JUSTICE KAPALA delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Michael L. Perry, appeals from his conviction in the circuit court of Du PageCounty of theft by deception (720 ILCS 5/16--1(a)(2)(A) (West 2000)). We affirm as modified andremand for a new sentencing hearing.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant was convicted at a jury trial of theft by deception (720 ILCS 5/16--1(a)(2)(A)(West 2000)) for failing to pay charges related to a hotel room he and his wife and children used. Attrial the following evidence was presented. The State called Kimberly Turnage, who was the seniorsales manager at the Embassy Suites, in Lombard, Illinois. Her responsibilities included bookingrooms for lodging and meetings and negotiating rates. In January 2000, Turnage was contacted bydefendant. Defendant was already staying at the Embassy Suites. He indicated to Turnage that hewished to negotiate a long-term rate because he would be staying for an extended time for businessreasons.

As a result of their conversation, Turnage drafted a confirmation letter containing different stay dates and a discounted room rate. Defendant then sent a letter to Turnage indicating that hewished to set up direct billing to his company, Prolific Development Corp. Defendant's letter alsocontained various trade references. The confirmation letter sent by Turnage was signed by defendantand returned to Turnage. Turnage then passed these documents on to the Embassy Suites accountingdepartment.

On cross-examination, Turnage admitted that defendant's letter to her requested a reductionin the rate quoted in the confirmation letter. However, defendant did eventually accept the rate inthe confirmation letter by signing it. Further, Turnage admitted that she had more than oneconversation with defendant regarding the room rate. Turnage also did not request a deposit on thecontract because defendant was already staying at the hotel when he contacted Turnage. However,Turnage did at one point prepare a credit card authorization letter because defendant wished to paysome of his charges with the credit card of someone named Brian Green. The letter was preparedso that Green could authorize the use of his credit card to pay some of defendant's room charges. Turnage further admitted that none of the vendors defendant listed as references was checked.

On redirect examination, Turnage stated that account balances and direct billing were not partof her duties. Further, she testified that the credit card authorization letter prepared for Green'ssignature had never been signed. However, she was unaware of whether any charges were incurredon Green's card, as this knowledge was beyond the scope of her duties. On recross-examination,Turnage indicated that the credit card authorization letter was faxed to Green.

The State also called Sandra Deen Neely to the stand. Neely was the director of humanresources at the Embassy Suites in downtown Chicago. Neely had previously worked at the EmbassySuites in Lombard as the assistant deputy manager responsible for day-to-day operations. As theassistant deputy manager, Neely became familiar with the guests at the hotel, especially the longer-term guests. Neely was the assistant deputy during the period of February 2000 through May 2000. During this time, she became familiar with defendant because he was a long-term guest. Neelyestimated that she had contact with defendant about four times, which consisted of just greetings. Although Neely had not spoken with defendant about billing or his account, she did becomeaware around April or May 2000 that there was a problem with defendant's billing and his account. This information was relayed to her by the controller of the hotel, Karen Trajkovich. Trajkovich wasresponsible for billing and accounting. Trajkovich provided Neely with defendant's letter requestingbilling directly to Prolific and with defendant's list of references. Both documents were on "ProlificDevelopment Corp." letterhead, which included an address, phone number, fax number, and e-mailaddress. The letter indicated that defendant was the president of Prolific. The documents also listeddefendant and Lee Mandel, CPA, as the contact persons. Neely attempted to contact defendantthrough the e-mail address listed on the letterhead but was unsuccessful. Neely also contacted LeeMandel, and he informed her that he was not connected with Prolific. Neely then contacted BudgetRent-A-Car because defendant had listed the company as a trade reference. Budget informed Neelythat defendant did not have a valid account with the company. She was aware from defendant's filethat his charges were in excess of $15,000. According to Neely, defendant never contacted her ormade any efforts to pay his bill.

