaintiffs appear toequate pleading the amounts each paid in settlement with proving their own liability to the injuredparty with whom they have settled. Sands suggests no such equivalency; rather, it distinguishes itselffrom Victory Memorial on the basis that Victory Memorial required proof of the amount paid insettlement, while Sands required a showing that liability to the injured party was reasonablyanticipated in order to demonstrate the plaintiff's status as a tortfeasor for the purposes of the Act. Sands, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 25. Plaintiffs' reliance on Sands, therefore, is misplaced.

Plaintiffs also cite to Hall v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 122 Ill. 2d 448, 458-59 (1988),apparently for the proposition that the failure of a plaintiff in contribution to allocate settlementmonies between separate claims will not preclude the contribution claim. Plaintiffs seem to suggestthat, analogously, the failure to allocate the amount paid to the injured party among the plaintiffsshould be treated the same way as the failure to allocate the amount paid among separate claims. Wedisagree. Hall had a single plaintiff in contribution who paid the injured party in settlement of twoclaims, one for compensation, and the other for punitive damages. Hall, 122 Ill. 2d at 450. Inrejecting the argument of the defendants in contribution, the court noted that the plaintiff incontribution had established the total amount of its liability to the injured party, even though therewere separate theories of recovery. Hall, 122 Ill. 2d at 459. In addition, the court noted that the Actdid not expressly require that a plaintiff allocate the settlement proceeds between alternative theoriesof recovery. Hall, 122 Ill. 2d at 459. The court held that the failure to allocate the settlement monieswould be examined for good faith; if the settlement was made in good faith and not unfairly to passon punitive damages to a defendant for which the plaintiff would not otherwise be able to obtaincontribution, then the failure to allocate the monies would not bar the contribution claim. Hall, 122Ill. 2d at 460. Here, by contrast, there is no issue of good or bad faith in settling the Strains' claim,or of improperly passing on punitive damages to defendants. Moreover, the failure to allocate wasnot in regard to several theories of recovery, but was in regard to the plaintiffs in contribution. Whilethere is no express requirement in the Act to allocate settlement proceeds to different claims, thereis an express requirement for plaintiffs in contribution to allocate the settlement to the injured partybetween the various plaintiffs in contribution. Victory Memorial, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 935. Therefore,we find that Hall is distinguishable. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court correctly dismissedplaintiffs' third amended complaint.

Next, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erroneously relied on the economic loss rule (seeMoorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69 (1982)) to conclude that plaintiffswere not able to plead the existence of damages. Ordinarily, we would not need to consider plaintiffs'contentions, because our conclusion that plaintiffs did not properly plead a claim for contributionwould sufficiently justify the trial court's determination. However, because plaintiffs are alsocomplaining that the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing them to file an amendedcomplaint, and because it is easy to envision that in some future pleading, plaintiffs would be able toallocate between them the amounts paid in settlement to the Strains, whether the trial court's rulingis also supported by the economic loss doctrine could have a significant bearing on our resolution ofwhether the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs' leave to amend. If plaintiffs are ableto plead the existence of cognizable damages, then it is readily conceivable that they could easilycorrect the flaws identified in their third amended complaint. Thus, we must consider plaintiffs'contention regarding the economic loss doctrine.

Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in holding that their damages were barred by theeconomic loss rule. Briefly stated, recovery for solely economic losses in relation to a product maynot be had upon a tort theory of negligence. Moorman, 91 Ill. 2d at 85; American Xyrofin, Inc. v.Allis-Chalmers Corp., 230 Ill. App. 3d 662, 669 (1992). The rationale for the economic loss rule isthat the manufacturer of the product should not be held liable for downstream losses caused by theproduct failing to meet the purchaser's specific business expectations. American Xyrofin, 230 Ill.App. 3d at 669. "Economic loss" has been defined as damages for inadequate value, costs of repairand replacement of the defective product, or the consequent loss of profits, as well as the diminutionof value of the product due to its inferior quality. Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 177(1982). The economic loss rule is not without exceptions. It will not be applied in threecircumstances: (1) where the plaintiff has sustained personal injury or property damage resultingfrom a sudden or dangerous occurrence; (2) where the plaintiff's damages are proximately caused bythe defendant's intentional, false representation; and (3) where the plaintiff's damages are proximatelycaused by the defendant's negligent misrepresentation where the defendant is in the business ofsupplying information to guide others in their business transactions. In re Chicago Flood Litigation,176 Ill. 2d 179, 199 (1997).

