Defendant, Ryan M. Kelley, was charged with aggravatedunlawful use of a weapon (UUW) (720 ILCS 5/24--1.6(a) (West 2000))and involuntary manslaughter (720 ILCS 5/9--3(a) (West 2000)) for shooting and killing his friend, Tyler Johnson, on August 7, 2000. Defendant filed a motion for a directed verdict following the closeof the State's case, and the trial court denied the motion. A juryfound defendant guilty of aggravated UUW and not guilty ofinvoluntary manslaughter. The trial court imposed a sentence of 60days' periodic imprisonment, 30 months' probation, and 200 hours'community service. On appeal, defendant argues that the trialcourt erroneously denied his motion for a directed verdict on theaggravated UUW charge because the State failed to prove that he wasnot on his land, in his abode, or in his fixed place of businesswhile he possessed the weapon. We affirm.

FACTS

We set forth only the facts relevant to this appeal. Attrial, Melissa Ramstedt, a friend of defendant, testified to whoresided in the building where the shooting occurred. During theState's case in chief, Melissa and the prosecutor engaged in thefollowing colloquy:

"Q. And I'm gonna direct your attention to August 7th of2000. Where did you live at that time?

A. 1004 Luther Avenue.

Q. And where in the house did you live?

A. In the basement.

Q. Did you live there with anyone?

A. With Timothy Strahorn.

Q. And what is your - at that time were you dating TimStrahorn?

A. Yes.

Q. And who else lived in the house?

A. His mother, Linda Strahorn, and occasional [sic] hissister, Kristin Strahorn. She went to college."

In her subsequent testimony, Melissa repeatedly referred tothe premises as "Tim's house." On the night of the incident,Melissa, Tim, and Robby Thor, another friend, were driving homefrom a restaurant when they encountered defendant and the victimdriving in another car on Luther and Guilford Avenues. The twogroups went to 1004 Luther Avenue and exited their cars, andMelissa immediately entered the basement. The boys chatted outsidefor a couple of minutes before they also went to the basement,where defendant displayed a handgun and asked Melissa whether shehad seen it before. Melissa replied that she had not seen the gunand "jokingly" told defendant to put it away. The victim jokedthat the gun was "pointing right at [him]" and told defendant toput it away because defendant did not "know what to do with [the]thing anyway." Melissa was sitting near defendant and saw that thegun was loaded as defendant spun the cylinder. No one seriouslyobjected to defendant playing with the gun.

Five minutes later, defendant walked toward the kitchendoorway in the basement and turned quickly toward the group to saysomething. As defendant turned, he raised his hand from his side,and the gun fired once. It appeared that defendant did notintentionally aim at the victim or anyone else. Melissa initiallythought that the bullet hit the bed, but she soon saw that thevictim had been shot. Defendant "just stood there," looking like"a complete ghost." Then the victim stood, walked three feet, andcollapsed to the floor. Melissa panicked and fled to a neighbor'shouse as defendant and the others assisted the victim.

Tim and Linda Strahorn testified that they both lived withMelissa at 1004 Luther Avenue. Tim stated that he first saw thegun when defendant pulled it from his waistband while in thebasement. Linda testified that her daughter, Kristin, was presentin an upstairs bedroom on the night of the shooting. Linda, Tim,and Melissa did not testify that defendant did not reside or workthere, and they did not identify who owned the premises.

Detective Robert Redmond testified that, after responding tothe shooting at 1004 Luther Avenue, he went to "[defendant's]house" where defendant's father gave Redmond a gun case. Several officers and a medical expert testified to other events followingthe shooting, and the State rested its case.

Defense counsel then filed two written motions for a directedverdict, and each motion was directed to one of the chargedoffenses. Counsel initially noted that defendant could not beconvicted of aggravated UUW if the State failed to prove that hewas not in his abode or fixed place of business at the time of theoffense. Counsel then argued that "[n]obody said anything aboutwhether [defendant] lived at that house, and certainly nobody saidanything about whether or not a business was operated out of thathouse that [defendant] might somehow be involved in." The courtdenied the motions with little comment, and defendant proceededwith his case.

Brian Fey testified that he was the manager at an Applebee'srestaurant in Rockford where defendant worked. Fey stated thatdefendant had a reputation for being careful and reliable. Oncross-examination, Fey stated that he and other employees knewdefendant well because he was a "full-time" employee.

Defendant testified that he had just turned 17 years old atthe time of the shooting and that he had been good friends with thevictim since the two were in seventh grade. He stated that, afterworking at Applebee's on the night of the shooting, he "went homeand called Tyler and changed clothes *** and talked to [his] dadfor a little while." Before he "left the house," defendant grabbeda gun. Defendant did not identify where he resided. However,defendant referred to the building at 1004 Luther Avenue as "Tim'shouse," and he testified that Tim invited him to enter the home onthe night of the shooting. The group entered the basement "whereTim and Melissa ha[d] their room and basically where they live[d]inside the house."

