No. 2--03--1038

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

After a bench trial, defendant, Margaret Olson, was convicted of forgery (720 ILCS 5/17--3(a)(1) (West 1998)) and sentenced to a year of conditional discharge. On appeal, defendantcontends that she was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.

The indictment alleged that, with the intent to defraud, defendant knowingly made a documentcapable of defrauding another. The allegedly fraudulent document is a 1999 quitclaim deed to realestate located in Washburn County, Wisconsin. Some background information, contained indocuments admitted into evidence at trial, is necessary to place the deed in context. In 1985,defendant's mother, who owned the property in fee, died intestate. On November 18, 1989, defendant, as the personal representative of her mother's estate, conveyed the property from the estateto herself. On December 8, 1989, defendant, by warranty deed, conveyed the property to herself, herhusband, Thomas Hueser, and her two daughters, Margo Hueser, now known as Margo Rinella, andHolly Hueser, now known as Holly Kabbe. The four grantees became joint tenants, each having a25% interest in the property. In 1993, Thomas Hueser died, and, in July 1997, his interest in theproperty was officially terminated. As a result, defendant, Rinella, and Kabbe each owned a 33% interest in the property as joint tenants. In 1996, defendant married Donald Olson. The allegedlyfraudulent quitclaim deed is dated November 4, 1999, and was recorded on November 9, 1999, inWashburn County. The deed recites that defendant, Rinella, and Kabbe quitclaim their interest in theproperty to themselves and to Olson. The deed is ostensibly signed by defendant, Rinella, Kabbe, andOlson. However, it is undisputed that defendant forged her daughters' signatures after they refusedto sign the deed. The deed contains an acknowledgment in which Marti Hubble, a notary public,states that, on November 4, 1999, defendant, Rinella, Kabbe, and Olson personally came beforeHubble in Du Page County, Illinois, and executed the deed.

At trial, Rinella testified as follows. In July 1997, defendant asked Rinella to sign somedocuments so that Thomas Hueser's name could be removed from the deed to the property andreplaced with Olson's name. Rinella refused to sign the papers. Defendant asked again, "then talkedabout doing a trust," but Rinella told her to "leave it as it was in one-third." Rinella wanted to holdonto her interest in the property and did not want Olson to "get it."

In November 1999, defendant again asked Rinella to sign some documents. Rinella refused. Defendant ceased her requests. In April 2001, Rinella checked with the Washburn County registerof deeds' office and learned that what purported to be her and Kabbe's signatures were on a quitclaimdeed that gave Olson, defendant, Rinella, and Kabbe each a 25% interest in the property. Defendantadmitted to Rinella that she had forged Rinella's name on the deed.

In June 2001, Rinella offered not to make any complaints against defendant to lawenforcement if defendant agreed, inter alia, that Olson would waive any interest in the property. Defendant declined Rinella's offer, although she said that she was willing to undo the quitclaim deed. In August 2001, Rinella contacted the Elmhurst police department. On November 29, 2001, Rinellasigned a criminal complaint against defendant even though she knew that, the previous month,defendant filed an action in Wisconsin to void the 1999 deed. In June 2002, the Wisconsin courtdeclared the deed void.

Michael Campise of the Elmhurst police department testified as follows. On August 17, 2001,he spoke to defendant. After Campise showed defendant the 1999 deed, she admitted that she hadforged her daughters' signatures and had then presented the deed to Marti Hubble, a notary public,at a bank in Elmhurst. Defendant explained that she had wanted to give Olson an interest in theproperty. She knew that, under Wisconsin law, her daughters' signatures were required. Becausethey were unwilling to go along, defendant forged their signatures.

The parties stipulated that Hubble would testify as follows. At all pertinent times, she workedat a bank in Elmhurst, in Du Page County. Her duties included notarizing documents. On November4, 1999, defendant asked her to notarize the quitclaim deed. Hubble could not recall whether thesignatures of Olson, Rinella, and Kabbe were already on the deed. However, Hubble normally didnot certify a person's signature unless the person was present. After certifying the deed, Hubble gaveit back to defendant.

