JUSTICE CALLUM delivered the opinion of the court:

The State petitioned to adjudicate defendant, Javier M.Beltran, a delinquent minor. Then, pursuant to section 5--805(2)of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act) (705 ILCS 405/5--805(2)(West 1998)), the State moved to prosecute defendant under thecriminal law. The juvenile court granted that motion, and a juryconvicted defendant of three counts of attempted first-degreemurder (720 ILCS 5/8--4(a), 9--1(a)(1) (West 1998)) and threecounts of aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24--1.2(a)(2) (West 1998)). On two of the attempt counts, the trialcourt sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms totaling 21years. On the remaining counts, the court imposed concurrenteight-year sentences. Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) section5--805(2) of the Act violated his right to due process of law (U.S.Const., amend. XIV); (2) the trial court erred in instructing thejury on accountability; (3) the convictions of aggravated dischargeof a firearm violated the one-act, one-crime rule; and (4) theimposition of consecutive sentences violated defendant's dueprocess rights (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Apprendi v. New Jersey,530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000)). Weaffirm in part and vacate in part.

I. FACTS

In its petition for adjudication, the State alleged thatdefendant had committed multiple counts of attempted first-degreemurder, a Class X felony (720 ILCS 5/8--4(c)(1) (West 1998)), andaggravated discharge of a firearm. On the date of the allegedoffenses, defendant was 15 years old. In its motion to prosecute,the State asserted the existence of probable cause to believe thepetition's allegations. See 705 ILCS 405/5--805(2)(a) (West 1998).

At a hearing, the State presented evidence to establishprobable cause, and the juvenile court found it sufficient. Afterthe presentation of additional evidence, the court determined thatdefendant had the burden to rebut the presumption that he should beprosecuted. See 705 ILCS 405/5--805(2)(a) (West 1998). The courtconsidered the statutory factors (705 ILCS 405/5--805(2)(b) (West1998)) and concluded that the presumption stood. Accordingly, thecourt granted the State's motion.

A grand jury indicted defendant. At trial, the Statepresented the following evidence relevant to our analysis. EloyCerenil (Eloy) testified that on April 10, 1999, about 8:15 p.m.,he was in his driveway with Rolando Cerenil (Rolando) and ArturoGarcia. Eloy heard gunfire, and a bullet hit him. The bulletpenetrated his spine and left him paralyzed from the waist down. He did not see who shot him.

Rolando testified that he heard six or seven shots. Defendantwas the shooter, and Adam Luna was with him.

Garcia testified that defendant fired five shots and that Lunawas at his side, also holding a gun. A bullet grazed Garcia. Defendant and Luna ran off.

After defendant presented evidence of an alibi, the Stateproffered a jury instruction on accountability (see IllinoisPattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 5.03 (4th ed. 2000)). Defendant objected, arguing that there had been no "indication ofaccountability." Nevertheless, relying on People v. Testa, 261Ill. App. 3d 1025 (1994), the trial court found the instructionappropriate because the evidence suggested that two people were"acting together" in the shooting.

In denying his posttrial motion, the court rejecteddefendant's constitutional attack on section 5--805(2) of the Act. Pursuant to section 5--8--4(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections(the Code) (730 ILCS 5/5--8--4(a) (West 1998)), the court imposedconsecutive sentences upon finding that defendant inflicted "severebodily injury" and committed his offenses "as part of a singlecourse of conduct during which there was no substantial change inthe nature of the criminal objective." 730 ILCS 5/5--8--4(a) (West1998). In denying defendant's motion to reconsider, the courtdeclined to merge the aggravated discharge counts into the attemptcounts. Defendant appealed.

II. SECTION 5--805(2) OF THE ACT

Defendant argues that, in two respects, section 5--805(2)violates due process. First, he asserts that the statute runsafoul of Apprendi. Although he did not raise that claim in thetrial court, a constitutional challenge may be raised at any time. People v. Vilces, 321 Ill. App. 3d 937, 943 (2001). Second, hecontends that the statute shifts to the minor an impermissibleburden. The trial court rejected that claim, but our review is denovo. See People v. Carney, 196 Ill. 2d 518, 526 (2001).

