Defendant, Nadine E. Hermann, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Lake Countyimposing restitution based on a charge of criminal damage to property (720 ILCS 5/21--1(a) (West2000)) that was dismissed in connection with her negotiated plea of guilty to other charges. Defendant contends that the trial court had no statutory authority to order restitution because she didnot agree to pay restitution with respect to that charge. Defendant argues that, because the trial courtexceeded its statutory sentencing authority, its order imposing restitution is void and must be vacated.We do not consider the merits of defendant's contention as we find that the case must be remandedto the trial court for compliance with the attorney certification requirements of Supreme Court Rule604(d) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)).

On December 7, 2001, in case No. 01--CM--9020, defendant was charged by informationwith criminal damage to property (count I) and harassment by telephone (720 ILCS 135/1--1(2)(West 2000)) (count II). The alleged victim of both offenses was Michele Rubenstein, and thecriminal damage to property charge arose from the allegation that defendant knowingly damaged thetires on Rubenstein's automobile. On December 19, 2001, in case No. 01--CF--4258, defendant wascharged by information with criminal damage to property (count I) and trespass to residence (720ILCS 5/19--4 (West 2000)) (count II). The alleged victim of both of these offenses was FrankAmelio. The criminal damage to property charge was predicated on damage to a window.

On May 15, 2002, defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea before Judge Diane E. Winter.The State agreed to nol-pros count I of case No. 01--CM--9020 and count II of case No. 01--CF--4258, and defendant agreed to plead guilty to count II in case No. 01--CM--9020 and count I in caseNo. 01--CF--4258. Evidently, no court reporter was present at the hearing, but the parties havesubmitted an agreed statement of facts offering a description of events relative to the agreement anddefendant's plea. According to the agreed statement of facts:

"Upon negotiation with the State, Defense Counsel presented an offer to theDefendant. The Defendant agreed to the terms and conditions of the plea agreement whichincluded the following: on motion of the State count one (1) of 01 CM 9020 was nolle pros'd[sic]; the Defendant pled to count two (2) concurrent with 01 CF 4258 [sic], was sentencedto eighteen (18) months of probation, a one hundred (100) dollar fine and court costs,probation services fees at five (5) dollars per month, one hundred twenty (120) days in theLake County Jail with good time credit and credit for time served, one hundred (100) publicservice hours, open mandate for anger management, no violent or harassing contact withFrank Amelio, no contact with Michelle Rubenstein, and a restitution hearing was set for June14, 2002, in courtroom 221 at 9:00 a.m. to determine restitution, if any."

Defendant entered her guilty plea, and her attorney prepared a sentencing order using apreprinted form. Paragraph 9 of the conditions of probation obligated defendant to pay restitutionin an amount to be determined at the hearing on June 14, 2002. The order did not specify to whomrestitution was payable. However, the case numbers 01--CM--9020 and 01--CF--4258 werehandwritten on the order next to paragraph 9. Defendant signed the order in acknowledgment thatshe had received and read the order. According to the agreed statement of facts, Judge Winter wrotethe case numbers next to paragraph 9 sua sponte and did not inform the State or defense counsel thatshe had done so.

The restitution hearing was held on June 14, 2002, before Judge Joseph R. Waldeck. At theoutset, defendant's attorney advised Judge Waldeck, over the State's objection, that Judge Winter hadwritten the case numbers next to paragraph 9 of the sentencing order after defendant had signed theorder. Defendant's attorney also argued that in entering her negotiated plea, defendant had notintended to admit that Rubenstein was entitled to restitution for the damage to her tires and that defendant would seek to withdraw her plea if the trial court viewed the plea agreement that way. Thetrial court responded as follows:

"The issue is not whether or not [defendant] admitted guilt or whether or not sheagreed to pay restitution. She, as I see it on the face of it, entered into an agreement, whichis a bargain or a contract; and in return for her pleading guilty to certain counts, certain othercounts were dismissed.

The *** counts *** which are alleged in 01 CM 9020 for which the State is seekingrestitution, since the restitution issue as pertains to the criminal damage to property since itis not excluded specifically, I would find that it is included ***.

