PRESIDING JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the opinion of thecourt:

In 1993 a jury convicted defendant, Juan A. Rivera, of theoffense of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9--1 (West 1992)). Thetrial court imposed a sentence of natural life imprisonment withoutthe possibility of parole. Defendant appealed, and this courtreversed his conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial. See People v. Rivera, No. 2--94--0075 (November 19, 1996)(unpublished order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23). In October1998 defendant was retried, and a jury again convicted defendant ofthe offense of first-degree murder; the trial court sentenceddefendant to natural life in prison. Following the trial court'sdenial of his posttrial motion, defendant timely appeals. We affirm.

Eleven-year-old Holly Staker was raped and murdered on August17, 1992, while she was baby-sitting at Dawn Engelbrecht's home inWaukegan. Engelbrecht returned home early from her work when shelearned her five-year-old son, Blake, had been locked out of herhouse and that Holly was not answering. She found her two-year-olddaughter, Taylor, on a bed in the children's bedroom and Holly'sbody on the floor. Defendant was incarcerated for an unrelatedcrime sometime after Holly's murder. An investigation led policeto interview defendant, as he had made several statements toanother prisoner, Edward Martin, regarding the murder. Defendantmade inculpatory statements to police officers and later providedwritten statements to the officers. On November 12, 1992,defendant was indicted for Holly's murder.

In November 1993 defendant was tried and convicted on threecounts of first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to lifeimprisonment without the possibility of parole. Defendant appealedhis conviction and sentence, and this court reversed and remandedfor a new trial. See People v. Rivera, No. 2--94--0075 (November19, 1996) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

Prior to retrial, defendant filed a motion to authorizefunding to hire an expert witness. Defendant sought to engage theservices of Richard Ofshe, a social psychologist, to present anexpert's testimony in the field of false confessions. In January1998 the trial court heard arguments on defendant's motion. Thetrial court was concerned with the nature and admissibility of theexpert's testimony and determined that further inquiry was neededbefore it would render a decision to authorize the funds. At asubsequent hearing the trial court reiterated its desire to conducta Frye hearing to determine the admissibility of Ofshe'santicipated testimony. Defendant submitted a memorandum to thetrial court concerning evidentiary rules and the Frye standard andin it questioned whether a Frye hearing was even necessary underthe circumstances of the case.

On February 23, 1998, the trial court conducted an extensivehearing and, on March 2, 1998, determined that false confessionevidence of the type proposed by Ofshe would be inadmissible. Thetrial court reasoned that the false confession evidence testimonythat Ofshe would render added "little or nothing to what [thejurors] can glean from the testimony themselves." The trial courtalso noted that, under the Frye standard, it was not convinced thatOfshe's type of testimony had general acceptance within thepsychiatric, psychological, or sociological community. The trialcourt ruled that it would not authorize the expenditure of fundsand denied defendant's motion.

Trial commenced on September 16, 1998. The record reflectsthat the State's case was premised mainly upon circumstantialevidence, as the physical evidence failed to identify anyparticular suspect. Edward Martin testified that in mid-September1992 he had a conversation with defendant while they were bothbeing held in the Lake County jail. Defendant told Martin that heknew who killed Holly and that he had approached Engelbrecht on herfront lawn on the evening of the murder. Defendant told Martinthat the night of the murder he was at a party at the Maurice Craigresidence and that another individual kept leaving and returning tothe party. Defendant told Martin that, after approximately 50minutes, the individual returned to the party but was nervous andhad blood on him. Defendant told Martin that they smoked somemarijuana, did some more partying, and then the individual left andhasn't been seen or heard from since. Defendant also opined thatHolly was a tease and that she deserved all 27 stabbings. Defendant said that neither of Engelbrecht's children had seenanything happen because her son was not there and her daughter wasin another room. Martin relayed to the police that defendant knewwho had killed Holly.

Michael Jackson testified that in August 1992 he was living atthe Craig residence. Jackson testified that on August 17, 1992,there was no party at the Craig residence. Jackson was acquaintedwith defendant and knew him from the neighborhood. On October 28,1992, Jackson went to the Lake County sheriff's office and metdefendant in a conference room. Defendant told Jackson that theofficers were trying to "railroad" him and asked Jackson to tellthe officers that they were together on the day of Holly's murder. Jackson responded that he did not want anything to do with the rapeand murder of a little girl and would not say what defendant wantedhim to say. Jackson reported his conversation with defendant tothe officers.