Here, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs' third amended complaint based on the application ofthe economic loss rule. Plaintiffs argue that the economic loss rule does not apply to theircircumstances. They argue that the Strains were private citizens without the expectation ofcommercial benefit accruing from the purchase of their residence. Plaintiffs argue that the Strainsexperienced a sudden and calamitous event, effectively causing the loss of their house as well as theloss of a large amount of personal property. Because the Strains experienced property damage inaddition to the loss of the house as a result of the mold, plaintiffs argue that the economic loss ruledoes not operate to bar their claim. We agree in part with plaintiffs' contention.

Redarowicz and Chicago Flood settled the question of whether the economic loss rule willbar recovery in tort for the loss of a plaintiff's house or property. In Redarowicz, the plaintiffpurchased a house from the original owners about a year after the house had been completed by thebuilder. The plaintiff noticed that the chimney and adjoining wall were beginning to pull away fromthe rest of the house. The plaintiff sued the builder and sought recovery in tort for the repair andreplacement of the defectively constructed chimney. Redarowicz, 92 Ill. 2d at 175-76. The courtheld that the plaintiff could not recover those damages in a defective construction case because theywere precisely the type of damages precluded by the economic loss rule. Redarowicz, 92 Ill. 2d at178. The court stated:

"This is not a case where defective construction created a hazard that resulted in a memberof the plaintiff's family being struck by a falling brick from the chimney. *** The plaintiff isseeking damages for the costs of replacement and repair of the defective chimney, adjoiningwall and patio. While the commercial expectations of this buyer have not been met by thebuilder, the only danger to the plaintiff is that he would be forced to incur additional expensesfor living conditions that were less than what was bargained for." Redarowicz, 92 Ill. 2d at178.

In Chicago Flood, the plaintiffs sued the City of Chicago for damages incurred when the city'sfreight tunnel network was flooded following damage to one of the tunnels after wood pilings in theChicago River had been replaced, but not in the location specified by the city. Chicago Flood, 176Ill. 2d at 184-85. The court held that "those plaintiffs who did not incur personal injury or propertydamage may not recover solely economic losses." Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d at 201. The courtcautioned, however, that the economic loss rule applied "even to plaintiffs who have incurred physicaldamage to their property if the damage is caused by disappointed commercial expectations, gradualdeterioration, internal breakage, or other nonaccidental causes, rather than a dangerous event." Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d at 200-01. The court also noted, with regard to destroyed inventory, thatthese damages did not run afoul of the economic loss rule because the plaintiffs were not seeking"damages for the loss of continuous electrical service, which is a disappointed commercialexpectation," but were seeking "damages for property loss, in the form of lost perishable inventory,as a result of a tortious event." Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d at 202. The court held that "these lossesfall outside the definition of economic loss and are recoverable in tort." Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2dat 202.

Redarowicz and Chicago Flood require that damages beyond the disappointed commercialexpectations be alleged. Redarowicz held that repair and replacement damages arising from defectiveconstruction were barred by the economic loss rule. Redarowicz, 92 Ill. 2d at 178. Chicago Floodelaborated the rule to bar recovery of economic losses, but allowed for the recovery of propertydamages apart from those of the damaged structure. Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d at 202. Thus, here,plaintiffs cannot recover contribution for damages accruing from the loss of the Strains' house, as thatis a classic economic loss. See Redarowicz, 92 Ill. 2d at 178. However, plaintiffs can recovercontribution for the losses to the Strains' personal property. Therefore, the trial court correctlydismissed that portion of the third amended complaint seeking contribution based on the loss of thehouse, but should not have dismissed that part of plaintiffs' claim seeking contribution based on thepersonal property damages incurred by the Strains.

