March 15, 2001

Nos. 2--99--1303, 2--99--1304, 2--99--1305,2--99--1306,     
2--99--1307, 2--99--1310, 2--99--1361, 2--99--1362,
2--99--1363, 2--99--1364, 2--99--1380, 2--99--1381,
2--99--1382, 2--99--1383, 2--99--1384, 2--99--1385,
2--99--1386, 2--99--1387, 2--99--1388, 2--00--0044,
2--00--0045, 2--00--0046, 2--00--0047, 2--00--0048,
2--00--0050, 2--00--0051, 2--00--0052, 2--00--0053,
2--00--0054, 2--00--0159, 2--00--0160, 2--00--0161,
2--00--0162cons.                                   

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

JUSTICE BOWMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The State appeals 33 circuit court orders granting the petitions of theabove-named defendants to rescind the statutory summary suspensions of theirdriver's licenses. Because the cases raise common issues of law, we haveconsolidated the appeals. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgmentsof the circuit court of Du Page County and remand the causes for furtherproceedings on the defendants' petitions.

Each defendant petitioned to rescind his or her summary suspension on groundsspecified by section 2--118.1(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS5/2--118.1(b) (West 1996)), then moved separately to rescind the suspension onconstitutional grounds. In each case, the circuit court granted rescissionsolely on constitutional grounds. Later, in a separate case, the supreme courtrejected these constitutional arguments. See People v. Fisher, 184 Ill.2d 441 (1998). The supreme court then vacated the original rescission ordershere and remanded the causes for reconsideration in light of Fisher.

Sometime after the supreme court's mandates were filed in the circuit court,the Secretary of State's office (Secretary or Secretary's office) sent eachdefendant a new "Confirmation of Summary Suspension" (Confirmation)stating that his or her license would again be summarily suspended as of aspecified date. The Secretary mailed each Confirmation only a few days beforethe starting date of the new suspension. The defendants petitioned to rescindthe suspensions, arguing that they had been denied their due process right topresuspension hearings and their statutory right to 46 days' notice of the newsuspensions (see 625 ILCS 5/11--501.1(g) (West 1998)).

The circuit court granted the petitions and denied the State's motions toreconsider. The State timely appealed. On appeal, the State asserts that (1)section 11--501.1(g) of the Code did not require the Secretary to provide anydefendant 46 days' notice of the new suspension; and (2) the defendants were notdenied any constitutional right to a presuspension hearing.

Defendants Kurt P. Eidel, Joaquin Fuentes, Luke E. Kelly, James A. Rohrman,and Joseph E. Trimarco have jointly filed an appellees' brief. Defendants CherylA. Murrell and Susan M. Platt have filed separate appellees' briefs. All of thedefendants who have filed briefs contend, in essence, that the Secretary'sarbitrary precipitate resuspensions of their licenses violated both the Code andprocedural due process.

FACTS

For obvious reasons, we do not recite the facts of every case. We present thefacts in People v. Eidel as paradigmatic.

On January 28, 1997, a police officer arrested Eidel (defendant) for drivingunder the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11--501(a)(2) (West 1996)) andwarned defendant in writing that, if he refused or failed a chemical test, hislicense would be suspended summarily for the period provided by statute (see 625ILCS 5/6--208.1 (West 1996)). Defendant refused testing. On February 4, 1997,defendant was charged by complaint with DUI and the arresting officer's"Law Enforcement Sworn Report" was filed in the circuit court. OnFebruary 11, 1997, the Secretary's office filed a Confirmation that tolddefendant that his license would be suspended effective March 15, 1997.

On February 26, 1997, defendant filed a petition to rescind his suspension.The petition listed a variety of statutory grounds for rescission (see 625 ILCS5/2--118.1(b) (West 1996)). Defendant obtained a continuance. On April 23, 1997,before any hearing took place, defendant filed a "Motion to RescindStatutory Summary Suspension" asserting that sections 6--208.1 and11--501.1 of the Code (625 ILCS 5/6--208.1, 11--501.1 (West 1996)) violated dueprocess and equal protection by discriminating against defendant and other adultnonfirst offenders who refused testing. On September 30, 1998, after a juryacquitted him of DUI, defendant filed another motion repeating theseconstitutional arguments. The State filed a response. Nothing in the recordshows that defendant ever requested an evidentiary hearing on his originalpetition or that the State ever answered the original petition.

