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PRESIDING JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the opinion of thecourt:

Following a jury trial, defendant, Joseph C. Komes, Jr., wasconvicted of failing to file a 1996 Illinois income tax return (35ILCS 5/1301 (West 1998)). He was sentenced to 30 months' felonyprobation, ordered to pay a $1,000 fine, and ordered to file a 1996Illinois income tax return. Defendant appeals, arguing that theindictment was defective and that the trial court gave theincorrect willfulness instruction to the jury. We affirm.

Although no question is raised concerning our jurisdiction, wemust consider the matter sua sponte. People v. Clark, 314 Ill.App. 3d 181, 182 (2000). Because the statement of facts indefendant's brief indicates that a "motion for sentencemodification" remains pending in the trial court, we must examinewhether that pending motion deprives this court of jurisdiction.

The jury returned its guilty verdict on August 25, 1999. OnSeptember 21, 1999, defendant, through counsel, filed a motion fora new trial. On September 27, 1999, defendant filed a pro senotice of appeal. The trial court sentenced defendant on October25, 1999. Defendant filed a second pro se notice of appeal onNovember 24, 1999. On November 29, 1999, the trial court ruledthat defendant's first notice of appeal was premature and orderedit stricken.

On December 29, 1999, defendant, acting pro se, filed adocument styled "Motion of Sentence Modification." Defendantalleged that he feared prosecution for failure to file federal taxreturns and prayed for an order allowing him to file under seal thestate income tax returns required as a condition of his probationand enjoining the release of the information contained in thereturns to anyone other than the Illinois Department of Revenue. The record on appeal contains neither a notice of motion settingthe matter for hearing nor a court order addressing defendant'smotion.

Ordinarily, a timely filed postsentencing motion serves as animplicit dismissal of a prior notice of appeal. People v. Clark,314 Ill. App. 3d 181, 185 (2000). In such a case, judicial economyrequires a reviewing court to remand the matter to the trial courtfor a ruling on the pending postsentencing motion. Clark, 314 Ill.App. 3d at 186. However, no remand is necessary in this case. First, defendant's motion was not timely as a motion to reconsiderhis sentence because it was filed more than 30 days aftersentencing. Second, although styled a "Motion for SentenceModification," defendant's motion does not challenge the trialcourt's authority to sentence defendant to probation or imposeconditions on that probation; instead, defendant merely requests amodification of one of the conditions of that probation. We findthat the relief defendant requested was addressed to the trialcourt's continuing jurisdiction to modify the conditions ofprobation under section 5--6--4(f) of the Unified Code ofCorrections (730 ILCS 5/5-6--4(f) (West 1996)). See People v.Rymut, 216 Ill. App. 3d 920, 923 (1991). Therefore, we concludethat defendant's postsentencing motion did not serve to implicitlydismiss his appeal or deprive this court of jurisdiction.

Defendant first argues that the indictment was defective. Before the trial began, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment,arguing that the State failed to cite to the provisions of thefederal code that required him to file a federal income tax return. The indictment provided as follows:

"On or about April 15, 1997, JOSEPH C. KOMES, JR.committed the offense of FAILURE TO FILE ILLINOIS INCOME TAXRETURN in that he was a resident of McHenry County, Illinoisin 1996, that pursuant to Illinois Complied Statutes, Chapter35, Section 5/502(a)(2) he was required to file an IllinoisIncome Tax Return for the year 1996, that he willfully failedto file an Illinois Income Tax Return for said year on orbefore the due date for filing as required by IllinoisCompiled Statutes, Chapter 35, Section 5/505(a)(2) and inviolation of Illinois Compiled Statutes, Chapter 35, Section5/1301 (Class 4 felony)[.]"

Defendant claimed that the State was required to cite to thefederal statute that required defendant to file a federal incometax return because defendant's obligation to file an Illinoisincome tax return was dependent on his obligation to file a federalincome tax return. Defendant based this argument on section502(a)(2) of the Illinois Income Tax Act (Act) (35 ILCS 5/502(a)(2)(West 1998)), which provided that a person who is required to filea federal income tax return must also file an Illinois income taxreturn. Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment was denied. He raised the issue a second time in his posttrial motion, and hisposttrial motion was denied.

When a challenge to an indictment is made before the trial, thestandard of review is whether the indictment complied with section111--3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS5/111--3 (West 1998)). People v. Sparks, 221 Ill. App. 3d 546, 548(1991). Sections 111--3(a)(1) through (a)(5) of the Code providethat the charging instrument must list, in writing, the charge, thename of the offense, the statutes that were violated, the name ofthe accused, the date the offense occurred, the county in which theoffense occurred, and the nature and elements of the offense.

When the indictment is challenged in a posttrial motion, theindictment must set forth the nature and elements of the charge inorder to be considered sufficient. People v. Clay, 167 Ill. App.3d 628, 634 (1988). The language of the violated statute can serveto inform a defendant about the nature and elements of the offenseas long as the statutory language specifies with reasonablecertainty the type of conduct that is alleged. People v. Wisslead,108 Ill. 2d 389, 394 (1985).

Here, we determine that the indictment complied with section111--3 of the Code and sufficiently apprised defendant of thecharge alleged. We also note that the State was not required toprovide defendant with a citation to the federal statute thatrequired defendant to file a federal income tax return because thecharge here was that defendant willfully failed to file hisIllinois income tax return. Section 502(a)(2) of the Act, whichwas not the offense with which defendant was charged, merelyprovided defendant with a citation to the Illinois statute thatrequired him to file an Illinois income tax return. This sectionof the Act provided that an Illinois resident must file an Illinoisincome tax return if the Illinois resident also was required tofile a federal income tax return. Thus, the filing of a federalincome tax return triggered the necessity of filing an Illinoisincome tax return, but the filing of a federal income tax returnwas not an element of failing to file an Illinois income taxreturn. See People v. Doss, 99 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1030(1981)(willful failure to file an Illinois income tax returnrequires the State to prove that (1) the defendant is subject tothe Act and (2) the defendant, among other things, willfully failedto file an Illinois income tax return). Therefore, we concludethat defendant's argument lacks merit.

Defendant next argues that the trial court erred when itinstructed the jury that "[c]onduct performed knowingly or withknowledge is performed willfully." Defendant argues that theproper willfulness instruction is the definition of willfulness asprovided in the United States Internal Revenue Code. The Stateargues that defendant has waived this issue because he did notraise it in his posttrial motion. We agree with the State.

During the jury instruction conference, defendant objected tothe instruction on willful conduct, but defendant claimed that theinstruction should not be given because it was not an IllinoisPattern Jury Instruction. In defendant's posttrial motion,defendant claimed, among other things, that "[t]he court erred inallowing instructions to be given to the jury that were improper." Defendant did not identify which instructions were improper or whyany of the instructions were improper.

Generally, issues not raised at trial and not presented in awritten posttrial motion are deemed waived on appeal. People v.Hicks, 181 Ill. 2d 541, 545 (1998). An exception to this rulearises when the issues the defendant raises involve constitutionalclaims that were properly raised at trial and that can be raised ina postconviction petition, sufficiency of the evidence matters, andplain error arguments. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 190(1988).

Here, the issue defendant raised about the willfulnessinstruction was not explicitly objected to at trial, notspecifically raised in a written posttrial motion, and not anexception to the waiver rule. Thus, we conclude that the issue hasbeen waived.

For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court ofMcHenry County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

McLAREN and RAPP, JJ., concur.