A. The Statute

In general, when the State petitions for an adjudication ofdelinquency, the minor is subject only to the sanctions availableunder the Act. See 705 ILCS 405/5--120 (West 1998). The mostserious of those sanctions is the minor's commitment to thejuvenile division of the Department of Corrections until his 21st birthday. See 705 ILCS 405/5--750 (West 1998). However, in somecircumstances, the State may move the juvenile court to transferthe case to the criminal court, allowing the State to pursue thesanctions available under the criminal law. Depending on thefacts, a transfer may be mandatory (705 ILCS 405/5--805(1) (West1998)), presumptive (705 ILCS 405/5--805(2) (West 1998)), ordiscretionary (705 ILCS 405/5--805(3) (West 1998)). Here, theState obtained a presumptive transfer under section 5--805(2).

To seek a presumptive transfer, the State must allege that (1)the minor committed, e.g., a Class X felony (other than armedviolence) or aggravated discharge of a firearm; and (2) the minorwas at least 15 years old. 705 ILCS 405/5--805(2)(a) (West 1998). If the juvenile court finds "probable cause to believe that theallegations *** are true," there arises a "rebuttable presumption" that the case should be transferred. 705 ILCS 405/5--805(2)(a)(West 1998). The court then "shall enter an order permittingprosecution under the criminal laws" unless, after consideringseveral enumerated factors, the court finds "clear and convincingevidence that the minor would be amenable to the care, treatment,and training programs available through the facilities of thejuvenile court." 705 ILCS 405/5--805(2)(b) (West 1998).

B. Apprendi

In this now-famous case, the defendant pleaded guilty to asecond-degree offense. Ordinarily, such an offense was punishableby 5 to 10 years' imprisonment. However, under New Jersey's "hatecrime" law, the trial court could impose a sentence of up to 20years if it found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that thedefendant's purpose had been to intimidate the victim because of,e.g., the victim's race. In Apprendi, the trial court made such afinding and sentenced the defendant to 12 years' imprisonment.

The Supreme Court determined that, in essence, the "hatecrime" law allowed the trial court to find, by a preponderance ofthe evidence, an element of the defendant's crime. Such aprocedure violated the defendant's due process right to " 'a jurydetermination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crimewith which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.' " SeeApprendi, 530 U.S. at 477, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 447, 120 S. Ct. at2356, quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510, 132 L.Ed. 2d 444, 449, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2313 (1995). Thus, the Courtheld that, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any factthat increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribedstatutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond areasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63.

Here, defendant submits the following. When the Statepetitioned to adjudicate him delinquent, he faced a sanction nogreater than commitment until his 21st birthday. However, afterthe juvenile court found (1) probable cause to believe the State'sallegations and (2) a lack of clear and convincing evidence ofdefendant's amenability to the juvenile court's facilities,defendant faced (and ultimately received) a much greater sanction. Thus, in violation of Apprendi, the maximum penalty was increasedupon facts that were not submitted to a jury and proved beyond areasonable doubt.

Superficially, defendant appears to proffer a validapplication of Apprendi. Nevertheless, his argument fails becausehe attempts to divorce the case's holding from its legal basis. New Jersey's "hate crime" law violated due process because, as theaccused in a criminal prosecution, the defendant had the right tohave a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, the facts thatestablished the maximum penalty. A hearing under section 5--805(2), however, is a juvenile proceeding. Thus, whether defendantwas denied due process depends on the standards applicable to thoseproceedings, rather than those applicable to criminal prosecutions. See People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289, 301-02 (1979).

It is well established that, in a juvenile proceeding, dueprocess does not require a jury. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403U.S. 528, 545-46, 29 L. Ed. 2d 647, 661, 91 S. Ct. 1976, 1986(1971); People ex rel. Carey v. Chrastka, 83 Ill. 2d 67, 74 (1980). As for the standard of proof, due process requires proof beyond areasonable doubt during the adjudicatory stage of a juvenileproceeding (In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367-68, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368,377, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1074-75 (1970)), i.e., the stage at which " 'adetermination is made as to whether a juvenile is a "delinquent" asa result of alleged misconduct on his part, with the consequencethat he may be committed to a state institution' " (Winship, 397U.S. at 358-59, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 372, 90 S. Ct. at 1069-70, quotingIn re Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 538,87 S. Ct. 1428, 1436 (1967)). However, that standard does notapply to the dispositional stage of a juvenile proceeding. SeeWinship, 397 U.S. at 359 n.1, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 372 n.1, 90 S. Ct. at1070 n.1.