Defendant explained his reasons for obtaining the gun. Several months before the incident, defendant contacted a formergirlfriend upon returning from Arizona where he had been living. Someone threw a brick through defendant's bedroom window, anddefendant suspected that the girl's current boyfriend wasresponsible. Defendant told his father about the brick-throwingincident, but he did not contact the police. Five days before theshooting, defendant purchased the gun to scare anyone who mightthreaten him. Defendant never intended to shoot the gun, and henever had a disagreement with the victim.

At the close of all of the evidence, defense counsel againargued for a directed verdict, and the trial court denied themotion. The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated UUW, thecourt imposed the sentence, and this timely appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously denied hismotion for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case. The statutory authority for directed verdicts is found in section115--4(k) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, whichprovides:

"When, at the close of the State's evidence or at theclose of all of the evidence, the evidence is insufficient tosupport a finding or verdict of guilty the court may and onmotion of the defendant shall make a finding or direct thejury to return a verdict of not guilty, enter a judgment ofacquittal and discharge the defendant." 725 ILCS 5/115--4(k)(West 2000).

"A motion for a directed verdict asserts only that as a matterof law the evidence is insufficient to support a finding or verdictof guilty. The [motion] requires the trial court to consider onlywhether a reasonable mind could fairly conclude the guilt of theaccused beyond reasonable doubt, considering the evidence moststrongly in the People's favor." People v. Withers, 87 Ill. 2d224, 230-31 (1981), citing People v. Tibbs, 57 Ill. App. 3d 1007,1012-13 (1978). In moving for a directed verdict, the defendantadmits the truth of the facts stated in the State's evidence forpurposes of the motion. Tibbs, 57 Ill. App. 3d at 1012. A motionfor a directed verdict presents a question of law, which theappellate court reviews de novo. Withers, 87 Ill. 2d at 230.

It is well settled that a defendant who chooses to presentevidence after the denial of his motion for a directed verdict atthe close of the State's case waives any error in the trial court'sruling on the motion unless he renews the motion at the close ofall the evidence. People v. DeBartolo, 242 Ill. App. 3d 811, 816(1993). The State argues that defendant waived his claim for adirected verdict because he failed to renew his motion at the closeof all the evidence.

After the State completed its case in chief, defendant filedtwo written motions for a directed verdict. The defense presentedevidence after the denial of the motions, but defense counselorally moved for a directed verdict at the close of all theevidence. We conclude that counsel's brief oral argumentadequately renewed the motions to preserve the issues on appeal. See People v. Connolly, 322 Ill. App. 3d 905, 913-14 (2001) (eventhough defense counsel failed to formally renew his motion for adirected verdict, he preserved the issue at the close of the caseby referring to the factual arguments made in support of theoriginal motion).

Defendant was charged by indictment with aggravated UUW inthat he "knowingly carried on or about his person while not on hisown land, in his own abode, or fixed place of business a revolver,and the firearm was uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible atthe time of the offense." See 720 ILCS 5/24--1.6(a) (West 2000). The statute defining the crime provides in relevant part:

"(a) A person commits the offense of aggravated unlawfuluse of a weapon when he or she knowingly:

(1) Carries on or about his or her person or in any vehicle or concealed on or about his or her person except when on his or her land or in his or her abode or fixed place of business any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm; ***

*** and

(3) One of the following factors is present:

(A) the firearm possessed was uncased, loadedand immediately accessible at the time of theoffense[.]" (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/24--1.6(a) (West 2000).

Because the legislature included the above-emphasizedexceptions within the statutory definition of the offense ofaggravated UUW, the State bears the burden of disproving beyond areasonable doubt the existence of the exceptions to sustain aconviction for the offense. People v. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d 330,335 (1998). In meeting this burden, the State may rely uponcircumstantial evidence if it provides proof beyond a reasonabledoubt of every element of the crime charged. However, there mustbe some evidence to create a reasonable inference of thedefendant's guilt; the State may not leave essential elements ofthe crime to conjecture or assumption. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d at335-36.

Defendant argues that his aggravated UUW conviction must bereversed because the State failed to prove that he was not on hisland, in his abode, or in his fixed place of business at the timeof the shooting. Defendant concedes that the State proved theremaining elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. TheState responds that it presented circumstantial evidence that"defendant had no connection to the property at 1004 Luther Avenue,where the offense occurred, except as an invited guest."

In determining whether the trial court erroneously denieddefendant's motion for a directed verdict on the aggravated UUWcharge, we would ordinarily be required to decide the thresholdissue of the scope of the evidence to be considered. In arguingthat it met its burden of proof, the State cites the testimony ofFey and defendant that was introduced during defendant's case. Defendant argues that this testimony should not be consideredbecause it was presented after he moved for a directed verdict.