On October 15, 1998, the circuit court rescinded defendant's summarysuspension. The court's written orders state that the rescission is based solelyon the constitutional grounds defendant raised. We have no report of any hearingthat might have resulted in these written orders. On October 16, 1998, the Statefiled a notice of appeal to the supreme court (see 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)).

On December 17, 1998, the supreme court filed its opinion in Fisher.The court rejected the precise constitutional theories on which the circuitcourt of Du Page County had relied to rescind defendant's summary suspension.See Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d at 449-56. On April 30, 1999, the supreme court'smandate in defendant's case was filed in the circuit court of Du Page County.The mandate states that, on April 6, 1999, the supreme court entered "thefollowing judgment" in the appeal in defendant's case:

"The motion by appellant to vacate the judgment of the Circuit Court of DuPage County and to remand this cause to the circuit court for reconsideration in light of this Court's decision in People v. Fisher et al. *** is allowed and this cause is remanded."

On May 3, 1999, the circuit court clerk of Du Page County filed a"Notice of Receipt of Reviewing Court Mandate." The notice, addressedto both the State's Attorney and defendant, states that the reviewing court'smandate has been filed in the circuit court; that the case has been ordered"REVERSED & REMANDED"; and that "Toreactivate this matter, please file your Notice of Motion in accordance withcourt rules." There is nothing in the record to prove that either party wassent this notice.

On July 22, 1999, the Secretary filed a new Confirmation with the circuitcourt. This document states that defendant's license will be suspended for 24months effective July 27, 1999.

On August 20, 1999, the State's Attorney filed a notice of motion statingthat on August 26, 1999, an assistant State's Attorney would appear in this case"For spreading of record." On August 26, 1999, the circuit courtentered an order stating that, after a hearing, the State's motion is grantedand the supreme court's mandate "is spread of record"; the circuitcourt's prior order holding the statute unconstitutional is vacated; and thesummary suspension of defendant's driver's license stands, "pendingmotions." On that day, defendant's counsel filed his appearance.

On September 2, 1999, defendant filed a new motion to rescind his summarysuspension. This motion alleged the following. At various times between aboutApril 13, 1999, and May 3, 1999, the circuit court clerk forwarded"Mandates" to the State and to counsel for the 33 defendants here. Thesupreme court's mandate in defendant's case was filed May 3, 1999. Defendantbelieved that the State was served with copies of all the supreme court's ordersin these cases. However, he was never served with the supreme court's order inhis case. Between July 20 and July 24, 1999, the Secretary sent all thedefendants Confirmations of the new summary suspensions. These new suspensionswere to start between July 27 and August 2, 1999. On July 22, 1999, theSecretary filed a new Confirmation in defendant's case, making his suspensioneffective July 26, 1999.

Defendant's motion argued that the Secretary's procedure was improper for tworeasons. First, the shortness of the interval between the issuance of theConfirmation and the effective date of the new suspension--12 days--violatedsection 11--501.1(g) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/11--501.1(g) (West 1998)), underwhich a summary suspension is to take effect 46 days after notice is given tothe motorist. Second, the shortness of this interval, in part caused by theState's Attorney's delay in notifying the Secretary of the supreme court'smandate, effectively deprived defendant of his due process right to apresuspension hearing.

The State filed a response alleging in part as follows. The State and all thedefendants received notice of the remands. The State tried to preserve judicialeconomy "by waiting to place cases on the call only when substantive actionwas to commence"; thus, after the Secretary issued the new Confirmations,the State put the cases back on the call so as to spread the mandates of recordand enable defendants such as Eidel to set the cases for hearing.

The State argued that, when the defendants filed their original petitions torescind their summary suspensions, all of them had the opportunity forpresuspension hearings on any issues they wished to raise. Indeed, the Statenoted, each defendant received a presuspension hearing and prevailed when thecircuit court rescinded his or her suspension on constitutional grounds. TheState reasoned that, if the defendants elected to forgo litigating the statutorygrounds for rescission in favor of relying on the theories later rejected in Fisher,they had themselves to blame if they did not receive full presuspensionhearings.

