JUSTICE BYRNE delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Rommel Reyes, appeals the trial court's findingsthat he violated his probation and was guilty of the offense offalse personation of a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/32--5.1 (West2000)). Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred indenying his motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence and(2) that the evidence was insufficient to support either thefinding that he violated his probation or the finding that he wasguilty of committing the offense. For the reasons that follow, weaffirm.

To aid in understanding the issues that defendant raises inhis appeal, we first briefly review the procedural background tothe appeal. On March 20, 2000, in case No. 99--CF--3023, pursuantto a negotiated agreement, defendant, who was a Waukegan policeofficer at the time, pleaded guilty to charges of officialmisconduct (720 ILCS 5/33--3(b) (West 2000)) and criminal sexualabuse (720 ILCS 5/12--15(a)(1) (West 2000)). For these offenses,defendant was placed on felony probation for a period of 24 months.

On June 6, 2000, a Libertyville police officer stopped a motorvehicle that defendant was driving. At the time of the stop,defendant was no longer a Waukegan police officer but was still onprobation. Based on defendant's conduct during the stop, theofficer arrested defendant and issued a citation charging defendantwith false personation of a peace officer. The State subsequentlycharged defendant by information with the offense of falsepersonation of a police officer and also filed a petition to revokedefendant's probation in case No. 99--CF--3023 on the ground thatdefendant had committed the offense of false personation of a peaceofficer. Defendant later filed a motion to quash his arrest and tosuppress evidence. The trial court denied the motion.

The State elected to proceed first with a hearing on thepetition to revoke probation. Following the hearing, the trialcourt found that the State had proved by a preponderance of theevidence that defendant violated his probation when he committedthe offense of false personation of a peace officer by falselyimpersonating a police officer.

The parties then agreed to proceed by stipulated bench trialwith respect to the charge against defendant of false personationof a peace officer. The parties agreed that the evidence at thestipulated bench trial would be the same evidence that waspresented at the hearing on the petition to revoke probation. Following the stipulated bench trial, the trial court found thatdefendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of false personationof a peace officer.

After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenceddefendant to intensive probation for a period of 30 months withvarious conditions, 18 months of periodic imprisonment, and 300hours of public service. Defendant's timely notice of appealfollowed.

We now turn to the issues that defendant raises on appeal. Defendant initially contends that the trial court erred in denyinghis motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. At a hearingon the motion, the State advised the trial court that the parties'understanding of the motion was that it applied only to the eventsthat occurred during the period from when the officer first sawdefendant's vehicle until the stop of the vehicle. Because of thisunderstanding, much of the evidence that is relevant to defendant'smotion to quash arrest and suppress evidence is distinct from theevidence that is relevant to the other issues that defendantraises. We will therefore first set out the facts specificallyrelevant to the issue of whether the trial court erred in denyingdefendant's motion and will resolve that issue before proceeding,if necessary, to set out the relevant facts and address the otherissues that defendant raises.

At the hearing on the motion, defendant testified that on June6, 2000, at around 1:30 a.m., he was driving his car, a white GMCJimmy, northbound on Route 45 when a Libertyville police officerstopped his car. Defendant asserted that, to the best of hisknowledge, he was in compliance with all the traffic laws and othercriminal laws of the State of Illinois at the time of the stop.

On cross-examination, defendant maintained that he was goingbetween 45 and 52 miles per hour before the stop and denied that hewas driving at a speed of over 60 miles per hour before the stop. Defendant acknowledged that he accompanied the officer who stoppedhim to the rear of his car where the officer pointed out that therear license plate light was not on.

Brian Bone, a Libertyville police officer, testified that atabout 1:30 a.m. on June 6, 2000, he was on duty in his squad carpatrolling a stretch of Route 45 where the speed limit was 55 milesper hour. Bone observed a white GMC Jimmy coming toward him onRoute 45 at a high rate of speed. Bone activated his radar unitbut was not able, at first, to get a radar reading on the Jimmy'sspeed because another vehicle that was near the Jimmy was moving atabout the same speed as the Jimmy. Following his initialobservation of the cars traveling at a high rate of speed, Boneobserved that the brake lights were activated on both the Jimmy andthe other car. After that, Bone was able to get a reading on theJimmy with his radar unit. The radar reading indicated that theJimmy was traveling 60 miles per hour.

