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Laws-info.com » Cases » Illinois » 2nd District Appellate » 2007 » People v. Minniti
People v. Minniti
State: Illinois
Court: 2nd District Appellate
Docket No: 2-05-0028 Rel
Case Date: 04/30/2007
Preview:No. 2--05--0028 Filed: 4-30-07 ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Kane County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) No. 02--CF--2047 ) v. ) ) JOSHUA R. MINNITI, ) Honorable ) Patricia Piper Golden, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE GILLERAN JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the court: After a bench trial before the circuit court of Kane County, the defendant, Joshua R. Minniti, was found guilty of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9--1(a)(1) (West 2000)), home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12--11(a)(2) (West 2000)), and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12--14(a)(2) (West 2000)). The defendant was sentenced to 61 years' imprisonment for firstdegree murder and 6 years' imprisonment for each of the remaining counts, all sentences to be served consecutively. The defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements and that he is entitled to additional sentencing credit for time served prior to sentencing. We disagree with his first contention, agree with his second, and affirm the judgment as modified. I. BACKGROUND

No. 2--05--0028 On October 21, 2001, 57-year-old Irma Braun was found bludgeoned to death in her home. Almost a year later, the defendant, who was 15 years old at the time the crime was committed, was arrested for Braun's death. On October 8, 2002, the defendant was charged by indictment with four counts of first-degree murder, one count of home invasion, and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. On May 2, 2003, the State filed a notice of intent to seek an extended-term sentence based on the statutory factor of "exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty." On July 22, 2003, the defense filed an amended motion to suppress statements. The motion alleged that although the investigators notified the defendant's father that they were going to interview the defendant concerning the subject crime, they did not tell his father that they had physical evidence implicating the defendant and that the defendant was going to be arrested and charged. The motion also alleged that the juvenile officer present for the interview did nothing to protect the defendant's rights and that the investigating officers used deceit and trickery to induce the defendant's confession. On July 31, 2003, a hearing was held on the motion to suppress. At the hearing, Officer Keith Gardner, a detective with the Kane County sheriff's office, testified that on October 21, 2001, during a canvass of the victim's neighborhood, he interviewed the defendant's father, Joseph Minniti (Minniti). The defendant and his family lived two houses west of the victim's house. Officer Gardner received permission from Minniti to speak with the defendant. On May 21, 2002, Officer Gardner again received permission to speak with the defendant and collected a DNA swab from him. On September 3, 2002, Officer Gardner testified that he reinterviewed Minniti about the murder, at the sheriff's office. Officer Gardner again asked Minniti for permission to speak with the

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No. 2--05--0028 defendant. Minniti gave permission and requested that Officer Gardner call his cell phone to set up a time for the interview. No particular date was mentioned at that time. On September 5, 2002, Officer Gardner called Minniti's cell phone, but there was no answer. Officer Gardner then called the defendant's house, but again there was no answer. Officer Gardner then left a message on Minniti's cell phone, informing him that he was en route to West Aurora High School to pick up the defendant for an interview. Officer Gardner told Minniti to call him when he received the message. Officer Gardner further testified that he and Sergeant Stutz arrived at the high school at 2:30 p.m. Sergeant Stutz arranged with the school officials to have the defendant removed from class to speak with the officers. The defendant remembered Officer Gardner from earlier interviews but indicated that his father had not told him that the police wanted to speak with him again. The defendant agreed to go to the sheriff's office for another interview. The defendant informed the officers that he needed to be at work at 5 p.m. At the sheriff's office, the defendant was placed in an interview room. Officer Gardner, Sergeant Stutz, and Sergeant David Wagner were present for the interview. The officers asked the defendant whether he wanted anything to eat or drink or had to use the washroom. The defendant declined. Officer Gardner testified that at some point, he again called Minniti's cell phone. Minniti answered, and Officer Gardner told him that the officers had picked the defendant up from school and brought him to the sheriff's office. Minniti again gave Officer Gardner permission to speak with the defendant. Officer Gardner testified that the interview began at 3 p.m. Sergeant Stutz read the juvenilesubject data sheet, and the Miranda rights, to the defendant. Sergeant Stutz explained each right to