A hearing under section 5--805(2) is dispositional, notadjudicatory. That is, the hearing determines not the minor'sguilt but the forum in which his guilt may be adjudicated. Taylor,76 Ill. 2d at 302. Thus, although the juvenile court made findingsthat exposed him to a greater sanction, defendant had no dueprocess right to have a jury make those findings beyond areasonable doubt. Because Apprendi bears only on the process duein criminal proceedings, the case is simply inapplicable here.

C. Burdens

Defendant asserts that, once the juvenile court finds probablecause to believe the State's allegations, section 5--805(2) invokesa mandatory rebuttable presumption that shifts to the minor theburden of proof. On this basis, too, defendant contends that thestatute violates due process.

We first note that section 5--805(2) does not expressly placea burden on the minor. However, it expressly invokes a "rebuttablepresumption" (705 ILCS 405/5--805(2)(a) (West 1998)), and arebuttable presumption necessarily shifts the burden of proof (seeHeiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 329, 76 L. Ed. 772, 780, 52 S. Ct.358, 362 (1932)). Thus, once the presumption arose, the juvenilecourt correctly inferred that defendant had the statutory burden torebut it.

We further note that defendant correctly labels this amandatory presumption, rather than a permissive one. A permissivepresumption allows but does not require the fact finder to inferthe presumed fact. A mandatory presumption, on the other hand, isone that the fact finder may not reject. People v. Watts, 181 Ill.2d 133, 142 (1998). Section 5--805(2) states that, unless thepresumption is rebutted, the juvenile court "shall enter an orderpermitting prosecution under the criminal laws." (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5--805(2)(b) (West 1998). In other words, unless thepresumption is rebutted, the court must accept the presumed factthat a transfer is warranted. Thus, the presumption is mandatory. See People v. O'Brien, 197 Ill. 2d 88, 93 (2001) ("shall" is "aclear expression of legislative intent to impose a mandatoryobligation").

A mandatory rebuttable presumption violates due process whenit relieves the State of its burden to prove the elements of acrime. Watts, 181 Ill. 2d at 144-47. However, in consideringstatutes similar to section 5--805(2), courts across the countryhave unanimously upheld such presumptions. For example, in In reWelfare of L.J.S., 539 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), theMinnesota Court of Appeals addressed a virtually identical statute. The court noted that the presumption at issue does not shift theburden of proof on the elements of an offense. Instead, thepresumption "merely determines which court will try the case andevaluate the elements of the offense." (Emphasis added.) L.J.S.,539 N.W.2d at 413; see also State v. Coleman, 26 P.3d 613, 618(Kan. 2001) ("The presumption does not improperly shift the burdenof proof to the defendant on any elements of the offenses");Commonwealth v. Cotto, 708 A.2d 806, 814 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998)(because transfer hearing determines only "the appropriate forumfor the adjudicatory proceeding," burden on minor "does not violatethe maxim that the Commonwealth is charged with proving eachelement of an offense").

As we noted in the preceding section, our own supreme courthas recognized that a transfer hearing resolves only whether theadjudicatory proceeding will occur in the juvenile forum. Taylor,76 Ill. 2d at 302. The court has further noted that a minor has noconstitutional right to be adjudicated in that forum. People v.J.S., 103 Ill. 2d 395, 402 (1984). Indeed, the legislature choseto create the juvenile court (J.S., 103 Ill. 2d at 402), and thelegislature could choose to abolish it. See Coleman, 26 P.3d at616 ("The special treatment of juvenile offenders *** results fromstatutory authority, which can be withdrawn"). Thus, thelegislature was free to impose on the minor the burden to provethat he belongs in that forum. Regardless whether he meets thatburden, the State retains the ultimate burden to prove the elementsof the crime, and the minor is afforded due process of law.

III. ACCOUNTABILITY

Next, defendant argues that the State failed to submitsufficient evidence to justify instructing the jury onaccountability. He asserts that the evidence showed that he wasguilty as a principal or not guilty at all. We disagree.

A defendant is legally accountable for another's conduct when,before or during the commission of a crime, and with the intent topromote or facilitate the commission of that crime, he solicits,aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid the other in the planningor commission of the crime. 720 ILCS 5/5--2(c) (West 1998); Testa,261 Ill. App. 3d at 1030. An instruction on the issue is justifiedif the State submits even the "slightest" evidence to support atheory of accountability. Testa, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 1030. Suchevidence, along with evidence that the defendant acted as aprincipal, is sufficient to support an instruction on each theory,even if the State advanced only one in its case in chief. Testa,261 Ill. App. 3d at 1030. We may reverse a trial court's decisionto issue a jury instruction only if the court abused itsdiscretion. People v. Kidd, 295 Ill. App. 3d 160, 167 (1998).

