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JUSTICE O'MALLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

In a two-count indictment, the State charged defendant,Douglas R. Poncar, with aggravated driving under the influence ofalcohol (aggravated DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11--501(a)(1), (a)(2),(d)(1)(A) (West 1998)). The trial court granted defendant's motionto suppress the results of a blood test medical personneladministered at a hospital. On appeal, the State contends that thetrial court erroneously concluded that suppressing the evidence wasappropriate because defendant was injured while in custody. Wereverse and remand.

The State indicted defendant on September 30, 1998. On June1, 1999, defendant moved to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. The trial court denied the motion on August 2, 1999. Defendantthen moved to suppress the results of the blood test.

During the suppression hearing on defendant's second motion,defendant presented the testimony of Officers James Sakelakos andWilliam Rowley. Their testimony revealed the following,essentially undisputed facts. At 2:49 p.m. on July 30, 1998,Sakelakos observed defendant driving with a flat tire and stoppedhim. Because of the damage to the rim, it seemed that defendanthad been driving with a flat tire for some time. Defendantappeared highly intoxicated, and Sakelakos attempted to administerfield sobriety tests. Shortly thereafter, Sakelakos arresteddefendant. Because defendant had soiled himself, Sakelakos calledfor a transport van and had defendant sit on the curb.

Defendant became unhappy when another officer who arrived atthe scene began to search defendant's vehicle. Defendant attemptedto stand up several times. When he finally managed to do so, hestumbled. Sakelakos extended his arms to prevent defendant fromfalling and again had him sit on the curb.

When the van arrived, defendant initially refused to enter it. Defendant then attempted twice to enter the van but missed thestep. Rowley, the driver of the van, guided defendant's foot ontothe step and assisted him inside. Defendant then sat on the benchin the van. Sakelakos followed the van to the police station.

According to Sakelakos, when the van arrived at the station,Rowley opened the door, and defendant was lying on the floor. Defendant did not respond when the officers asked him to exit thevehicle, so Rowley attempted to assist defendant out of the van. Defendant initially resisted and used vulgar language buteventually exited the van.

Defendant also resisted somewhat as the officers led him tothe "shakedown" room to inventory his property. In the room,Rowley asked defendant to place his hands and head against thewall. When defendant did not comply, Rowley placed defendant'shands on the wall. Defendant repeatedly pulled his hands away fromthe wall and tried to turn to face Rowley. Each time, defendantappeared to be more agitated and uncooperative. At one point,defendant turned abruptly. Because Rowley was concerned thatdefendant might become aggressive, he positioned defendant againstthe wall again and held his forearm across the middle ofdefendant's back. Rowley testified that he used only the forcenecessary to return defendant to the desired position against thewall and did not shove him. At least two other officers assistedRowley. Sakelakos testified that, because he turned awaymomentarily to retrieve a pair of gloves, he did not see how theinjury occurred. Rowley testified that defendant turned his head,and defendant's right ear was cut after it struck the wall andbecame pinched between the wall and his eyeglass frames. Accordingto Sakelakos, defendant was not bleeding profusely, but enough towarrant medical attention beyond basic first aid. Accordingly, theofficers called for an ambulance. Defendant did not requestmedical treatment.

Because defendant continued to be uncooperative, the officersstruggled with defendant while waiting for the ambulance andwrestled him to the floor. Sakelakos rode in the ambulance withdefendant and was with defendant while he received treatment in theemergency room. In the emergency room, Sakelakos handcuffeddefendant's left wrist to the gurney. Defendant remaineduncooperative and refused to answer the treating nurse's questions. The nurse explained to defendant that he appeared to be intoxicatedand that it was necessary to determine what he had taken. Therefore, a blood test was necessary before an anesthetic could beadministered. Defendant objected to having his blood drawn. Hedid not resist, however, when medical personnel ultimately drew hisblood. Shortly thereafter, medical personnel administerednovocaine to defendant and treated the injury. None of the policeofficers present requested the blood test. Upon his discharge fromthe hospital, defendant told the hospital staff that the policeofficers beat him.

Before granting defendant's motion, the court expressedconcern that allowing the evidence to be admitted could lead topolice misconduct:

"Doesn't that cause you some concern that if you allowthe results of the tests when taken for treatment for theseinjuries that were inflicted by police, whether intentional orunintentional, that that would then open the door for policeto do that whatever they wanted and then come up with a schemeand say, I don't know what happened?

He was combative and we had to bat him down and he gotinjured.

How do you prevent that from becoming the norm, I guess my question is."

The court then formulated a "prophylactic rule" as follows:

"Isn't it easier to have a blanket ruling that says if aperson is injured at the hands of police, intentionally orunintentionally, the result they get can't be used againstthem in a DUI?

That way the police -- even if there was a thought theymight want to do that, it doesn't benefit them to do it.

Isn't it more of a prophylactic type of protection ratherto say in each case did they beat him up or not beat him up? See what I'm saying?

I have heard enough I think. I'm going to decide thiscase not on the issue of whether it's admissible on thestatute but on the basis that something bothers me about theidea of a person being in custody for DUI and then receivingsome type of physical injuries at the hands of the police.

I'm not saying these officers, that they intentionallybeat this man up or did anything intentional to cause himharm.

