JUSTICE BOWMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant, James E. Black,pleaded guilty to home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12--11(a)(1) (West1998)). In exchange for the guilty plea, the State agreed to dropthree other charges that were pending against defendant, but noagreement was made about defendant's sentence. At the timedefendant pleaded guilty, no evidence about the victims' ages waspresented to the court. However, at the sentencing hearing, thecourt found that defendant would be sentenced to an extended-termof imprisonment because the victims of the home invasion were over60 years old. See 730 ILCS 5/5--5--3.2(b)(4)(ii) (West 1998). Once the court determined that defendant was eligible for anextended sentence, the court evaluated the various aggravating andmitigating factors and sentenced defendant to 40 years'imprisonment. Defendant moved to reconsider his sentence, and thetrial court granted the motion, reducing defendant's sentence to 34years' imprisonment. Defendant appeals, arguing that his extended-term sentence was improper underApprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). We vacatedefendant's sentence and remand the cause.

Before defendant pleaded guilty, the trial court adviseddefendant that home invasion was a Class X felony. As such,defendant could be sentenced to between 6 and 30 years'imprisonment. The trial court also told defendant that if anextended-term sentence applied, defendant could face 30 to 60years' imprisonment. The factual basis for defendant's plearevealed that on December 13, 1993, defendant went to the Elginhome of Charles Jewel and Jewel's wife. While armed with adangerous weapon, defendant and his codefendants threatened theJewels and robbed them. The State failed to tell the court thatthe Jewels were over 60 years old when defendant robbed them.

At the sentencing hearing, Charles Jewel testified that he was67 years old when the home invasion occurred, and Jewel's wife was64 years old. During the State's closing arguments, the assistantState's Attorney argued that defendant should be sentenced to anextended-term of imprisonment because the victims of the homeinvasion were over 60 years old. The court asked defendant'sattorney if he had an argument to present on that issue, and theattorney said no. The court then found that defendant was eligiblefor an extended-term sentence.

The closing arguments continued, and, when the argumentsconcluded, the court began to evaluate the various aggravating andmitigating factors that were presented. During a discussion ofthese factors the court made the following statement:

"The defendant committed the offense against persons 60years of age or older. Okay, but I would not use that interms of *** adding on more years in terms of the aggravationif we get to the extended term[.] ***

Legislature has put up and allows me to take in a lot ofdifferent factors and a lot of different issues and one of thethings that the legislature has asked me to do is to look atand gives me the option to make extended term on behalf ofcrimes committed against senior citizens. And that certainlywas here and it was certainly terror.

So first of all is that I'm going to impose extendedterm."

The court then assessed the various aggravating and mitigatingfactors and found that a 40-year sentence was appropriate. Defendant moved to reconsider his sentence, and the trial courtgranted the motion, reducing defendant's sentence to 34 years'imprisonment. This timely appeal followed.

Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it imposed anextended-term sentence because under Apprendi the fact warrantingan extended-term sentence here, i.e., the age of the victims, wasneither charged in the indictment nor proved beyond a reasonabledoubt at trial. The State suggests that Apprendi does not applybecause defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment that waswithin the sentencing range for this offense. The State claimsthat the single sentencing range for each class of felony includesthe minimum term available under section 5--8--1 of the UnifiedCode of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5--8--1 (West 1998)) and themaximum term available under the extended-term sentencingprovisions.

We determine that the State's argument is not persuasive. There are two cases that support defendant's argument and ourconclusion. In People v. Thurow, 318 Ill. App. 3d 128, 135 (2001),the Third District concluded that during the trial the trier offact must make a specific finding about the victim's age before thecourt can impose an extended sentence using the victim's age as thebasis for the extended-term sentence.

After Thurow was decided, this court decided People v.Chanthaloth, 318 Ill. App. 3d 806 (2001). In Chanthaloth the ageof the victim was presented to the jury, and the defendant did notchallenge that evidence. Chanthaloth, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 818. Therefore, under a strict interpretation of Apprendi, the trialcourt properly imposed an extended-term sentence using the age ofthe victim as the basis for imposing an extended-term sentence. Chanthaloth, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 818. However, this court alsonoted that in imposing an extended-term sentence the trial courtconsidered not only the age of the victim but also the nature ofthe crime and the fact that the victim was handicapped. Chanthaloth, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 818. Because the trial courtconsidered these other factors in addition to the age of thevictim, this court remanded the cause so that the defendant couldbe resentenced. Chanthaloth, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 818.