After getting the radar reading on the Jimmy, Bone made a U-turn so that he was traveling northbound on Route 45, the samedirection as the two cars. Bone then observed that there was norear license plate light illuminating the license plate on theJimmy. After observing the unlit rear license plate light, Boneactivated the emergency lights on his squad car and stopped theJimmy. When the Jimmy stopped, Bone looked more closely at therear license plate light and confirmed that it was not on. Defendant was the driver and sole occupant of the Jimmy.

On cross-examination, Bone acknowledged that he did not issuea traffic citation to defendant for speeding but only for having anunlit rear license plate light. In the year and a half that he hadbeen assigned to traffic duty, Bone had made hundreds of trafficstops. Bone estimated that only about 10 of the stops were fornothing more than an unlit rear license plate light.

Following the hearing, the trial court found that Bone had asufficient basis to stop defendant's car because Bone reasonablysuspected that defendant had violated two traffic laws. The courtstated that the suspected violations were speeding and driving atnight with an unlit rear license plate light.

On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court's rulingwas against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant focusesalmost exclusively on the propriety of the stop with respect to thesuspected speeding violation. Defendant virtually ignores thesuspected unlit rear license plate light violation.

We initially note our standard of review. Traditionally, when a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence involvedfactual determinations and credibility assessments, a reviewingcourt would not reverse the trial court's ultimate ruling unless itwas manifestly erroneous. People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425,430-31 (2001). This deferential standard of review was grounded inthe reality that the trial court was in a superior position todetermine and weigh the credibility of the witnesses, to observethe demeanor of the witnesses, and to resolve conflicts in thetestimony of the witnesses. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 431. However, our supreme court has recently decided that, when a motionto suppress involves a question of probable cause or reasonablesuspicion, a reviewing court should apply a de novo standard ofreview to the trial court's ultimate finding with respect toprobable cause or reasonable suspicion. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at431. We will therefore accord great deference to the trial court'sfactual findings and reverse those findings only if they areagainst the manifest weight of the evidence; however, we willreview de novo the ultimate question of defendant's legal challengeto the denial of his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. See Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 431.

In this case, the trial court found that, when Bone stoppeddefendant, Bone had sufficient reason to believe that defendant wasviolating or had violated two traffic laws. The suspectedviolations were speeding and driving with an unlit rear licenseplate light.

Officer Bone testified that he got a radar reading ondefendant's car showing that defendant was driving at 60 miles perhour. The radar reading was taken after defendant had slowed down. The speed limit was 55 miles per hour. The trial court apparentlyfound Bone's testimony to be credible. Defendant does not reallycontest the finding that his rear license plate late was unlit. Based on this record, we cannot say that the trial court's findingthat Officer Bone had sufficient reason to believe that defendanthad committed two traffic violations was against the manifestweight of the evidence.

We next consider whether Officer Bone's reasonable suspicionsthat defendant had committed two traffic violations were asufficient basis for Bone to stop defendant's car. A lawfultraffic stop requires a reasonable suspicion that the vehiclestopped is subject to seizure for a violation of law. Delaware v.Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 673, 99 S. Ct. 1391,1401 (1979). Therefore, a police officer who observes a vehicleviolate a traffic law may lawfully stop the vehicle. People v.Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402, 413 (1998).

Here, Officer Bone observed defendant's car violate twotraffic laws. First, Officer Bone observed defendant's carspeeding (see 625 ILCS 5/11--601(b) (West 2000)). Second, OfficerBone observed that the rear license plate light on defendant's carwas unlit (see 625 ILCS 5/12--201(c) (West 2000)). Based onOfficer Bone's observations of these traffic law violations, weconclude that his stop of defendant's car was a lawful trafficstop. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denyingdefendant's motion to quash his arrest and to suppress evidence.

Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in findinghim in violation of his probation and in finding him guilty ofcommitting the offense of false personation of a peace officer. Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to supportthese findings.

