Defendant, James V. Croft, was charged with the unlawful possession of a controlledsubstance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2002)), a Class 4 felony. Defendant filed a motion to quashhis arrest and suppress the evidence, asserting that it was obtained through an illegal seizure. Thetrial court granted defendant's motion, and the State timely appealed. We affirm.

The facts are undisputed. On July 15, 2002, Officer Anthony Row was on patrol, in uniform,in a marked squad car. Accompanying Row was his friend, Brad Gardner, a police officer from Iowawho was neither in uniform nor acting in an official capacity. At 11:15 p.m., Officer Row observeddefendant pushing his bicycle up a hill in a residential neighborhood. Defendant, wearing dark pantsand no shirt, walked his bicycle because it did not have a light. Officer Row passed defendant in hissquad car, turned around, and parked in the street. He then exited the vehicle and waited fordefendant to approach. Although the red lights were not activated, the car was partially obstructingtraffic. When defendant was within speaking distance, Officer Row identified himself, informeddefendant of several complaints of theft and vandalism in the area, and asked for identification. Defendant was not carrying tangible identification, but provided his name and date of birth. Defendant felt that it was his duty to comply with the officer's request.

After defendant identified himself, Officer Row asked where he was headed. According toOfficer Row, there had been several thefts and vandalism in the area between July 10 and 15, 2002,and it "just seemed strange" seeing defendant push a bicycle while in dark pants at 11:15 p.m. Defendant replied that he was going to see his girlfriend, Tina Fowler, and that he had been workingon the roof of her parents' home. Officer Row, who had moved into the neighborhood in February2002, "knew that she lived in that area" and that work was being done on the roof. However, OfficerRow did not recognize defendant and had not seen him in the area before. Officer Row testified thathe "was stopping [defendant] to make sure that there was [sic] nothing else going to happen."

Officer Row radioed the sheriff's department for defendant's criminal history and anyoutstanding warrants. While Officer Row was waiting for this information, Officer Hefel arrived inanother squad car and parked on the other side of the street. According to Officer Row, when anofficer effects a stop "of any kind," another officer automatically deploys to that area. During thistime, Officer Row commented on defendant's tattoo. The tattoo, located on defendant's back, wasa picture of Anamosa State Penitentiary. Officer Row had previously worked at that prison andstated that it was "a very nice tattoo." Officer Row testified that he initially saw the tattoo when hiscar's headlights illuminated defendant's bare back, although the tattoo was not the reason he initiatedcontact with defendant.

After waiting approximately 5 to 10 minutes, Officer Row was informed that defendant hadno outstanding warrants. Officer Row did receive an "officer safety alert" due to defendant's previousconvictions of assault, theft, and possession of drugs. According to Officer Row, "whenever acriminal history comes back with drugs," the dispatcher relays an officer safety alert, or "10-61,"which is code for "isolate yourself." Officer Row then turned off his portable radio and remainedoutside with defendant, while Officer Hefel closed his car door and received information from thesheriff's department.

Next, Officer Row asked defendant for consent to do a pat-down search of his person toensure that he did not have any weapons or burglary tools. Defendant agreed, turned around, andraised his arms. A pat-down of defendant's pockets and socks revealed neither weapons nor burglarytools. Officer Row then noticed that defendant was carrying a tan, transparent shopping bag, whichwas open at the top. Defendant testified that the transparent bag was hanging from his bike'shandlebars and contained a white paper bag. Officer Row asked defendant what was in the whitepaper bag, and defendant replied that it contained dirty socks. Officer Hefel asked defendant if hecould search the bag. According to defendant, he said "yeah" and began removing it from hishandlebars. Defendant testified that Officer Hefel then reached over, grabbed the bag, and startedlooking through it. Defendant agreed to the search because he felt that he "had to," and because hedid not feel that he could walk away. Defendant was subsequently arrested for unlawful possession of a substance containing methamphetamine (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2002)).

In its ruling on the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, the trial court made thefollowing findings. Based on the four previous thefts in the neighborhood, the initial encounterbetween Officer Row and defendant qualified as a community caretaking encounter. Defendantexplained where he was headed, and this explanation was consistent with Officer Row's observationthat people, in fact, had been working on the Fowlers' roof. However, the community caretakingfunction ceased at the point where defendant explained his conduct and the check on his informationrevealed no warrants. In addition, the court found that the officer safety alert did not create a basisfor a Terry stop, because there was nothing to indicate that a crime had been or was about to becommitted. The court determined that, even if the officer safety alert provided some basis for a pat-down, the issue was "not really relevant" since the pat-down failed to reveal any weapons. Accordingto the court, "the encounter should have ended" at that point. However, defendant did not feel freeto leave, due to the continued questioning and the presence of two squad cars. Because defendantwas illegally detained, his subsequent consent to the search was tainted. Accordingly, the courtgranted defendant's motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence.

