The trial court granted the motion of defendant, Michael K.Balsley, to quash a warrant to search defendant's home and tosuppress evidence found during the search. On appeal, the Stateargues that (1) where officers search curbside trash near aresidence and recover contraband and documents linking a suspectand the trash to that residence, probable cause exists to searchthe residence and (2) during the suppression hearing, the trialcourt erred in admitting defendant's affidavit and thus allowingdefendant to avoid testifying. We reverse.

Before the police searched defendant's home, Illinois StatePolice Inspector Robbie Dail filed a complaint for a searchwarrant. The complaint identified as the target of the proposedsearch the single-family dwelling at 377 Wheaton Avenue in Dixon. Dail averred that on Tuesday July 27, 1999, he and Officer J. GaryCooper retrieved one bag of garbage from a garbage can sitting onthe side of the street and near the mailbox at 377 Wheaton. Tuesday was the day that garbage in that area usually wascollected, and the garbage can was sitting in the place from whichgarbage typically was removed. Dail averred further that hesearched the garbage bag and found "very small" pieces of cannabis,a "Com-Ed letter addressed to Mike Balsley, 377 Wheaton Avenue,Dixon, Illinois, and a NICOR bill addressed to Mike Balsley" at thesame address.

Judge Payne issued a search warrant, which was executed onJuly 30, 1999. Thereafter, the State charged defendant with theunlawful possession of more than 5,000 grams of a substancecontaining cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(g) (West 1998)) and theunlawful possession, with the intent to deliver, of more than 5,000grams of a substance containing cannabis (720 ILCS 550/5(g) (West1998)). Defendant moved to quash the warrant and to suppress theevidence recovered during the search of his home.

During the hearing on the motion, defendant called Dail, whotestified that he went to 377 Wheaton Avenue at about 8 a.m. onJuly 27, 1999. Dail saw a garbage can sitting on the side of thestreet. He estimated that the garbage can was between 5 and 20feet from the mailbox at that address. Dail identified aphotograph of the residence. The photograph shows a mailbox nextto the street. There is a tree in the yard, and the tree appearsto be several feet to the right of the mailbox. Dail testifiedthat the garbage was sitting between the mailbox and the tree. Inside the garbage can was a white garbage bag that was tied shut. The residence nearest to 377 Wheaton was about 100 yards away.

Dail testified that he had been investigating defendant sinceJanuary 1998 and had most recently been to 377 Wheaton Avenue oneor two days before July 27, 1999. Dail could not remember whetherany garbage was out on that day.

On July 27, Dail left 377 Wheaton and returned with Cooper atabout 8:30 a.m. Dail retrieved the garbage bag and placed it inhis vehicle. He drove to Cooper's home to inspect the garbage. The bag itself was knotted shut, and no twist tie was used. Because the bag was tightly tied, Dail had trouble opening it. Heremoved and inspected each item in the bag. In the bag, Dail foundfour or five very small pieces of plant material that appeared tobe cannabis. The pieces were not contained in any additionalpackaging. A field test of one of the pieces returned a positiveresult for cannabis. Also, Dail found the two pieces of mailaddressed to defendant at 377 Wheaton. Dail placed the cannabis inan evidence bag and discarded the remaining trash.

Dail testified further that he thought it was possible thatcannabis grew wild in the area near 377 Wheaton. Dail knew thatdefendant owned a dog and acknowledged the possibility that thesmall pieces were wild cannabis that was carried into the home. Dail attached a photograph of the residence to the complaint forthe search warrant and participated in executing the warrant. Cooper's testimony substantially coroborated that of Dail.

Phillip Geil testified that he had worked for Rock ValleyDisposal since 1993. On July 27, 1999, he was working as a trashcollector, and 377 Wheaton was on his route. Tuesday was theregular collection day for that area. Geil's garbage truck wasabout 30 feet long. Geil viewed the same photograph that Dail hadidentified earlier. The photograph showed a garbage can sittingnext to the street and to the right of the tree. Geil recalledthat the garbage always was left in the same location as depictedin the photograph and never near the mailbox. If the garbage werenear the mailbox, Geil would have to back up his truck to reach it. On July, 27, 1999, Geil removed one garbage bag from the garbagecan sitting on the curb.

Over the State's objection, the trial court admitteddefendant's affidavit. The affidavit stated that defendant neverplaced his trash near the mailbox but instead placed it at thelocation depicted on the photograph. The distance between thatlocation and the place where the officers claimed to have found thegarbage was 48 feet. Defendant averred further that he left thegarbage at that location so that the trash collector would not haveto back up his truck to reach it.