Alejandro Ontiveros also testified that on August 17, 1992,there was no party at the Craig residence. Maurice Craig testifiedthat he, his mother, and siblings lived a few blocks fromEngelbrecht's residence in August 1992 and that there was no partyat his house on August 17, 1992.

Michael Blazincic, an officer with the Lake County sheriff'sdepartment, investigated Holly's murder and interviewed defendant. Defendant told Blazincic that, on the day of Holly's murder, he wasat a party at the Craig residence. Defendant noticed that anotherindividual by the name of Robert had appeared at the party and leftseveral times throughout the course of the party. Defendant toldBlazincic that, after Robert returned to the party the third time,he appeared to be very nervous and had some scratches on his face;Robert told the people at the party that he had fallen. Thereafter, the people at the party heard police sirens and sawflashing lights. Defendant stated that he and some others left theCraig residence and went in the direction of where the emergencyvehicles were going; Robert went in the opposite direction. Defendant had not seen him since.

Blazincic and Lieutenant Fernando Shipley of the Waukeganpolice department confronted defendant with inconsistenciesregarding statements he had made to them during the interview. Defendant admitted to Shipley that he had lied but did not offer areason.

Officer Donald Meadie of the Waukegan police department andAssistant Commander Chuck Fagan also interviewed defendantregarding his explanations for his whereabouts on the night ofHolly's murder. After approximately 45 minutes, defendant appearedto bow his head and began crying. Defendant admitted that he wasin the house with Holly. Defendant explained that Holly tried toseduce him; he relented and they had intercourse. Defendantstopped, though, when Taylor began crying. Holly wanted tocontinue and became angry when defendant stopped. She thenthreatened defendant with a knife. Defendant further explainedthat, in fighting Holly off when he attempted to halt her attack,he ended up with the knife. Not realizing he had the knife,defendant began punching Holly and she fell to the floor. Defendant stated that he panicked. He washed the knife, left theapartment, broke the knife and threw it down, and went home. Athome he took a shower and burned his bloodied clothes. He returnedto the area of the apartment and approached Engelbrecht to find outwhether Holly was dead. Meadie prepared defendant's statement, anddefendant made one correction and signed it.

Lieutenant Michael Maley of the Illinois State Police alsoobtained a statement from defendant. In that statement, defendantexplained that he was unable to achieve an erection because of hisearlier ingestion of cocaine and Holly was ridiculing him. Hebecame angry and retrieved a knife from the kitchen. Hollystruggled with defendant while he was "cutting" her. Defendantexplained that, if she had stopped struggling with him, he wouldhave stopped cutting her and she would not have gotten hurt anyfurther. Defendant put Holly on the bed. He then developed anerection, so he engaged in vaginal and anal intercourse upon her. He washed his hands and the knife in the kitchen and used a towelto wipe any fingerprints on the doorknob. Defendant also statedthat he wanted it to appear like a burglary break-in, so he puncheda mop handle through the back door. Defendant then left theapartment, broke the knife and threw it down, went home, showered,and burned his clothes before returning to the area of theapartment. Defendant stated that he did not know until thefollowing day that he had killed Holly.

David Ostertag was a detective sergeant for the Round LakeBeach police department and an investigator for the Lake Countymajor crimes task force at the time of Holly's murder. He sat withdefendant while defendant ate lunch during his interview. Defendant told Ostertag that he was sorry for what he did to Hollyand that he did not have to worry about going to prison because hewould kill himself first.

