JUSTICE BYRNE delivered the opinion of the court: 

As the result of a partially negotiated guilty plea,defendant, Annette M. Palmer, pleaded guilty to the offense ofarmed violence premised on aggravated battery. The January 28,2000, information alleged in pertinent part that defendant, "whilearmed with a dangerous weapon, a bludgeon, *** intentionally andwithout legal justification cut Pastor Escamilla about the bodythereby causing great bodily harm [to him]." See 720 ILCS 5/12--4(a), 33A--2 (West 1998). This offense is a Class 2 felony (720ILCS 5/33A--1(c)(3), 33A--3(b) (West 1998)) having a normalsentencing range of three to seven years' imprisonment (730 ILCS5/5--8--1(a)(5) (West 1998)). Under certain provisions of theUnified Code of Corrections (Code), an extended sentence of 7 to 14years' imprisonment may be imposed (730 ILCS 5/5--8--2(a)(4) (West1998)) if the court finds certain aggravating factors ("facts")were applicable such as where the offense was accompanied byexceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wantoncruelty (wanton cruelty) (730 ILCS 5/5--5--3.2(b)(2) (West 1998)),or the victim was a person 60 years of age or older at the time ofthe offense (age) (730 ILCS 5/5--5--3.2(b)(4)(ii) (West 1998)). There was no agreement as to the sentence. It appears that thetrial court imposed an extended sentence of 10 years' imprisonmentbased on its consideration at the sentencing hearing of two factorsor "facts"--wanton cruelty and age.

On June 2, 2000, following the denial of defendant's motion toreconsider the sentence, defendant timely appealed. Defendantargues that her extended sentence must be reduced to a nonextendedsentence because, in violation of her right to due process, theenhancing or aggravating factors (wanton cruelty and age) were notcharged, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

In support of her position she relies on Apprendi v. New Jersey,530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000) (Apprendi). For the reasons that we shall explain, we agree with defendant. Wevacate the sentence and remand the cause for resentencingconsistent with the principles enunciated in Apprendi and with theviews expressed herein.

The record further reveals that on January 28, 2000, defendantpleaded guilty to the armed violence charge and, as part of theplea agreement, the State nol-prossed the charges of attemptedfirst-degree murder, aggravated battery, and aggravated battery ofa senior citizen. It appears that part of the consideration forthe plea was that the Class 2 felony was a probationable offense. The court read the armed violence charge to defendant. The trialcourt informed defendant, among other things, that the offense was"technically probationable" and that the sentencing range for theoffense was three to seven years' imprisonment. The court alsostated that defendant could receive a term of 7 to 14 years'imprisonment "if you have a previous conviction within the last 10years *** or if *** there is aggravation that qualifies you forthat category." The court later added that it did not know whetherdefendant qualified for an extended term due to a previous felonyconviction or "if the injuries are severe enough for this court toconsider an extended term sentence. It's possible. But Iunderline the word possible." The court explained generally thevarious rights that defendant would give up by pleading guilty.

The State presented a factual basis for the plea, which isbriefly summarized here. The victim, Escamilla, was drinking withdefendant. Escamilla fell asleep. When he woke up, defendant wasstabbing him. No weapon was found, but defendant claimed she useda garden tool (bludgeon) to attack Escamilla. Defendant went tothe hospital with blood on her body. In her statement, she claimedthat she had been sexually assaulted. The victim later arrived atthe hospital and had 57 stab wounds. (The record shows that thereis a slight discrepancy in the exact number of stab wounds.) TheState characterized the wounds as "great bodily harm." The woundsrequired stitches, sutures, and surgery. A police investigationdetermined that defendant did the stabbing. The State assertedthat the sexual assault claim was unfounded. Defense counsel addedthat it was defendant who called the police initially, and thepolice transported her to the hospital where she remained for aboutfive hours. When defendant saw Escamilla at the hospital, shecalled the police a second time. She later went voluntarily to thepolice department. She stayed in the lockup for about three daysbefore she was charged. The trial court accepted the factual basisand the waiver of defendant's right to a trial and set the matterfor sentencing.

