People v. Larson
State: Illinois
Court: 2nd District Appellate
Docket No: 2-97-0676
Case Date: 05/21/1998
No. 2--97--0676
_________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
_________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, by the Village ) of McHenry County.
of Island Lake, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) No. 96--TR--48348
)
v. )
)
LARRY R. LARSON, ) Honorable
) Maureen P. McIntyre,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE GEIGER delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant, Larry Larson, was charged by complaint with
reckless driving (625 ILCS 5/11--503(a)(West 1996)). After the
State presented evidence at his bench trial, the defendant moved to
dismiss the complaint, alleging that it was void because it did not
describe the actual conduct on which the charge was based (see 725
ILCS 5/111--3(a)(3)(West 1996)). The trial court granted the
motion, and the State appeals (see 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)).
The State argues that the complaint, though alleging no facts,
was sufficient under the special standard of People v. Tammen, 40
Ill. 2d 76 (1968). Defendant responds that Tammen applies only to
Illinois Uniform Traffic Tickets (see 134 Ill. 2d R. 552), as
opposed to other charging instruments, including the long-form
complaint used here. We agree with the defendant and affirm.
Laura Leicht, the citizen complainant, signed the sworn
complaint on November 6, 1996. The complaint charges that, on or
about 8:20 a.m. that day, defendant committed a misdemeanor,
reckless driving, in that he operated a car [therein described]
upon Hyacinth Terrace in the vicinity of Ralph Court with willful
and wanton disregard for the life, limb and safety of the public.
Officer Scott Gaithman s signature attested that Gaithman read the
defendant his rights on November 6, 1996. Gaithman prepared the
complaint and served it on defendant on November 6, 1996.
After the State presented its evidence at the defendant s
bench trial, the defendant argued for the first time that the
complaint was void because it did not specify the nature and
elements of the reckless driving charge. The court agreed and
dismissed the complaint. The State timely appealed.
Although the parties stipulated statement of facts calls the
judgment a directed finding, the parties agree that the trial
court never decided defendant s guilt or innocence but dismissed
the complaint as legally inadequate. The court s written order is
to the same effect. Therefore, the State may appeal under Supreme
Court Rule 604(a)(1)(145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)).
The State argues that, because the defendant was charged with
a misdemeanor traffic offense, the complaint was not void for lack
of specificity and the defendant could not challenge it for the
first time after his trial began. We disagree.
Generally, a criminal complaint that lacks the necessary
certainty to charge an offense is void and may be attacked at any
time. People v. Heard, 47 Ill. 2d 501, 505 (1970). A charging
instrument must set forth the nature and elements of the offense
charged. 725 ILCS 5/111--3(a)(3)(West 1996); People v. Pena, 170
Ill. App. 3d 347, 353 (1988). In the reckless driving context, a
complaint must set the particular act or acts that comprised the
offense. People v. Griffin, 36 Ill. 2d 430, 433 (1967); Pena, 170
Ill. App. 3d at 353. The complaint here does not do so. The State
does not contend that the complaint satisfies the Griffin rule.
Instead, the State argues that, under Tammen, the complaint need
not set out the defendant s allegedly criminal acts because it
charges him with a misdemeanor traffic offense. We disagree.
In Tammen, the court held that an Illinois Uniform Traffic
Ticket sufficiently informs a defendant of the nature and elements
of the offense by naming and citing the offense even if it does not
specify the nature and elements of the offense, i.e., the
defendant s specific acts. The court explained that the uniform
traffic ticket is used only for misdemeanors and is written by the
arresting officer (rather than a State s Attorney), ordinarily at
the time the offense is committed. Therefore, naming and citing
the offense ordinarily will inform the defendant sufficiently of
why he is being charged. Tammen, 40 Ill. 2d at 78-79.
Tammen s language limits its special rule to uniform traffic
tickets. We have recognized that prosecutions based on uniform
traffic tickets are sui generis and must be distinguished from
those based on criminal complaints, indictments, and
informations. Village of Huntley v. Oltmann, 242 Ill. App. 3d
725, 727 (1993); see also People v. Schultz, 173 Ill. App. 3d 738,
742 (1988); People v. Domovich, 91 Ill. App. 3d 870, 873 (1980).
As the defendant notes, the State has cited no cases applying
Tammen to a charging instrument other than a uniform traffic
ticket. Also, as the defendant points out, the difference between
the complaint here and a standard traffic ticket is not trivial.
The complaint relies on information from a citizen rather than on
the observations of the officer who drafted it. This procedure
could routinely allow a substantial delay between the alleged
offense and the drafting or issuance of the complaint. Allowing a
nonspecific charge to be made by such a complaint would not be
consistent with the reasoning of Tammen.
The judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
INGLIS and McLAREN, JJ., concur.
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