The transcribed testimony of Frank McDonald was read to thejury. McDonald was a witness who testified at defendant's firsttrial but was unavailable for defendant's retrial. Prior to thesubmission of the transcript, the parties edited from it portionsof what this court had previously found improper, as well as otherportions such as testimony that was stricken by objection. McDonald's testimony reflected that he and defendant were bothprisoners in the Lake County jail from November 1992 to February1993. McDonald explained that, while he was serving time, heoccupied himself by reading the statutes pertaining to criminalconduct and the discovery packages of fellow inmates. Defendantasked McDonald to review his discovery materials to uncoverinformation on another possible suspect, Dion Markadonis. Afterreviewing the material, McDonald discussed the case with defendant. Defendant asked McDonald what he thought, and McDonald responded,inter alia, "You're in a lot of trouble. *** You killed Holly." McDonald stated that defendant's head "went down and he said,'Yeah, I did.' "

David Crespo was an inmate at the Lake County jail during thetime defendant was awaiting this retrial. Crespo testified that heand defendant attended a Spanish Bible study meeting together inMay 1997. As they returned to the jail, defendant admitted toCrespo that he had "killed that little girl." Defendant toldCrespo, however, that he would be "taken care of" if he toldanyone. Crespo was initially afraid to tell anyone but latercontacted authorities and relayed the statements to them.

Taylor Arena, Engelbrecht's daughter, was approximately 32months old at the time of Holly's murder and was approximately 8years old at the time of defendant's retrial. Taylor testifiedthat she remembered going to the store with Holly to buy a pizza,returning home, cooking the pizza, and eating it. Blake wasplaying outside. Taylor said the man who stabbed Holly came inthrough the back door and that Holly did not let him in. Taylorrelated that the man stabbed Holly three times in her stomach. They were in the kitchen and he dragged her into the bedroom andput Holly on one of the beds. The man picked Taylor up and put heron the same bed. After Taylor finished testifying, the trial wasadjourned for the day.

When court resumed the next morning, the State advised thetrial court that, after Taylor had finished testifying, sheidentified defendant as the person who had stabbed Holly. TheState requested leave to recall her, and defense counsel objected. The trial court conducted a hearing in which all parties questionedTaylor regarding her recollection of defendant and her recentidentification of him. The trial court allowed the State to recallTaylor, and Taylor identified defendant to the jury as the personwho had stabbed Holly. The trial court also authorized theexpenditure of $5,000 to the defense for an expert to testifyregarding the recalled memory of Taylor.

The State rested, and the defense called Dr. Larry Heinrich,a licensed clinical psychologist, to testify as an expert. In 1993Heinrich examined defendant and performed a clinical interview. Heinrich opined that on October 30, 1992, when defendant admittedto committing the murder, he was "decompensated," that is, he wasunable to respond in a manner that would be consistent with alogical, coherent, and integrated manner. Heinrich explained that,in defendant's case, he was under such stress that in response hewould do anything or say anything to escape the stressful situationhe was in. Heinrich estimated that defendant's state ofdecompensation began when he became emotional during the interviewand began crying.

Defense counsel next made an offer of proof with respect tothe proposed testimony of Ofshe regarding false confessions. Thetrial court recalled that it would not allow funding because it didnot find Ofshe's material admissible.

Just prior to the parties' closing arguments, defense counselinformed the trial court that neither of the two expert witnessesthat they had wanted to testify regarding the recalled memory ofTaylor Arena was available. Earlier in the trial, the trial courthad suggested that defense counsel subpoena the experts. The trialcourt reasoned that it would be preferable to subpoena one expertand force him to reschedule two or three patients rather thandetain the jurors an extra four or five days. Defense counselexplained that they did not want to subpoena the experts becausethey feared the experts would become hostile if faced with thattype of proceeding. Defense counsel requested a continuance tosecure the testimony of one of the experts, Dr. Kraus. The trialcourt responded that it stood ready to issue a subpoena and a bodyattachment but it would not continue the case.

The parties presented their closing arguments and the trialcourt instructed the jury. The jury retired to deliberate. Duringthe course of deliberations, the jury communicated with the trialcourt regarding the verdict forms and the definition of reasonabledoubt. The trial court responded after consulting with theparties. Deliberations continued into the following day, and thetrial court received another note from the foreperson informing thetrial court that he believed the jury was at an impasse. The noteread, in pertinent part:

"We have certain members of the jury that believe withoutphysical evidence *** they cannot agree to a guilty verdictbeyond a reasonable doubt.

We have a larger number of jurors who believe, beyond areasonable doubt, that [defendant] is guilty.

At this time the division is strong and we do not see away to move the parties."

