People v. Ceja

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People v. Ceja

State: Illinois

Court: 2nd District Appellate

Docket No: 2-07-0293 Rel

Case Date: 03/25/2008

Preview:No. 2--07--0293

Filed: 3-25-08

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAUL C. CEJA, Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County.

No. 98--CF--1488 Honorable Kathryn E. Creswell, Judge, Presiding.

JUSTICE GROMETER delivered the opinion of the court: This case is before us on defendant Raul C. Ceja's motion for summary remand. Defendant contends that the trial court improperly dismissed his petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122--1 et seq. (West 2006)). We agree, and, for the reasons that follow, we vacate and remand. A summary of the proceedings up until this point in the litigation would be helpful in understanding our disposition of this appeal. Hence, we set forth the following. After a jury trial in 1999, defendant was convicted of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9--1 (West 1998)). On April 17, 1999, he was sentenced to death. Defendant appealed to the supreme court; that appeal was not resolved until April 2003. Meanwhile, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition in August 2001. Also, Governor George Ryan commuted defendant's sentence to natural life in prison in January 2003. After seeking and receiving several continuances, defendant, through counsel, filed

No. 2--07--0293 an amended postconviction petition on November 30, 2006. The trial court dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently without merit on February 21, 2007. Defendant appeals the trial court's decision. He reasons that since this was a capital case at the time the initial postconviction petition was filed, there was never a period during which the summary dismissal provision of the Act applied. See 725 ILCS 5/122--2.1(a) (West 2006). Further, even if the case is deemed to be a noncapital case due to the commutation of his sentence, the petition had already been pending for more than 90 days at the time the court dismissed it. Dispositive of defendant's argument is whether the filing of the amended petition triggered a new 90-day period during which the court could summarily dismiss his petition. We hold that it did not. Before turning to the substance of defendant's contentions, we will address the State's argument that defendant waived any objection to the trial court summarily dismissing his petition. Specifically, the State invokes the invited-error doctrine. See, e.g., People v. Lopez, 187 Ill. App. 3d 999, 1007 (1989). It points out that defendant caused the lengthy delay in this case by seeking a myriad of continuances before amending his petition. But for these continuances, the State reasons, the trial court would have had an opportunity to dismiss the petition summarily. The State's waiver argument breaks down, however, because, as we explain in more detail below, when defendant filed his original petition, this was a capital case. Therefore, the petition was never subject to summary dismissal. Any delay caused by defendant did not cause the trial court to lose an opportunity to dismiss the petition. Hence, the question before us is whether the trial court had the authority to dismiss defendant's amended petition. The Act establishes a three-stage procedure for adjudicating postconviction petitions. People v. Cummings, 375 Ill. App. 3d 513, 516 (2007). In the first stage,

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No. 2--07--0293 "the circuit court determines whether defendant's allegations sufficiently demonstrate a constitutional violation that would necessitate relief, and the court may summarily dismiss a petition upon finding that it is frivolous or patently without merit." Cummings, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 516; see also 725 ILCS 5/122--2.1(a)(2) (West 2006). In a noncapital case, if the petition is not dismissed in the first stage, the court may appoint counsel for an indigent defendant, counsel may amend the petition, and the State may move to dismiss the petition. People v. Rish, 344 Ill. App. 3d 1105, 1110 (2003). In the third stage, the court conducts an evidentiary hearing and considers the merits of the petition. People v. Starks, 365 Ill. App. 3d 592, 598 (2006). In a capital case, there is no provision for a stage-one dismissal of a petition as frivolous or patently without merit. See 725 ILCS 5/122--2.1(a)(1) (West 2006). In essence, since there is no stage one in a capital case, the petition is automatically docketed for further proceedings. See 725 ILCS 5/122

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