People v. Pieper

SUPREME COURT CASES

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People v. Pieper

State: Illinois

Court: 2nd District Appellate

Docket No: 2-07-0220 Rel

Case Date: 02/06/2008

Preview:No. 2--07--0220 Filed: 2-6-08 ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Carroll County. ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) Nos. 06--DT--52 ) 06--TR--812 ) 06--TR--813 ) 06--CM--161 ) ) COREY A. PIEPER, ) Honorable ) John F. Joyce, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE O'MALLEY delivered the opinion of the court: The State appeals from an order granting the motion in limine of defendant, Corey A. Pieper, to exclude the result of a blood alcohol content (BAC) test administered to him after the Mt. Carroll police arrested him for driving under the influence (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11--501(a)(2) (West 2006)). Citing section 11--501.8(f) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/11--501.8(f) (West 2006)), defendant asserted that, because the police reported his BAC result to the Secretary of State under the provisions of the Code creating a summary driver's license suspension for any driver under age 21 with a BAC over 0.00 (see 625 ILCS 5/6--208.2, 11--501.8 (West 2006) (the zero-tolerance provisions)), the State was precluded from using the BAC result in a criminal prosecution. The court agreed and excluded the result. We hold that the reporting of a zero-tolerance violation is not

No. 2--07--0220 relevant to whether BAC testing has been done pursuant to section 11--501.1(a) (625 ILCS 5/11--501.1(a) (West 2006) (the general implied consent provision)) or section 11--501.8(a) and that section 11--501.8(f) works to exclude BAC results only when testing is done exclusively pursuant to section 11--501.8(a). As defendant did not show that his testing was under section 11--501.8(a), the exclusion was improper, and we therefore reverse the exclusion order and remand the cause. Officer Dennis Asay of the Mt. Carroll police department arrested defendant for DUI on August 13, 2006. Defendant was under 21 at the time. Asay also ticketed defendant for illegal transportation of alcohol. The State later charged defendant with underage drinking (235 ILCS 5/6--20 (West 2006)). In the resulting proceedings, defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude under section 11--501.8(f) the result of the BAC test administered after his arrest. In the motion, defendant admitted that Asay had read him both the zero-tolerance (625 ILCS 5/11--501.8(c) (West 2006)) and general implied consent (625 ILCS 5/11--501.1(c) (West 2006)) warnings. He noted that the police had reported his BAC result to the Secretary of State as a zero-tolerance violation. He asserted that this reporting showed that his testing was pursuant to section 11--501.8(a) and that, under section 11--501.8(f), BAC results obtained under section 11--501.8(a) are inadmissible in criminal proceedings. At the hearing on the motion, the State was prepared to submit evidence of Asay's intent in giving the test, but the court decided that it could rule without hearing that evidence. The trial court held that, by submitting a report to the Secretary of State under the zerotolerance provisions, Asay had effectively elected to test defendant under section 11--501.8(a), and the inadmissibility rule of section 11--501.8(f) therefore applied. Its oral comments suggest that it believed that a BAC test reported under the zero-tolerance provisions necessarily must have been

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No. 2--07--0220 conducted under section 11--501.8(a) rather than section 11--501.1(a). The State filed a certificate of impairment and appealed under Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (210 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)). It now argues that the trial court misinterpreted section 11--501.8. Defendant contends that the court's interpretation was correct, but also argues that this appeal is not proper under Rule 604(a)(1). We consider first why the appeal is proper and then explain why section 11--501.8(f) did not make defendant's BAC result inadmissible. Defendant claims that this appeal is not proper under Rule 604(a)(1) because the ruling at issue here was a simple evidentiary ruling, rather than one suppressing evidence, and because the evidence was not necessary for the State's case. He is wrong on both points. First, although Rule 604(a)(1) provides for "appeal *** from an order or judgment the substantive effect of which results in *** suppressing evidence" (210 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)), the supreme court has held that, "[f]or the purposes *** of Rule 604(a)(1), there is no substantive distinction between evidence that is 'excluded' and evidence that is 'suppressed.' " People v. Drum, 194 Ill. 2d 485, 491 (2000). The court thus permitted the State's appeal under Rule 604(a)(1) of an order excluding certain evidence as not falling within the residual hearsay exception. Drum, 194 Ill. 2d at 491-92. Under the rule in Drum, the order here was appealable regardless of whether it was a suppression order or merely evidentiary. Second, contrary to what defendant suggests, this court cannot second-guess the State's certificate of impairment by considering whether excluded evidence was necessary to the State's case. People v. Young, 82 Ill. 2d 234, 247 (1980). The State's certificate here is thus sufficient to establish the impairment of its case, despite the possibility that other evidence could substitute for the BAC result. Before turning to the substance of this case, we consider the applicable standard of review. The State asserts that the issue is one of statutory interpretation and that we therefore review the

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No. 2--07--0220 matter de novo. Defendant asserts that, as this was an evidentiary ruling by the trial court, we can reverse only if the trial court abused its discretion. "The determination of whether evidence is relevant and admissible is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse such a determination unless the trial court abuses that discretion." People v. Turner, 373 Ill. App. 3d 121, 124 (2007). "However, ' "[a trial] court *** abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law." ' " Turner, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 124, quoting Najas Cort

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