No. 2--01--1210

JUSTICE GILLERAN JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Darren L. Ribar, was arrested and charged withdriving under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11--501(a)(2)(West 2000)). Defendant was given notice that his drivingprivileges would be summarily suspended under section 11--501.1 ofthe Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code) (625 ILCS 5/11--501.1 (West2000)). Thereafter, he petitioned the court to rescind the summarysuspension. Ultimately, the trial court granted the petition,ruling that defendant had not received a hearing within 30 days ofthe petition's filing, as required by section 2--118.1(b) of theCode (625 ILCS 5/2--118.1(b) (West 2000)). The State appeals,arguing that the court erred in calculating the 30-day period forthe hearing. We reverse.

The relevant facts are as follows. Defendant was arrested andgiven his notice of the statutory summary suspension on August 24,2001. On August 29, 2001, defendant filed his petition to rescindthe statutory summary suspension. The trial court continued thehearing twice because the Secretary of State had not yet filed aconfirmation of the statutory summary suspension. The confirmationwas finally filed on September 24, 2001. On September 28, 2001,defendant's hearing was held. At the hearing, defendant moved todismiss the summary suspension, claiming the hearing was untimely. The court granted defendant's motion and the State now timelyappeals.

The sole issue on appeal is how to compute the 30-day periodin which a hearing on a petition to rescind a summary suspension ofdriving privileges must be held. See 625 ILCS 5/2--118.1(b) (West2000). This presents a question of law, which we review de novo. People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 217 (2000).

The State argues that the 30-day period should be calculatedunder the guidelines of section 1.11 of the Statute on Statutes(the Statute) (5 ILCS 70/1.11 (West 2000)). According to thatsection, "[t]he time within which any act provided by law is to bedone shall be computed by excluding the first day and including thelast." 5 ILCS 70/1.11 (West 2000). Excluding the first day, theday the petition was filed, the defendant's hearing would have timely occurred on the thirtieth day.

Defendant, on the other hand, argues that the first day mustbe included when calculating the time frame. Defendant relies on People v. Schaefer, 154 Ill. 2d 250, 259 (1993), in which the court determined that the 30-day period commences with the filingof the petition. Including the first day, the defendant's hearingwould have been untimely.

We agree with the State. Although section 1.11 of the Statutedoes not explicitly say that it governs how to calculate the 30-daytime period in which a summary suspension rescission hearing mustbe held, we find that it is implicit. Section 1.11 of the Statuteis a general time-computation statute that applies to "any actprovided by law." 5 ILCS 70/1.11 (West 2000). A defendant'sright to a hearing on his petition to rescind a statutory summarysuspension within 30 days is an act provided by law. See 625 ILCS5/2--118.1(b) (West 2000)). Therefore, it follows that the timeperiod during which a summary suspension rescission hearing must beheld falls under the guidelines of section 1.11 of the Statute. See People v. Burke, 220 Ill. App. 3d 839, 844 (1991) (applying section 1.11 of the Statute to the summary suspension rescissionhearing time period).

Applying the time-computation guidelines of section 1.11 ofthe Statute is not inconsistent with the holding in Schaefer, uponwhich the defendant relies. The Schaefer court did notspecifically address the computation of the 30-day time period. Rather, as noted above, the Schaefer court simply held that the 30-day time period begins when a defendant files a petition to rescinda summary suspension. See Schaefer, 154 Ill. 2d at 259. As withany other time period governed by section 1.11 of the Statute, anevent will always trigger the time period to begin, but thecalculation of the time period, including whether to count thefirst and last days and how to treat weekends and holidays, is tobe determined according to the guidelines of section 1.11 of theStatute. See 5 ILCS 70/1.11 (West 2000). Accordingly, we concludethat the trial court erred by granting defendant's petition torescind the statutory summary suspension.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of thecircuit court of McHenry County and remand the cause for furtherproceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

BOWMAN and O'MALLEY, JJ., concur.