People v. Ramirez, No. 2-98-1265
2nd District, 7 April 2000
| THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALEJANDRO H. RAMIREZ, Defendant-Appellant. | Appeal from the Circuit Court of Boone County. No. 98-CF--44 Honorable Gerald F. Grubb, Judge, Presiding. |
JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Alejandro H. Ramirez, entered an open plea of guilty to four counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of achild, J.A. (720 ILCS 5/12--14.1(a)(1) (West 1998)). After a hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to four consecutiveseven-year prison terms. The trial court denied defendant's motion to reconsider the sentences, and he timely appealed.
Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the trial court erred in considering a victim impactstatement from J.A.'s mother, M.P. Defendant asserts that, under section 3(a) of the Rights of Crime Victims and WitnessesAct (Victims Act) (725 ILCS 120/3(a) (West 1998)), she was not a "crime victim" and thus had no right to submit a victimimpact statement (see 725 ILCS 120/6 (West 1998)). Defendant also argues that section 9 of the Victims Act isunconstitutional insofar as it states that "Nothing in this Act shall create a basis for vacating a conviction or a ground forappellate relief in any criminal case." 725 ILCS 120/9 (West 1998). The State replies that defendant lacks standing tochallenge the constitutionality of section 9 of the Victims Act; that there was no error in introducing M.P.'s statements; andthat any error was harmless. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The facts are these. The presentence investigation report (PSIR) contains a statement by the victim, J.A. The entirestatement reads:
"I feel so happy he's gone. But I feel mad for what he did and I just hope he's gone from my life for A [sic] long time.
I can't right [sic] any more because I don't want to remember."
Also in the PSIR is a form, issued by the Boone County probation office, labeled "Victim Impact Statement" and informingthe reader that the victims of certain crimes may present sentencing courts with statements made pursuant to the VictimsAct. The form states that it "can be used for both purposes: to obtain a Presentence Investigation Report and to obtain aVictim Impact Statement." M.P. filled out the form with handwritten answers to 10 questions, describing the effects ofdefendant's crimes on J.A. and other family members. M.P. prepared a separate one-page statement describing the anguishJ.A. and she suffered from the offenses. This statement appears in the PSIR as well. Nothing in the record suggests thatM.P. consulted with the State's Attorney's office in preparing either statement.
At the sentencing hearing, defendant sought to bar M.P.'s statements, arguing that J.A. was not physically or mentallyincapable of exercising his rights under the Victims Act. See 725 ILCS 120/3(a)(3) (West 1998). The trial court disagreedand admitted M.P.'s statements. Neither J.A. nor M.P. was at the hearing. The court admitted a written statement in whichdefendant admitted that, about two years earlier, he performed oral sex on his eight-year-old nephew in Texas. In imposingthe seven-year sentences, the trial judge stated that defendant's sexual acts with his nephew made the minimum six-yearsentences inappropriate. The judge did not mention M.P.'s statements. Later, in refusing to reconsider the sentences, thejudge reiterated his reasoning, with no mention of M.P.'s statements.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting M.P.'s victim impact statement. Defendant observes that,under the Victims Act, one definition of "crime victim" is a "single representative who may be the *** parent *** of anyperson granted rights under this Act who is physically or mentally incapable of exercising such rights." 725 ILCS120/3(a)(3) (West 1998). Defendant reasons that M.P. did not fit this definition because A.J. was capable of exercising hisright to prepare a victim impact statement and, in fact, did so. However, as section 9 of the Victims Act forecloses any suchargument as a basis for appellate relief, defendant also argues that section 9 is unconstitutional on a number of grounds,chiefly the separation of powers (see Ill. Const. 1970, art. II,