At the hearing on the petition to revoke probation, OfficerBone testified that after he stopped defendant's car he explainedthe violations to defendant and examined defendant's driver'slicense. Defendant told Bone that he believed that the rearlicense plate light on his car was working because he had justgotten his car back from the shop. Bone and defendant then walkedtogether to the rear of defendant's car to check the light. Whilethey were walking, defendant asked Bone if he knew a Mundeleinpolice officer named Gorski. Bone responded that he did not knowGorski personally but knew the name. Defendant then told Bone thatGorski would know defendant because defendant had dealt with Gorskiwith regard to an accident that had resulted in defendant's carbeing in the shop.

Bone further testified that, after defendant returned to thedriver's side of his car, defendant asked Bone if Bone knew anindividual named Joe Garcia who used to work for the Libertyvillepolice department. Bone responded that he knew Garcia and thatGarcia had worked as a community service officer with theLincolnshire police department before being hired by the McHenryCounty sheriff's department. Bone's testimony continued asfollows:

"Q. What did the defendant say?

A. The defendant stated that he worked -- or, 'I workwith Joe Garcia,' which is the Waukegan police officer.

Q. Did he say -- well, strike that. What did you sayor what did he state next?

A. I said, 'Really? You're a police officer?' And hestated yes, he was a police officer.

Q. Did he specifically say, 'I'm a Waukegan cop?'

A. Yes he did."

Bone further testified that he then asked defendant if he hadany identification, such as a badge or identification card, that apolice department would issue to identify its sworn officers. Defendant responded that he did not have a badge with him becausehe had just completed a field training program for new officers. Defendant explained that he had not purchased a badge to carrywhile he was off duty because of the cost of such a badge. Defendant also stated that he did not have his identification cardwith him because he had left it at home.

Bone further testified that, after defendant explained why hedid not have a badge or identification card with him, defendantthen stated, " 'But I am a police officer' " and pointed toward aFraternal Order of Police (FOP) member medallion that was on therear bumper of his car and a FOP member sticker that was on hiswindshield.

Before defendant got back into his car, defendant asked Boneif he knew a person named Chris Dador. Bone responded that he knewDador because he had worked with Dador when he, Bone, was a LakeCounty sheriff's deputy. Defendant then told Bone that he had goneto the police academy with Chris Dador's brother, Al Dador. Bonetestified that defendant stated that Chris and Al Dador "know Iwork for Waukegan."

Bone further testified that he then contacted the Libertyvillepolice dispatcher to have a routine check done on defendant'sdriver's license and to have the dispatcher call the Waukeganpolice department to determine whether defendant was in fact apolice officer there. The dispatcher advised Bone that defendantwas not employed as a police officer with the Waukegan policedepartment. After obtaining this information, Bone returned todefendant's car and again spoke with defendant.

Bone further testified "I asked him again, I asked him if heis a Waukegan police officer, and he stated yes, I am a Waukeganpolice officer. And I again restated are you -- are you a Waukeganpolice officer? He again stated that he is a Waukegan policeofficer." Defendant then pointed toward a black nylon briefcasethat was on the passenger seat of his car and "stated that he hadall his documentation and the various paperwork from the WaukeganPolice Department that shows that he is in fact a Waukegan policeofficer."

Bone then confronted defendant with the information from thedispatcher indicating that defendant was not a Waukegan policeofficer. Bone testified that defendant then stated, " 'Well,actually I'm a part-time officer there. I still hold the title aspatrol officer, though I am a computer consultant at this time.' " Bone reiterated that defendant stated that he continued to hold theofficial title of police officer.

Bone further testified that he then asked defendant how hecould continue to hold the title of police officer if he,defendant, was a registered sex offender. Defendant then statedthat "he had been fucked over by the Waukegan Police Department andhe in fact did not want to work with them anymore."

Bone testified that defendant then consented to a search ofhis car. The search revealed a business card that stated thatdefendant was a police officer. The business card was introducedinto evidence along with the FOP medallion that was on the bumperof defendant's car.

On cross-examination, Bone acknowledged that the business carddid not have a date on it. Bone also acknowledged that he did notobserve defendant passing out any business cards and that defendantnever asked for leniency on the ground that he was a policeofficer.