The State recalled Dail, who testified that the garbage bag heremoved did not have any holes in it. There were no other bags inthe garbage can.

The trial court found that, because no one observed defendantcarrying the trash out to the curb, People v. Burmeister, 313 Ill.App. 3d 152 (2000), required that defendant's motion be granted. The State timely appealed.

When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppressevidence, we accord great deference to the trial court's factualfindings and will reverse them only if they are against themanifest weight of the evidence. People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d425, 431 (2001). Next, we review de novo the trial court'sdecision to suppress the evidence. People v. Mabry, 304 Ill. App.3d 61, 64 (1999).

A judge may issue a search warrant for the seizure of evidenceof a crime if a person submits a complaint "which states factssufficient to show probable cause and which particularly describesthe place or person, or both, to be searched and the things to beseized." 725 ILCS 5/108--3(a) (West 2000). By placing a trashcontainer on the curb for collection, a defendant terminates anypossessory or ownership interest in the contents. This abandonmentof the trash ends the defendant's privacy expectation in it, andthe fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches andseizures does not apply. People v. Pacheco, 281 Ill. App. 3d 179,183-84 (1996). Thus, the police officers properly conducted awarrantless search of defendant's trash. They could use theevidence discovered to obtain a search warrant, however, only ifthe complaint for the search warrant established probable causethat the curbside evidence came from the residence to be searched. Burmeister, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 155.

This appeal turns on the application of Burmeister. There,the police likewise collected trash bags from the curb in front ofthe defendants' residence and found small amounts of contraband. No one saw any of the defendants carry the bags out to the curb. The complaint for a search warrant was based on the search of thetrash and "tips from 'anonymous sources.' " Burmeister, 313 Ill.App. 3d at 153. The trial court granted the motion to suppressevidence. This court held that "when an application for a searchwarrant is based on contraband discovered in curbside trash,probable cause exists to search the home only if the applicationincludes a reliable eyewitness account of the defendant depositingthe trash." Burmeister, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 159. In reaching thisconclusion, the court noted that trash is readily accessible toanimals, children, scavengers, and snoops. Burmeister, 313 Ill.App. 3d at 155. Because the warrant application failed to link thecurbside contraband to the defendants or their residence, the trialcourt's ruling was affirmed. Burmeister, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 158.

The State asked the Burmeister court to hold that the merepresence of contraband in curbside trash creates probable cause tosearch the nearest residence. The court replied that "[i]f weadopted such a rule, anyone could deposit contraband in the trash,alert the police, and watch as the victim's residence wassearched." Burmeister, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 158.

Relying on the reasoning set forth in State v. Erickson, 496N.W.2d 555 (N.D. 1993), the State argues that Burmeister isdistinguishable. We agree. In Erickson, the trash retrieved froma Dumpster behind the defendant's home contained a traffic ticketissued to the defendant, a letter addressed to him, and evidence ofcannabis trafficking. The court held that the evidence supplied asufficient nexus between the contraband, the defendant, and thehome to be searched to support a finding of probable cause. Erickson, 496 N.W.2d at 559; see also State v. Bordner, 53 S.W.3d179, 182 (Mo. App. 2001) (probable cause to search defendant's homeexisted where search of trash outside defendant's home revealedproducts commonly used to manufacture methamphetamine and policereceived reports that defendant was using and manufacturing thedrug in his home).

The Burmeister court concluded that it did not need to decidewhether to follow Erickson because Erickson was distinguishable. Burmeister, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 157. In Burmeister, there was noevidence that the trash contained any "indices of residency", suchas mail, linking the trash to the defendants' residence. Burmeister, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 157.

Although this cause is very similar to Burmeister, we concludethat it is distinguishable on its facts. The Burmeister court heldthat where there are no "indices of residency" a reliableeyewitness account of the suspect depositing the trash is requiredto establish probable cause to search the suspect's home. Because such evidence was present here, the trial court incorrectly appliedBurmeister and granted defendant's motion to suppress.

Here, the testimony of the witnesses allays the Burmeistercourt's clearly expressed concern about tampering. The garbage bag was tightly tied shut, and there was no evidence of tampering.

In summary, the facts disclosed at the hearing are sufficientto support the well-established legal principles for establishingprobable cause and to distinguish this case from Burmeister. Thesefacts include the location of the garbage in relation to thelocation of the residence, the nature of the residential area, theamount of cannabis, the identifiers inside the garbage bag, and themanner in which the garbage bag was secured and its condition.

The judgment of the circuit court of Lee County is reversed.

Reversed.

BOWMAN and KAPALA, JJ., concur.