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JUSTICE O'MALLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Carla D. Moneyham, was charged by information inthe circuit court of Lake County with theft (720 ILCS 5/16--1(a)(1)(A) (West 1998)). The charging instrument described thestolen property as a credit card belonging to Patrick Foster. Following a bench trial, defendant was found guilty and sentencedto a one-year term of conditional discharge and a $250 fine. Therecord reflects that defendant was also charged with criminaltrespass to real property (720 ILCS 5/21--3 (West 1998)), althoughthe record does not contain the charging instrument. The Statenol-prossed the trespass charge during the hearing on defendant'sposttrial motion. The only issue raised on appeal is whetherdefendant was proved guilty of theft beyond a reasonable doubt. Weconclude that she was and we affirm her conviction.

The following evidence was introduced at trial. PatrickFoster testified that he owned rental property in Zion, Illinois,including a two-story apartment leased to defendant from May 1,1998, to April 30, 1999. Foster allowed defendant to remain on thepremises an extra week after the lease expired in order to cleanthe apartment. While Foster was unsure exactly when defendantvacated the apartment, he testified that he changed the locks onMay 7, 1999. On the morning of May 17, 1999, while Foster wascleaning and painting the apartment with the help of his friendAlex, defendant forced her way into the apartment. Fosterproceeded upstairs, where he called the police on his cellulartelephone. Alex remained on the first floor, but defendantfollowed Foster upstairs to the bedroom, which Foster had startedpainting. Defendant demanded that Foster return her securitydeposit. At some point defendant's boyfriend, Tony, joined thepair in the upstairs bedroom. Tony threatened to beat Foster up ifhe did not return the security deposit. During the confrontation,Foster observed defendant bend down and pick up what he describedas a small plastic vinyl bag or jacket and clip from the bedroomfloor. (For convenience we will refer to this item as the "vinyljacket.") According to Foster's testimony, he kept his workidentification and "time card," driver's license, Social Securitycard, cash station card, and a Visa credit card in the vinyljacket. Foster testified that defendant placed the vinyl jacketsomewhere in her clothes.

In response to continued intimidation from defendant'sboyfriend Tony, Foster agreed to refund the disputed securitydeposit, and Tony left the apartment. Defendant remained, however,and demanded that the security deposit be returned immediately. Eventually, a police officer arrived and Foster told the officer hewanted defendant to leave the premises. Foster did not mention tothe officer that defendant had placed his vinyl jacket in herclothing. After a conversation with the police officer, defendantleft the apartment. About 20 minutes later, Foster realized thatdefendant had not returned the vinyl jacket. Foster called thepolice again and unsuccessfully searched the apartment for thevinyl jacket. Foster testified that defendant returned to theapartment the next day, but he did not let her inside. She leftafter knocking on the door for about five minutes.

Defendant testified that while speaking with Foster on May 17,1999, she noticed some object on the bedroom floor but did not knowwhether it was the vinyl jacket Foster described. Defendant deniedtaking the vinyl jacket, the Visa card, or any other items. Defendant also denied returning to the apartment the following day. Based upon this evidence, the trial court found defendant guilty oftheft and criminal trespass to real property. The trial courtspecifically found that Foster was a credible witness. Aspreviously noted, the trespass charge was later nol-prossed. After denying her posttrial motion, the trial court sentenceddefendant to a one-year term of conditional discharge and a $250fine. This appeal followed.

"A criminal conviction will not be set aside unless theevidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates areasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt." People v. Collins, 106Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). When the defendant challenges thesufficiency of the evidence, it is not the function of this courtto retry the defendant. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261. Rather, "'the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in thelight most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of factcould have found the essential elements of the crime beyond areasonable doubt.' " (Emphasis in original.) Collins, 106 Ill. 2dat 261, quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed.2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). A reviewing court willnot substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on issuesof the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 431 (2000). "[I]t is theresponsibility of the trier of fact to 'fairly *** resolve conflictsin the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonableinferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.' " Cooper, 194 Ill.2d at 431, quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 573,99 S. Ct. at 2789. This standard of review applies regardless ofwhether the evidence is direct or circumstantial and regardless ofwhether the defendant receives a bench trial or a jury trial. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d at 431.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a criminalconviction so long as it satisfies proof beyond a reasonable doubtof the elements of the charged offense. People v. Hall, 194 Ill.2d 305, 330 (2000). The trier of fact need not be satisfied beyonda reasonable doubt as to each link in the chain of circumstances ifall of the evidence taken together satisfies the trier of factbeyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. Hall, 194 Ill.2d at 330. Similarly, the trier of fact is not required todisregard inferences that flow normally from the evidence and tosearch out all possible explanations consistent with innocence andraise them to a level of reasonable doubt. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d at332. The trier of fact may reject the defense that someone otherthan defendant committed the offense where that theory is based uponmere surmise or possibility. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d at 332.