Obviously, she was on notice by the fact that she pled guilty to one of the counts in01 CM 9020; and the restitution issue, because the order is silent as to excluding restitutionissues regarding any of the counts, I think it is properly included."

The State did not pursue restitution for the damage to Frank Amelio's window. At therestitution hearing, Michele Rubenstein testified that her mother had bought her a new set of tires for$228.65. About a week after the tires were mounted, they were slashed. Rubenstein could not affordanother set of new tires, so she purchased a set of used tires for $100. On cross-examination, sheacknowledged that she did not see who slashed her tires. The trial court ordered defendant to pay$328.65 in restitution. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider the restitution order. Defense counselfailed to support the motion to reconsider sentence with an attorney's certificate as required by Rule604(d). Judge Waldeck heard and denied the motion. This appeal followed.

This case presents the threshold issue of compliance with Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (188Ill. 2d R. 604(d)), which provides, in pertinent part:

"No appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty shall be taken unless thedefendant, within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed, files in the trial court amotion to reconsider the sentence, if only the sentence is being challenged, or, if the plea isbeing challenged, a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment. No appealshall be taken upon a negotiated plea of guilty challenging the sentence as excessive unlessthe defendant, within 30 days of the imposition of sentence, files a motion to withdraw theplea of guilty and vacate the judgment."

Prior to a hearing on any postsentencing motion, Rule 604(d) requires defense counsel to "file withthe trial court a certificate stating that the attorney has consulted with the defendant either by mailor in person to ascertain defendant's contentions of error in the sentence or the entry of the plea ofguilty, has examined the trial court file and report of proceedings of the plea of guilty, and has madeany amendments to the motion necessary for adequate presentation of any defects in thoseproceedings." 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d). Failure to file the appropriate motion ordinarily results indismissal of the appeal. People v. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d 67, 74 (1999). Where the defendant files theproper motion but his or her attorney fails to file the necessary certificate, the case must be remandedto the trial court for new proceedings in compliance with the rule. People v. Janes, 158 Ill. 2d 27,35-36 (1994).

Relying on People v. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291 (2003), the State argues that this appeal mustbe dismissed because defendant failed to file the appropriate motion required by Rule 604(d). TheState argues that, because defendant's plea was negotiated, Rule 604(d) required her to file a motionto withdraw guilty plea if she wanted to challenge her sentence. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d). Defendantresponds that Flowers is distinguishable and asserts that her timely motion to reconsider sentence wasa permissible pleading under Rule 604(d) to assert her contention that the trial court exceeded itsstatutory sentencing authority when it ordered restitution on a dismissed charge absent an agreementbetween the parties to do so. See 730 ILCS 5/5--5--6(d) (West 2000).

In Flowers, the defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to seven counts of forgery andwas ordered to pay restitution. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d at 294-95. Following the imposition of sentence,the defendant did not file any postplea motions and her direct appeals were subsequently dismissedby the appellate court. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d at 296. The defendant then filed a postconviction petitionalleging that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to comply with Rule 604(d). More than 16months after the defendant was sentenced, postconviction counsel filed a motion to reconsidersentence. The trial court denied the motion and the defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal from thedenial. Postconviction counsel then withdrew the defendant's postconviction petition. Flowers, 208Ill. 2d at 296-97.

On appeal, the defendant argued that the provision of the trial court's sentencing orderpermitting the Department of Corrections to withhold a portion of her prison income to satisfy therestitution order was void because the trial court lacked any statutory authority to impose thewithholding order. The State responded that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear the casebecause Rule 604(d) required the defendant to file a motion to withdraw guilty plea rather than amotion to reconsider sentence. The State also argued that the motion to reconsider sentence had notbeen filed within 30 days as required by Rule 604(d). Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d at 298. The appellatecourt rejected the State's arguments and held that a motion to reconsider sentence was sufficientunder Rule 604(d) where the trial court's sentence went beyond the terms of the agreement negotiatedby the parties. The appellate court also excused the defendant's failure to timely file her motion toreconsider sentence, arguing that Rule 604(d)'s timing requirements can be excused when the interestsof justice so require. The appellate court concluded that the trial court's withholding order was voidand vacated the order. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d at 298-99.