The State also argued that the procedures used on remand did not violatesection 11--501.1(g) of the Code because that section states only that a summarysuspension is to take effect 46 days after "the notice of the statutorysummary suspension" (625 ILCS 5/11--501.1(g) (West 1998)) is given to thedefendant. According to the State, the "notice" in this section isthat which the officer gives the motorist before asking the motorist to take achemical test, not the Confirmation that the Secretary issues later. Thus, theState complied with section 11--501.1(g) at the outset of each case, when theSecretary informed the defendant that his or her suspension would start 46 daysfrom the receipt of the officer's warning. As section 11--501.1(g) did notaffect the validity of the Secretary's action after a case was remanded, theSecretary could impose a new suspension that started fewer than 46 days afterthe defendant received the new Confirmation.

The trial court granted defendant's motion to rescind, holding that the newsuspension was invalid because (1) the Secretary's decision to resuspenddefendant's license within 12 days of mailing the new confirmation was"arbitrary and without statutory authority"; and (2) defendant waseffectively denied any chance for a presuspension hearing. The trial courtdenied the State's motion to reconsider. The State timely appealed. As noted, wehave consolidated this appeal with 32 other appeals.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, the State reiterates the arguments it made at the trial level andasserts that the trial court erred in rescinding the summary suspensions thatwere imposed after the original rescission orders were vacated and the causeswere remanded. The State appears to assume that, after the vacatur of theoriginal rescission orders, each defendant's driver's license was not suspendedagain until the date specified in the new Confirmation. The State concedes thateach new Confirmation was mailed only a few days before the starting date of thenew suspension, essentially denying any defendant a hearing before the start ofthe new summary suspension. However, the State contends that each defendant wasentitled to no more than a prompt hearing shortly after the start of each newsuspension and that each defendant received one. The defendants who have filedappellees' briefs respond that (1) section 11--501.1(g) of the Code required theSecretary to place at least 46 days between a defendant's receipt of the newConfirmation and the starting date of the new suspension; and (2) they weredenied their due process right to prompt hearings on their petitions to rescindthe new suspensions. These defendants also claim that the State's Attorney'soffice is to blame for the short notice of the impending suspensions, as itunjustifiably delayed reinstating the cases in the circuit court. The defendantsassert that, on remand, the Secretary had to reinstate the cases promptly orlose its right to relief. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the Statethat the rescission judgments cannot stand. We do not endorse all the State'sreasoning.

We hold first that section 11--501.1(g) of the Code does not support thejudgments. Resolving this issue turns on the meaning of a statute, a question oflaw that we address de novo. See Branson v. Department of Revenue,168 Ill. 2d 247, 254 (1995). We seek to ascertain the legislature's intent, thebest guide ordinarily being the statutory language itself. Paris v. Feder,179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997). If this language is unambiguous, we must follow it.Branson, 168 Ill. 2d at 254. We must read a statute as a whole, withevery part construed in connection with every other part. Lulay v. Lulay,193 Ill. 2d 455, 466 (2000). We believe that the State's reading of section11--501.1(g) is correct in the main and that the trial court misinterpreted thisprovision.

Section 11--501.1 of the Code sets out the protocol for statutory summarysuspensions. (Those parts of section 11--501.1 pertinent to these appeals havenot been materially amended since these cases began.) Under section 11--501.1(e)(625 ILCS 5/11--501.1(e) (West 1998)), the Secretary's office shall enter asummary suspension "[u]pon receipt of the sworn report of a law enforcementofficer." Section 11--501.1(f) requires the officer submitting the swornreport to "serve immediate notice of the statutory summary suspension onthe person." (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/11--501.1(f) (West 1998)).Section 11--501.1(g), at issue here, provides in turn that the summarysuspension "shall take effect on the 46th day following the date thenotice of the statutory summary suspension was given to the person."(Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/11--501.1(g) (West 1998). Reading these relatedprovisions together, we think section 11--501.1(g)'s meaning is plain. The"notice" is that which the officer gives the motorist on the scene.Thus, section 11--501.1(g) is a self-executing provision under which a summarysuspension starts 46 days after the officer serves the motorist with notice thatthe motorist's license is to be suspended.

