JUSTICE CALLUM delivered the opinion of the court:

The State filed a verified complaint seeking the forfeiture ofa 1998 Chevrolet Corvette, VIN 1G1YY22G2W5108366. The complaintalleged that the Corvette was subject to forfeiture pursuant tosection 505(a)(3) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act(Substances Act) (720 ILCS 570/505(a)(3) (West 2000)) and theprovisions of the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (ForfeitureAct) (725 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2000)). The complaint allegedthat the car was used or was intended to be used to facilitate aviolation of the Substances Act and was seized from Dina M. Doyleon August 28, 2000. Claimant, Robert Doyle (Robert or claimant),filed a verified claim asserting that he was an innocent owner ofthe Corvette and that it was not forfeitable as neither he nor DinaDoyle, who was alleged to have an interest in the car, was involvedin any illegal action making it subject to forfeiture.

Following a bench trial, the trial court found that DinaDoyle was the owner of the Corvette within the meaning of theForfeiture Act and ordered the forfeiture of the car to the State as provided by law. Claimant appeals, arguing essentially that (1)the State's evidence was insufficient to prove that the use of thecar (in connection with a drug offense) by a third party (MichaelMohr) was more than mere "incidental use" of the car; (2) the cardid not "facilitate" a violation of the Substances Act; and (3) thetrial court erred in ordering the forfeiture of claimant's interestin the car as he was a co-owner of the car and did not know of,acquiesce in, or consent to a third party's conduct that gave riseto the forfeiture. We affirm.

At the trial, the parties stipulated that, if Officer MarioMineo were called to testify, he would testify essentially asfollows. On August 28, 2000, Mineo was a Glendale Heights policeofficer. He assisted in the arrest of Dina Doyle on an outstandingwarrant. Upon his arrival at 139 E. Montana, Mineo observed Dinastanding at the rear of a white 1998 Corvette, with the rear hatchopen. A second person known to Mineo as Michael Mohr was sittingin the driver's seat with the door closed. Mohr was leaning overthe center console with his hands toward the passenger side of thecar. Mineo asked Mohr to exit the car and, as he did, Mineo couldsee that Mohr was sweating and shaking. Mineo looked into thepassenger side of the car and saw a small tinfoil package lying onthe floor of the passenger side. Mineo knew that heroin iscommonly packaged in tinfoil. He retrieved the package and openedit, finding a white powdery substance that later tested positivefor the presence of heroin. Mohr had previously told Mineo that he used heroin.

When Mineo told Mohr and Dina what he had found, Dina stated,without being questioned, that the heroin was Mohr's and that sheknew that he also had a needle in the car. Mohr denied knowledgeof the heroin at that time. Later, Mohr told Mineo that the heroinwas Dina's and that he had done heroin earlier that day. Mohr wascharged with possession of a controlled substance for the heroinfound in the Corvette on August 28, 2000. Dina was not charged.

Officer Mineo had also arrested Dina on August 13, 1999. Onthat day Mineo stopped the 1998 Corvette. Mohr was the driver. Mohr was arrested for driving with a revoked license, and Dina wasarrested for possession of heroin. Dina had two baggies in herpurse; one had a white powdery substance and one had white residue. Dina admitted that the substance was heroin. Dina pleaded guiltyto that offense and the case (No. 99--CF--2017) was still open. Mineo also reviewed Glendale Heights police report No. 9917213,which contained facts regarding Dina's arrest for having no validdriver's license. On December 2, 1999, Dina was again stoppedwhile driving the Corvette and was arrested for not having a validdriver's license. At the time of the arrest, Dina's purse wassearched, and Officer Lambert located a rolled-up dollar bill withwhite powdery residue on it. That substance later tested positivefor heroin. That case (No. 00--CF--2198) was still pending.

During Mineo's arrests of Dina, he saw in the car women'sclothing consistent with what he knew to be Dina's employment atthe time. Mineo also had prior noncustodial contacts with Dinawhile she was in the Corvette and on those occasions the vehiclecontained women's clothing.

Garry Harrison, deputy chief of police of Glendale Heights,testified that, in connection with the investigation in August2000, he obtained documents pertaining to the purchase of the car, and he testified regarding their content. The parties stipulatedto the admission of these documents as business records generatedat the time of sale, July 29, 1999. Exhibit No. 1 is a bill ofsale for the Corvette from Woodfield Chevrolet, showing the totalpurchase price ($36,097.58), the down payment ($15,000), and thebalance due. At the bottom is the signature of the buyer, "RobertDoyle," and the co-buyer, "Dina Marie Doyle." Exhibit No. 2 is awarranty buyer's guide signed by "Dina M. Doyle." Exhibit No. 3 isa "We-Owe" statement that the seller owed nothing to the customerand it has the signature of "Dina M. Doyle." Exhibit No. 4 is a"GM Resale Disclosure Notice of Nonconformity" with the signatureof "Robert Doyle" as consumer and that of "Dina M. Doyle," which iscrossed out. Exhibit No. 5 is a credit application signed "DinaMarie Doyle." Exhibit No. 6 is a La Salle Bank truth-in-lendingdisclosure form signed "Robert Doyle" and "Phyllis Doyle." ExhibitNo. 7 is a $15,000 down payment check made out to WoodfieldChevrolet in the amount of $15,000 and signed "Dina Marie Doyle." Dina M. Doyle's name and address are printed on the check. Harrison testified that the signatures for Dina Doyle all appear tohave been made by the same person.