The sentencing hearing began on February 29, 2000. The Statepresented evidence in aggravation. The complaining witness readthe victim impact statement expressing his fears since thecommission of the offense. An employee testified regarding a fightbetween defendant and another inmate in December 1999. With theaid of photographs that were admitted into evidence, Sean Hilbert,an investigator for the North Chicago police department, testifiedregarding the wounds the victim sustained and the conditions foundat the scene of the crime. Hilbert stated at one point that thevictim had 52 wounds. Hilbert also testified that defendantclaimed the victim had sexually assaulted her. On cross-examination, the investigator admitted that the incident happenedat midnight and that Escamilla did not arrive at the hospital formedical treatment until the following morning, almost 12 hourslater.

Brian Gorcowske, an Elgin police detective, testifiedregarding his investigation of a June 19, 1999, incident in whichdefendant's boyfriend, Kevin Childress, suffered a fatal stab woundduring the course of a domestic dispute. Gorcowske determined thatdefendant inflicted the stab wound. Defendant had claimedalternatively that she acted in self-defense or the fatal wound wasan accident. The State sought to charge defendant with second-degree murder, but the grand jury returned a "no true bill." Gorcowske admitted that on a prior occasion Childress had beenarrested and charged for punching defendant in the eye. Thatcharge was subsequently dropped because defendant did not choose tohave him prosecuted.

In mitigation, defendant's father testified regarding thepositive aspects of his relationship with defendant. Defendant hadbeen in abusive relationships. He believed she needed counseling,and he believed he could be of assistance to her.

The State argued that there were aggravating factors present.

Among other things, the State argued that defendant should be givenan extended sentence because of the age of the victim and becausethe offense was accompanied by brutal or heinous behaviorindicative of wanton cruelty. The State emphasized that there were54 wounds.

Defense counsel argued that there were mitigatingcircumstances and that defendant had been in situations where shehad been abused or battered. He claimed the wounds were notindicative of wanton cruelty and characterized them as slashesrather than stabs. He asked the court to consider defendant's needfor social services and substance abuse counseling and herpotential for rehabilitation; he sought a period of probation anda six-month jail term.

The trial court considered various aggravating and mitigatingfactors. The court noted in particular that defendant should havecontemplated that 54 wounds would cause harm. The court could notdetermine that defendant acted under strong provocation or hadgrounds tending to excuse or justify her conduct. The courtconsidered defendant's criminal history and her cocaine use anddetermined that she was likely to commit another crime. The courtfound that the nature of the (great) bodily harm made the truth-in-sentencing provisions applicable (see 730 ILCS 5/3--6--3(a)(2)(iii) (West 1998) (for certain enumerated offenses, defendant mustserve 85% of the sentence where there is a finding of great bodilyharm to victim). The court concluded that an extended term of 10years' imprisonment was warranted because the victim was 67 yearsold and there were 54 to 57 stab wounds.

At the hearing on defendant's motion to reconsider thesentence, defense counsel argued among other things that theoffense was not accompanied by brutal or heinous behavior and that,had the case gone to trial, the factual circumstances could haveshown that defendant's unreasonable belief--that the amount offorce used was justified in self-defense--was inconsistent with afinding of behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. In support ofhis argument, counsel cited People v. Evans, 87 Ill. 2d 77, 88(1981).

The trial court denied the motion to reconsider, but issued acorrected mittimus on June 2, 2000, to show that the armed violenceoffense was a Class 2 felony. We note that the original sentencingorder of March 21, 2000, states that defendant's term ofimprisonment for armed violence is 10 years. The order furthernotes, "Court finds offense was brutal and heinous" and "Court alsofinds great bodily harm."

Defendant argues essentially that the sentencing procedurethat was used to enhance her sentence is unconstitutional. Insupport of her position, she relies on the general rule ofApprendi, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at2362-63, which states, "Other than the fact of a prior conviction,any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond theprescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, andproved beyond a reasonable doubt." Defendant asserts that thearmed violence charge to which she pleaded guilty did not encompassthe additional "facts" or "elements" of wanton cruelty and age,which the trial judge found and then used to enhance her sentencebeyond the normal, statutory maximum penalty.