The record reflects that, at some later point but before thetrial court responded to the foregoing note, the jurors called thedeputy to request transcripts of testimony of 10 witnesses. Theforeperson informed the deputy that, by reviewing the testimony,the jury could expedite its deliberations and reach a verdict yetthat day. Following arguments of the parties, the trial courtresponded to the jury:

"Daily transcripts of the trial are not prepared. Thetestimony you requested would take several days to prepare. I will not provide those transcripts to you.

Please continue to deliberate."

The jury continued its deliberations into the evening, and atapproximately 7 p.m., the parties agreed that the trial court wouldissue the following instruction to the jury:

"Stop your deliberations. You will again be sequesteredfor the evening. You must not discuss this case in any waywith anyone. ***

Any communications, other than food, housing and comfortmatters, must be reduced to writing and tendered to the court.

If there are further communications addressed to theCourt, do not include in your written notes any indication asto the number of jurors that would vote one way or another."

Jury deliberations resumed the next day. At approximately 11a.m., the jury requested defense exhibits for its review. Afterconferring with the parties, the trial court responded and askedthe jury which specific defense exhibits it was missing. At somepoint later, the jury sent the following note to the trial court:

"As mentioned yesterday, we have an issue of a lack ofphysical evidence ***. We have tried to review directtestimony to get past this issue but, have failed.

Quite frankly, continued discussion has only served toescalate a tense situation. We are not progressing and havenot progressed for the past 4-6 hours of deliberation.

We are more than willing to discuss this issue with you,face-to-face, but a simple 'keep deliberating' message is notgoing to move this jury forward ***."

At approximately 3 p.m., the trial court conducted a hearing inresponse to the jury's note. Following arguments of the parties,the trial court decided to instruct the jury pursuant to People v.Prim, 53 Ill. 2d 62 (1972). The jury was brought into thecourtroom; the trial court read the Prim instruction, and the juryreturned to deliberate. The following evening, the jury founddefendant guilty of three counts of the offense of first-degreemurder and not guilty of one count of the offense of first-degreemurder.

Defendant filed a posttrial motion and the trial courtconducted a hearing. In November 1998 following the arguments ofthe parties, the trial court denied defendant's posttrial motionand scheduled defendant's sentencing hearing. On December 10,1998, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing. Defendantalso presented a supplemental motion for new trial and asked for acontinuance to obtain a report in support of the motion reflectingthat Taylor had recanted her identification testimony of defendant. The State objected to defendant's motion for a continuance and thesupplemental motion for new trial. The trial court heard thearguments of the parties and denied defendant's motion forcontinuance and then the supplemental motion for new trial.

Proceeding to the sentencing phase, the trial court statedthat this was a case of "uncommon savagery and unspeakablebrutality." The trial court continued and reflected upon thefactors in aggravation. It found that defendant had a history ofcriminal conduct and that sentencing him was necessary to deterothers from committing a similar offense. It further found thatthe crime was committed during the course of a criminal sexualassault and that the murdered individual was under the age of 12. The trial court commented that, for those two reasons, defendantwas initially eligible for a death sentence. The trial court foundthat the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal andheinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty and determined thatdefendant was eligible for extended-term sentencing. The trialcourt sentenced defendant for a period of natural life imprisonmentwithout the possibility of parole. The mittimus reflects that thetrial court entered judgment on defendant's conviction of first-degree murder during the course of an aggravated criminal sexualassault. The trial court denied defendant's motion to reconsidersentence, and defendant timely appeals.

[Nonpublishable material under Supreme Court Rule 23 removedhere.]

In a supplemental brief, defendant contends that his sentenceof natural life imprisonment is void because it fails to complywith the recent Supreme Court ruling announced in Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). The Apprendi court held that, "[o]ther than the fact of a priorconviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyondthe prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, andproved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. We note that, sinceApprendi was decided, our legislature has amended section 5--5--3of the Unified Code of Corrections (the Code) in response (see 730ILCS 5/5--5--3(d) (West 2000)). However, we decline to address theamendment in light of our conclusion that the trial court properlysentenced defendant in accordance with the rule announced inApprendi.