The State argues that the court erred by granting defendant's motion to quash his arrest andsuppress evidence. The State does not dispute the trial court's finding that the initial contact wasproper on a community caretaking basis. Instead, the State contends that the circumstances weresufficient to transform the encounter into a Terry stop (see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 20 L. Ed.2d 889, 906-07, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)), and that the search of defendant's bag was reasonable. Defendant counters that the initial encounter was an investigative stop rather than a function ofcommunity caretaking, and that Officer Row did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion thatdefendant had committed or was about to commit a crime.

When the facts are not in dispute, as in this case, our review of a trial court's determinationon a motion to suppress evidence is de novo. People v. Avant, 331 Ill. App. 3d 144, 149 (2001). Theoretically, there are three tiers of lawful police-citizen encounters: (1) an arrest supportedby probable cause; (2) a Terry stop or brief seizure of a person that must be supported by areasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity; and (3) an encounter commonly referred toas the community caretaking or public safety function, which involves no coercion or detention andthus does not constitute a "seizure." People v. Leifker, 307 Ill. App. 3d 25, 28 (1999). Communitycaretaking is a label that describes consensual police-citizen encounters that typically involve thesafety of the public. People v. Harris, 207 Ill. 2d 515, 522 (2003). An encounter is a function ofcommunity caretaking when an officer initiates it to check on an individual's well-being, without initialthought of criminal activity. People v. Simac, 321 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1004 (2001). This function istotally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence of a violation of acriminal statute. City of Highland Park v. Lee, 291 Ill. App. 3d 48, 52 (1997).

In the present case, we are not convinced that Officer Row's initial contact with defendant fellwithin the community caretaking function. Rather, Officer Row's testimony revealed that the purposebehind the encounter was investigative. Four thefts and two incidents of vandalism were reportedthe week before the encounter. According to Officer Row, seeing defendant push a bicycle while indark pants at 11:15 p.m. "just seemed strange" and was "not a normal occurrence in thatneighborhood." Officer Row subsequently initiated the encounter "to make sure that there was [sic]nothing else going to happen."

When an officer questions an individual to check on his well-being, without initial thought ofcriminal activity, he is within the purview of community caretaking. However, Officer Row did notquestion defendant without initial suspicion of criminal activity. On the contrary, he questioneddefendant to investigate his possible involvement in recent instances of theft and vandalism in theneighborhood. See People v. Dent, 343 Ill. App. 3d 567, 578 (2003) (police are not performing acommunity caretaking function when they are specifically investigating reports of criminal activity). Because Officer Row's purpose in questioning defendant was not totally divorced from detection,investigation, or acquisition of evidence, we cannot say that he was performing communitycaretaking.

The danger of blurring the distinction between community caretaking and an investigativedetention becomes apparent when an officer claims to be engaging in community caretaking but is,in reality, investigating reports of criminal activity. For this reason, we decline to extend the label ofcommunity caretaking to the facts of this case. To hold otherwise would grant police officers theauthority to, in fact, "investigate" criminal activity under the guise of community caretaking. Practically speaking, officers would be encouraged to originate contact under this pretense with thehope that the encounter would escalate into a valid Terry stop. In effect, this is an abuse of thecommunity caretaking function. The requirement of reasonable suspicion under Terry is diluted ifofficers are permitted to "ease into" a Terry stop by first engaging in community caretaking. That said, Officer Row's initial contact with defendant did not implicate the fourth amendmentbecause consensual police questioning, even when it is investigative, does not constitute a seizure. See People v. Smith, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 1052 (2002). A person is seized within the meaning ofthe fourth amendment when the police have in some way restrained that person's liberty. Smith, 331Ill. App. 3d at 1053. The question is whether, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable personwould believe that he was free to leave. Smith, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 1053.

Here, the State argues that the encounter escalated into a Terry stop after Officer Rowreceived the safety alert. Thus, the State does not dispute that defendant in this case was seized. Instead, the State argues that the stop was valid under Terry, citing the following factors asestablishing reasonable suspicion: Officer Row's intimate knowledge of the community, the recentthefts and vandalism, defendant's dark dress and tattoo, Officer Row's failure to recognize defendantas one of the workers in the neighborhood, and the officer safety alert.

