People v. Reedy
State: Illinois
Court: 2nd District Appellate
Docket No: 2-96-0101
Case Date: 03/11/1998
No. 2--96--0101
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Lake County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 95--CF--2160
)
GARY REEDY, ) Honorable
) Raymond J. McKoski,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Gary Reedy, was convicted by a jury of aggravated
battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12--4.2(a)(1) (West 1996)) and
was sentenced to 15 years in prison. Under the "truth-in-
sentencing" provisions of section 3--6--3(a)(2)(ii) of the Unified
Code of Corrections, defendant is eligible to receive no more than
4.5 days of good conduct credit for each month of his sentence.
730 ILCS 5/3--6--3(a)(2)(ii) (West 1996).
On appeal, defendant argues that the truth-in-sentencing
provisions of section 3--6--3(a)(2)(ii) are unconstitutional and
therefore unenforceable. In support, defendant first contends that
Public Act 89--404 (Public Act 89--404, eff. August 20, 1995), in
which the legislature enacted section 3--6--3(a)(2)(ii), violates
the single subject rule of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill.
Const. 1970, art. IV, 8(d)). Defendant also argues that section
3--6--3(a)(2)(ii) violates the equal protection clause (U.S.
Const., amend. XIV, 1; Ill Const. 1970, art. I, 2) by treating
similarly situated offenders in a dissimilar manner. In response,
the State first contends that defendant may not challenge section
3--6--3(a)(2)(ii)'s constitutionality on direct appeal.
Alternatively, the State argues that section 3--6--3(a)(2)(ii) is
constitutional. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with
defendant that the legislature enacted section 3--6--3(a)(2)(ii) in
violation of the single subject rule.
I. DIRECT APPEAL
The State initially argues that defendant may not challenge
section 3--6--3(a)(2)(ii)'s constitutionality on direct appeal. In
support, the State cites the opinion in People v. Watford, No. 3--
96--0315 (December 2, 1997), of the Appellate Court, Third
District.
In Watford, the defendant raised the same issue that defendant
raises in this appeal, namely, whether section 3--6--3(a)(2)(ii)'s
truth-in-sentencing provisions are constitutional. The court
concluded, without any citation to authority, that a defendant
subject to truth-in-sentencing legislation cannot challenge the
constitutionality of that legislation on direct appeal. Watford,
slip op. at 1-2. Watford explained that, because the
responsibility for enforcing the truth-in-sentencing laws lies with
the Department of Corrections and not with the trial court, those
laws are "not intended to be a condition of the defendant's
sentence," have "no legal effect on the sentencing proceeding," and
are "a matter outside the scope of the sentencing proceedings."
Watford, slip op. at 2-4. Consequently, to challenge the
constitutionality of the truth-in-sentencing laws, a defendant
first must wait for the Department of Corrections to calculate his
good-time credit. Watford, slip op. at 4. The defendant then may
file a habeas corpus, mandamus, or declaratory judgment action
alleging that the Department of Corrections is calculating his
credit improperly. Watford, slip op. at 4.
We are not persuaded by Watford. In Illinois, a criminal
defendant possesses the right to appeal directly from any sentence
imposed for a felony conviction. 730 ILCS 5/5--5--4.1 (West 1996).
Illinois courts have long recognized that good-time credit is a
part of every sentence. See, e.g., People ex rel. Colletti v.
Pate, 31 Ill. 2d 354, 357 (1964) (good time is "a part of every
sentence"); People v. Baptist, 284 Ill. App. 3d 382, 387 (1996)
("compliance with conditions for awarding good-time credit is one
of the terms of the original sentence"). Indeed, this court has
held on numerous occasions that, because good-time credit is
" inherent in every sentence of imprisonment, " a sentencing court
may consider the possibility of good-time credit when fashioning a
defendant's sentence. See People v. Fetter, 227 Ill. App. 3d 1003,
1009 (1992); People v. Clankie, 180 Ill. App. 3d 726, 733 (1989);
People v. Torgeson, 132 Ill. App. 3d 384, 389 (1985). If the nexus
between good-time credit and the defendant's sentence allows the
trial court to factor in the former when imposing the latter, it
likewise allows a defendant to question the validity of the former
on direct appeal of the latter.
Moreover, even if good-time credit were not "inherent in every
sentence of imprisonment" as a general matter, it is inherent in
every sentence subject to the truth-in-sentencing laws. Section
5/5--4--1(c--2) of the Unified Code of Corrections compels the
trial court at the defendant's sentencing hearing to (1) inform the
public that the defendant is subject to section 3--6--3(a)(2)(ii)'s
truth-in-sentencing provisions, and (2) based upon the application
of those provisions, advise the public of "the actual period of
time this defendant is likely to spend in prison as a result of
this sentence." (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5--4--1(c--2) (West
1996). Significantly, section 5--4--1(c--2) is itself part of the
truth-in-sentencing legislation enacted by Public Act 89--404.
Thus, by its own terms, the truth-in-sentencing act injects itself
into a defendant's sentencing hearing. We therefore cannot agree
with Watford's conclusion that the truth-in-sentencing act has "no
legal effect on the sentencing proceeding" and is "a matter outside
the scope of the sentencing proceedings." Watford, slip op. at 3-
4.
Accordingly, contrary to Watford, we hold that a defendant
subject to section 3--6--3(a)(2)(ii)'s truth-in-sentencing
provisions may challenge the constitutionality of those provisions
on direct appeal. We therefore proceed to the merits of
defendant's appeal.
II. THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE
We next address defendant's contention that section 3--6--
3(a)(2)(ii) is unconstitutional because it was enacted in violation
of the single subject rule of the Illinois Constitution of 1970
(Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, 8(d)).