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No. 2--05--0028 the defendant, and the defendant signed a waiver of his rights. Sergeant Stutz informed the defendant that he was there as a juvenile officer to help the defendant and that the defendant should ask Sergeant Stutz if he had any questions during the interview. Officer Gardner testified that he and Sergeant Wagner questioned the defendant. They told the defendant that they were reinterviewing neighbors because it had been almost a year since the crime. Sergeant Wagner asked the defendant if he was involved in the victim's death. The defendant denied any involvement. The defendant explained that on the morning of the crime he went to the Aurora Country Club, where he worked as a caddy. Around 12 p.m., he went to his neighbor's house across the street to play basketball. The defendant went back to his house about 8 p.m. He brought his dogs outside into the yard and sat on the sunporch. After that, he went to bed. The defendant indicated that he occasionally did odd jobs for the victim, and he explained some of those jobs. At about 4 p.m., the officers took a 20-minute break. Officer Gardner testified that during the break he learned that Minniti was trying to reach him, so he called him. Minniti asked what was taking so long and said that the defendant had to be at work by 5 p.m. Officer Gardner told Minniti that the defendant was cooperating and that he did not know how much longer the interview would last. Minniti did not ask to speak with the defendant. The interview resumed at 4:20 p.m. During this round of questioning, the officers asked the defendant about inconsistencies in his stories from his earlier interviews. The officers told the defendant that DNA evidence implicating him was found inside the victim and that there was satellite imagery showing a person leave the defendant's home, enter the victim's house, and then return to the defendant's home. According to Officer Gardner, the defendant then became defensive,

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No. 2--05--0028 started yelling and swearing, and asked to go home. Sergeant Stutz told the defendant that "it was probable" he was not going home that night. The defendant agreed to continue being questioned and eventually admitted that "it was an accident." According to Officer Gardner's testimony, the defendant stated that he left his basement at 1 a.m. and walked to the victim's house. He first checked to see if her car was there, and it was not. He then went inside the home to steal a portable stereo that he had seen earlier in her bedroom. He used a crowbar to force his way in through the back door. He went upstairs to the bedroom. The bedroom was dark, and he did not see that the victim was in the room. The defendant walked toward the portable stereo, and the victim came up behind him and grabbed his neck. The defendant then reached back with the crowbar and struck the victim in the head. The victim fell to the floor and was bleeding. The defendant went to the kitchen and thought about calling an ambulance but did not. The defendant then went back to the bedroom to check on the victim. He knelt down next to her and she grabbed him, so he struck her on the head several times. This second round of questioning, which lasted about one hour, ended at about 5:20 p.m. Officer Gardner testified that the interview resumed at 5:30 p.m. and lasted about 10 minutes. The defendant was no longer angry, but was very emotional and apologetic. When the defendant was confronted with evidence that a sexual assault had occurred, he admitted that it was possible that he had "stuck it in her twice." The officers took another break for five minutes. At 5:45 p.m., the defendant was asked whether he penetrated the victim anally. The defendant said he might have but thought he penetrated only the victim's vagina. After another five-minute break, Assistant State's Attorney Bob Berlin questioned the defendant for over an hour. At 6:32 p.m., the defendant consented to being videotaped. In the

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No. 2--05--0028 videotaped statements, the defendant essentially repeated what he had told Officer Gardner in the 4:20 p.m. interview. The defendant also indicated that after he returned to the victim's bedroom and struck her again, he penetrated the victim in the vaginal area twice. After that he was in shock and stumbled around the house, used the hallway bathroom, and then left through the same back door. He threw away the clothes he was wearing and dumped the crowbar in someone's trash. On cross-examination, Officer Gardner admitted that he lied to the defendant about some of the DNA evidence and the satellite photos. While the police did match the defendant to the DNA from a drop of urine found in the victim's bathroom, his DNA was not found inside the victim. Officer Gardner also admitted that there was no satellite imagery. Officer Gardner testified that when he spoke with Minniti, he did not tell him about the DNA evidence. When Officer Gardner returned Minniti's phone call following the first round of questioning, he still did not tell him about the DNA evidence. Rather, Officer Gardner assured Minniti that the questioning was along the same lines as previous interviews. Sergeant Stutz, of the juvenile division of the Kane County sheriff's office, testified that on September 5, 2002, he and Officer Gardner went to West Aurora High School to pick up the defendant. Sergeant Stutz explained to the defendant that he was there as a juvenile officer and that the police had his father's consent to speak with him. The defendant did not realize that he was going to be interviewed again, but he knew that his father had been recently questioned. The defendant agreed to go to the station and was not handcuffed. At the station, the defendant was placed in an investigation room. Sergeant Stutz filled out a subject data sheet with the defendant. While filling out the sheet, the defendant stated that he had not taken any alcohol, drugs, or medications in the last 24 hours. The defendant stated that he had