With these principles in mind, we consider defendant'schallenge to the sufficiency of the evidence against her. Defendantinitially argues that the State failed to establish the requisitemental state for theft. The offense of theft, as charged here,requires proof that defendant knowingly obtained or exertedunauthorized control over property of the owner and intended todeprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property. 720 ILCS 5/16--1(a)(1)(A) (West 1998); see People v. Jones, 149 Ill.2d 288, 296-97 (1992). Defendant claims that there is no evidencein the record that she could have known that Foster's vinyl jacketcontained the credit card she is charged with stealing. Therefore,according to defendant, even if she took defendant's vinyl jacket,she did not knowingly exert or obtain control over the Visa card anddid not intend to permanently deprive Foster of the Visa card. Wedisagree.

The theft statute does not require proof that the offender wasaware of the precise character of the property involved. Where theobject of the theft is a purse, wallet, or similar container, anatural inference arises that the offender acted with the intent todeprive the owner of its contents, whatever they might be; it is notnecessary that the offender knew in advance what the contents wereto be responsible for their theft. See Chadwell v. State, 37 Ark.App. 9, 822 S.W.2d 402 (1992) (holding that knowledge of contentsof a stolen jacket was not necessary to sustain conviction of theftof credit card which was located within a wallet in one of thejacket pockets); Commonwealth v. Schraffa, 2 Mass. App. 808, 308N.E.2d 575 (1974) (holding that jury could find that defendant whostole truck intended to steal whatever the truck contained althoughits contents may have been unknown to him when the truck was taken); People v. Earle, 222 Cal. App. 2d 476, 35 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1963)(holding that knowledge of contents of money bag taken from pharmacywas unnecessary to sustain conviction of theft of cash inside thebag).

Defendant next argues that the evidence was insufficient toestablish that she was the person who took Foster's property. Sheargues that Foster did not see her leave the apartment with Foster'svinyl jacket. She notes that her boyfriend and Foster's friend Alexwere also present at the apartment during the relevant time frameand one of them could have taken the item. The argument isunpersuasive. Foster observed defendant pick the vinyl jacket upfrom the floor of the bedroom and place it in her clothing. Shortlyafter defendant left the apartment, Foster determined that the vinyljacket was missing. This circumstantial evidence is sufficient toestablish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the culprit. The trial court was not required to acquit defendant based on thetheoretical possibility that defendant put the vinyl jacket back butsomeone else later stole it. As previously noted, the trier of factmay reject the defense that some other party committed the offensewhen based on mere surmise or possibility. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d at332. That is the case here.

Finally, defendant argues that the evidence does not supporther conviction because her behavior was consistent with innocenceand Foster's testimony was not credible. With respect to the formerpoint, defendant notes that she remained at the apartment afterFoster purportedly observed her place the vinyl jacket in herclothing. She contends that had she stolen the item, she logicallywould have fled immediately. She also contends that had shecommitted the theft, she would not have returned to the apartmentthe next day as Foster testified. In addition, defendant notes thatthere was no evidence that she ever used the stolen credit card. With respect to Foster's credibility, defendant notes that Fosterdid not protest when he saw her place his property in her clothing;he did not report this to the police officer who was summoned toremove defendant from the premises; and he did not confrontdefendant about the theft or summon the police when she returned tothe apartment the next day. Defendant argues that Foster may havefabricated his testimony out of ill will toward her.

As previously noted, it is the responsibility of the trialcourt to determine what weight to give this evidence and whatinferences to draw from it. It is also the trial court'sresponsibility to assess the credibility of the witnesses. We willnot substitute our judgment for the trial court's on these matters. We cannot say that the evidence against defendant is so improbableor unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of her guilt.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of circuit court ofLake County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

McLAREN and CALLUM, JJ., concur.