This does not fully resolve the issue. Defendants contend that the mold grew over a lengthyperiod of time. This, according to defendants, means that the losses occurred as a result of a gradualdeterioration and not a sudden and calamitous event. As a result, defendants conclude that the losses do not fall under the exception to the economic loss rule for personal injury and property damageresulting from a sudden or dangerous occurrence. We disagree.

While the growth of the mold and bacteria occurred gradually, it is still a sudden andcalamitous event for purposes of analyzing the application of the economic loss rule. As this courthas stated:

"Damages which are the proximate result of a sudden and calamitous occurrence thatcauses harm to other property are compensable in tort. [Citations.] The type of harmattendant to a sudden and calamitous event does not flow from disappointed commercialexpectations; rather, it arises from '[h]azards peripheral to the product's [intended] function.' [Citation.] When characterizing an event as sudden and calamitous the focus is upon 'thesuddenness of the occurrence of an event--the point when the injury occurs *** --where suchoccurrence causes personal injury or damage to property external to the defective productwhich exposes a party to an unreasonable risk of injury to himself or his property, rather thanthe suddenness or length of time within which the defect or cause of the occurrence develops*** and manifests itself in the sudden and calamitous occurrence.' (Emphasis in original.)[Citation.]" American Xyrofin, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 671.

The circumstances of this case qualify as a sudden and calamitous event. The mold and bacterialinfestation grew gradually, but its manifestation was sudden and calamitous, damaging the Strains'personal property and requiring them to flee their house or experience the likelihood of personalinjury. Properly viewed from the point of injury, and not from the development of the mold andbacterial infestation, the occurrence was sufficiently sudden and calamitous to place it under theexception to the economic loss rule for property damage resulting from a sudden or dangerousoccurrence.

Defendants also complain that the allegations were conclusory and not factual. Defendantsargue that the complaint sets out only a passing reference that abnormally high levels of mold andbacteria caused extensive damage to the personal effects of the Strains. Defendants argue that thisis insufficient to allow the complaint to proceed. We agree. Plaintiffs' allegations are both conclusoryand cursory. They do not allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that the economic loss rule shouldnot apply. That said, however, this is an easily remedied defect. We note that a complaint shouldnot be dismissed with prejudice unless it is apparent that no set of facts can be proved under thecomplaint that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Smith v. Central Illinois Regional Airport, 207 Ill.2d 578, 584-85 (2003). We also noted above that plaintiffs' failure to properly allege a contributionclaim was due to their failure to allocate the amounts paid in settlement among plaintiffs and otherentities identified in the settlement. This, too, is an easily remedied defect. Thus, we conclude that,while dismissal of the third amended complaint was proper for all of the reasons identified above, itshould not have been dismissed with prejudice, because plaintiffs have demonstrated that they shouldbe able to allege sufficient facts to entitle them to contribution from defendants for their pro rata shareof the damages stemming from the Strains' personal property losses. In all other respects, however,we find that the trial court's dismissal with prejudice of the third amended complaint was proper.

The resolution of the foregoing does not entirely obviate our consideration of plaintiffs'remaining contention on appeal. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court abused its discretion in refusingto allow them leave to file a fourth amended complaint. Based on the posture of this case and ourresolution of the issues raised regarding the third amended complaint, we now see this as presentingtwo separate questions. First, did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to allow anyamendment of the complaint? Where a cause of action can be stated, a trial court abuses its discretionif it refuses to allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint. Droen v. Wechsler, 271 Ill. App. 3d 332,335 (1995). Moreover, the trial court should exercise its discretion liberally in favor of allowingamendments, and any doubts should be resolved in favor of allowing the amendment, if the ends ofjustice will be furthered by allowing the plaintiff to file an amended complaint. Droen, 271 Ill. App.3d at 335. As we noted above, the defects in the third amended complaint are easily remedied. Therefore, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the third amended complaintwith prejudice. It should have allowed plaintiffs another opportunity to amend their complaint.