On cross-examination, Neely admitted that up until the point that she became involved withdefendant's account, the responsibility for the account would have been solely with the controller. Further, she testified that the accounting department normally set up a process through the corporateoffice to check trade references before setting up direct billing. However, that was not done in thiscase, because the accounting department did not feel that it had all of the information that thecorporate office required. Nonetheless, the general manager of the hotel signed off on the directbilling request without checking any of defendant's trade references. Neely admitted that even thoughthe references were submitted by defendant in January 2000, they were not checked until May 2000. At the time defendant and his family initially checked in, they paid for their room with a credit card.

The State next called Trajkovich to the stand. She testified that she had been employed bythe Embassy Suites in Lombard since November 1992 and has been controller since July 1999. Trajkovich was approached by Turnage to set up direct billing for defendant. Turnage providedTrajkovich with the letter and reference sheet from defendant. Trajkovich testified that the usualpractice for approving direct billing requests involved running all application materials through thecorporate office. This process required Trajkovich to supply background data such as bankinformation. The basic process involved a type of credit check based on the person's bankinginformation. However, Trajkovich did not have the required information with respect to defendant.

Trajkovich then informed Turnage that direct billing could not be set up due to the lack ofinformation. Subsequently, the general manager at the time, Robert Hjort, approached Trajkovichand told her to set up direct billing for defendant anyway and that Hjort would approve it. As a resultof this request, Trajkovich set up the direct billing account for defendant. The account was set upto bill Prolific as defendant had requested in his letter. Hjort signed the authorization for directbilling. Direct billing for defendant's charges began on February 8, 2000. Trajkovich sent a letter todefendant indicating the approval of his direct billing request. Among the terms indicated in the letterwas that payment was due within 30 days of the statement date.

The first bill sent to Prolific was for $3,877.94 and included room charges plus tax as well asrestaurant charges and copying charges. The bill was sent on March 3, 2000, to the address forProlific that had been provided by defendant. On March 20, 2000, Trajkovich sent out another bill,again mailing it to Prolific. This bill showed the previous balance of 3,877.94, which had remainedunpaid, and new charges totaling $3,106.79, for a total due of $6,984.73. This new grand totalcovered charges from February 8, 2000, through March 16, 2000, and included charges for the room,tax, restaurant charges, laundry charges, and phone calls. There was a tax credit on the bill becauseafter 30 days of stay, tax was no longer charged by the state. On April 4, 2000, because defendanthad failed to pay any of the charges, Trajkovich left defendant a message at the phone number thatdefendant had provided in his letter. She left a message indicating that there was an outstandingbalance and requesting the status of the payment. Defendant did not return the phone call.

On April 14, 2000, Trajkovich mailed to Prolific another billing statement, which stated thecurrent and total charges, and a collection letter, which stated that payment was past due and thatprompt payment would be appreciated. The total charges indicated in the statement and letter werethrough April 9, 2000, and amounted to $10,033.11. The new charges included room charges,restaurant charges, laundry charges, phone calls, and a postage charge. On April 28, 2000,Trajkovich sent another bill and collection letter because she had yet to receive a payment or aresponse from defendant. She slid this letter under defendant's hotel room door when she did notreceive any payment or response after she mailed the letter. This letter indicated that over 60 dayshad passed since the initial bill had been mailed, that $10,033.11 was the previous unpaid balance, andthat the current charges amounted to $1,992.81. The total balance amounted to $12,025.92 andcovered February 8, 2000, through April 19, 2000. The letter also informed defendant to contactTrajkovich if he needed an explanation of the charges. Once again there were additional charges forincidentals consisting of restaurant charges and laundry charges. No payment or response was made.

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Following defendant's conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial, the trial courtsentenced defendant to six years in the Illinois Department of Corrections and ordered that he payrestitution to the Embassy Suites. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant asserts four contentions on appeal. First, that he was not proven guilty beyond areasonable doubt, because the evidence was insufficient to establish that he intended to deceive ordefraud the Embassy Suites. Second, that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt thathe intended to permanently deprive the Embassy Suites of property. Third, that his trial counsel wasineffective such that a new trial is warranted. Fourth, and finally, that the evidence was insufficientto prove that he stole property worth over $10,000. Because we find that defendant's fourthcontention impacts our analysis with respect to the first three contentions, we will begin our analysisby addressing defendant's fourth contention. Further, we note that only our analysis of defendant'sfourth contention is contained in the published portion of this opinion and the remainder of ouranalysis is contained in the unpublished portion.