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No. 2--05--0028 slept for nine hours the night before and had last eaten at 11:30 a.m. The defendant did not appear confused. On the data sheet, the defendant circled that he had completed the tenth grade. The defendant denied any physical discomfort, that he was under a doctor's care, that he had talked to a psychiatrist in the last 12 months, and that he had attempted suicide in the last two years. He described his emotional and physical well-being as good. Sergeant Stutz told the defendant that he was a juvenile officer there on the defendant's behalf and would not partake in the interview. Sergeant Stutz explained that if the defendant did not understand something during the interview, he should tell him. The defendant signed the data sheet. Sergeant Stutz testified that he then read the defendant his Miranda rights from a preprinted form. He also explained each right. The defendant indicated that he understood his rights and initialed each sentence. After the defendant waived his rights, Sergeant Stutz remained with the defendant throughout the interview. Sergeant Stutz testified that during the interview, when the defendant was confronted with certain evidence, he raised his voice and started to cry. The officers remained calm and did not threaten or promise anything to the defendant. The defendant did not appear to have difficulty communicating his answers to the officers. The defendant was offered food, drink, and the opportunity to use the bathroom. On cross-examination, Sergeant Stutz acknowledged that he knew that some of the information the officers told the defendant was incorrect, but he chose not to interrupt the interview. Minniti testified that he learned of the victim's murder on October 21, 2001, when the police came to speak with him and his son. Later, the police asked him and the defendant for fingerprints and DNA samples. On September 5, 2002, at around 2 p.m., Officer Gardner left a message on his cell phone, informing him that the police went to the high school to pick up his son for "routine

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No. 2--05--0028 questioning." When Minniti returned the call, Officer Gardner said he was on the way to the sheriff's office with the defendant. Officer Gardner told him they were doing a follow-up interview since it had been almost a year since the crime. Officer Gardner did not tell him that the police had any new evidence. Minniti gave the officers permission to interview his son. Two days earlier, Minniti had been interviewed by the police. They did not discuss any new evidence or information about the case. Minniti's interview lasted about 5 to 10 minutes, and at that time, he gave the police permission to speak with his son. Minniti gave Officer Gardner his cell phone number so that at a later date they could work out the "specifics" of his son's interview. Minniti further testified that he found it peculiar that it was almost 5 p.m. and his son was still with the police. He called Officer Gardner around 4:30 or 4:45 p.m. Officer Gardner's secretary told him that Officer Gardner was still in the interview room and that he would return the call. Officer Gardner called Minniti back about an hour later. Officer Gardner told him that the officers were ready to wrap up the interview. Officer Gardner did not tell him that they were going to arrest his son. Minniti did not remember whether he asked to speak with his son. Minniti did not go to the station. At 7:30 p.m., Officer Gardner called Minniti again and told him that he was on the way to his house. Minniti asked whether the defendant was coming home, and Officer Gardner said that he was not, but did not give any explanation. Soon after, Officer Gardner arrived at Minniti's house to execute a search warrant. The defendant testified that he was 16 years old on September 5, 2002, when he was arrested and charged with murder. When he was picked up from school, he went with the officers willingly. He stated that Sergeant Stutz did not tell him that he was a juvenile officer. Rather, Sergeant Stutz said he was there so the police "don't beat up on him." Sergeant Stutz helped him fill out a form and

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No. 2--05--0028 asked him if he wanted something to drink. The defendant further testified that after one of the breaks, the officers came back into the interview room with a folder and told him, "we think that you are involved with it," referring to the murder. The defendant testified that he then told the officers that he wanted to see his father and a lawyer. He also asked to go home. Officer Gardner told him that he would "get on it" but continued questioning him. The defendant testified that he was not allowed to see his father or speak to a lawyer during the interview. He was not told that his father had called during the interview. The defendant further testified that although Sergeant Stutz went over the intake form and read him the Miranda rights, he did not fully understand his rights. The defendant testified that he did not understand that he could stop the questioning at any time. He insisted that he asked to see his father and a lawyer. He testified that he eventually signed a statement agreeing to give videotaped statements, at which time attorney Berlin asked him more questions and went over the Miranda rights again. The defendant acknowledged that he did not tell attorney Berlin that he had asked for a lawyer or that he wanted his father there. However, he told attorney Berlin that he had asked to go home. The defense rested its case. Sergeant Wagner of the Kane County sheriff's office testified that he was present for the defendant's interview with Officer Gardner and Sergeant Stutz. Sergeant Wagner did not recall the defendant asking to see his father or a lawyer during the interview. According to Sergeant Wagner, Sergeant Stutz did not introduce himself to the defendant by saying, "I am here so that they don't beat you up." Rather, Sergeant Stutz said that he was there on the defendant's behalf as a juvenile officer and explained that his role was to make sure that the defendant's rights were protected.