Here, no evidence of the victims' ages was presented to thecourt when defendant pleaded guilty. Thus, the trial court failedto find during the guilty plea proceedings that the victims of thehome invasion were over 60 years old. When defendant pleadedguilty he did not know that he was giving up his right to have theState prove that the victims were over 60 years old. Because thefact that the victims were over 60 years old increased the penaltythat defendant faced and no evidence was presented regarding thisfact during the guilty plea proceedings, we conclude thatdefendant's extended-term sentence must be vacated.

The dissent maintains that defendant "was on notice" that theage of the victims could be relevant because he knew that an oldercouple lived in the residence involved in the crime and because hechided one of the other individuals involved in the burglary fortaking the " 'old woman's jewelry.' " Slip op. at 9. We fail tosee how these two facts informed defendant that the victims' agewas a factor that the court could consider in sentencing defendant.

Moreover, we find distinguishable the cases relied upon by thedissent to support its position that the State's failure to informthe trial court of the age of the victims at the plea hearingconstituted harmless error. See People v. Blackwell, 325 Ill. App.3d 354 (2001); People v. Peacock, 324 Ill. App. 3d 749 (2001); People v. Pearson, 324 Ill. App. 3d 622 (2001);People v. Rohlfs,322 Ill. App. 3d 965 (2001). In Blackwell, Peacock, Pearson, and Rohlfs, undisputed evidence was presented during trial that thevictim's age was 60 years or older. In each of these cases theappellate court found that, although the victim's age was notsubmitted to the trier of fact for proof beyond a reasonable doubt,it was unlikely that the trier of fact could have found a differentage, given the undisputed evidence of age. Consequently, wherethere was evidence before the trial court of a factor used insentencing, the failure to submit that fact to the trier of factfor proof beyond a reasonable doubt was harmless error. Blackwell,325 Ill. App. 3d at 359-60; Peacock, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 760-61; Pearson, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 628;Rohlfs, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 972. Here, as noted above, there was no evidence presented to the trialcourt during the guilty plea proceedings regarding the victims'ages.

The dissent relies on our treatment of the defendant's Apprendi claim in People v. Chandler, 321 Ill. App. 3d 292 (2001)as support for its conclusion that, by entering a guilty plea,defendant in the present case waived the right to challenge thefactor that resulted in his extended sentence. The dissent,however, misconstrues Chandler as stating that anytime a defendantpleads guilty he waives his constitutional rights as to any claimthat occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. Furthermore,unlike the present case, the trial court in Chandler specificallyadmonished the defendant that consecutive sentences based on hisfuture dangerousness, i.e., the factor the court ultimately reliedon in imposing consecutive sentences, were a possibility. Chandler, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 297. Also, the court based thedefendant's future dangerousness not on the presence of anadditional factual element but on the number and nature of thedefendant's crimes. Here, although the trial court adviseddefendant of the sentence he could face if an extended termapplied, it did not forewarn him, prior to sentencing, regardingthe factors that could result in such a sentence.

Moreover, we consider it significant that in Chandler wedetermined that, because the defendant filed only a motion toreconsider his sentence and not a motion to withdraw his plea, itwas unclear what relief the trial court could provide if we vacatedhis sentences. Chandler, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 298. Consequently,we concluded that the defendant could not raise an Apprendi claimat that stage of the proceedings. Chandler, 321 Ill. App. 3d at298. In our view, Chandler does not provide adequate support forthe dissent's position.

The State argues that this court should affirm the trialcourt's sentencing order because section 5--5--3.2(b)(1) of theCode (730 ILCS 5/5--5--3.2(b)(1) (West 1998)) allows the trialcourt to impose an extended-term sentence when the defendant hasbeen convicted of a similar or greater class felony within the last10 years. Here, the State argues that an extended-term sentencecould properly be imposed because defendant's criminal recordrevealed that defendant was convicted of burglary of adwelling/occupied structure in Florida in 1990.

Although it appears that the trial court could have imposed anextended-term sentence based on this fact, this is not the reasonwhy the trial court chose to impose an extended-term sentence. Rather, the trial court imposed an extended-term sentencespecifically because the victims were over 60 years old. Thus, wedetermine that the State's argument lacks merit. We note, however,that our determination does not preclude the trial court on remandfrom considering defendant's prior conviction in imposing sentence.

For the above-stated reasons, we are constrained to vacate theextended-term sentence pursuant to the United State's SupremeCourt's holding in Apprendi. On remand, defendant, at a minimum, has a right to be resentenced in light of the views expressedherein. We note that while this cause was pending in this court,our legislature enacted a statute that addressed the issuepresented in Apprendi. See Public Act 91--953