Following a bench trial, the defendant, VenkatesanDeenadayalu, was convicted of criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12--15(a)(2) (West 1998)) and battery (720 ILCS 5/12--3(a)(2) (West1998)) and sentenced to 24 months' sex-offender probation and 10days in the Sheriff's Work Alternative Program. On appeal, thedefendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in admitting other-crimes evidence; and (2) he was not proved guilty beyond areasonable doubt of the offense of criminal sexual abuse. Weaffirm.

On June 25, 1999, the defendant was charged by complaint withthe misdemeanor offense of criminal sexual abuse. 720 ILCS 5/12--15(a)(1) (West 1998). The complaint alleged that, on October 6,1998, the defendant rubbed his genitals against the leg of thevictim, S.C., for the purpose of his sexual arousal. On January25, 2000, the defendant was charged by information with theadditional offense of battery. This charge alleged that on October6, 1998, the defendant committed a battery against the victim whenhe kissed her.

The following evidence was introduced at trial. The victimtestified that, on October 6, 1998, she experienced a severeheadache and a sore neck and went to the Emergency Medical Clinic(Clinic) in Downers Grove. The defendant was a physician on duty atthe Clinic and conducted an examination of the victim. The victimtestified that, after going into an examination room, the defendantappeared and attempted to lock the door. The victim testified thatno one else was in the room besides the defendant and her.

The victim explained her symptoms to the defendant. The victimtestified that the defendant then put his hand up her shirt frombehind and rubbed her neck in the area where she was experiencingpain. The defendant then moved his hand down her back, placed hishand in the waistband of her sweatpants, and felt the crack of herbuttocks. The victim testified that this conduct occurred over aperiod of 30 seconds.

The victim testified that the defendant then pressed his bodyagainst her knee for about five seconds. The victim felt something"hard" against her body, which she believed to be an erection. Thevictim thought that the defendant had an erection because she sawa "protrusion" from his pants area. The defendant then attemptedto pry open the victim's legs. The defendant leaned into thevictim and "smelled all the way up [her] head." The defendant thenplaced his hands under the victim's shirt. The victim testifiedthat the defendant was unable to touch her breasts because she kepther arms down. The defendant then tilted the victim's chin up andkissed her. The defendant told the victim that she appeared"sweaty." The defendant then left the examining room and returnedwith a prescription form and nose spray. The defendant stillexhibited an erection when he returned to the room.

The victim testified that the defendant's conduct amazed andshocked her and that she did not say anything to the defendantduring the incident. Following the examination, the victim went tothe front desk and paid the fee without voicing a complaint. Thevictim left the Clinic accompanied by her boyfriend, Jerry Kupsche. After she told Kupsche about the defendant's conduct, Kupsche tookher to Edwards Hospital in Naperville. The victim reported theincident to the police the following day.

Officer James Stark of the Downers Grove police departmenttestified that he took the report of the victim's complaint. Afterreceiving the complaint, Officer Stark went to the Clinic andinterviewed the defendant. The defendant denied touching thevictim in an unprofessional manner. The defendant told OfficerStark that there was normally a female assistant in the room duringan examination of a female patient but that no assistant waspresent during the victim's examination because the office wasshort-handed.

Over objection, the State introduced the testimony of K.B. andL.H. regarding other acts of sexual misconduct committed by thedefendant. K.B. testified that she filed a complaint against thedefendant with the Downers Grove police department after thedefendant performed an examination upon her at the Clinic on March11, 1999. On this occasion, the defendant entered the examiningroom and locked the door. No one else was in the room besides K.B.and the defendant. K.B. explained her symptoms to the defendant,which included abdominal and back pain. The defendant instructedK.B. to pull her pants down. Without wearing gloves, the defendanttouched K.B.'s clitoris with his finger and stroked it up and downfor less than a minute. The defendant did not penetrate K.B.'svagina with his finger. The defendant then left the room and K.B.pulled up her pants. When the defendant returned to the room, hewinked at K.B.