The second question is, did the trial court properly refuse to allow plaintiffs to file theirproposed fourth amended complaint? In determining whether to allow an amended complaint, thetrial court is to consider four factors: (1) whether the proposed amendment would cure the defectivepleading, (2) whether other parties would be prejudiced or surprised by the proposed amendedcomplaint, (3) whether the plaintiff had previous opportunities to amend the complaint, and (4)whether the proposed amendment is timely. Loyola Academy v. S&S Roof Maintenance, Inc., 146Ill. 2d 263, 273 (1992). We consider each of the factors of the Loyola Academy test in turn.

First, our review of the proposed fourth amended complaint shows that it continues to sufferfrom the defect identified in the third amended complaint, namely, plaintiffs still do not allocateamong the settling parties the amounts paid in settlement of the Strains' personal property claims. In an attempt to cure this defect, plaintiffs alleged that the parties identified in the 2002 settlementrelease are all the same entity. This claim is belied by the text of the 2002 settlement release itself,which identifies each of the parties paying the settlement to the Strains as a distinct corporate entity. Because the allegation in plaintiffs' proposed fourth amended complaint is contradicted by the 2002settlement release, we do not accept the allegation as true. See Rogalla v. Christie Clinic, P.C., 341Ill. App. 3d 410, 413 (2003). In addition, plaintiffs still attempt to recover contribution for the house,which we have held above to be prohibited by the economic loss rule. Thus, the proposedamendment does not cure the defects already identified.

Second, the proposed fourth amended complaint seeks to add a claim sounding in breach ofcontract. While plaintiffs had earlier pleaded breach of contract, the earlier claims were based ondefendants' failures to obtain insurance. This time, plaintiffs allege that the breaches occurred as aresult of defendants' failures to properly perform their work. In other words, plaintiffs are adding anew theory of recovery to the case, the breach of the subcontract with each defendant. Thisamendment was sought in the procedural posture that the trial court had already entered finaljudgment by dismissing the third amended complaint with prejudice. As the court's discretion toallow an amendment is curtailed following a final judgment (Vanderplow v. Krych, 332 Ill. App. 3d51, 58 (2002)), we do not believe that the trial court's refusal to allow the amended complaint afterit had dismissed the cause with prejudice was an abuse of discretion.

The third factor slightly favors denying plaintiffs leave to amend because plaintiffs have hadopportunities to amend their complaint. The original complaint was filed by the Strains. The firstamended complaint recast the original complaint by substituting plaintiffs in place of the Strains, andadded new parties defendant. The second amended complaint added new claims and was dismissedby motion. The third amended complaint attempted to correct the deficiencies identified in the secondamended complaint. Thus, plaintiffs have had two opportunities to amend their complaint. Therefore,the third factor weighs slightly against allowing an amendment. The last factor is neutral. As notedabove, we determined that plaintiffs' postjudgment motion to reinstate and for leave to amend wastimely. Thus, the third and fourth factors are largely inconsequential to the outcome of the four-factor test identified in Loyola Academy. Because the first two factors weigh so strongly againstallowing the complaint to be amended, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion inrefusing the proposed fourth amended complaint.

To sum up, then, we find that the trial court properly dismissed with prejudice plaintiffs'contribution claim arising from the damage to the Strains' house, but erred in dismissing withprejudice plaintiffs' contribution claim arising from damage to the Strains' personal property. Thatportion alone of the third amended complaint should have been dismissed without prejudice. We alsofind that the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs the opportunity to file an amended complaint butthat it properly refused the tendered fourth amended complaint. Therefore, we order the trial courtto allow plaintiffs to file a different fourth amended complaint consistent with our opinion herein.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed in partand reversed in part, and the cause is remanded with directions.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded with directions.

CALLUM and GILLERAN JOHNSON, JJ., concur.