JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court:

The defendant, David Ryan Huffman, pleaded guilty on August 7,1995, to three counts of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9--1(a)(1)(West 1998)) and one count of concealment of a homicidal death (720ILCS 5/9--3.1(a) (West 1998)). The trial court sentenced thedefendant to 75 years in prison. On direct appeal, this courtaffirmed the defendant's convictions and sentence on December 27,1996. See People v. Huffman, No. 2--95--1640 (1996) (unpublishedorder under Supreme Court Rule 23). On August 19, 1998, thedefendant filed a petition for postconviction relief. In thatpetition, the defendant made no allegations of fact showing that any delay in filing the petition was not due to his culpablenegligence. The trial court dismissed the petition as beingpatently without merit. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motionto reconsider, and the State filed a motion to dismiss thedefendant's petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,alleging that it was untimely filed. The trial court agreed thatthe petition was untimely and granted the State's motion todismiss. The defendant now appeals from that ruling.

On appeal, the defendant contends that the limitations periodsfor postconviction petitions under section 122--1(c) of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122--1(c) (West 1996))are not jurisdictional and the trial court erred in dismissing thepetition without hearing evidence as to whether the defendant'sdelay in filing the petition was due to his culpable negligence. In response, the State cites People v. Stenson, 296 Ill. App. 3d93, 95-96 (1998), and People v. Heirens, 271 Ill. App. 3d 392, 402(1995), which held that a defendant's failure to file apostconviction petition within the limitations period establishedin the Act is a jurisdictional bar to the action.

Although it was not cited by either of the parties in theinstant appeal, our supreme court recently held in People v.Wright, 189 Ill. 2d 1 (1999), that, because the lack of culpablenegligence--not time--is the inherent element of the right to bringa postconviction petition, compliance with section 122--1(c) is nota jurisdictional prerequisite. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d at 8-9. Instead, the limitations period set forth in the Act is a statuteof limitations, which requires the defendant to allege sufficientfacts demonstrating the lack of culpable negligence. Wright, 189Ill. 2d at 10-11; see also People v. Bates, 124 Ill. 2d 81, 88(1988) (to show the absence of culpable negligence, a petitionermust allege facts justifying the delay). In Wright, the supremecourt found that the State waived the right to challenge thetimeliness of the defendant's petition by failing to argue beforethe circuit court that the petition was untimely. Wright, 189 Ill.2d at 11. In contrast to Wright, the State in the present case didraise the timeliness of the defendant's petition in the courtbelow. Because we may affirm the trial court's judgment for anyreason appearing in the record even if it was not relied upon bythe trial court, we will consider whether the defendant's petitionmust be dismissed as untimely. See People v. Paarlberg, 243 Ill.App. 3d 731, 734 (1993).

The statute of limitations applicable to the filing of thedefendant's postconviction petition was the statute that was ineffect at the time he filed his petition. Bates, 124 Ill. 2d at85-86 (amendment to the Act that shortened the statute oflimitations should be applied retroactively to a conviction thatoccurred prior to its enactment). When the defendant filed hispostconviction petition on August 19, 1998, section 122--1(c) ofthe Act set forth the limitations periods applicable to the filingof petitions for postconviction relief as follows:

"No proceedings under this Article shall be commencedmore than 6 months after the denial of a petition for leave toappeal or the date for filing such a petition if none is filedor *** 3 years from the date of conviction, whichever issooner, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that thedelay was not due to his or her culpable negligence." 725ILCS 5/122--1(c) (West 1996).

The plain language of the Act requires the dismissal of anuntimely filed petition, unless the petitioner "alleges factsshowing that the delay was not due to his or her culpablenegligence." 725 ILCS 5/122--1(c) (1996); Bates, 124 Ill. 2d at88. In People v. Van Hee, 305 Ill. App. 3d 333 (1999), this courtheld that a defendant's motion to extend the time for filingpostconviction relief was properly denied where the defendantfailed to allege sufficient facts indicating that a prison lockdownlasted a sufficient amount of time to excuse his delay in filing. Van Hee, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 336-38. This court also observedthat a defendant's allegation that he was unfamiliar with thecontrolling limitations period is insufficient to establish thatthe delay was not due to his culpable negligence. Van Hee, 305Ill. App. 3d at 337.

Here, the defendant's appeal was decided on December 27, 1996. The defendant did not file a petition for leave to appeal with thesupreme court. The date for filing his notice for leave to appealexpired on January 17, 1997. Thus, the defendant had until July17, 1997, to file his petition for postconviction relief. However,the defendant filed his petition on August 19, 1998, more than oneyear past the deadline. The defendant's petition did not containallegations justifying the late filing. The defendant did not filea motion to amend his petition to allege the lack of culpablenegligence until after the trial court dismissed the petition. Thereafter, the defendant did not obtain a ruling on his motion toamend. Where, as here, the defendant has not obtained a ruling onhis motion, the motion is presumed to have been abandoned absentcircumstances indicating otherwise. Van Hee, 305 Ill. App. 3d at335.

At any rate, the defendant did not allege sufficient facts inhis motion to amend to justify the delay by showing a lack ofculpable negligence. The defendant alleged in his motion that hewas unaware of the limitations period because he was not advised byhis attorney of the deadline for bringing his postconvictionpetition. As previously stated, the defendant's allegation that hewas unfamiliar with the controlling limitations period isinsufficient to establish a delay not due to his culpablenegligence. See Van Hee, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 337. The defendantalso alleged in his motion that the delay in filing was justifiedby his discovery of new evidence. However, the defendant did notallege any specific dates of when he learned of the allegedly newevidence, and therefore, we must conclude that he has failed toallege sufficient facts demonstrating that the delay was justified. See Van Hee, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 337 (where court found that,absent specific dates in an affidavit, it was left to speculatethat the lockdown lasted a short period of time and did not excusethe defendant's delay).

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the defendant'spetition failed to allege sufficient facts to justify the delay,and, therefore, it was untimely filed beyond the limitations periodset forth in section 122--1(c) of the Act. Accordingly, we affirmthe judgment of the circuit court of Carroll County, whichdismissed the defendant's petition.

Affirmed.

INGLIS and HUTCHINSON, JJ., concur.