Defendant notes that only two witnesses identified a specificshooter and that both identified defendant. No one testified thatshots were fired by anyone else for whom defendant could have beenaccountable. Thus, defendant concludes, no evidence justified aninstruction on accountability.

We acknowledge the absence of any direct evidence that anyonebut defendant fired shots. However, evidence of accountability maybe circumstantial. People v. Cooks, 253 Ill. App. 3d 184, 188(1993). Garcia testified that, as defendant fired his shots, Lunawas at his side, holding a gun. Furthermore, Garcia stated thatdefendant fired five shots, but Rolando testified that he heard sixor seven. Thus, although no one saw Luna fire his gun, the jurycould have inferred that he did so. The jury then could havedetermined that, to the extent that Luna was guilty as a principal,defendant was guilty as an accessory.

Defendant relies on People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1 (1994),People v. Crowder, 239 Ill. App. 3d 1027 (1993), and People v.Lusietto, 41 Ill. App. 3d 205 (1976). However, in each case, theState presented no evidence to even suggest that the defendantcould have been guilty as an accessory rather than a principal. See Williams, 161 Ill. 2d at 51; Crowder, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 1030;Lusietto, 41 Ill. App. 3d at 207-08. As we explained, that is notthe case here. The trial court did not err in instructing the juryon accountability.

IV. ONE ACT, ONE CRIME

Defendant asserts that his convictions of aggravated dischargeof a firearm arose from the same physical act as his convictions ofattempted first-degree murder. Thus, he concludes, the aggravateddischarge convictions must be vacated under the one-act, one-crimerule. See People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566 (1977). The Stateagrees, and so do we.

In People v. Crespo, No. 86556 (February 16, 2001), thedefendant stabbed the victim three times in rapid succession. Thedefendant was charged with, and convicted of, armed violence andaggravated battery. The supreme court held that, although themultiple stabbings could have supported the separate convictions,the State did not apportion the crimes among the various wounds,either in the indictment or at trial. Because the State portrayedthe defendant's conduct as a single attack, multiple convictionswere untenable.

Crespo controls. Here, defendant and Luna fired a series ofshots at three victims. Against each victim, defendant was chargedwith, and convicted of, a count of attempt and a count ofaggravated discharge. However, as to each victim, the indictmentdid not specify which shots supported which charge. Similarly, attrial, the State did not distinguish among the shots. Thus,against each victim, defendant committed a single act thatsupported only a single conviction. Because aggravated dischargeof a firearm is less serious than attempted first-degree murder, wevacate the aggravated discharge convictions. See People v. Amaya,321 Ill. App. 3d 923, 931 (2001).

V. CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES

Finally, defendant attacks section 5--8--4(a) of the Code, thebasis for his consecutive sentences. He notes that, to invokesection 5--8--4(a), the trial court found that he inflicted "severebodily injury" and committed his crimes "as part of a single courseof conduct during which there was no substantial change in thenature of the criminal objective." 730 ILCS 5/5--8--4(a) (West1998). He concludes that, under Apprendi, due process requiredthose facts to be submitted to a jury and proved beyond areasonable doubt.

In Carney, 196 Ill. 2d at 531-32, the supreme court forecloseddefendant's argument:

"While, undeniably, a defendant who receives consecutivesentences will serve a longer period of imprisonment than adefendant who receives identical concurrent sentences, thisfact alone does not make Apprendi applicable. The applicationby a judge of the factors identified in section 5--8--4(a) ofthe Code determines only the manner in which a defendant willserve his sentences for multiple offenses. The defendant isnot exposed to punishment beyond that authorized by the jury'sverdict, provided that the sentence for each separate offensedoes not exceed the maximum permitted by statute for thatoffense."

The court concluded "that consecutive sentences imposed undersection 5--8--4(a) of the Code do not violate the due processrights of defendants and that the Supreme Court's Apprendi decisiondoes not apply to such sentences." Carney, 196 Ill. 2d at 536.

In accordance with Carney, we reject defendant's argument.

VI. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we vacate defendant's convictions ofaggravated discharge of a firearm. In all other respects, thejudgment of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed.

Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

GEIGER and BYRNE, JJ., concur.