After Bone finished testifying, the parties stipulated that ifthe Waukegan police chief was called to testify his testimony wouldbe that, at one time, defendant had been a police officer with theWaukegan police department but that on June 6, 2000, the departmentno longer employed defendant in any capacity. At the State'srequest, the trial court then took judicial notice of thesentencing order in case No. 99--CF--3023 showing that defendanthad been placed on probation in that case for the offenses ofofficial misconduct and criminal sexual abuse.

Defendant then testified as a witness on his own behalf. Defendant testified that on June 6, 2000, at about 1:30 a.m., hewas driving home from work when Officer Bone stopped his car. Defendant acknowledged that after he and Bone walked to the rear ofhis car to check to see if the rear license plate light was on heasked Bone if Bone knew Officer Gorski. Defendant explained thathe mentioned Gorski because Gorski had taken an accident reportinvolving defendant's car and defendant thought Gorski could verifythe accident.

Defendant also testified that Officer Bone pointed to the FOPmedallion on his car and then asked defendant "Are you a cop?" Defendant responded, in the past tense, "yes, I was." When Boneasked defendant where he had been a police officer, defendantresponded, in the past tense, that he had been a police officer inWaukegan and had worked with Joe Garcia. Further conversationabout Joe Garcia ensued.

Defendant further testified that Bone asked him if he had abadge or an ID with him. Defendant responded, " 'no, I don't haveit on me, it's with the department.' " Defendant explained that hemeant that after he resigned from the Waukegan police departmentthe department had kept his badge and ID. Defendant denied that heever told Officer Bone that he, defendant, was currently a memberof the Waukegan police department.

On cross-examination, defendant admitted that the businesscard stating that he was a Waukegan police officer was his. Defendant also agreed that he had no difficulty talking to OfficerBone.

Following the hearing, the trial court found that the Statehad proved by a preponderance of the evidence that defendantviolated his probation by falsely impersonating himself to OfficerBone as a police officer. The parties then agreed that the matterwould proceed to a stipulated bench trial to determine whetherdefendant was guilty of committing the offense of false personationof a peace officer. The parties agreed that the evidence that waspresented at the hearing on the petition to revoke probation wouldconstitute the evidence at the stipulated bench trial and that theproceedings with respect to the motion to quash arrest and suppressevidence would also apply to the stipulated bench trial. The trialcourt then found that defendant was guilty of committing theoffense of false personation of a peace officer beyond a reasonabledoubt. The trial court later denied defendant's motion for a newtrial.

Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenceddefendant to 30 months of intensive probation with variousconditions, 18 months of periodic imprisonment, and 300 hours ofcommunity service. Defendant's timely notice of appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant contends that the evidence wasinsufficient to prove either that he committed the offense of falsepersonation of a peace officer or that he violated his probation. With respect to both contentions, defendant posits that thetestimony of Officer Bone was equivocal as to whether defendant'sstatements to Bone regarding being a police officer were in thepast tense or the present tense. Defendant asserts that his owntestimony regarding the statements unequivocally shows that hereferred to being a police officer only in the past tense. Defendant argues that the equivocal nature of Bone's testimony withrespect to the tense of the statements is enough to show that theevidence was insufficient. Alternatively, defendant argues that,even if Bone's testimony was sufficient to show that defendantclaimed he was presently a police officer, he is entitled to areversal because the alleged impersonation was not the type ofimpersonation that is contemplated by the statute that prohibitsthe false personation of a peace officer.

In a criminal case, the State has the burden of establishingbeyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the offensethat the defendant is charged with committing. People v. Sanford,24 Ill. 2d 365, 368 (1962). In proceedings to determine whether adefendant violated a condition of his probation, the State needonly prove its allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. 730ILCS 5/5--6--4(c) (West 2000); People v. Goleash, 311 Ill. App. 3d949, 955 (2000).

We will first determine whether the evidence in the criminalcase that the State brought against defendant was sufficient toprove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Whenconsidering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in acriminal case, it is not the function of a reviewing court to retrythe defendant. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). Rather, the relevant question is whether, after viewing theevidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rationaltrier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimebeyond a reasonable doubt. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261. The trierof fact has the responsibility to determine the credibility of thewitnesses, to resolve conflicts or inconsistencies in theirtestimony, to assess the weight to be given to their testimony, andto draw reasonable inferences from all the evidence. See People v.Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36, 84 (1999); People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d326, 360 (1992). A reviewing court should not reverse a criminalconviction unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, orunsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of thedefendant's guilt. People v. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d 420, 444(1995).