In Apprendi, the defendant, Charles C. Apprendi, Jr., pleadedguilty to certain firearms violations. He fired several bulletsinto the home of an African-American family. The prosecutor forthe State of New Jersey reserved the right to request that thetrial court impose an enhanced sentence based on a hate-crimestatute. The defendant reserved the right to challenge thesentence enhancement on constitutional grounds. None of thecharges referred to the hate-crime statute and none alleged thatApprendi acted with a racially biased purpose.

Apprendi was sentenced to an extended term after theprosecutor moved to enhance the sentence. Under the New Jerseystatute, the judge was called upon to extend the sentence if thejudge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that thedefendant, in committing the crime, acted with a purpose tointimidate the victim based on the race, color, gender, handicap,religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity of the victim. Pursuantto the statute, the maximum 10-year prison sentence couldeffectively be doubled if the requisite finding was made. Thetrial court, sitting without a jury, found by a preponderance ofthe evidence that the shooting was racially motivated and sentencedthe defendant to a 12-year term of imprisonment for the firearmscharge.

The United States Supreme Court characterized the defendant'smental state (purpose to intimidate) as an element of thesubstantive offense rather than merely a sentencing factor. SeeApprendi, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 457-58, 120 S. Ct. at2366. The Court explained that due process of law requires thatthe accused be afforded a jury determination that he is guiltybeyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the crime with whichhe is charged, that is, due process protects the accused against aconviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of everyfact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 447, 120 S. Ct. at2355-56.

The Court pointed out that it is unconstitutional for alegislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts thatincrease the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminaldefendant is exposed and that it is clear that such facts must beestablished beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at ___,147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2363. The Court concluded thatthe New Jersey procedure was an unacceptable departure from thejury tradition, reversed the ruling of the supreme court of NewJersey, and remanded the cause for further proceedings. The Courtobserved that its decision was foreshadowed by Jones v. UnitedStates, 526 U.S. 227, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311, 119 S. Ct. 1215 (1999)(under fifth amendment due process clause, any fact other thanprior conviction that increases maximum penalty for crime must becharged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond areasonable doubt).

For a fuller understanding of the Court's ruling in Apprendi,it is instructive to examine briefly the New Jersey appellate courtdecision and the dissent therein in particular. State v. Apprendi,304 N.J. Super. 147, 698 A.2d 1265 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.1997), aff'd, State v. Apprendi, 159 N.J. 7, 731 A.2d 485 (1999),rev'd, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120S. Ct. 2348 (2000). In the appellate decision of State v.Apprendi, the reviewing court held that the hate-crime statute'sauthorization for extended sentencing, based upon the trial judge'sfinding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant hada biased motive, did not violate the due process requirement thatthe state must prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonabledoubt. The majority treated the defendant's bias or motive as asentencing factor rather than as an element of the offense.

In the dissent (State v. Apprendi, 304 N.J. Super. at ___,698 A.2d at 1272-75 (Wecker, J.S.C., dissenting)), Judge Weckerexplained that the defendant's rights to a trial by jury and to beproved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt were violated because thedefendant's motive to intimidate was an element of the crime thatincreased the sentence for the crime. Judge Wecker noted that thedefendant did not raise the right to an indictment by a grand jury(the indictment did not allege the prohibited purpose element); hisplea did not provide a factual basis for the prohibited purpose;and he denied such a purpose at the sentencing hearing. Thedissenting judge explained that, while the defendant waived hisright to a jury trial on the underlying charge, he did not waivethat right, or the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, withrespect to the prohibited purpose element. State v. Apprendi, 304N.J. Super. at ___, 698 A.2d at 1273.

Judge Wecker concluded that, where the state intends to seeka mandatory extended sentence because the underlying crime isaccompanied by the forbidden purpose set forth in the hate-crimestatute, then, unless the defendant expressly waives a jury, onlya jury can find the defendant guilty and then only upon proofbeyond a reasonable doubt. Judge Wecker further concluded that thedefendant's extended sentence should be vacated and the causeremanded for resentencing within the normal sentencing range forthe underlying offense. State v. Apprendi, 304 N.J. Super. at___, 698 A.2d at 1275. The United States Supreme Court's decisionin Apprendi, which is based on these due process concerns, isconsistent with Judge Wecker's dissent.