The fourth amendment offers protection by balancing the public interest in controlling crimeand effective law enforcement with an individual's right to be free from unreasonable search andseizure. Avant, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 151. Thus, a limited investigatory or Terry stop is permissibleonly where there is a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that the personhas committed or is about to commit a crime. People v. Robinson, 322 Ill. App. 3d 169, 174 (2001). Determining whether the stop was an unreasonable seizure is a two-step process. People v. Sparks,315 Ill. App. 3d 786, 792 (2000). First, we decide whether the stop was justified at its inception;next, we determine whether the scope of the stop was proportional to the circumstances that justifiedthe interference in the first place. Sparks, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 792.

Whether the stop was justified at its inception is an objective consideration. People v.Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d 103, 109 (2001). We ask whether the police action was appropriate based onthe facts available to the officer. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d at 109. An officer's investigatory "good faith"is not sufficient to warrant the intrusion. Sparks, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 792. The officer must be ableto point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with reasonable inferences therefrom,reasonably warrant the intrusion. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d at 109.

In addition, the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsensejudgments and inferences about human behavior. Avant, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 151. In deciding whetherthere was reasonable suspicion, we consider the totality of the circumstances. Smith, 331 Ill. App.3d at 1055. While a reasonable suspicion may emerge from seemingly innocent, noncriminal conduct,the question for the court is the degree of suspicion that attaches to the circumstances surroundinga defendant's actions. Smith, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 1055. The facts are insufficient to support aninvestigatory detention when they describe " ' "a very large category of presumably innocent travelers,who would be subject to virtually random seizures." [Citation.]' " Smith, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 1055,quoting People v. Anaya, 279 Ill. App. 3d 940, 945-46 (1996).

Further, an officer's decision to engage in a brief Terry stop may not be justified on the basisof unparticularized suspicion or on a hunch. People v. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d 165, 181 (2003). Thesituation confronting the officer must be so far from the ordinary that any competent officer wouldbe expected to act quickly. Avant, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 152-53.

In this case, the facts known to Officer Row simply did not establish an articulable basis tobelieve that a crime had been, or was about to be, committed. A few days prior to his encounter withdefendant, Officer Row was informed that there had been a few incidents of theft and vandalism inthat particular neighborhood. However, Officer Row had not personally responded to any of thosecomplaints and had no description of a possible suspect. No evidence suggested that he observeddefendant doing anything but walking his bicycle. In fact, nothing about defendant's activitysuggested criminal conduct. At most, Officer Row commented that defendant walking a bicycle at11:15 p.m. "just seemed strange" and was "not a normal occurrence in that neighborhood." OfficerRow further stated that he had not seen defendant in the area before. However, stopping anindividual because he looks "suspicious" or is new to the area, without more, is insufficient toestablish reasonable suspicion. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 49-52, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 360-63,99 S. Ct. 2637, 2639-41 (1979). Further, defendant had no outstanding warrants and provided anexplanation for his conduct. Defendant's reason for being in the neighborhood was consistent withOfficer Row's knowledge that work was being done in the area. In short, Officer Row had merelya hunch, not the reasonable suspicion necessary to effect a Terry stop.

Additionally, our supreme court has held that an officer lacked reasonable suspicion toconduct an investigatory stop in a closer case than the one at bar. In Thomas, an individual wasspotted riding his bicycle at 11:30 p.m. while holding a police scanner that permitted him to monitorpolice radio transmissions. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d at 106. The officer had previously arrested theindividual for drug offenses, had recently learned of his release from prison, and had heard aconfidential informant's tip that the individual was using his bicycle to deliver illegal drugs. Thomas,198 Ill. 2d at 106. Nevertheless, the court held that the officer's suspicion was grounded incircumstances that fell short of warranting a stop. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d at 110.

In the present case, it is clear that Officer Row effected the investigatory stop without havingthe requisite degree of suspicion to support it. Having concluded that Officer Row lacked reasonablesuspicion to stop defendant, we need not address whether the officers exceeded the scope of a properTerry stop. Because defendant's consent to search was tainted as the product of the illegal detention,the trial court did not err in determining that the evidence against him must be suppressed.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Jo Daviess County.

Affirmed.

McLAREN and GILLERAN JOHNSON, JJ., concur.