But there's no question that whatever the harm was, theinjury he suffered while at the hands of police, be it becausehe was an aggressor or wasn't an aggressor -- I don't knowwhat happened, and I don't have to decide that.

I think it's a better rule to say that if a person isinjured, after already being arrested for DUI, he's injured atthe hands of the police, and there is no question he wasinjured at the hands of the police.

They did something that caused the injury.

Again, it's not a matter of whether they did itintentionally or in terms of trying to protect themselves fromsome aggression.

If they do that, if it happens, they know they can't thentake him to the hospital and get blood results and use that ina DUI.

That I think is a safety net for everyone involved.

That way the police would not be tempted to do that, andwe don't have to make that decision.

So I'm going to base my decision in suppressing the bloodresults on the basis that in this particular factual situationwhere the person is already arrested for DUI, he suffersinjuries while in custody at the hands of the police, thenthose blood results will not be admissible against him in theDUI case.

Now, that's basically these facts of this case.

I'm not going to say if someone is walking into thepolice station and he trips on his own and bangs his head, andthey take him to the hospital, that might not be a differentresult.

But on these facts and these circumstances I'm going togrant the motion."

The State filed a certificate of impairment and timelyappealed. See 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1). We review de novo thetrial court's interpretation of the law.

Only fourth amendment constraints and specific statutoryprovisions govern the admissibility of blood-alcohol tests in a DUIprosecution. People v. Yant, 210 Ill. App. 3d 961, 964 (1991). Section 11--501.4 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code)provides:

"(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, theresults of blood tests performed for the purpose ofdetermining the content of alcohol *** of an individual'sblood conducted upon persons receiving medical treatmentin a hospital emergency room are admissible in evidenceas a business record exception to the hearsay rule onlyin prosecutions for any violation of Section 11--501 ofthis Code *** when each of the following criteria aremet:

(1) the chemical tests performed upon an individual's blood were ordered in the regularcourse of providing emergency medical treatment andnot at the request of law enforcement authorities;

(2) the chemical tests *** were performed by the laboratory routinely used by the hospital; and

(3) results of chemical tests performed uponan individual's blood are admissible intoevidence regardless of the time that the recordswere prepared.

(b) The confidentiality provisions of law pertainingto medical records and medical treatment shall not beapplicable with regard to chemical tests performed uponan individual's blood under the provisions of thisSection in prosecutions as specified in subsection (a) ofthis Section." 625 ILCS 5/11--501.4 (West 1998)

The testimony revealed that defendant's injury was seriousenough to warrant medical attention and that medical personnelordered the blood test in the regular course of providing emergencymedical treatment. Thus, if the State lays the proper foundationregarding the manner in which medical personnel conducted the bloodtest, section 11--501.4(a) would allow the State to introduce theresults of the test at trial.

The trial court essentially ruled that, even if section 11--501.4 applied, it is necessary to create an exception where thesuspect receives emergency medical treatment after being injuredwhile in police custody. The court expressed concern thatadmitting the blood test results under the circumstances of thiscase might provide police with an incentive to injure anuncooperative suspect so they could transport him to the hospitaland obtain a blood test.

The trial court's ruling was contrary to well-established law. Defendant cites no authority for the rule adopted by thetrial court that the results of a blood test performed by emergencymedical personnel for the treatment of injuries sustained by aperson while he was in police custody are per se inadmissible undersection 11--501.4. No such rule is provided in the plain text ofsection 11--501.4. Defendant points to no case construing thattext as embodying such a rule, nor can we find any such case. Wedisagree with defendant's suggestion that People v. Wilson, 116Ill. 2d 29 (1987), stands for the rule that "evidence against aperson should not be admitted when it is obtained throughquestionable circumstances relating to an injury to a defendantcreated at the hands of police officers." Wilson concerned theadmissibility of a confession under section 114--11(d) of the Codeof Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par.114--11(d)) (now 725 ILCS 5/114--11(d) (West 1998)), which requiresthat the State establish the voluntary nature of a defendant'sconfession. See Wilson, 116 Ill. 2d at 38. The court in Wilsonmade no suggestion that its holding was relevant to theadmissibility of other types of evidence such as blood testresults, and defendant points to no relevant analogy between Wilsonand this case.

The results of defendant's blood test are not barred under thefourth amendment either. In Yant, the court held that the fourthamendment did not preclude admission of the defendant's blood testresults because there was no indication that the physician's bloodtest order was a subterfuge procured by the police or a form ofState action. Yant, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 965. As in Yant, there isno evidence here that supports a conclusion that the blood test wasthe result of police subterfuge. The only conclusions thatreasonably may be drawn from the evidence are that defendant wascombative during the entire time he was at the police station andthat he was injured accidentally while resisting the officers'attempt to keep defendant in the desired position. The trial courtdeclined to find that the officers "did anything intentional tocause [defendant] harm." Instead, the court declared that the factthat defendant was in police custody when he was injured wassufficient to render the blood test results inadmissible. Thisrule is contrary to the rule in Yant that the results of a bloodtest performed by emergency medical personnel are admissible underthe fourth amendment unless the police employed subterfuge toprocure the test. See Yant, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 965.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County and remand the cause for further proceedings. Wedirect the trial court to determine, consistent with the rule inYant, whether or not the police employed subterfuge to obtain atest of defendant's blood following his arrest.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

McLAREN and CALLUM, JJ., concur.