Recently, this court applied the Apprendi rule in People v.Chanthaloth, 318 Ill. App. 3d 806 (2001). There, a jury found thedefendant guilty of home invasion and residential burglary. Thetrial court imposed a 40-year extended term and a consecutive 4-year nonextended term for the respective offenses. The trialcourt, sitting without a jury, found three aggravating factors thatrendered the defendant eligible for the extended sentence for thehome invasion offense: the crime was exceptionally brutal andheinous; the victim was over the age of 60; and the victim wasphysically handicapped at the time of the offense. On appeal, thiscourt held that the extended sentence for home invasion violatedthe Apprendi rule. This court determined that the aggravatingfactors were in effect elements of the offense. See People v.Hope, No. 2--00--0417 (December 28, 2001) (explaining Chanthaloth).

In Chanthaloth, although evidence of the age of the victim hadbeen submitted to a jury and proved as an element of the offensebeyond a reasonable doubt in accordance with Apprendi, this courtnevertheless vacated the defendant's extended sentence because itappeared that the trial court had considered not only the victim'sage, but also the victim's disability and the brutal nature of thecrime. The cause was remanded for resentencing consistent with the rule of Apprendi. But cf. People v. Rhoades, 323 Ill. App. 3d 644(2001) (exceptionally brutal and heinous nature of first-degreemurder of minor was held to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt bydefendant's guilty plea where the plea and sentence were fullynegotiated, defendant was specifically and clearly admonishedregarding the possible sentence of life imprisonment if the courtfound his conduct brutal and heinous, and the State had sought thedeath penalty).

In People v. Thurow, 318 Ill. App. 3d 128 (2001), petition forleave to appeal allowed, 194 Ill. 2d 580 (2001), the reviewingcourt determined that a sentence for enhanced involuntarymanslaughter was unconstitutional under Apprendi where the jury wasnot instructed to make a finding beyond a reasonable doubt withrespect to an element of the offense--that the victim was a familyor household member. In sentencing the defendant to an extendedterm of eight years' imprisonment, the trial judge found that thevictim was a child under the age of 12, a factor that was notpresented to the jury.

The Thurow court observed that the Illinois statute inquestion imposed no burden of proof on the judge but merely statedthat certain factors may be considered by the judge in imposing theextended term. The reviewing court held that section 5--5--3.2(b)(4)(i) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5--5--3.2(b)(4)(i) (West 1998)) is unconstitutional under Apprendi to theextent that it allows the trial court to impose an extendedsentence "based on the age of the victim where that specificfinding is not charged to the jury." Thurow, 318 Ill. App. 3d at135.

In People v. Johnson, No. 5--99--0637 (October 23, 2001),following a bench trial, the defendant was found guilty ofattempted murder, aggravated battery, and unlawful possession of aweapon by a felon. At the sentencing stage, the trial judge foundthat the attempted murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutalbehavior indicative of wanton cruelty. Based on this additionalfinding of fact, the trial judge imposed an extended sentence of 50years' imprisonment where the normal maximum sentence allowed wouldotherwise have been a 30-year prison sentence. The reviewing courtheld that this finding involved an added element of the offense;that the judge's finding violated the Apprendi rule; and that thiselement should have been charged and proved beyond a reasonabledoubt before a jury. The reviewing court reduced the sentence tothe 30-year normal maximum term.

Our careful consideration of Apprendi, the dissent in State v.Apprendi, Chanthaloth, Thurow, and Johnson compel us to concludethat the sentencing procedure in the present case violated theApprendi rule. During the plea proceedings, defendant did notplead guilty to a charge that alleged the offense was accompaniedby exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior, or that the victim wasa person 60 years of age or older. These sentence-enhancing"facts" were not clearly and specifically made part of the factualbasis necessary for the trial court to accept a plea that wasknowingly and voluntarily entered with respect to the additional"facts." The admonishment to defendant was merely general withrespect to the possibility of an extended sentence, and there wasno mention of "brutal and heinous" conduct or the age of the victimas part of the plea. As in Apprendi, when defendant pleadedguilty, she did not know that she was giving up her right to havethe State prove beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury that the crimewas accompanied by brutal and heinous conduct indicative of wantoncruelty, or that the victim was 60 years of age or older. Adefendant should not be induced to plead guilty to one offense andthen be sentenced for another offense.