In the present case, the trial court sentenced defendantpursuant to section 5--8--1 of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5--8--1 (West1998)), which provides:

"(a) Except as otherwise provided in the statute definingthe offense, a sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall bea determinate sentence set by the court under this Section,according to the following limitations:

(1) for first degree murder,

(a) a term shall be not less than 20 years andnot more than 60 years, or

(b) if the court finds that the murder wasaccompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinousbehavior indicative of wanton cruelty or, except asset forth in subsection (a)(1)(c) of this Section,that any of the aggravating factors listed insubsection (b) of Section 9--1 of the Criminal Codeof 1961 are present, the court may sentence thedefendant to a term of natural lifeimprisonment[.]" 730 ILCS 5/5--8--1(a), (b) (West1998).

Aggravating factors listed in section 9--1(b) of the Criminal Codeof 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9--1(b) (West 1998)) that allow a trial courtthe discretion to sentence a defendant to natural life imprisonmentinclude whether the victim was killed in the course of anotherfelony and whether the victim was under the age of 12 and the deathresulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicativeof wanton cruelty. See 720 ILCS 5/9--1(b)(6), (b)(7) (West 1998).

Defendant argues that the determination of whether a crime wasaccompanied by brutal and heinous behavior indicative of wantoncruelty is a factual finding the trial court used to increase hissentence beyond the statutorily prescribed 60 years. He furtherstates that the State failed to plead this required factor andsubmit it to the jury. Therefore, according to defendant, thisfactor the trial court used to enhance his sentence beyond 60 yearswas not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant submits that,because the State failed to plead and present this requirement tothe jury and because the jury made no finding that the offensecommitted was accompanied by exceptionally brutal and heinousbehavior indicative of wanton cruelty, the trial court lacked theauthority to impose a sentence greater than 60 years. He therefore concludes that, based upon the rule announced in Apprendi, hissentence of natural life imprisonment was unconstitutionallyimposed.

Since Apprendi was decided, our reviewing courts have examinedand reexamined our state's statutory sentencing scheme. See Peoplev. Reed, 324 Ill. App. 3d 671 (2001); People v. Vida, 323 Ill. App.3d 554 (2001); People v. Nitz, 319 Ill. App. 3d 949 (2001); Peoplev. Joyner, 317 Ill. App. 3d 93 (2000). In Reed, Nitz, and Joyner,the reviewing courts held that this particular sentencing schemewas unconstitutional under Apprendi because it allowed the trialcourts to impose extended-term sentences upon their findings thatthe murders were accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinousbehavior indicative of wanton cruelty without affording thedefendants the right to a jury determination of whether the Stateproved that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. See Reed, 324 Ill.App. 3d at 685; Nitz, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 969; Joyner, 317 Ill.App. 3d at 110.

In Vida, however, the First District offered a differentanalysis. In Vida, a jury convicted the defendant of first-degreemurder. At sentencing, the trial court found that the defendant'sactions were exceptionally brutal and heinous and indicative ofwanton cruelty, and it sentenced the defendant to 100 years'imprisonment. The reviewing court in Vida read sections 5--8--1and 5--8--2 together as part of a single sentencing scheme andnoted that the courts in Joyner and Nitz appeared to treat thesentencing provisions independently of each other. Vida, 323 Ill.App. 3d at 570. The court distinguished Apprendi by noting that,in Illinois, the application of an extended-term statute isdetermined by the "offense" rather than by the extent or nature ofthe defendant's participation. Vida, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 572,citing People v. Palmer, 148 Ill. 2d 70, 89 (1992). In affirmingthe defendant's conviction and extended-term sentence, thereviewing court found that the trial court considered the evidenceregarding the particular offense for which the defendant was triedand properly sentenced the defendant within the range of possiblepenalties for first-degree murder. Therefore, no constitutionalviolation occurred. Vida, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 572-73.

More recent, though, is our supreme court's analysis anddisposition of People v. Ford, No. 90083 (October 18, 2001). InFord, the defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder (720ILCS 5/9--1(a)(1) (West 1998)) following a bench trial, and theState sought the imposition of the death penalty. The defendantwaived a jury for both phases of the capital sentencing hearing. The trial court found that the defendant was eligible for the deathpenalty but declined to impose it. Rather, the trial court imposedan extended-term sentence of 100 years based upon its finding thatthe murder " 'was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinousbehavior indicative of wanton cruelty.' " Ford, No. 90083, slipop. at 5, quoting 730 ILCS 5/5--5--3.2(b)(2), 5--8--2(a)(1) (West1998).