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No. 2--05--0028 Sergeant Stutz and Officer Gardner were called to rebut the defendant's testimony. They both testified that Sergeant Stutz informed the defendant that he was a juvenile officer. They denied that the defendant was told that Sergeant Stutz was there so that other officers did not "beat up" on him. They stated that the defendant did not ask to see his father or a lawyer. Officer Gardner further testified that during the defendant's interview, he received a message from a lawyer indicating that he had been contacted by the Minniti family and was calling on the defendant's behalf. The lawyer left his name and phone number. The message was received at 7:30 p.m. on the day of the interview. Officer Gardner listened to the message sometime after executing the search warrant or the next day. He did not save the message or prepare a report about it. He did not return the call because he did not feel it was relevant. Officer Gardner had not informed anyone about the phone call until the suppression hearing. Attorney Berlin testified that he met the defendant at about 5:50 p.m. on September 5 and had not been present for any of the earlier interviews that day. Attorney Berlin asked the defendant if the police read him his rights and if he understood those rights. The defendant responded in the affirmative. The defendant told attorney Berlin that he had already given statements to the police. Attorney Berlin testified that the defendant had no problem communicating and that he gave appropriate responses to questions. Attorney Berlin verbally advised the defendant of his rights, and the defendant indicated that he understood each of them. The defendant also indicated that he would give another statement. The defendant did not ask to see his father or a lawyer. Attorney Berlin further testified that when the defendant agreed to give videotaped statements, attorney Berlin advised him of his rights a second time. Attorney Berlin asked the defendant how he was treated by the police, and the defendant said he was treated fine. The

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No. 2--05--0028 defendant did not indicate that his rights were violated or that he had asked to see his father or a lawyer. The defendant said that no threats or promises were made. After hearing arguments, the trial court gave detailed findings regarding the voluntariness of the defendant's statements. The trial court discussed the factors relevant to such a determination and its findings on those factors. Specifically, the trial court found that the defendant was 16 years old at the time of his statements and had little previous experience with the criminal justice system; the defendant was of average intelligence; the time of day and the duration of the questioning were proper; the interview was with the defendant's father's consent; the defendant was informed of his rights numerous times; the defendant was not subjected to any physical punishment; the confession was not induced by the police deception; the police deception did not render the defendant's confession involuntary; the juvenile officer's presence was the reason that numerous breaks were taken; the defendant's father was aware of the interrogation and had the opportunity to go to the police station; and the defendant's assertion that he had asked to speak with his father and a lawyer was incredible. As such, the trial court found that the defendant's statements were made knowingly and voluntarily and were not coerced, nor was the defendant's will overborne. The trial court denied the defendant's amended motion to suppress. Thereafter, the defendant waived his right to a jury trial, and a bench trial commenced on February 2, 2004. On February 6, 2004, the trial court found the defendant guilty on one count of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9--1(a)(1) (West 2000)), one count of home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12--11(a)(2) (West 2000)), and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(2) (West 2000)). As to the counts of murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault, the trial court found that the crimes were exceptionally brutal and heinous. On November 30, 2004,

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No. 2--05--0028 following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 61 years' imprisonment for murder and 6 years' imprisonment on each of the remaining counts, to be served consecutively. Also on that date, the trial court admonished the defendant of his appeal rights in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 605(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 605(a)). On January 7, 2005, the parties appeared before the court and the following exchange ensued: "[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And I am asking leave at this time to file a motion to reconsider. It should have been filed about a week ago. It was inadvertently placed in a wrong pile of documents to be filed. I believe that if the [S]tate does not object, the court does not lose jurisdiction over the matter to hear the motion to reconsider, and it is fairly brief in nature, Judge. THE COURT: Do you object? [ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY]: No, your Honor, we don't. THE COURT: You are given leave to file it instanter." Thereafter, argument was heard on the defendant's motion to reconsider his sentence. The State stood on the arguments that it made at the sentencing hearing and further argued that the trial court had not erred in sentencing because the trial court had found the crime to be brutal and heinous. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to reconsider. The defendant filed his notice of appeal the same day. II. DISCUSSION At the outset, we note that the parties dispute this court's appellate jurisdiction. The defendant acknowledges that he did not timely file his motion to reconsider sentence. The defendant's motion to reconsider sentence was filed and denied on January 7, 2005, 38 days after he