Since these additional sentence-enhancing "facts" in effectconstituted elements of the offense that warranted punishmentbeyond the normal maximum sentence, the judge's findings during thesentencing stage violated Apprendi. Absent a specific waiver bydefendant of a trial by jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt asto these specific elements and a clear and complete admonishment todefendant regarding the elements and the applicable enhancedpenalties, these elements should have been charged and proved to ajury beyond a reasonable doubt. We believe that Apprendi requiresno less to avoid violating a defendant's constitutional right ofdue process of law when entering a guilty plea.

The State argues that our decision in People v. Chandler, 321Ill. App. 3d 292 (2001), calls for a different result. Wedisagree. In Chandler, the defendant pleaded guilty to a series ofoffenses and was sentenced to consecutive terms of six years'imprisonment for arson and three years' imprisonment for aggravatedbattery. The defendant pleaded guilty to more than one crime, andthe court did not find him guilty of any elements not alleged inthe indictment. The court specifically admonished defendant thatconsecutive sentences based on his future dangerousness were apossibility.

A court has the discretion to impose a consecutive sentencebased on the nature and circumstances of the offense and thehistory and character of the defendant where the court is of theopinion that such a term is required to protect the public fromfurther criminal conduct by the defendant. 730 ILCS 5/5--8--4(b)(West 1998). In Chandler, the court based its finding of thedefendant's future dangerousness not on the presence of anadditional factual element but on the number and nature of thedefendant's crimes. In other words, the trial court based itsfinding of future dangerousness on defendant's criminal record. Adefendant's prior crimes constitute recidivism, which Apprendirecognized as an exception to the requirement that the offenses beproved beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury. See Chandler, 321Ill. App. 3d at 296; People v. Watson, 322 Ill. App. 3d 164 (2001);People v. Lathon, 317 Ill. App. 3d 573, 583-88 (2000). Finally, weobserve that our supreme court has held that the imposition ofconsecutive sentences does not violate the rule of Apprendi. People v. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d 269, 286-287 (2001). As can be seenfrom our discussion, Chandler is distinguishable on its facts, andit should be limited to those facts.

We recognize that in Chandler the court broadly stated,"Having waived a jury trial on all issues, defendant cannot nowclaim that he was deprived of the right to have a jury determinethe issue of his future dangerousness. Similarly, he cannot claimthat he was unfairly deprived of the right to have the State provethat point beyond a reasonable doubt." Chandler, 321 Ill. App. 3dat 297. However, we do not believe that an expansive reading ofChandler is warranted here, as the State urges, so that thedefendant in this case can be said to have waived all the rightsguaranteed under Apprendi. To the extent that Chandler evenremotely suggests that a guilty plea waives deficiencies in thecharge, the admonishments, and the factual basis necessary to aknowing and voluntary plea as to all the elements of an offense,including sentence-enhancing elements, we decline to followChandler. To do otherwise would be to disregard Apprendi itself.

We hereby vacate defendant's extended-term sentence. Defendant has not challenged her conviction, and it is thereforeaffirmed. On remand, defendant must be resentenced in accordancewith the rule of Apprendi and the views we have expressed herein. See Chanthaloth, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 818.

The judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmedin part and vacated in part, and the cause is remanded withdirections.

Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded withdirections.

CALLUM, J., concurs.

PRESIDING JUSTICE HUTCHINSON, dissenting:

I must again dissent from the Apprendi analysis and conclusionreached by the majority. I would affirm the order sentencing thedefendant to an extended term of 10 years' imprisonment for theoffense of armed violence, a Class 2 felony. I would do so for tworeasons: (1) defendant entered a guilty plea to the charge afterproper mandatory admonitions and notice of the possibility of anextended-term sentence, and (2) the age of a victim is an easilyproved fact that does not require a trial court to weigh or examinea defendant's mental state, and here the victim's age was notdisputed.