A. BACKGROUND
Section 3--6--3(a)(2)(ii), in its current form, was enacted on
August 20, 1995, as part of Public Act 89--404. Prior to Public
Act 89--404's enactment, a person convicted of aggravated battery
with a firearm was eligible to receive one day of good conduct
credit for each day of service in prison. See 730 ILCS 5/3--6--
3(a)(2)(West 1994). Effective August 20, 1995, Public Act 89--404
amended section 3--6--3(a)(2) to state that a person convicted of
aggravated battery with a firearm is eligible to receive only 4.5
days of good conduct credit for each month of his sentence. In
this case, the trial court sentenced defendant under the amended
version of section 3--6--3(a)(2) (730 ILCS 5/3--6--3(a)(2)(ii)
(West 1996)).
Defendant's primary argument in this appeal is that Public Act
89--404 violates the single subject rule of the Illinois
Constitution. The single subject rule governs the method by which
legislation is enacted. Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 503
(1997). Therefore, before analyzing whether Public Act 89--404
complies with the single subject rule, we will examine both the
procedural history and the substance of that Act. See Johnson,
176 Ill. 2d at 503.
1. Procedural History
Public Act 89--404 began its life on March 3, 1995, as Senate
Bill 1187. Entitled "A Bill for an Act concerning the insanity
defense," Senate Bill 1187 originally (1) increased the burden of
proof for a defendant asserting the insanity defense, (2) redefined
the term "insanity," and (3) revised the procedures governing
petitions for the transfer or release of defendants found not
guilty by reason of insanity. On April 25, 1995, the Senate passed
the Bill without amendment.
When it reached the House of Representatives, Senate Bill 1187
experienced considerable growth through a series of amendments. In
one of its amendments, the House deleted the Bill's entire text and
started from scratch. No longer confined to the insanity defense,
Senate Bill 1187 now also addressed such topics as (1) the duties
and jurisdiction of local law enforcement officials, (2) asset
forfeiture proceedings arising from drug offenses, (3) truth-in-
sentencing, and (4) the perfection and attachment of hospital
liens. Recognizing that the Bill's original title no longer was
accurate, the House renamed Senate Bill 1187 "An Act in relation to
governmental matters, amending named Acts." The House passed
Senate Bill 1187 with these amendments and sent it back to the
Senate.
On May 24, 1995, the Senate considered and debated Senate Bill
1187 in its amended form. Unlike the debate that preceded the
Senate's April 25, 1995, vote, this debate did not in any way
address the Bill's insanity defense provisions. Instead, the
debate was confined solely to the Bill's truth-in-sentencing
provisions. At the close of the debate, the Senate voted on and
passed Senate Bill 1187 as amended by the House.
On June 22, 1995, Senate Bill 1187 was sent to Governor Edgar
for signature. On August 20, 1995, Governor Edgar approved the
Bill and signed it into law as Public Act 89--404.
2. Substantive Provisions
In its enacted form, Public Act 89--404 contains 10 sections
covering an impressive array of subjects. Section 5 amends the
Counties Code to redefine the sheriff's duties as "conservator of
the peace." Similarly, section 10 amends the Illinois Municipal
Code to redefine the local police department's duties as "peace
officers."
Section 15 amends the Criminal Code of 1961 to (1) increase
the burden of proof for a defendant asserting the insanity defense
and (2) redefine the term "insanity."
Section 20 amends the Cannabis Control Act to provide for a
new distribution of the proceeds from an asset forfeiture sale
conducted pursuant to that Act.
Section 25 amends the Illinois Controlled Substances Act to
(1) allow multiple convictions and sentences for persons who
violate that Act with respect to more than one type of controlled
substance, (2) define each violation of that Act as a separate
offense, (3) impose sentencing guidelines for persons convicted of
violating that Act, and (4) provide for a new distribution of the
proceeds from an asset forfeiture sale conducted pursuant to that
Act.
Section 30 amends the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 to
(1) define the term "law enforcement agency" and (2) expand a
police officer's power to make arrests outside of his or her
jurisdiction.
Section 35 amends the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act by
deleting the requirement that judicial in rem proceedings be held
by the court and without a jury.
Section 40 amends the Unified Code of Corrections to (1)
revise the rules and regulations governing good conduct credit and
early release, (2) create the Illinois Truth-in-Sentencing
Commission, (3) redefine the term "insanity," (4) revise the
procedures governing petitions for the transfer or release of
defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity, and (5) create
new procedures for certain sentencing hearings.
Section 45 amends the Code of Civil Procedure to state that
the homestead exemption does not apply to property subject to
certain drug asset forfeiture proceedings.
Section 50 amends the Hospital Lien Act to (1) create a new
title for that Act, (2) include within that Act all hospitals
operated by a unit of local government, and (3) revise the
procedures for the perfection and attachment of hospital liens.
In sum, Public Act 89--404 addresses at least five legislative
subjects and amends nine statutory codes covering both civil and
criminal matters.
B. GOVERNING LAW
Found in Article IV, section 8, of the Illinois Constitution
of 1970, the single subject rule provides, in pertinent part:
"Bills, except bills for appropriations and for the
codification, revision or rearrangement of laws, shall be
confined to one subject." Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, 8(d).
Because the single subject rule is a substantive, rather than a
procedural, requirement for the passage of bills, an alleged
violation of the rule is subject to judicial review. Johnson, 176
Ill. 2d at 514.
In a recent decision, the Illinois Supreme Court explained
that the single subject rule serves two purposes. First, the rule
exists to prevent the passage of legislation that, standing alone,
could not muster the votes necessary for passage. Johnson, 176
Ill. 2d at 514; see also Geja's Caf
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