Insofar as section 11--501.1(g) applies here, it does not support therescissions of the defendants' suspensions. We use Eidel's case as illustrative.The officer who stopped Eidel on January 28, 1997, asked Eidel to submit to achemical test. When Eidel refused, the officer immediately served him with awritten notice that his license would be suspended for a minimum of six months,with the suspension to take effect on the forty-sixth day following the issuanceof the written notice. The Secretary then mailed Eidel a Confirmation statingthat his summary suspension would start March 15, 1997, 46 days after January28, 1997. Therefore, insofar as it is possible to speak of the State"complying" with a self-executing provision, the State did so here.

However, each defendant who has filed a brief asserts that section11--501.1(g) not only required the original summary suspension to start no fewerthan 46 days after the officer's warning but further required a 46-day windowbetween the date a defendant received the new Confirmation and the starting dateof the new suspension. For two reasons, we reject this claim.

First, the defendants' argument ignores the plain language of section11--501.1(g), which ties the 46-day waiting period only to the arrestingofficer's issuance of the original on-the-scene notice. Second, the argumentrests on the assumption that, after the original summary suspensions werevacated and the causes remanded, the Secretary needed to issue new Confirmationsin order for the defendants' licenses to be suspended again. However, we believethat any defects in the new Confirmations are immaterial because the newConfirmations themselves were superfluous. When the supreme court vacated theoriginal rescission orders, the defendants' licenses were automaticallyresuspended. Thus, there was no need for the Secretary to issue newConfirmations, and any deficiencies in them cannot support the rescission ordershere.

We believe this conclusion follows from the nature of the proceedings atissue. A summary suspension is not a judicial act but an administrative functionof the Secretary. Koss v. Slater, 116 Ill. 2d 389, 395 (1987). Adefendant may challenge this administrative order by seeking a hearing, whichmay result in a judgment rescinding the Secretary's order. The rescission undoesthe administrative summary suspension, at least prospectively. People v.Focia, 287 Ill. App. 3d 767, 769 (1997).

In the cases at bar, the trial court rescinded the summary suspensions. Onappeal, the supreme court vacated the trial court's judgments. To"vacate" a judgment is to nullify or cancel it. Black's Law Dictionary1546 (7th ed. 1999). A judgment that has been vacated is void. New York LifeInsurance Co. v. Sogol, 311 Ill. App. 3d 156, 158 (1999); Kelch v. Watson,237 Ill. App. 3d 875, 877 (1992). It is "entirely destroyed." Peoplev. Baker, 85 Ill. App. 3d 661, 663 (1980). The vacatur restores the partiesto the status quo ante, as though the trial court judgment had never beenentered. Sogol, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 158; see also Williamsburg VillageOwners' Ass'n v. Lauder Associates, 200 Ill. App. 3d 474, 483 (1990)(ascribing similar effect to reversal). Thus, where a trial court reverses anadministrative order but the court of review vacates that judgment, the originaladministrative decision is restored as though the trial court had neverdisturbed it. See Sexton v. Greer, 135 Vt. 343, 376 A.2d 750 (1977) (vacaturof trial court order reinstating laid-off police officer left officer with onlyseniority he had when he was terminated; seniority could not accumulate duringlife of judgment that was later vacated).

Applying these principles, we conclude that, because the new Confirmationswere superfluous, any defects in them were of no moment. In each case, thesupreme court's vacatur of the original rescission order restored the parties totheir preexisting status, as though the original rescission order had neverexisted. This means that the supreme court's act revived the originaladministrative order summarily suspending the defendant's license. Because thesupreme court automatically restored each defendant's original summarysuspension, there was no need for the Secretary to issue a "new"suspension. In each case, there was only one suspension and the Secretaryneeded to act only once. At the least, each original suspension was revived bythe time the appropriate supreme court mandate was filed in the circuit court.We conclude that the State did not violate section 11--501.1(g) of the Code.

We now turn to the second ground on which the trial court rescinded thesummary suspensions: that the defendants were denied their due process right toa hearing before (or shortly after) the effective dates of the new suspensions.