Harrison interviewed Robert and Phyllis Doyle on August 31,2000. Harrison asked Robert about a previous arrest of Dina in1999 for a drug violation and the extent of his knowledge of Dina'sdrug use. Robert was aware of the August 1999 arrest. Robert wasaware that in the 1999 arrest Dina blamed the possession of thedrugs on Mohr. Robert had found a court order in connection withthe arrest, ordering his daughter Dina into rehabilitation, whichRobert and his wife had set up for her. Robert learned of Dina'sand Michael's drug use at that time. Robert stated that theCorvette was in his name, as were all the vehicles at the house,and the insurance was in his name. Robert said that Dina made thepayments on the Corvette, and she was the primary driver of theCorvette, but he had made a few payments when Dina did not have themoney. Robert said he had driven the car occasionally, but he didnot like to drive it because it was too hard to get in and out ofand it was "too fast."

Harrison asked Phyllis Doyle about her daughter Dina's druguse. She knew of Mohr's drug problem and was beginning to thinkthat Dina was involved in drugs. Phyllis said that the carbelonged to Robert and that Dina saved her money and made the downpayment and the monthly payments, but the car was in Robert's namebecause of Dina's credit and employment history. She said Dina wasthe primary driver of the Corvette except when she was unable tomake the monthly payments.

Harrison further testified that Phyllis told him that Robertthreatened to sell the Corvette and throw Dina out of the house. He also recalled Robert saying he was going to sell the car andmove to Florida. The first statement was made in reference to a 1999 arrest, and the second was made in reference to the mostrecent arrest in 2000. Phyllis told him she knew that after thefirst 1999 arrest a seizure of the car was possible. Harrisonexplained that, after the first arrest, Mineo wanted to seize thecar but explained to Phyllis that the vehicle was not going to beseized because, at that time, too much money was owed on it.

After the State rested, Robert Doyle testified that he was 62years old, that his daughter was Dina Doyle, and that he wasmarried to Phyllis Doyle. He had a 40-year-old daughter and a 22-year-old son. Robert said he had previously purchased a 1995Corvette but it was "totaled" by his son in July 1999. It wasstipulated that Robert received a check from the insurance companyfor the loss in the amount of $17,070.09. The insurance companyhad paid out a partial initial check in the amount of $9,322.41that was placed into a savings account with his daughter at WestSuburban Bank. He also had a joint checking account with Dina atSt. Paul.

Dina went with Robert to purchase the 1998 Corvette atWoodfield Chevrolet. After agreeing on the purchase, Robert told Dina to write out a check for the down payment from their jointchecking account because she had her check with her. She had herown checks without Robert's name on them. Robert paid for theinsurance on both Corvettes. He had the authority to say whocould use the car and when. He stated he had barred Dina fromusing the car many times. His son, Leon, used the car many times.

Robert testified that, on the day the 1998 Corvette wasseized, he had not given Mohr permission to go inside the car anddid not know that Mohr had drugs on him. Robert made payments onthe car. Dina also made some payments when Robert gave her themoney. His son also made payments when Robert gave him the money. Robert had told Harrison that they all made payments on the car asthere were times when Robert could not make it to the bank. Robertadmitted that he told Dina, his wife, and the police that he wasgoing to sell the car because of what was going on. The loan forthe car at La Salle Bank was in the name of Robert and Phyllis, andthe bank was demanding payment from Robert. Robert claimed thatthe Corvettes were used as family cars.

On cross-examination, Robert further testified that he ownedfour "family" cars and any of the family members could drive any ofthe cars. His son had a 1996 Lincoln Continental, which Phyllisand Robert also drove, but it was in Robert's name. Robert alsohad a Beretta that he and his wife drove. All the family driverswere listed on the insurance policy that Robert maintained.

Robert explained that Dina went to pick out the Corvette withhim because he needed a licensed driver to drive it home. He didnot know what Dina's credit was like as he never asked her, but shehad accounts with department stores, so he surmised she must havehad some credit. She never had a car titled in her name. Robertdenied that Dina was a "co-buyer." When asked to explain why Dinasigned her name as co-buyer on exhibit No. 1, Robert explained thatshe would then be entitled to drive the car home under theinsurance policy. He insisted that he, not Dina, bought the car.