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No. 2--05--0028 was sentenced. The defendant filed his notice of appeal that same date. The State argues that under the doctrine of revestment, its mere failure to object to the defendant's late filing of his motion to reconsider did not revest the trial court with jurisdiction over the motion. The defendant argues that the revestment doctrine applies because, in addition to failing to object to the late filing of his motion to reconsider, the State also actively participated in the hearing on the defendant's motion by arguing that the trial court had properly determined that the crime was brutal and heinous. The defendant argues that the State's active participation in a proceeding that was inconsistent with the merits of the prior sentencing order revested the trial court with jurisdiction such that we have jurisdiction to consider his subsequent appeal. A trial court loses jurisdiction to vacate or modify its judgment 30 days after entry of judgment unless a timely postjudgment motion is filed. People v. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291, 303 (2003) (where more than 30 days have elapsed since the imposition of a sentence, and the trial court has not extended the 30-day period, the trial court is divested of jurisdiction to hear a postjudgment motion); Beck v. Stepp, 144 Ill. 2d 232, 238 (1991); People v. Sawczenko, 328 Ill. App. 3d 888, 893 (2002). However, under the revestment doctrine, litigants may revest a court that has general jurisdiction over the matter with both personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the particular cause after the 30-day period following final judgment. People v. Kaeding, 98 Ill. 2d 237, 240 (1983). Revestment applies when the parties (1) actively participate without objection (2) in further proceedings that are inconsistent with the merits of the prior judgment. Kaeding, 98 Ill. 2d at 241; Ridgely v. Central Pipe Line Co., 409 Ill. 46, 50 (1951). This court recently explained the rationale behind the doctrine:

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No. 2--05--0028 "It has been stated that the rationale behind the revestment doctrine is that the trial court considers the benefitting party to have ignored the judgment and started to retry the case (Wilkins v. Dellenback, 149 Ill. App. 3d 549, 555 (1986)), the benefitting party by its conduct consents to have the prior ruling set aside (Sears v. Sears, 85 Ill. 2d 253, 260 (1981)), or that the benefitting party by its conduct waives the right to question the jurisdiction of the court (Ridgely v. Central Pipe Line Co., 409 Ill. 46, 50 (1951))." People v. Price, 364 Ill. App. 3d 543, 546 (2006). This court also recently questioned the continued vitality of the doctrine. See Price, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 546. The Price court noted our supreme court's holding in Flowers, which indicated, " '[l]ack of subject matter jurisdiction is not subject to waiver [citation] and cannot be cured through consent of the parties [citation].' " Price, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 547, quoting Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d at 303. The Price court questioned whether the revestment doctrine survived Flowers. Price, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 546. The Price court suggested that tracing the roots of the revestment doctrine showed that at one point it allowed a party's acquiescence to revest a court only with personal, and not subject matter, jurisdiction. Price, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 547, citing Grand Pacific Hotel Co. v. Pinkerton, 217 Ill. 61 (1905). However, the Price court also questioned whether our supreme court would implicitly overturn the revestment doctrine. Price, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 546. Ultimately, the Price court determined that it must "leave open the question of whether *** the revestment doctrine survive[d] the supreme court's decision in Flowers," because revestment had not occurred under the facts of that case. Price, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 547. Since Price, however, this court has held that the revestment doctrine remains intact. See People v. Montiel, 365 Ill. App. 3d 601, 604-05 (2006). In Montiel, this court determined that in