On further appeal, our supreme court concluded that the trial court lacked subject matterjurisdiction to consider the defendant's motion to reconsider sentence because the motion was notfiled within the time required by Rule 604(d). Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d at 306. In so holding, the supremecourt recognized the well-established principle of law that a void order may be attacked at any timeor in any court, either directly or collaterally. However, the court explained that the issue of voidnessmust be raised in the context of a proceeding that is properly pending in the courts. Flowers, 208 Ill.2d at 308. The court concluded that, because the appellate court lacked jurisdiction over the case,it was without authority to grant the defendant relief from the allegedly void withholding order. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d at 307. The court noted that its conclusion "render[ed] unnecessaryconsideration of whether the appellate court was correct, on the merits, when it held that Flowers'Rule 604(d) motion was not deficient for failing to include a request for withdrawal of her guiltyplea." Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d at 307.

We agree with defendant that Flowers is unhelpful in resolving the issues presented in thiscase. In contrast to the situation in Flowers, defendant's Rule 604(d) motion was timely filed in thetrial court. Therefore, provided that defendant filed the appropriate postplea motion required by Rule604(d), defendant's appeal is properly before this court and we have no jurisdictional impediment toconsidering whether defendant is entitled to relief from the allegedly void sentencing order. SeePeople v. Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d 19, 28-29 (2004). The question that we must resolve is whetherRule 604(d) required defendant to move to withdraw her guilty plea in order to assert her challengeto the trial court's statutory authority to enter the restitution order on the dismissed charge. As notedabove, the court in Flowers expressly declined to consider this precise question. We therefore rejectthe State's assertions that Flowers controls the outcome of this appeal and conclude thatconsideration of other authorities is necessary.

We begin our analysis with a consideration of the language of the rule. As quoted above,Rule 604(d) provides that, as a prerequisite to filing an appeal from a judgment entered on a guiltyplea, a defendant must, within 30 days of the imposition of sentence, file "a motion to reconsider thesentence, if only the sentence is being challenged, or, if the plea is being challenged, a motion towithdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment." 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d). Here, the parties do notdispute that defendant seeks to challenge only her sentence and not her underlying plea of guilty. However, this determination does not end the analysis. Rule 604(d) further provides that no appealshall be taken upon a negotiated plea of guilty "challenging the sentence as excessive" unless thedefendant files, within 30 days of sentencing, a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 188 Ill. 2d R.604(d). In this case, defendant does not challenge the trial court's sentence on the basis that it wasexcessive. Instead, defendant contends that the restitution order was void because the trial court waswithout statutory authority to impose restitution on the dismissed count absent an agreement betweenthe parties. Defendant also claims that the trial court was without authority to enter the restitutionorder because it went beyond the plea agreement reached by the parties. Because defendant haschallenged the trial court's legal authority to order restitution and has not claimed that the sentencewas excessive, we conclude that Rule 604(d) did not require defendant to move to withdraw herguilty plea. Rather, we hold that the plain language of the rule required defendant to file only amotion to reconsider sentence.

We find support for our conclusion in People v. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d 331 (1997), and Peoplev. Wilson, 181 Ill. 2d 409 (1998). In Williams, the defendant entered a negotiated plea agreementwith the State and pleaded guilty to the charge of retail theft. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d at 332. Followingsentencing, the defendant filed a timely motion to reconsider sentence arguing that the trial court waswithout statutory authority to impose consecutive sentences of prison and probation for a singleoffense. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d at 332. Relying on People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996), uponwhich the present Rule 604(d) is based, the State argued that the defendant was required to withdrawhis guilty plea before he could challenge the sentence he received pursuant to the plea agreement. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d at 333. Our supreme court rejected the State's argument, explaining that "thedefendant does not contend that his sentence was excessive; rather, he argues that the court imposeda sentence which, under the statute, it had no authority to impose." Williams, 179 Ill. 2d at 333. Thesupreme court concluded that Evans was inapplicable and did not bar defendant's claim that hissentence was void because it did not conform to the statute. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d at 333.