In People v. Washington, 23 Ill. 2d 546 (1962), the defendantmoved for a finding of not guilty at the close of the State'sevidence, and the motion was denied. The defendant then took thestand and offered testimony that strengthened the State's case. Washington, 23 Ill. 2d at 547. At the close of all the evidence,the defendant again moved for a finding of not guilty, and thesecond motion was denied. On appeal to the supreme court, thedefendant argued that the trial court erroneously denied his firstmotion and that a reviewing court should consider only the evidencethat had been introduced "up to the time the motion was made." Washington, 23 Ill. 2d at 548. The supreme court rejected theargument, noting the well-settled rule that in civil cases "amotion for a directed verdict made at the close of the plaintiff'scase is waived when the defendant introduces evidence after themotion has been denied." (Emphasis added.) Washington, 23 Ill. 2dat 548, citing Joliet, Aurora & Northern Ry. Co. v. Velie, 140 Ill.59 (1892). The court did not comment further on the correctness ofthe denial of the first motion and instead decided the defendant'salternative claim that was directed to the sufficiency of theevidence. Washington, 23 Ill. 2d at 549.

Ten years later, the supreme court revisited the issue andheld that "[i]n both criminal and civil cases a defendant waiveshis right to a directed verdict when he introduces evidence afterhis motion has been denied." People ex rel. Kubala v. Woods, 52Ill. 2d 48, 54 (1972), citing Washington, 23 Ill. 2d at 549. Onecould infer that, when a defendant appeals the denial of a motionfor a directed verdict presented at the close of the State's case,Washington and Kubala require the reviewing court to examine all ofthe trial evidence, including any evidence presented by thedefendant after the denial of the original motion. The underlyingrationale of this approach is that, if a defendant may benefit fromfavorable evidence he introduces after the State closes its case inchief, he should also bear the risk that unfavorable evidence mightbe elicited.

Among the remaining cases we have reviewed, Connolly, 322 Ill.App. 3d 905 at 915 (2001), addresses the issue most directly, butit appears to contradict Kubala and Washington. In Connolly, thiscourt noted that a general analysis of the sufficiency of theevidence supporting a guilty finding requires the consideration ofall of the evidence presented at trial, including the evidenceadduced by the defendant during his case. Connolly also held that,when reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict or afinding of not guilty, a reviewing court must examine only theevidence introduced by the State during its case in chief, even ifthe defendant presented evidence after the denial of the motion. Connolly, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 918-19.

In announcing the rule, Connolly, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 913,cited DeBartolo, which states that, if a defendant introducesevidence after the denial of his motion for a directed verdict, hemust "renew" the motion at the close of all of the evidence. DeBartolo, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 816. This court's use of the term"renew" in DeBartolo suggests that the motion following the closeof the case is actually a motion to reconsider the denial of theoriginal motion and that the two motions are identical in scope.

Viewing this court's recent decision in Connolly in light ofthe supreme court's 30-year silence on the issue, we find itunclear whether a reviewing court should consider all of theevidence presented at trial, including the evidence presentedduring the defendant's case, when reviewing the denial of a motionfor a directed verdict or directed finding at the close of theState's case. However, we need not reconcile Connolly, Kubala, andWashington because we dispose of this appeal on other grounds.

When the trial judge denied the motion for a directed verdictat the close of the State's case, she broadly stated that "therewas sufficient testimony" to convict. However, at trial and onappeal, the parties focus exclusively on defendant's possession ofthe gun in the basement of 1004 Luther Avenue, and by doing so,they mistakenly presume that defendant's relationship to thepremises is dispositive of the issue of guilt.

The indictment broadly charged defendant with knowinglycarrying the revolver on or about his person, and defendant losessight that he could be found guilty of aggravated UUW based on hisconduct at a location other than the scene of the shooting. We arecompelled to examine this alternative theory of guilt because thetrial judge's broad statement in denying the motion implies thatshe considered this type of conduct even though the parties didnot. The State has not addressed the issue merely because thenarrowly tailored argument of defendant's motion has not requiredit. We may affirm the result below on any basis that is supportedby the record (People v. Huff, 195 Ill. 2d 87, 91 (2001)), and wetherefore conclude that our analysis would be incomplete withoutexamining defendant's conduct before his arrival at the residence.

During its case in chief, the State established throughMelissa's testimony that defendant drove on a public road on hisway to "Tim's house." Soon after defendant exited his vehicle andentered the basement at the residence, he displayed the handgun,which he carried in his waistband. This circumstantial evidenceproves that, while defendant was traveling on Luther Avenue, hecarried the revolver on or about his person while not on his land,in his abode, or in his fixed place of business. At that time, thegun was uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible in defendant'swaistband. See 720 ILCS 5/24--1.6(a) (West 2000). Althoughdefendant was not charged with carrying the weapon "in anyvehicle," we conclude that his actual possession of the gun in hiscar on Luther Avenue satisfies the element of carrying a revolver"on or about his person" because it was in his waistband while hedrove. After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable tothe prosecution, we conclude that the State negated beyond areasonable doubt the exceptions set forth in the offense ofaggravated UUW. Therefore, the trial court correctly denieddefendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of theState's case.

For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court ofWinnebago County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

McLAREN and O'MALLEY, JJ., concur.