A. Proof That the Property Stolen Exceeded $10,000 in Value

Defendant contends that the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that theproperty he stole by deception exceeded $10,000 in value. The offense of theft by deception requiresthat a person "knowingly *** [o]btain[] by deception control over property of the owner" and"[i]ntend[] to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property." 720 ILCS 5/16--1(a)(2)(A) (West 2000); People v. Kotlarz, 193 Ill. 2d 272, 299 (2000). To prove the offense of theftby deception, the State must show that: (1) the victim was induced to part with property; (2) thetransfer of the property was based upon deception; (3) the defendant intended to permanently deprivethe victim of the property; and (4) the defendant acted with specific intent to defraud the victim. SeeKotlarz, 193 Ill. 2d at 299. Subsection (b) of section 16--1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code)delineates different sentences dependent upon various factors, including the value of the propertytaken by deception. See 720 ILCS 5/16--1(b) (West 2000). Defendant in this case was sentencedunder subsection (b)(5), which reads, "[t]heft of property exceeding $10,000 and not exceeding$100,000 in value is a Class 2 felony." 720 ILCS 5/16--1(b)(5) (West 2000). Defendant claims thatthe State has not proven that the value of the property stolen exceeded $10,000, because the rightto use the hotel room was not property within the meaning of section 16--1.

Generally, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict on appeal, " 'therelevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonabledoubt.' " (Emphasis in original.) People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985), quoting Jackson v.Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). However,defendant's contention sets forth a legal question. Namely, does property, as defined for purposesof section 16--1, include the value of the right to use the hotel room? Therefore, defendant presentsan issue of statutory construction, which we review de novo. People v. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d 317, 324 (2005).

Preliminarily, we must address the State's contention that defendant has waived this issue byfailing to raise it in the trial court. Defendant admits that he failed to raise the issue in the trial courtbut contends that a sufficiency of the evidence argument cannot be waived. The State responds that

defendant is raising a sentencing issue and, therefore, waived this issue by failing to object at thesentencing hearing or in a postsentencing motion. We agree with defendant that this issue is one ofsufficiency of the evidence and, therefore, can be raised at any time.

Defendant correctly contends that the value of the property was an element of the offenseof theft in this case. More specifically, subsection (c) of section 16--1 states that "[w]hen a chargeof theft of property exceeding a specified value is brought, the value of the property involved is anelement of the offense to be resolved by the trier of fact as either exceeding or not exceeding thespecified value." 720 ILCS 5/16--1(c) (West 2000). Therefore, there can be no doubt that the valueof the property was an element of the offense in this case. Generally, a defendant must bothspecifically object at trial and raise the issue again in a posttrial motion to preserve any alleged errorfor review. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). However, the doctrine of waiver isinapplicable when a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d at 190. Because defendant's contention is that the evidence was insufficient to show that the valueof the property exceeded $10,000, because the value of the right to use the hotel room was not"property" within the meaning of section 16--1, we find waiver to be inapplicable.

Turning to the merits of defendant's contention, we first note that the cardinal rule of statutoryconstruction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d at 324. The best indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, which is to be given itsplain and ordinary meaning. Eden Retirement Center, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 213 Ill. 2d273, 291 (2004). In this case, section 16--1 requires that defendant obtained control over the"property" of another. 720 ILCS 5/16--1 (West 2000). Section 15--1 of the Code defines propertyfor purposes of section 16--1. 720 ILCS 5/15--1 (West 2000). Section 15--1 states:

" '[P]roperty' means anything of value. Property includes real estate, money,commercial instruments, admission or transportation tickets, written instruments representingor embodying rights concerning anything of value, labor, or services, or otherwise of valueto the owner; things growing on, affixed to, or found on land, or part of or affixed to anybuilding; electricity, gas and water; telecommunications services; birds, animals and fish,which ordinarily are kept in a state of confinement; food and drink; samples, cultures,microorganisms, specimens, records, recordings, documents, blueprints, drawings, maps, andwhole or partial copies, descriptions, photographs, computer programs or data, prototypesor models thereof, or any other articles, materials, devices, substances and whole or partialcopies, descriptions, photographs, prototypes, or models thereof which constitute, represent,evidence, reflect or record a secret scientific, technical, merchandising, production ormanagement information, design, process, procedure, formula, invention, or improvement." 720 ILCS 5/15--1 (West 2000).