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No. 2--05--0028 Toman v. Park Castles Apartment Building Corp., 375 Ill. 293, 302 (1940), our supreme court used language that was indistinguishable from that used in Flowers. Montiel, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 605. Specifically, in Toman, our supreme court stated that " '[i]t is a familiar rule that when a court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter, it cannot be conferred by consent ***. *** There can be no waiver of jurisdiction of the subject matter where the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order appealed from.' " Montiel, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 605, quoting Toman, 375 Ill. at 302. Despite that language, our supreme court applied the doctrine of revestment at least as recently as Kaeding, 98 Ill. 2d at 241. Montiel, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 605. As such, the Montiel court determined that if Toman did not eliminate the doctrine of revestment, then neither did Flowers, which expressed the same principles as Toman. Montiel, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 605. The Montiel court further explained that the doctrine of revestment can be reconciled with Flowers and Toman because "it is not consent but active participation that revests jurisdiction." (Emphasis in original.) Montiel, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 605. Furthermore, the roots of the revestment doctrine are not in conflict with this determination. The Price court suggested, citing Pinkerton, 217 Ill. at 84, that the revestment doctrine at one point allowed a party's acquiescence to revest a court only with personal, and not subject matter, jurisdiction. However, in the context of the Pinkerton case, the holding has repeatedly been interpreted to mean that where a court of general jurisdiction over the subject matter loses jurisdiction of a particular case by operation or effect of law, the parties may, by voluntarily appearing and participating in further proceedings, revest the court with jurisdiction over their persons and the subject matter of the action. Kaeding, 98 Ill. 2d at 240-41; Craven v. Craven, 407 Ill. 252, 255 (1950); Rossiter v. Soper, 384 Ill. 47, 59-60 (1943). As such, pursuant to Montiel, the revestment doctrine remains intact. Montiel, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 605.

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No. 2--05--0028 Cases relying on the revestment doctrine reveal that there is a presumption that the application of the revestment doctrine to an untimely postjudgment motion essentially tolls the time for filing an appeal. In other words, if a trial court is revested with jurisdiction of an untimely postjudgment motion, then a defendant's notice of appeal, filed within 30 days after the ruling on the motion, vests the appellate court with jurisdiction. For example, in People v. Harrell, 342 Ill. App. 3d 904, 907 (2003), the defendant filed an untimely postjudgment motion. This court stated that "[a]lthough the posttrial motion was admittedly filed late, the State concede[d] that appellate jurisdiction [was] proper because the State participated in the hearing without objection." Harrell, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 907; see also People v. Watkins, 325 Ill. App. 3d 13, 17 (2001) ("[b]ecause defendant filed his notices of appeal within 30 days from the date of the denial of the [untimely but revested] motions, his appeals are timely"); People v. MacArthur, 313 Ill. App. 3d 864, 868 (2000) ("[a]s defendant filed his notice of appeal only four days after the [denial of] his [untimely but revested] motion, his appeal is timely"). Although Supreme Court Rule 606(b) (188 Ill. 2d R. 606(b)) generally sets forth the methods to invoke this court's appellate jurisdiction, in MacArthur this court characterized revestment as "an exception to the timeliness requirement[s] of Rule 606(b)." MacArthur, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 868. As such, based on the traditional application of the revestment doctrine, we have appellate jurisdiction over this case. The State actively participated in the hearing on the defendant's untimely postjudgment motion. The State appeared at the hearing. The trial court asked the State if it objected to the filing of the motion on the basis that the motion was filed a week late. The State indicated that it had no objection. The trial court then granted the defendant leave to file his late motion to reconsider, and the hearing ensued. The State then went on to argue that the defendant's

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No. 2--05--0028 motion should be denied because the trial court had properly determined that the crime was brutal and heinous. Furthermore, the hearing on the motion to reconsider was inconsistent with the merits of the prior judgment. See People v. Gargani, No. 2--05--0478, slip op. at 2 (February 14, 2007) (the prosecutor's active participation in the hearing on the motion to reconsider sentence was inconsistent with the merits of the prior judgment because it was a tacit acknowledgment that the prior proceedings should be revisited). As such, the State's active participation in a proceeding that was inconsistent with the merits of the prior sentencing order revested the trial court with jurisdiction of the defendant's postjudgment motion. See Kaeding, 98 Ill. 2d at 241. The defendant's notice of appeal, filed within 30 days after the ruling on his untimely but revested postjudgment motion, vests the appellate court with jurisdiction. See Montiel, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 605; Harrell, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 907; Watkins, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 17; MacArthur, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 868. Accordingly, we will address the merits of the defendant's appeal. On appeal, the defendant first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements. In support of this contention, the defendant argues that his statements to the police were involuntary because they were the product of police deception, the police frustrated his father's ability to confer with him before and during his interrogation, and the juvenile officer present during the interrogation did not protect his rights. Admitting an involuntary confession into evidence violates the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. V) and article I, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,
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