JUSTICE KAPALA delivered the opinion of the court:

The State appeals from an order of the circuit court ofMcHenry County dismissing the statutory summary suspension pursuantto section 11--501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS5/11--501.1 (West 2000)) of the driving privileges of defendant,Benjamin J. Jordan. The State contends that the trial court erredin concluding that defendant was entitled to relief because thearresting officer failed to give immediate notice of thesuspension. We reverse and remand.

Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence ofalcohol, drugs, or intoxicating compounds (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11--501(West 2000)) on May 26, 2001, at which time he consented to haveblood drawn and tested. On July 23, 2001, the arresting officersubmitted a sworn report indicating that testing of defendant'sblood disclosed the presence of cannabis, a controlled substance,or an intoxicating compound. The sworn report further indicatedthat on July 23, 2001, the officer had given notice, by mail, ofthe statutory summary suspension of defendant's driving privileges. The Secretary of State mailed a notice of confirmation of thestatutory summary suspension indicating that it would take effecton September 7, 2001. Defendant filed a petition to rescind thesuspension. In addition, he filed a separate motion to "dismiss"the summary suspension due to the arresting officer's failure togive him immediate notice of the summary suspension and the rightto a hearing. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, thearresting officer testified that after defendant's blood was drawn,the sample was sent to the Illinois State Police Crime Laboratory. The officer identified a letter to him from the laboratory dated June 20, 2001, containing the test results. The officer had noknowledge of when the letter was sent and he did not recall when hereceived it. Finding that there was an unreasonable delay from thetime that the blood test results were known until the notice of thestatutory summary suspension was mailed to defendant, the trialcourt granted defendant's motion to dismiss. At that pointdefendant withdrew his petition to rescind and this appealfollowed.

Section 11--501.1 of the Vehicle Code (Code) provides inpertinent part:

"(a) Any person who drives or is in actual physicalcontrol of a motor vehicle *** shall be deemed to have givenconsent *** to a chemical test or tests of blood, breath, orurine for the purpose of determining the content of alcohol,other drug or drugs, or intoxicating compound or compounds orany combination thereof in the person's blood if arrested, asevidenced by the issuance of a Uniform Traffic Ticket, for[DUI]. ***

(d) If the person refuses testing or submits to a testthat discloses an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more, orany amount of a drug, substance, or intoxicating compound inthe person's breath, blood, or urine resulting from theunlawful use or consumption of cannabis listed in the CannabisControl Act, a controlled substance listed in the IllinoisControlled Substances Act, or an intoxicating compound listedin the Use of Intoxicating Compounds Act, the law enforcementofficer shall immediately submit a sworn report to the circuitcourt of venue and the Secretary of State, certifying that thetest or tests was or were requested under paragraph (a) andthe person refused to submit to a test or tests, or submittedto testing that disclosed an alcohol concentration of 0.08 ormore.

(f) The law enforcement officer submitting the swornreport under paragraph (d) shall serve immediate notice of thestatutory summary suspension on the person and the suspensionshall be effective as provided in paragraph (g). In caseswhere the blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 or greater orany amount of a drug, substance, or compound resulting fromthe unlawful use or consumption of cannabis ***, a controlledsubstance ***, or an intoxicating compound *** is establishedby a subsequent analysis of blood or urine collected at thetime of arrest, the arresting officer or arresting agencyshall give notice as provided in this Section or by deposit inthe United States mail of the notice in an envelope withpostage prepaid and addressed to the person at his address asshown on the Uniform Traffic Ticket and the statutory summarysuspension shall begin as provided in paragraph (g). ***

(g) The statutory summary suspension referred to in this Section shall take effect on the 46th day following the datethe notice of the statutory summary suspension was given tothe person." 625 ILCS 5/11--501.1 (West 2000).

The State argues, inter alia, that this provision does notrequire immediate notice of a statutory summary suspension based ona blood-alcohol concentration established by laboratory testing ofblood or urine (as opposed to a breathalyser test that displaysresults at the time the test is administered). Based on the plainlanguage of the statute we agree.

When interpreting a statute, the court's primary objective isto ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Ramos v. City of Peru, 333 Ill. App. 3d 75, 77 (2002). Whendetermining legislative intent, a court will construe the languageof the statute according to its plain and ordinary meaning and ifthe statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the statute'splain meaning will be given effect. Ramos, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 77-78.

The first sentence of section 11--501.1(f) of the Codeexplicitly requires a law enforcement officer to give "immediatenotice" of a statutory summary suspension. However, the nextsentence creates an exception where the blood-alcohol concentration"is established by a subsequent analysis of blood or urinecollected at the time of arrest." 625 ILCS 5/11--501.1(f) (West2000). In that situation, the statute authorizes alternativemethods of notification: "the arresting officer or arresting agencyshall give notice as provided in this Section or by deposit in theUnited States mail." (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/11--501.1(f)(West 2000). "As used in its ordinary sense, the word 'or' marksan alternative indicating the various members of the sentence whichit connects are to be taken separately." People v. Frieberg, 147Ill. 2d 326, 349 (1992).

Here the disjunctive word "or" separates notice "by deposit inthe United States mail" from notice "as provided in this Section";thus the two methods of notice plainly stand in contradistinctionto one another. Notice by United States mail is distinct fromnotice as otherwise provided in section 11--501.1(f). Therefore,when a law enforcement officer is authorized to give notice bymail, the general requirements of section 11--501.1(f), includingthe requirement of "immediate notice," do not apply. It issignificant that a statutory summary suspension only takes effecton the 46th day after notice is given. 625 ILCS 5/11--501.1(g)(West 2000). Delay in giving notice of a statutory summarysuspension defers the effective date of the suspension by an equalinterval. We fail to see how such delay visits any hardship onaffected motorists: they are simply allowed to stay on the roadslonger before the suspension takes effect.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of thecircuit court of McHenry County. Because of the disposition below,the trial court never considered defendant's petition to rescind. Accordingly we remand the cause to the circuit court for furtherproceedings on that petition.

Reversed and remanded.

HUTCHINSON, P.J., and BYRNE, J., concur.