L.H. testified that she first went to the Clinic in September or October 1998 because she was experiencing migraine headaches. After the defendant examined her on this occasion, he prescribedher Vicodin. L.H. continued to experience migraine headaches andwas again examined by the defendant in July 1999. The defendantclosed the door and asked L.H. if she had any pain in her genitalarea. The defendant initially examined L.H.'s stomach area andthen moved his hands over her clothed vaginal area for about 15seconds. During another examination in August 1999, the defendantmoved his hands over L.H.'s vaginal area for about 30 seconds.

In September or October 1999, L.H. consulted the defendantabout a yeast infection. The defendant examined L.H.'s vagina withhis fingers for approximately one to two minutes. When L.H. liftedher head to complain of pain, she noticed the defendant's groinarea pressed against the examination table. L.H. could not tellwhether the defendant had an erection, but she believed that he wasaroused based upon his facial expression.

In February 2000, L.H. was again examined by the defendantbecause she was suffering from ringworm. When the defendantentered the examining room, he locked the door. The defendantplaced his hands under L.H.'s gown and touched her breasts. Thedefendant then put his mouth near L.H.'s vagina for about 30seconds, unzipped his pants, and exposed his penis. L.H. told thedefendant "that would never happen," and the defendant then zippedhis pants back up. On each of these examinations, the defendantand L.H. were alone in the examining room. On April 17, 2000, L.H.contacted the Downers Grove police department to report thedefendant's conduct. L.H. testified that she continued to see thedefendant over this period of time because she was addicted toVicodin.

The defendant called three witnesses during his case in chief.Minella Aleksi, a medical assistant at the Clinic, testified thathe worked the same shift as the defendant. Aleksi maintained thathe had never seen the defendant lock the door to an examinationroom when a patient was in the room. According to Aleksi, theClinic had policies requiring that (1) all examination doors remainunlocked; (2) patients wear gowns during an examination; and (3) afemale assistant be present during all gynecological examinations.

Donna Jelinek testified that she was the office manager at thedefendant's medical office in Bloomingdale. Jelinek testified thatL.H. had come to the office on January 25, 2000, complaining ofitching. Jelinek was present when the defendant examined L.H. onthis occasion and did not observe the defendant touch her in anyimproper manner.

The defendant also testified on his own behalf. The defendantacknowledged that he examined the victim on October 6, 1998. Thedefendant testified that nobody else was present during theexamination of the victim and that he did not lock the door duringthe victim's examination. The defendant explained that, becausehis left leg is shorter than his right, he leans when he stands. The defendant always kept his wallet in his right pocket andtestified that his wallet might have made contact with the victim'sbody during the examination. The defendant denied touching thevictim's lips, smelling her hair, rubbing her back, putting hishand under her shirt, attempting to open her legs, or having anysexual contact with her. The defendant also denied that he had anerection during the examination. The defendant testified that heasked the victim if she was sweaty in order to determine whethershe was having any side effects to the nasal spray he had givenher.

The defendant also testified concerning the other-crimesevidence introduced by the State. As to K.B., the defendanttestified that there was no medical assistant in the room becausehe was not performing a vaginal exam. The defendant testified thatK.B. complained of abdominal pain, and he examined her abdominalarea by palpating with his three middle fingers. The defendantdenied touching K.B.'s vaginal area.

As to L.H., the defendant acknowledged that he became hertreating physician in October 1998. The defendant denied that heever touched L.H.'s vaginal area during his treatment. Thedefendant testified that he did treat L.H. for ringworm and a yeastinfection, but that he did not perform a vaginal exam during thesevisits.

At the close of evidence, the trial court found the defendantguilty of both charges. The trial court found the victim'stestimony and the testimony of both K.B. and L.H. to be persuasive. The trial court also found that the testimony of Aleksi and Jelinekwas not credible. The trial court subsequently sentenced thedefendant to 24 months' sex-offender probation and 10 days in theSheriff's Work Alternative Program. The defendant subsequentlyfiled a timely notice of appeal.

