People v. Holman

SUPREME COURT CASES

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People v. Holman

State: Illinois

Court: 2nd District Appellate

Docket No: 2-08-0599 Rel

Case Date: 06/10/2010

Preview:No. 2-08-0599 Filed: 6-10-10 ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Lake County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 07--CF--3565 ) JERRY B. HOLMAN, ) Honorable ) Christopher R. Stride, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court: Defendant, Jerry B. Holman, was convicted by a jury of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 2006)). He was sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment plus a 3-year term of mandatory supervised release (MSR). On appeal, defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress evidence; (2) he was denied his right to due process when the trial court prohibited defense counsel from using demonstrative evidence during cross-examination; (3) the trial court erred in imposing a fee for reimbursement of court-appointed counsel; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing defendant to a three-year term of MSR where he was convicted of a Class 1 felony that carries only a two-year MSR term. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand. I. BACKGROUND

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Prior to trial, defendant's attorney left the public defender's office but was granted leave to continue to represent defendant pro bono as private counsel. The succeeding assistant public defender was then allowed to withdraw as counsel. After a short exchange between the trial court and the attorneys present, the trial court assessed a public defender fee of $1,200. The following evidence was adduced at trial. Waukegan police officer Joshua Amann testified that on September 15, 2007, he was patrolling a bike path in Waukegan that he described as an area having "a lot of graffiti" and "activity." At 9 p.m., Amann saw two men walking toward his parked squad car. One man, Donald Dagen, was carrying what Amann believed was a 40-ounce bottle of alcohol. The other man, defendant, was not carrying anything. Amann announced he was a police officer and turned on his squad car's spotlight. He ordered them loudly to "come here." Dagen put the bottle down near the bike path. Then he and defendant veered off the path and crouched behind some bushes. At this point, Amann could see only the tops of their heads. Amann called for backup and again ordered the two men to come over and talk to him. After "a few seconds," defendant and Dagen emerged from the bushes and approached the squad car. Amann had them stand with their hands on the squad car until two other police officers arrived approximately a minute or two later. The officers then patted down both men. Amann testified that they did not find any weapons or contraband on either man. While the backup officers watched defendant, Amann searched the bushes in the area where he saw Dagen and defendant crouch down. He found a bag containing 20 individually wrapped "crack" cocaine rocks sitting on a leaf that was growing underneath the bushes. Dagen and defendant were placed under arrest and handcuffed. They were transported to the police station in separate squad cars. Amann noticed defendant moving around in the backseat of his squad. He told defendant

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No. 2--08--0599 he always searched his car after transporting anyone. Amann testified that defendant replied that he was "throwing crack rocks in the back of [his] squad car." After defendant was brought into the station for booking, Amann searched the car while it was in the police garage and found 10 individually packaged crack rocks on the floor of the car. Three officers then conducted a "strip search" of defendant and found seven individually wrapped "crack" cocaine rocks in the elastic of his underwear. Waukegan police department Lieutenant Jon Oliver, the State's expert witness in narcotics, testified regarding the packaging and the weight of the packages of cocaine. During crossexamination of Oliver, defense counsel used a whiteboard to record Oliver's responses regarding factors that he routinely considered in determining whether a person possessed narcotics with the intent to sell them. Initially, the trial court allowed defense counsel to proceed over the State's objection to the use of the board. When defense counsel wrote "facts are better than assumptions" on the board, the trial court sustained the State's objection on the ground that the phrase was argumentative. The trial court allowed defense counsel to continue using the board to record a few more of Oliver's responses such as "cell phone," "money," and "scales," until the State renewed its objection. After ruling that the use of the board unfairly highlighted the officer's testimony during his cross-examination and was unfairly prejudicial, the trial court told defense counsel that he could: "make a list of all the things the officer testifies to that are factors and those things that are not, and in his closing argument he is certainly entitled to produce an exhibit which reflects those items. But I find that in cross-examination, before the State has rested its proofs, and before we have even gotten to a defense case, [sic] that the effect of this exhibit is purely prejudicial."

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No. 2--08--0599 Defendant was convicted of one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. 720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 2006). II. ANALYSIS A. Denial of Motion to Suppress Evidence Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence because the cocaine was recovered as a result of his unconstitutional seizure. Courts of review apply a two-part standard of review when faced with a challenge to a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence. People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530 (2006). First, the trial court's findings of historical fact are reviewed only for clear error, and deference is afforded to any inferences the factfinder drew from those facts. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 542. We will not disturb the trial court's factual findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 542. "A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented." People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008). This deferential standard of review is grounded in the reality that the trial court is in a superior position to determine and weigh the credibility of the witnesses, observe the witnesses' demeanor, and resolve conflicts in their testimony. People v. Richardson, 234 Ill. 2d 233, 251 (2009). However, the reviewing court is free to assess the facts in relation to the issues presented in the case and may draw its own conclusions when deciding what relief should be granted. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 542. We review de novo the trial court's ultimate legal ruling on the motion to suppress. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 542. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill.

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No. 2--08--0599 Const. 1970, art. I,

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