Defendant contends that the right to use the hotel room was not property within the meaning ofsection 15--1. We agree.

In determining the scope of section 15--1, we find the court's decision in People v. Davis, 203Ill. App. 3d 838 (1990), instructive. The alleged "property" at issue in Davis was the value of anemployee's anticipated labor. Davis, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 842. The court discussed the meaning ofproperty for purposes of theft, and thus the meaning of property as defined in section 15--1, by firstnoting that, at common law, property for purposes of theft, known at the time as larceny, includedonly tangible personal property and excluded electrical energy, water power, written documents suchas deeds and contracts, and things growing on, affixed to, or found on land partaking the nature ofrealty. Davis, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 844-45. Then, turning to the language of section 15--1, the courtfound that including the value of an employee's anticipated labor under the definition of propertydelineated in section 15--1 would require "a liberal and expansive interpretation of the generaldefinition, 'anything of value.' " Davis, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 846. The court held that the legislaturedid not intend such an open-ended interpretation. Davis, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 846. In so holding, thecourt recognized that section 15--1 listed items as property that, at common law, would not havebeen considered property for purposes of the crime of larceny. Davis, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 846. Thus,the court found that section 15--1 was in derogation of the common law and, therefore, should bestrictly construed. Davis, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 846.

In further analyzing section 15--1, the court next stated that the general term defining property as "anything of value" was followed by specific items. Davis, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 846. Thelist of specific items is preceded by the words, "[p]roperty includes." 720 ILCS 5/15--1 (West 2000). According to the Davis court, use of the word "includes" did not by itself necessarily limit the generalterm. Davis, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 846. The court pointed out that some cases had held that the useof the word "includes" was meant to broaden or enlarge the interpretation of a term, that is, thelegislature's intent in using the word "includes" was "to provide as large an access as possible to thegeneral term." Davis, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 846, citing Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 24Ill. App. 3d 718, 727 (1974). Other cases have held that "includes" is sometimes used to add to thegeneral class a species that does not naturally belong to it. Davis, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 846, citingIllinois Central R.R. Co. v. Franklin County, 387 Ill. 301 (1944).

In the case of section 15--1, the court held that "includes" was used more akin to the latteruse described above, that is, to add species to the general class, not to enlarge the general class itself. More specifically, the court held that the specific items listed after "includes" are "an enumerationexcluding all other things not in the specific category." Davis, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 846. Thus, inaccordance with the principle that statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictlyconstrued, the court held that property as defined in section 15--1 meant "tangible personal propertyor property which falls within the specific categories enumerated in the definition." (Emphasisadded.) Davis, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 846. That is, the court determined that the enumerated list did notenlarge access to the general term "anything of value" but instead added independent categories ofproperty. Further, the court found that such an interpretation comported with the requirement thatcriminal or penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused and with theconstitutional requirement that criminal statutes must be definite. Davis, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 846-47. The version of section 15--1 applicable in Davis is identical to the current statute except,unlike the current statute, it did not list "telecommunications services" as an enumerated type ofproperty. Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 15--1 with 720 ILCS 5/15--1 (West 2000). Therefore, the rationale of Davis is still applicable.

Moreover, we believe that the decision of the Davis court manifests the legislature's intent. In Davis, we believe, the court implicitly recognized that the word "includes" as used in section 15--1was ambiguous. This recognition is evident because the court explicitly noted that the word"includes" has more than one reasonable meaning. "A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of beingunderstood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different ways." Krohe v. City ofBloomington, 204 Ill. 2d 392, 395-96 (2003).

