People v. Craig

SUPREME COURT CASES

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People v. Craig

State: Illinois

Court: 2nd District Appellate

Docket No: 2-06-0318 Rel

Case Date: 06/29/2007

Preview:No. 2--06--0318 Filed: 6-29-07 ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Lake County. ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) Nos. 04--CF--164 v. ) 05--CF--4166 ) LAVELL T. CRAIG, ) Honorable ) Fred L. Foreman, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court: In 1996, defendant, Lavell T. Craig, pleaded guilty to unlawful restraint (720 ILCS 5/10--3(a) (West 1996)) and was ordered to register as a sex offender. In 2005, he was charged with failing to register (730 ILCS 150/3(a) (West 2004)). The trial court dismissed the charges with prejudice, holding that requiring defendant to register as a sex offender violated his due process rights because the crime of which he was convicted did not involve a sexual component. The State appeals, contending that a rational basis exists for requiring defendant to register as a sex offender. We reverse and remand. On May 30, 1996, defendant pleaded guilty to a number of charges including unlawful restraint. The only factual basis for that charge appearing in the record was that defendant had "detained [L.B.] to some degree" without legal authority. That conviction required defendant to register as a sex offender. See 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.5) (West 1996). In 2005, defendant was

No. 2--06--0318

charged in two separate cases with failing to register as a sex offender. Defendant moved to dismiss the charges, contending that requiring him to register as a sex offender after he was convicted of an offense that was not a sex crime deprived him of due process. Defendant relied on People v. Johnson, 363 Ill. App. 3d 356 (2006), in which the First District held that the defendant could not be required to register as a sex offender after he was convicted of aggravated kidnapping. Johnson, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 363. The trial court stated that it was constrained to follow Johnson and dismissed the charges with prejudice. The State timely appealed. On appeal, the State contends that requiring a defendant convicted of unlawful restraint to register as a sex offender does not violate due process. The State further contends that, while the trial court was required to follow Johnson, this court is not so bound and should follow subsequent cases that have repudiated Johnson's holding. The Sex Offender Registration Act (the Act) provides that a sex offender shall register with the chief of police or county sheriff of any place where he or she resides for more than 10 days. 730 ILCS 150/3(a) (West 2004). As relevant here, the Act defines "sex offender" as one convicted of one or more of several enumerated offenses. 730 ILCS 150/2 (West 2004). When defendant was charged, unlawful restraint was one such offense, provided that the victim was less than 18 years old and the defendant was not the victim's parent. 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.5) (West 1996). The legislature has since amended the Act to provide that a defendant convicted of unlawful restraint need not register unless the offense was sexually motivated. Pub. Act 94--945,

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