He acknowledged that Dina wrote the check for $15,000 on theirjoint account but he did not have his checkbook with him that day,as it did not occur to him that he might need his checkbook to buya car.

Robert admitted that on August 13, 1999, when Mohr and Dinawere arrested for possession of heroin, Robert knew then or shortlythereafter that Mohr was a drug user. He was upset and threatenedto take the car away from Dina "[t]hat time and times before thatalso." Robert stated that he had been handicapped for 10 years andwalked with a cane, and it was "pretty tough" for him to get in andout of the Corvette. When asked why Dina signed the papers at thedealership, Robert first stated it was because the office was onthe second floor and there was no elevator. He then explainedthat, although he could have gone to the second floor, it did notseem to be "that big of a thing for her to go up and sign as me." The trial court found that the State had met its burden ofshowing that Dina was the owner of the Corvette within the meaningof the statute, despite the casual use of the vehicle by others andthe title in Robert's name. The court found by a preponderance ofthe evidence that the vehicle was used to facilitate Mohr'spossessory drug offense, and the car was ordered forfeited.

In denying Robert's motion to reconsider, the court explainedthat a number of factors supported its finding that Dina was "theowner" of the Corvette. Dina signed most of the documents at thetime of the purchase; she was seen driving the car on numerousoccasions; she was the subject of two prior arrests for possessionof heroin while in the vehicle; many aspects of Robert's testimonywere either incredible or improbable; and the court observedRobert's demeanor and determined that he would have had difficultygetting in and out of the car. Additionally, Dina had written thecheck, and there was testimony that she made payments on thevehicle. The court concluded that Robert was merely the holder of"naked title" to the car. The court also determined that the carprovided a dimension of privacy that facilitated the use orpossession of a controlled substance.

Because the trial court is best suited to evaluate thetestimony of the witnesses and to draw reasonable inferences fromthe evidence, this court will not reverse an order of forfeitureunless the trial court's decision is against the manifest weight ofthe evidence. See People v. One 1982 Maroon Ford Mustang, 258 Ill.App. 3d 127, 132 (1994). We must consider whether the Corvette was"used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner tofacilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, orconcealment of" a controlled substance pursuant to section505(a)(3) of the Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/505(a)(3) (West2000)). We must consider first whether the State sufficientlyshowed the existence of probable cause for the forfeiture of thecar. Next, we consider whether the trial court properly found thatDina was the owner of the car for statutory purposes and whetherRobert failed to prove his innocent owner defense by apreponderance of the evidence.

In an effort to deter drug offenses, the Forfeiture Act, whichtook effect in 1990, sets out uniform procedures for the seizureand forfeiture of property under the Substances Act. TheForfeiture Act is to be liberally construed to effectuate itsremedial purpose (725 ILCS 150/13 (West 2000)). People v.$1,124,905 U.S. Currency & One 1988 Chevrolet Astro Van, 177 Ill.2d 314, 326 (1997); People v. $52,204.00 United States Currency,252 Ill. App. 3d 778, 782 (1993). With respect to a forfeitureproceeding, the Forfeiture Act controls over the Substances Act.

We first state the burden of proof in this proceeding underthe Forfeiture Act. This Act provides that the State shall havethe initial burden to "show the existence of probable cause forforfeiture of the property." 725 ILCS 150/9 (G) (West 2000); AstroVan, 177 Ill. 2d at 326. Where the State satisfies its burden ofestablishing probable cause, then the burden shifts to the claimantto show by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is notsubject to forfeiture. 725 ILCS 150/9(G) (West 2000); People v.1515 Coolidge Avenue, Aurora, Illinois, 308 Ill. App. 3d 805, 810(1999). During the State's probable cause portion of the proceeding, "the court must receive and consider, among otherthings, all relevant hearsay evidence and information" (725 ILCS150/9(B) (West 2000)), whereas during all other portions of theproceeding, the law of evidence related to civil actions applies(725 ILCS 150/9(B)(West 2000)). Astro Van, 177 Ill. 2d at 326-27. The trial court may rely on circumstantial evidence to assist inestablishing probable cause to support the forfeiture of theproperty. $52,204.00, 252 Ill. App. 3d at 782.

In People v. 1946 Buick, VIN 34423520, 127 Ill. 2d 374 (1989),the court considered the meaning of an earlier but similar versionof section 505(a)(3) of the Substances Act, which provided that avehicle is subject to forfeiture if it is used or intended for use"in any manner to facilitate any violation of this Act." Ill. Rev.Stat. 1985, ch. 56