The court recognized that "includes" could be read as indicating that the list provides specificexamples of the general term. Davis, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 846. The list could enumerate items suchthat the general term must mean something more expansive than it would standing in isolation. Therefore, for purposes of section 15--1, "includes" could be read to indicate that the items followingwere specific examples of the general class of "anything of value" and that, as a result, "anything ofvalue" could not mean only "tangible personal property," because several of the enumerated itemswere not tangible personal property. Thus, the use of the word "includes" in this sense would enlargethe meaning of "property" far beyond that of the common-law meaning, because property wouldembrace many items that are not tangible personal property.

However, the Davis court also recognized that "includes" could be interpreted another way. More specifically, the court recognized that "includes" could indicate that the items following werenot in any way connected to the general class but, instead, were additional independent enumerationsof "property." See Davis, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 846. This interpretation of the word "includes" findssupport in other cases interpreting criminal provisions. See United States v. Vargas-Garnica, 332F.3d 471, 473-74 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that the use of the word "includes" in a statute defining"crime of violence" did not add an additional requirement to the general class but instead addedseparate additional classes not connected to the general class).

In order to resolve this ambiguity, the court employed the rule that a statute in derogation ofthe common law must be strictly construed. Cf. Scott v. Rockford Park District, 263 Ill. App. 3d853, 857 (1994) (refusing to use the principle of statutory construction that statutes in derogation ofthe common law are to be strictly construed against the local public entity, because the language ofthe statute at issue was unambiguous). Had the court chosen the enlarging application of "includes,"the definition of "anything of value" would have necessarily been expanded beyond the common-lawdefinition of "property" because the enumerated list, which would represent examples of the generalclass, contains items that were not considered "property" under the common law. Thus, as weexplained above, "anything of value" would mean something more than "tangible personal property"because several of the enumerated items are not tangible personal property. However, by choosingthe more limited application of "includes," the court was able to define "anything of value" inaccordance with the common law, that is, "tangible personal property," and to limit the additionalitems that are considered "property" to only those items specifically enumerated. In essence, theDavis court chose meanings of "anything of value" and "includes" that, when taken together, limitthe derogation of the common law as much as reasonably possible.

We find that this resolution of the ambiguity was the proper one because it limits theexpansion of the common-law definition. Further, we believe that the structure of section 15--1 alsosupports this conclusion. More specifically, if the legislature had intended the items following"includes" to simply be an illustrative list of the general class, it could have written "property isanything of value including ..." However, the legislature instead chose to begin a new sentence withthe phrase "[p]roperty includes." We believe that this structure, that is, the beginning of a newsentence, was intended to convey that the items specifically enumerated were in addition to, not partof, the general class.

Our reading finds support in Vargas-Garnica. In that case, the statute at issue read:

" ' "Crime of Violence"-

(I) means an offense under federal, state, or local law that has as an elementthe use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person ofanother; and

(II) includes murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forciblesex offenses (including sexual abuse of a minor), robbery, arson, extortion,extortionate extension of credit, and burglary of a dwelling.' [Citation.]" Vargas-Garnica, 332 F.3d at 473.

The court found that the use of the word "and" coupled with "includes" meant that in order to be a"crime of violence" an offense could satisfy either part I or part II of the statute. Vargas-Garnica,332 F.3d at 473-74. Additionally, the court found it worthwhile to note that "and" was followed bya new subsection. Vargas-Garnica, 332 F.3d at 474. This subsection contained the enumeratedoffenses. Vargas-Garnica, 332 F.3d at 474. In other words, "and" coupled with "includes" followedby a new subsection signaled that the items following were in addition to, not exemplary of, thegeneral definition. This structure is much like the period and beginning of a new sentence in section15--1.

Further, when the legislature chooses not to amend a statute after judicial construction, itis presumed that the legislature has acquiesced in the court's interpretation of legislative intent. R.D.Masonry, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 215 Ill. 2d 397, 404 (2005). In this case, the legislature has hadover a decade to amend the statute if it disagreed with the Davis court's interpretation of section 15--1. The only amendment made by the legislature since Davis was to add "telecommunicationsservices" to the list of enumerated categories. This addition in no way speaks to or modifies thedecision of the Davis court. Thus, we presume that the legislature has acquiesced in the Davisinterpretation. Additionally, we believe that the fact that the legislature actually did amend section15--1 but did not do anything to change the Davis interpretation in the process provides even strongerevidence of the legislature's acquiescence to that interpretation.