Most recently, in People v. Black, No. 2--00--0189 (February18, 2002), I dissented after a defendant entered a guilty plea,received an extended sentence, and then challenged his sentence onthe basis of Apprendi. In that case, the majority accepted theApprendi argument and remanded the cause for a new sentencinghearing because the trial court had used the age of the victims asthe basis for the extended-term sentence. The reviewing courtfound that the victims' ages were not identified at the time of theplea but were specifically articulated by the trial court duringthe sentencing phase of the case. While conceding that thedefendant in Black had been advised that an extended-term sentencewas possible and that the number of years for such extended-termsentence had been identified, the majority held that, because thedefendant was not forewarned, prior to sentencing, regarding thefactors that could result in such a sentence, the principles ofApprendi had been violated.

My dissent in Black focused on the defendant's voluntaryguilty plea, the fact that he had notice of the victims' ages basedupon statements he made during the commission of the offense, andhis waiver of all nonjurisdictional errors or irregularities as aresult of the voluntary guilty plea. The situation, in my opinion,is no different in this case.

Here, the defendant entered a voluntary plea of guilty to thecharge of armed violence premised on aggravated battery. Anothercharge arising out of the same incident and involving the samevictim, aggravated battery to a senior citizen, was nol-prossed atthat time, and there was evidence before the trial court that thedefendant and the victim were involved in a personal relationship. The trial court specifically noted the number of stab wounds andthe age of the victim when the extended-term sentence was imposed. Therefore, the defendant was on notice of the victim's age byvirtue of her personal relationship with him and the dismissedcharge, and she pleaded guilty, waiving all nonjurisdictionalerrors and irregularities.

In coming to my conclusion in this case, and as I came to myconclusion in the Black case, I relied on People v. Chandler, 321Ill. App. 3d 292 (2001). In particular, this court said inChandler:

"A defendant who pleads guilty does not have the sameappeal rights as one convicted following a trial. [Citation.] Generally, after pleading guilty, a defendant may not raiseclaims of the deprivation of constitutional rights thatoccurred before the entry of the plea. [Citation.] Beforedefendant entered his plea, the court informed him of thesentencing ranges for the offenses and specifically admonishedhim of the possibility of consecutive sentences. Havingwaived a jury trial on all issues, defendant cannot now claimthat he was deprived of the right to have a jury determine theissue of his future dangerousness. Similarly, he cannot claimthat he was unfairly deprived of the right to have the Stateprove that point beyond a reasonable doubt." People v.Chandler, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 297.

I also take issue with the majority on another Apprendi-related matter as it relates to its reliance on People v.Chanthaloth. As I noted in another recent dissent (People v. Hope,No. 2--00--0417, (December 28, 2001)), I was the author ofChanthaloth, and I disagreed with the majority's use of that caseto mandate a remand for resentencing when the victim's age was usedto extend a sentence. In the Hope dissent, I noted that severalother cases were decided after Chanthaloth that sharpened andclarified the Illinois sentencing law as it relates to Apprendichallenges, and, in particular, I cited a First District case,People v. Blackwell, 325 Ill. App. 3d 354 (2001). Hope, slip op.at 14-15.

Reasoning that a trial court need find only one singlestatutory factor in aggravation to impose an extended sentence(Blackwell, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 359), the majority there determinedthat, although an Apprendi violation may have occurred where theage of the victim was not submitted to a jury, the victim's age wasknown, it was undisputed by the parties, it was easily proved, and,therefore, it was harmless error. See also People v. Rohlfs, 322Ill. App. 3d 965 (2001)(failure to ask the jury to determine thevictim's age may have been harmless error where the victimtestified she was 93 years old, there was no dispute regarding herage, and no reasonable jury could have found her to be under theage of 60).

Returning to this case, the defendant was on notice of thevictim's age, the victim's age was not disputed by the parties, andthe victim's age was a fact easily proved. Furthermore, thedetermination of the victim's age did not require that the trialcourt weigh any evidence or examine the defendant's mental state. Therefore, the trial court's use of the victim's age to extend thesentence of the defendant was, at worst, harmless error.

Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court's order imposingan extended-term sentence upon defendant.