Section 32--5.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/32--5.1 (West 2000)) sets out the elements of the offense of falsepersonation of a peace officer. Section 32--5.1 provides:

"A person who knowingly and falsely represents himself tobe a peace officer of any jurisdiction commits a Class 4felony." 720 ILCS 5/32--5.1 (West 2000).

In this case, there was conflicting evidence as to whether thestatements that defendant made to Officer Bone regarding being apolice officer were phrased in the present tense or in the pasttense. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to theState, the trial court could have resolved these conflicts bydetermining that defendant made the statements in the presenttense. In addition, Officer Bone testified that defendant madestatements regarding his not having a badge or identification card. Although defendant attempted to explain these statements bytestifying that he meant that the Waukegan police department hadtaken his badge and identification card, the trial court could havefound defendant's explanation not to be credible. Furthermore,Officer Bone testified that, after he confronted defendant with theinformation from the dispatcher, defendant made statements to theeffect that he was still a police officer but was only working parttime. Defendant did not offer any explanation for thosestatements. Based on all the testimony and the other evidence,such as the business card and the FOP medallion, we conclude thatthe evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt thatdefendant committed the offense of false personation of a peaceofficer.

We now turn to defendant's alternative contention that, evenif the evidence was sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubtthat he knowingly falsely impersonated a police officer, hisconviction nonetheless should be reversed because the impersonationwas not the type of impersonation contemplated by section 32--5.1. In support of this contention, defendant first argues that merelymaking the claim of being a police officer is not enough to satisfythe elements of the offense because there is a corollaryrequirement that the person making the claim must also have soughtto gain something of value through the impersonation. Defendantmaintains that he never sought to gain something of value inimpersonating a police officer but, at most, engaged in mere"puffing."

Defendant cites a federal case, United States v. Rippee, 961F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1992), in support of this argument. However,Rippee is inapposite because it involved a federal statute thatcontained an express element requiring that the impersonator"demands or obtains any money, paper, document, or thing of value." Rippee, 961 F.2d at 678. Unlike the federal statute at issue inRippee, section 32--5.1 does not contain any such express element. Moreover, defendant has not provided any authority that convincesus that such an element should be read into section 32--5.1. If the legislature had wanted to include such an element in section32--5.1, we believe it simply would have done so. For thesereasons, we conclude that defendant's argument regarding thecorollary requirement fails.

We note parenthetically that, even if, arguendo, an elementregarding seeking something of value was part of the offense offalse personation of a peace officer, the evidence in this casewould have been sufficient to satisfy such an element. Althoughdefendant asserts that his false representation that he was apolice officer was mere puffing, we believe that the trial court reasonably could have inferred that defendant, through thepersonation, sought to avoid a traffic ticket. That plainly issomething of value. See Rippee, 961 F.2d at 679.

Finally, defendant argues that his conviction should bereversed because his false representation that he was a policeofficer did not constitute conduct that was within the scope of theharm that section 32--5.1 was intended to prevent. In support ofthis argument, defendant relies on People v. Ellis, 296 Ill. App.3d 862, 866 (1998), where the court in construing section 32--5.1stated that "[t]he statute exists to protect citizens who would beharmed or deceived by those acting under the color of authority."

We agree with the State that defendant's reliance on Ellis ismisplaced. Nothing in Ellis indicates that the purpose of section32--5.1 as stated therein is the only purpose of the statute orthat there must be the possibility of harm to a citizen in orderfor a person to be guilty of the offense. Consequently, we are notpersuaded by defendant's argument.

For all these reasons, we conclude that the evidence wassufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendantcommitted the offense of false personation of a peace officer. Because the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonabledoubt that defendant committed the offense of false personation ofa peace officer, and in view of the lower standard of proof in aprobation revocation proceeding, where grounds for revocation needonly be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, we also concludethat the evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant violatedhis probation by committing the offense of false personation of apeace officer while on probation.

The judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

McLAREN and BOWMAN, JJ., concur.