A similar conclusion was reached in Wilson, wherein the defendant entered into a pleaagreement with the State and pleaded guilty to charges of aggravated battery and unlawful possessionof a controlled substance. Wilson, 181 Ill. 2d at 410-11. Following sentencing, the defendant fileda motion to reduce sentence, arguing that the term of imprisonment ordered by the trial courtexceeded the statutory maximum for the offense. Wilson, 181 Ill. 2d at 414. Relying on Williams,the supreme court held that because the defendant contended that his sentence violated statutoryrequirements, his motion to reduce sentence was sufficient to permit appellate review. Wilson, 181Ill. 2d at 413; see also People v. Exum, 307 Ill. App. 3d 1000, 1003 (1999) (holding that thedefendant's motion to reconsider sentence was sufficient to present claim that trial court exceededits statutory authority in imposing sentence).

Furthermore, we also note that, where a trial court sentences a defendant outside of theagreed-upon terms of a plea agreement, the defendant may properly raise the issue in a motion toreconsider sentence and is not required to file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. See People v.Foster, 308 Ill. App. 3d 286, 289 (1999). A motion to reconsider sentence is appropriate in suchinstances because the defendant is seeking only to be sentenced pursuant to his or her agreement withthe State and is not seeking to avoid or modify the terms of the plea agreement. Foster, 308 Ill. App.3d at 288.

In light of these authorities, we conclude that defendant's motion to reconsider sentencesatisfied the requirements of Rule 604(d). The motion did not allege that the sentence was excessiveand was not an improper attempt by defendant to avoid or modify the terms of her plea agreementwith the State. Instead, defendant argued that the trial court was without statutory authority to orderrestitution on the dismissed charge. Also, defendant asserted that the plea agreement entered intoby the parties did not require the payment of restitution on the dismissed charge. Under thesecircumstances, Rule 604(d) did not require defendant to file a motion to withdraw her guilty plea andto vacate the judgment. See Wilson, 181 Ill. 2d at 414; Williams, 179 Ill. 2d at 333; Foster, 308 Ill.App. 3d at 288. Hence, dismissal of the appeal is not warranted.

Having resolved this issue, we are now left with the question of defense counsel's failure tofile an attorney's certificate as required by Rule 604(d). Defendant asserts that, despite her trialcounsel's failure to comply with the certification requirements of Rule 604(d), judicial economynecessitates that this court consider the issue raised on appeal. We disagree. It is neither a waste ofresources nor an exercise in futility to ensure proper compliance with the rules of our supreme court. See People v. Willis, 313 Ill. App. 3d 553, 558 (2000). In Janes, 158 Ill. 2d at 33, the supreme courtheld that "the remedy for failure to strictly comply with each of the provisions of Rule 604(d) is aremand to the circuit court for the filing of a new motion to withdraw guilty plea or to reconsidersentence and a new hearing on the motion." Janes, 158 Ill. 2d at 33. The supreme court hasreaffirmed the strict compliance rule articulated in Janes. See People v. Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d 359, 371(1998).

Lacking the required certification, we have no assurance that trial counsel consulted withdefendant, examined the trial court file and the report of proceedings from the plea of guilty, andmade necessary amendments to the motion for adequate presentation for any defects in thoseproceedings. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d). In addition to the alleged errors raised here, there may beother errors that should be presented for the trial court's review and should be preserved for laterreview by this court. Pursuant to Janes, we reverse the trial court's order denying defendant's motionto reconsider sentence and remand the case so that defendant can file a new postjudgment motion andreceive a hearing on that motion in compliance with Rule 604(d). See Janes, 158 Ill. 2d at 33.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County andremand the case for further proceedings pursuant to Rule 604(d).

Reversed and remanded with directions.

BYRNE and GILLERAN JOHNSON, JJ., concur.