The defendant's first argument on appeal is that the trialcourt erred in permitting the State to introduce evidence that hecommitted other crimes against K.B. and L.H. The defendant arguesthat the evidence was highly prejudicial and was not probative toestablish his criminal intent in the instant case.

Evidence of the commission of other crimes is not admissiblefor the purposes of showing a defendant's disposition or propensityto commit crime. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 364 (1991). However, evidence of the commission of other crimes is admissiblewhere it is relevant to prove modus operandi, intent, identity,motive, or absence of mistake. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 364-65. Thetrial court must weigh the relevance of the evidence to establishthe purpose for which it is offered against the potentialprejudice. People v. Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d 441, 452 (1991). Whenevidence of another crime is offered, there must be some similaritybetween the other crime and the crime charged to ensure that it isnot being used to establish criminal propensity. People v.Johnson, 239 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1074 (1992). The trial court'sruling as to the admissibility of such evidence will not bereversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Thingvold, 145 Ill.2d at 452-53.

Illinois courts have held that other-crimes evidence isrelevant in a sexual assault prosecution to prove the defendant'sintent or lack of an innocent frame of mind. See People v. Luczak,306 Ill. App. 3d 319, 325-26 (1999); People v. Harris, 297 Ill.App. 3d 1073, 1086-87 (1998); Johnson, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 1074-76. For example, in Johnson, the court held that it was permissible toadmit evidence that a defendant had committed a prior sexualassault to show the lack of innocent intent in the sexual assaultfor which he was on trial. Johnson, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 1075. Thecourt noted that there were numerous similarities between the otherconduct and the charged offense, including that both victims wereabducted in the same manner and both victims were beaten, choked,and bitten. Johnson, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 1075.

Similarly, in People v. Harris, 297 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 1086(1998), the court found that evidence of a prior sexual assault wasadmissible to establish the defendant's lack of innocent intent inthe sexual assault for which he was on trial. Once again, thecourt noted the similarities between the two crimes--the victimswere abducted in the same area, driven to a similar location,assaulted, and returned to locations near to where they lived andto where they had been taken. Harris, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 1086.

Most recently, in People v. Luczak, 306 Ill. App. 3d 319, 325-26 (1999), the court also permitted evidence that the defendant hadcommitted a prior sexual assault six years earlier. In Luczak, thedefendant testified that no sexual conduct had occurred between himand the victim, although he admitted to giving the victim a ride. Luczak, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 325. Such testimony conflicted withthe testimony of the victim, who stated that the defendant droveher to the southeast side of Chicago, threatened her, andeventually attacked her. Luczak, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 320-21. After noting similarities between the prior conduct and the conductthat the defendant was now being charged with, the court held thatthe evidence of the prior conduct was relevant to the issue of thedefendant's intent at the time he was with the victim. Luczak, 306Ill. App. 3d at 325-26.

In the present case, the trial court found that the evidenceof the defendant's other acts of sexual misconduct was relevant toestablish intent and the absence of mistake. On the basis of theprinciples outlined above, we cannot say that such a determinationconstituted an abuse of discretion. There were many similaritiesbetween the defendant's conduct in the other cases and his conductin the present case. In all of the cases, the defendant used hisposition as a physician in order to commit the acts of sexualmisconduct. The defendant always examined the victims alone andattempted to lock the examining room door. The defendant did sodespite the existence of Clinic policies requiring otherwise. Following the defendant's initial medical inquiries, he wouldeventually touch the women in areas unrelated to the reportedailment. This conduct would eventually lead to nonconsensualsexual contact. Although the specific sexual acts committed by thedefendant varied from case to case, his conduct in isolating thevictims and relying on his position as a physician was always thesame in each instance.

Additionally, as in Luczak, the other-crimes evidence in thiscase was particularly relevant because the defendant denied thatany sexual conduct occurred between him and the victim. Thedefendant testified that the victim mistook the nature and thelocation of his touching during the examination. The defendantalso asserted that the victim mistook the wallet in his pocket foran erection. In light of the conflicting testimony between thevictim and the defendant, intent and the absence of mistake werecrucial issues for the trial court to decide. See Luczak, 306 Ill.App. 3d at 325. Therefore, we agree with the trial court thatevidence of the defendant's other crimes was relevant.