Consequently, we apply the definition of "property" as set forth by the court in Davis, thatis, that "property" is tangible personal property or anything specifically enumerated in section 15--1. Under this test, we find that the right to use a hotel room is not tangible personal property and is notlisted within the specific enumerated categories of section 15--1. Thus, the value of the right to usethe hotel room was not property under section 16--1.

However, the State contends that defendant did not take the right to use the hotel room but,instead, took the monetary value of the rate agreement for the room. The State's contention isunavailing. Defendant "took" the right to use the room. The rate agreement was simply anexpression of the value of that right and was not what was taken by defendant. Further, the monetaryvalue of the rate agreement is not tangible personal property nor does it fall into one of the specificcategories enumerated in section 15--1. Therefore, even if defendant had "taken" the monetary valueof the rate agreement as the State suggests, this value would not be considered property for purposesof section 15--1 or section 16--1.

Defendant contends, and the State does not dispute, that without the value of the right to usethe hotel room, the proven value of the property stolen is far less than $10,000. However, defendantadmits that the State did prove that the value of the items taken that do fit within section 15--1exceed $300 in value. More specifically, defendant admits that the restaurant charges representcharges for property within the meaning of section 15--1 and that the restaurant charges exceed $300in value. Therefore, defendant requests that we reduce the degree of his conviction from a Class 2felony to a Class 3 felony and remand for a new sentencing hearing. Subsection (b)(4) of section 16--1 states that "theft of property exceeding $300 and not exceeding $10,000 in value, is a Class 3felony." 720 ILCS 5/16--1(b)(4) (West 2000). Further, Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(3) states thaton review we may "reduce the degree of the offense of which the appellant was convicted." 134 Ill.2d R. 615(b)(3).

We find People v. Williams, 267 Ill. App. 3d 870 (1994), instructive regarding our use of thispower under the facts of this case. In Williams, the appellate court held that the State failed to provebeyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed more than 100 grams but less than 400 gramsof a substance containing cocaine. Williams, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 879. However, the court found thatthe evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant possessed more than 15 grams but less than100 grams of a substance containing cocaine. Williams, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 879. This proof, alongwith the proof of the defendant's intent to deliver, amounted to a lesser degree offense than the crimecharged. Williams, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 880. The court found that it could rule that a conviction beentered against the defendant for the lesser offense even though it was not the offense charged,because it was a lesser included offense of the offense charged. Williams, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 880. Additionally, the court held that Rule 615(b)(3) provided an independent basis upon which it hadauthority to reduce the degree of the offense. See Williams, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 880.

This case is similar to Williams. The State failed to prove that the value of the property stolenexceeded $10,000 but succeeded in proving a lesser value. This is akin to the State's failure inWilliams to prove that the amount possessed was more than 100 grams but less than 400 grams but,instead, proved a lesser amount. Thus, we find that Williams and Rule 615(b)(3) give us authorityto reduce the degree of defendant's conviction from a Class 2 felony to a Class 3 felony and wechoose to exercise this power.

However, before we remand for resentencing, we must determine whether defendant'sremaining contentions requesting reversal or, in the alternative, a new trial, have merit. Because wehave decided that the only "property" that defendant took was the incidentals and not the right to usethe hotel room itself, we consider defendant's remaining contentions only as they relate to suchincidentals. B. Defendant's Intent to Deceive or Defraud

The material in sections II B through II D is nonpublishable under Supreme Court Rule 23(166 Ill. 2d R. 23).

[Nonpublishable material under Supreme Court Rule 23 removed here.]

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant's conviction as modified, reducing hisconviction to a Class 3 felony, and we remand the cause for a new sentencing hearing.

Affirmed as modified and remanded.

BOWMAN and GILLERAN JOHNSON, JJ., concur.