Defendant's first witness, Holly Kabbe, testified that, in July 2001, she talked with Rinellaabout some conditions that Rinella wanted to impose before allowing defendant to undo the 1999deed. Later, Kabbe asked to have her name removed from the indictment against defendant becauseshe did not consider herself a victim.

Defendant testified as follows. After she obtained full title to the Wisconsin property, shebecame concerned that, if anything happened to her, the property would have to go through probatein Wisconsin. Therefore, in 1989, she put the property into joint tenancy, giving herself, ThomasHueser, Rinella, and Kabbe each a 25% interest in it. After Thomas Hueser died, defendant and herdaughters each had a 33% interest in the property. Later, defendant married Olson. Defendanttestified that, in 1999, she wanted Olson to have a share of the property, just as Hueser had beforehe died. However, she also testified that she wished to put the property into a trust to make it"secure for [her] daughters only."

Defendant knew that to give Olson a share of the property, she needed her daughters'signatures. However, because Rinella and Kabbe would not sign the deed, defendant forged theirsignatures, then had Hubble notarize the deed at the bank in Elmhurst. Later, defendant filed the deedin Washburn County. Defendant never consulted a lawyer. She testified that she never intended todilute her daughters' interests in the property from 33% each to 25% each.

The trial court found defendant guilty. The trial court concluded that defendant knew thatshe needed her daughters' signatures on the deed in order to give Olson an interest in the propertyand that defendant intended to defraud not only her daughters but also the Washburn County registerof deeds. Defendant was sentenced to a year of conditional discharge. She timely appealed.

On appeal, defendant contends that the State did not prove her guilty beyond a reasonabledoubt of forgery. Defendant contends specifically that the State did not prove (1) that the offenseoccurred in Illinois, or (2) that she acted with the intent to defraud when she forged her daughters'signatures on the deed. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.

In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask only whether, afterviewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational fact finder could havefound the elements of the offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Ward, 154 Ill. 2d272, 326 (1992); People v. Hill, 272 Ill. App. 3d 597, 603-04 (1995). The trier of fact is responsiblefor determining the witnesses' credibility, weighing their testimony, and deciding on the reasonableinferences to be drawn from the evidence. People v. Lamon, 346 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1089 (2004).

We consider first whether the State proved that the offense occurred in Illinois. Jurisdictionmust be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Holt, 91 Ill. 2d 480, 492 (1982). Here, theState could satisfy its burden by proving that the offense was committed either wholly or partly withinIllinois. See 720 ILCS 5/1--5(a)(1) (West 1998). Defendant asserts that the trial court could onlyspeculate that she was in Illinois when she forged her daughters' signatures on the quitclaim deed. Therefore, she maintains, the State did not prove jurisdiction. We disagree.

Defendant's contention assumes that the offense of which she was convicted consisted solelyof forging the signatures. This assumption is incorrect. As charged here, a person commits forgery when, with the intent to defraud, she knowingly "[m]akes or alters any document apparently capableof defrauding another in such manner that it purports to have been made by another or *** byauthority of one who did not give such authority." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/17--3(a)(1) (West1998). Hence, the State did not need to prove that defendant was in Illinois when she affixed theforged signatures to the deed. Instead, because the charged offense was defendant's making of thefraudulent deed, the State needed to prove only that the deed was, at least in part, "made in Illinois."

The State met its burden. It is undisputed that defendant induced Hubble to sign the deed'sacknowledgment, in defendant's presence, in Elmhurst. Thus, the deed was made partly in Illinois,and defendant was fully responsible for this phase of the production. Moreover, obtaining Hubble'ssignature was no trivial matter. By signing the acknowledgment, Hubble, a notary public, enableddefendant to record the deed. See Wis. Stat.