Although due process does not entitle a motorist to a presuspension hearing,it does require a prompt postsuspension hearing. Mackey v. Montrym, 443U.S. 1, 61 L. Ed. 2d 321, 99 S. Ct. 2612 (1979); People v. Gerke, 123Ill. 2d 85, 91-92 (1988). The defendants argue, and the trial court held, thatthe Secretary effectively deprived the defendants of a prompt postsuspensionhearing when it issued the new confirmations only a few days before theeffective date of the new suspensions.

We disagree. As we have explained, there was only one summary suspension ineach case, and each defendant received a full opportunity for a presuspensionhearing on any grounds he or she sought to raise. We take defendant Eidel's caseas illustrative. On January 28, 1997, Eidel was warned that his license would besuspended effective March 15, 1997. Under the Code, he had the right to a fullhearing no later than 30 days after the receipt of his written request for oneor the first appearance date listed on the traffic citation (see 625 ILCS5/2--118.1(b) (West 1996)). Eidel did in fact file his petition on February 26,1997, about a month before his suspension was to start. Had he not obtained acontinuance, he could have had a full hearing on all the issues he raised asearly as March 26, 1997, only one day after the suspension started. Holding ahearing one day after a suspension takes effect satisfies due process. Gerke,123 Ill. 2d at 91-92.

The facts in the other defendants' cases are not materially different. Eachdefendant received only one suspension, predicated on one set of facts,and subject to a prompt hearing at which the defendant could and did raise anygrounds he or she desired to establish that the suspension was erroneous.Indeed, each defendant had a prompt hearing at which he or she prevailed,albeit only temporarily. The original hearings did not adjudicate all the issuesthat the defendants raised in their petitions. However, as far as the recordsdisclose, that is only because the defendants themselves opted not to pursue anystatutory grounds for rescission, instead staking their hopes on theconstitutional arguments later rejected in Fisher.

We turn finally to the defendants' claim that the trial court properlyrescinded their summary suspensions because the State failed to reinstate thecauses within a reasonable time after the supreme court's mandate was filed inthe circuit court. The defendants rely on opinions interpreting and applyingSupreme Court Rule 369(c) (134 Ill. 2d R. 369(c)), which governs trial courtproceedings after a remand. These opinions hold that a trial court may dismiss acase when the party that prevailed on appeal fails to reinstate the case withina reasonable time. See People v. NL Industries, Inc., 297 Ill. App. 3d297 (1998); National Underground Construction Co. v. E.A. Cox Co., 273Ill. App. 3d 830 (1995). We believe that the defendants read these opinions outof context.

We must note that, in rescinding the defendants' summary suspensions, thecircuit court did not rely on Rule 369(c) or the opinions holding that the ruleallows trial courts to dismiss cases in some situations. Instead, the circuitcourt relied on due process and the Code and granted the defendants relief onthe merits. We now address defendants' Rule 369(c) argument.

Supreme Court Rule 369(c) states, "When the reviewing court remands thecase for a new trial or hearing and the mandate is filed in the circuit court,the case shall be reinstated therein upon 10 days' notice to the adverseparty." 134 Ill. 2d R. 369(c). Rule 369(c) replaced section 88 of the Codeof Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 110, par. 88), under which theparty that prevailed on appeal had to file the reviewing court's mandate withina specified time or lose its right to pursue the relief granted by the reviewingcourt. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 110, pars. 88(2), (3); Miller v.Bloomberg, 126 Ill. App. 3d 332, 337-38 (1984). However, Supreme Court Rule368(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 368(a)) requires the reviewing court to transmit itsmandate to the circuit court and to provide notice to the parties, and Rule369(a) requires the circuit court to file the mandate promptly (134 Ill. 2d R.369(a)). Thus, under the present rules, the circuit court automaticallyreacquires jurisdiction even if the prevailing party has not acted, althoughnotice to the losing party is still required before new proceedings may start.See Bank of Viola v. Nestrick, 94 Ill. App. 3d 511, 514-15 (1981).

The adoption of the new rules changed the prevailing party's burden. Undersection 88(2), the winner on appeal had both to file the mandate timely and toreinstate, i.e., redocket, the case before he could obtain the reliefavailable on remand. See Miller, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 338; Tidwell v.Smith, 43 Ill. App. 2d 9 (1963) (abstract of opinion). After Rules 368 and369 took effect, the prevailing party had no need to file the reviewing court'smandate. However, perhaps illogically, some courts continued to give theprevailing party the burden to pursue the action by redocketing the cause. See Miller,126 Ill. App. 3d at 338.