The defendant challenged the constitutionality of hissentence, and our supreme court affirmed. Ford, No. 90083, slipop. at 5-12. The Ford court noted that the trial court had foundbeyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was eligible for thedeath penalty because the murder was committed in the course ofanother felony and involved the infliction of torture (720 ILCS5/9--1(b)(6), (b)(14) (West 1998)). Based on the trial court'sfindings, the Ford court determined that the statutory maximumpenalty defendant could receive was that of death and that thesentence the defendant ultimately received--100 years--did notexceed the maximum. Ford, No. 90083, slip op. at 7-8.

The Ford court rejected the defendant's argument that theaggravating factor the trial court employed to impose his 100-yearsentence--that the murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutalor heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty--was not provedbeyond a reasonable doubt. The court explained that Apprendi didnot require that every fact related to sentencing be proved beyonda reasonable doubt but only those facts that increase the penaltyfor a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be provedbeyond a reasonable doubt. Ford, No. 90083, slip op. at 10. Therefore, the court concluded, the trial court's finding that themurder the defendant committed was accompanied by exceptionallybrutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty did nothingto increase the penalty that the defendant was already facing. Rather, the Ford court explained that the trial court's finding wasproperly used as guidance in determining the defendant's sentence. Ford, No. 90083, slip op. at 11-12.

In the present case, the State declined to seek the deathpenalty, and the cause proceeded to a jury trial. Followingdeliberations, the jury specifically found, inter alia, thatdefendant had committed first-degree murder during the course of afelony, that is, an aggravated criminal sexual assault (see 720ILCS 5/9--1(a)(3) (West 1998)). Pursuant to the principlesenunciated in Ford and based exclusively upon the evidencepresented to the jury, defendant was confronted at that point withthe possibility that he was eligible to receive a prescribedstatutory maximum sentence of natural life imprisonment. See 730ILCS 5/5--8--1(b), 720 ILCS 5/9--1(b)(6) (West 1998).

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that it hadconsidered the evidence presented throughout trial; it had alsoreviewed the presentence investigation report; it considered thearguments of counsel; it considered the victim impact statement;and it considered the statutory and nonstatutory factors inaggravation and mitigation. The trial court reviewed the historyof the case, including the jury's findings of guilt in threedifferent ways--that defendant knew his acts would cause death orgreat bodily harm to Holly, that the act was committed during thecourse of an aggravated criminal sexual assault, and that defendantknew his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodilyharm. The trial court noted the applicable mitigating factors. After also noting the applicable aggravating factors, includingthat the murdered victim was under the age of 12 years, the trialcourt determined that defendant was eligible for an extended-termsentence. The trial court found that the repeated stab wounds andthe sexual acts committed upon the victim, a small youngindividual, reflected that the likelihood of rehabilitation ofdefendant was virtually nonexistent. The trial court concludedthat the murder of Holly was accompanied by exceptionally brutaland heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. Based upon theevidence presented, the trial court determined that defendantshould receive the prescribed statutory maximum sentence of naturallife imprisonment.

We determine that defendant's sentence of natural lifeimprisonment was specifically authorized by statute and hold thatthe trial court's imposition of the sentence complied with the ruleannounced in Apprendi.

We recognize that, in People v. Joyner, 317 Ill. App. 3d 93(2000), this court previously held that section 5--8--1(a)(1)(b) was unconstitutional as a violation of due process and adefendant's right to a trial by jury. See also People v. Swift,322 Ill. App. 3d 127 (2001) (holding the extended-term sentencingprovision of section 5--8--2(a) of the Code unconstitutional). However, upon our reconsideration, and upon our review of oursupreme court's analysis in Ford, we now hold otherwise. A trialcourt, as the entity vested with the authority to sentence adefendant, should also be vested with the discretion to render upona defendant a sentence within the range of penalties statutorilyprovided by our legislature based upon the offense rather than theextent or nature of the defendant's participation as well as therelevant evidence presented by the parties at trial and atsentencing. Accordingly, we affirm defendant's conviction andsentence.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit courtof Lake County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

BOWMAN and O'MALLEY, JJ., concur.