The defendant relies on People v. Rogers, 324 Ill. 224, 233(1926), for the proposition that, in sexual assault cases, the useof other crimes to show intent, knowledge, accident, or mistake isimproper because these factors are shown by testimony concerningthe act itself. In Rogers, the Illinois Supreme Court held that,in a case where the defendant was charged with taking indecentliberties with a child, the State could not introduce evidence thatthe defendant had sexually assaulted 12 other girls. Rogers, 324Ill. at 233. However, this rule has been applied only in caseswhere the defendant is alleged to have committed acts of sexualmisconduct with children. See People v. Woltz, 228 Ill. App. 3d670, 674 (1992); People v. Daniels, 172 Ill. App. 3d 616, 624-25(1988). In the present case, all of the defendant's alleged sexualmisconduct was committed against adults. Therefore, under thereasoning of Johnson, Harris, and Luczak, we conclude that theState could properly introduce evidence of other similar crimes ofsexual misconduct to prove intent, knowledge, and the lack ofmistake. Accordingly, we do not believe that the trial courtabused its discretion in allowing the other-crimes evidence forthis limited purpose.

The defendant also argues that the admission of this evidencewas improper because it was used to enhance the credibility of thevictim and resulted in a mini-trial of the collateral offenses. The defendant complains that K.B. and L.H. gave detailed testimonyand that the State called a police officer to testify about hisinvestigation of one of the collateral offenses. However, in thiscase, the trial judge rather than the jury sat as the finder offact. In a bench trial, it is presumed that the trial court willconsider only properly admitted evidence. People v. Eddmonds, 101Ill. 2d 44, 65-66 (1984). Likewise, when other-crimes evidence isintroduced for a limited purpose, it is presumed that the trialjudge considered it only for that purpose. People v. Avery, 227Ill. App. 3d 382, 389 (1991). Here, throughout the course of theproceedings, the judge repeatedly reiterated that the other-crimesevidence would be admitted only to establish intent and the absenceof mistake. During its ruling, the trial court again repeated thatit had considered the other-crimes evidence only for this limitedpurpose. Accordingly, we do not believe that the defendant wasdeprived of a fair trial or that the finding of guilt wasimproperly based on his other acts of sexual misconduct.

As his final argument on appeal, the defendant argues that theState did not prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of theoffense of criminal sexual abuse. As noted earlier, the charge ofcriminal sexual abuse alleged that the defendant rubbed hisgenitals against the leg of the victim. Specifically, thedefendant argues that the State did not prove that the victim inthis case was unable to consent to the sexual conduct. 720 ILCS5/12--15(a)(2) (West 1998).

When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of theevidence, it is not the function of this court to retry thedefendant. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). Therelevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in thelight most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of factcould have found the essential elements of the crime beyond areasonable doubt. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261. The determinationsof the witnesses' credibility, the weight to be given to theirtestimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from theevidence are the responsibilities of the fact finder. Collins, 106Ill. 2d at 261-62. A conviction may be upheld based on thepositive and credible testimony of a single witness, even if thistestimony is contradicted by the defendant. People v. Garza, 298Ill. App. 3d 452, 458 (1998).

In order to prove the defendant guilty of criminal sexualabuse, the State was obligated to prove that the defendantcommitted "an act of sexual conduct and the accused knew that thevictim was unable to understand the nature of the act or was unableto give knowing consent." 720 ILCS 5/12--15(a)(2) (West 1998). For purposes of his argument, the defendant does not dispute thatsexual conduct occurred between himself and the victim. Instead,the defendant asserts that the victim was under an obligation totell him to stop the offensive touching if she did not wish him tocontinue. The defendant argues that, because the victim wascomplaining of a headache, she should have been on notice thatsomething was amiss when she felt the defendant's hands progressingdown her back and touching her buttocks. The defendant assertsthat the victim was in a position to refuse consent at this timeand that she did not.