Because Rule 369(c) does not specify when the prevailing party must act,several opinions have held that the prevailing party must redocket the casewithin a reasonable time or lose its right to pursue relief on remand. Thus, in E.A.Cox, the trial court granted the defendant summary judgment. The appellatecourt reversed and remanded the cause, but the plaintiff waited almost two yearsto move to reinstate the case. The trial court refused to reinstate the case.The appellate court affirmed, explaining that the prevailing party must pursueits rights after the mandate issues and that, if it fails to reinstate the casewithin a reasonable time, the circuit court may in its discretion dismiss thecase. Thus, the plaintiff forfeited its right to pursue its claim further. E.A.Cox, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 836-37.

Similarly, in NL Industries, the plaintiffs obtained a supreme courtjudgment reversing the dismissal of their complaint and remanding the cause. Theplaintiffs delayed moving to reinstate the case until almost nine months afterthe supreme court's mandate issued. The trial court refused to reinstate thecase and dismissed the action with prejudice. Relying on E.A. Cox, theappellate court affirmed, explaining that the plaintiffs did not have anunlimited time after the remand in which to reassert their rights. NLIndustries, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 303.

The defendants who have filed appellees' briefs in these appeals urge that E.A.Cox and NL Industries support the judgments that are on appeal. Thesedefendants reason that, upon remand, the State had the duty to reinstate thecases within a reasonable time and that, as the State failed to do so, thecircuit court properly rescinded the defendants' summary suspensions. Wedisagree.

In E.A. Cox, as in NL Industries, the prevailing party, theplaintiff, had to reinstate the case to start the trial process movingagain--otherwise, it would not be able to obtain any relief on its complaint.The reviewing court in each case simply held that, by failing to act promptly,the plaintiff lost its right to take the further steps necessary to prevail onits claim. Because the plaintiff needed to act to secure the benefit of thereversal, its delay in reinstating the case was inherently suicidal.

The cases here sit altogether differently. Here, each defendant sued torescind his or her summary suspension, and each defendant needed to see thetrial process through to completion in order to obtain the relief that he or shesought. The State did not need to invoke the judicial process in the firstinstance, as the Secretary's administrative act effectuated the summarysuspension. When the supreme court vacated the rescission order and remanded thecause for further proceedings, the State had no need to reinstate thedefendant's lawsuit in order to take advantage of the supreme court's decision.The State had already received all it wanted when the supreme court undid thefirst rescission order. The defendant had to pursue the matter further toprevail in a suit where he or she had the burden of proof. People v. Orth,124 Ill. 2d 326, 337-38 (1988).

E.A. Cox and NL Industries do not suggest otherwise. Theysimply embody the commonsense rule that a party who does not act is saddled withthe result of his inaction, including the possible dismissal of a suit he hasfiled. In the cases at bar, the State did not lose anything by its inactionbecause the supreme court's orders simply restored the original administrativesummary suspensions. Insofar as the State failed to act timely on these orders,it risked forgoing whatever benefit it might have gained from pursuing furtherproceedings on remand. However, the State did not forfeit the benefit alreadyinherent in the supreme court's orders vacating the judgments. In somecircumstances, a circuit court may prevent a party from proceeding further atthe trial level, but the court cannot undo the judgment of a higher court.

We conclude that the State's delay in reinstating the cases at bar does notsupport the orders rescinding the defendants' summary suspensions. As no othergrounds exist for these judgments, they must be reversed and we must remand thecauses so that the defendants may be heard on any remaining issues presented bytheir actions to rescind their summary suspensions. Although the circuit courthas never addressed the statutory grounds the defendants raised, we cannot sayas a matter of law whether the defendants have abandoned these various groundsfor rescission. Of course, we cannot say whether any defendant should ultimatelyprevail on any of these statutory grounds or any other grounds that the circuitcourt may allow him or her to raise on remand. It is for the circuit court tosort out the remaining issues attendant to the final dispositions of these casesat the trial level.

The judgments of the circuit court of Du Page County are reversed, and thecauses are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

McLAREN and O'MALLEY, JJ., concur.