In People v. Borak, 13 Ill. App. 3d 815 (1973), this courtconsidered the question of a patient's ability to consent tounexpected sexual conduct committed by her physician during agynecological examination. In that case, the physician asked thepatient extremely personal questions, such as her ability toachieve orgasm, while manipulating his finger in the patient'svagina. Borak, 13 Ill. App. 3d at 817. The physician was alsobreathing heavily and appeared flush. The patient testified thatshe was scared and believed that the physician was sexuallyaroused. The patient did not ask the physician to let her go atthis time and instead followed his instructions to close her eyes. The patient then felt the physician's tongue against her vagina. The patient then got up on her elbows, but lay back down and closedher eyes after the physician instructed her to do so. About 30seconds later, the patient felt the physician's penis enter hervagina, at which time she sat up quickly and got dressed. Thephysician was subsequently convicted of deviate sexual assault andrape. Borak, 13 Ill. App. 3d at 816-17.

On appeal, the physician argued that the State had not provedthat the acts of sexual conduct were performed against thepatient's will. Borak, 13 Ill. App. 3d at 818. This court heldthat a patient is incapable of consenting when a physician commitsdeviate sexual acts under the pretext of medical treatment ininstances when the victim is surprised and unaware of thedefendant's intention. Borak, 13 Ill. App. 3d at 820-21. We thenexplained:

"[E]ven if the [patient] realized that [the physician's]questions were improper, this would not in itself indicatewhat was to follow. While [the physician's] appearanceindicated to [the patient] that he was sexually aroused, hehad not performed any actions which she knew to be improper,and [the patient] was not put on notice that [the physician]would perform an overt, deviate act upon her body. [Thephysician's] act of deviate sexual conduct was, *** 'throughsurprise', with [the patient] being 'utterly unaware of hisintention in that regard.' [The patient] was thereforeincapable of consenting to the act, and 'statutory' force waspresent.

However, the contrary is true as to the act ofintercourse. When [the physician] put his mouth on [thepatient's] organ, she became aware of his intentions, andnothing he did thereafter could come as a surprise. *** Yetshe failed to object and followed [the physician's]instruction to lay back down and close her eyes. *** Herfailure to resist when it was within her power to do soamounts to consent, and removes from the act an essentialelement of the crime of rape." Borak, 13 Ill. App. 3d at 821.

This court therefore affirmed the physician's conviction fordeviate sexual assault based on the physician's act of placing hismouth on the patient's vagina, but it reversed his conviction forrape based on the act of sexual intercourse. Borak, 13 Ill. App.3d at 822.

In the present case, the defendant's conduct was less overtthan the physician's conduct in Borak. As in Borak, there wasnothing in this case to suggest that the victim should havequestioned the nature of the defendant's initial behavior orsuspect that sexual conduct was to follow. It would not beunreasonable for a patient complaining of severe head and neck painto believe that a doctor would check to see if the patient wasexhibiting signs of muscle tension down her back. Although perhapsthe victim might have started to question the defendant's conductwhen he touched her buttocks, we do not believe that a patientwould necessarily be put on notice that an assault was about tooccur. Therefore, as in Borak, we do not believe that the victimin this case was put on notice of the defendant's intentions untilhe committed the charged act of sexual conduct, which was pressinghis genitals against the victim's leg. Indeed, the victimtestified that she was completely amazed and shocked by thedefendant's actions. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidencesupported the trial court's finding that the victim was unable toconsent to the defendant's conduct.

In closing, we acknowledge that the testimony presented inthis case was conflicting. However, the victim's testimony washeard by the trial judge along with all of the other evidence. After having the opportunity to observe the demeanor of thewitnesses, the trial judge found the testimony of the victim andthe State's other witnesses to be credible and persuasive. Basedupon the record before us, we cannot say that such a determinationwas unreasonable, and we decline the defendant's invitation toreweigh the testimony. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendantwas proved guilty of the offense of criminal sexual abuse.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit courtof Du Page County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

O'MALLEY and CALLUM, JJ., concur.