No. 2--03--1245

______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE

Appeal from the Circuit Court

OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOSEPH M. RIZZO,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE BOWMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial, defendant, Joseph M. Rizzo, was convicted of disorderly conduct (720ILCS 5/26--1 (West 2000)) and sentenced to two years' probation. On appeal, defendant contendsthat (1) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) his counsel was ineffectivefor eliciting testimony favorable to the State; (3) the trial court failed to give him properadmonishments in compliance with Supreme Court Rule 605(a) (Official Reports Advance Sheet No.21 (October 17, 2001), R. 605(a), eff. October 1, 2001); and (4) a probation condition prohibitinghim from entering any school, park, or forest preserve is unreasonable and constitutionally overbroad. We affirm in part and vacate in part.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 28, 2001, the State charged defendant with one count of disorderly conduct, allegingthat on June 26, 2001, defendant knowingly entered Lisa Marie Paul's property and, for a lewdpurpose, deliberately looked into her house through a window.

A jury trial commenced on June 23, 2003, with Lisa testifying as follows. On the night of theincident, June 26, 2001, Lisa lived in small ranch house in Wheaton. The house had a one-step porchto the front door with a large bay window to the right of the front door. Lisa returned home to relaxon her couch and watch television after moving items from her garage to a friend's house earlier thatevening. The lights were on inside the house. Outside the house, an overhead porch light was onalong with floodlights by the bushes in front of the house. Around 11:30 p.m., Lisa thought she sawa "flash" outside the bay window. When she looked out the bay window, however, she did not seeanything. Lisa continued to watch television, and between 5 and 10 minutes later, she saw anotherflash. She looked out the bay window again and saw defendant, who has only one arm, standingdirectly outside the window about two feet from where she was sitting on the couch. Lisa was notfriends with defendant but had seen him walking up and down her block "hundreds" of times. Lisahad also seen defendant walking up and down her street earlier that night.

Defendant was wearing a "blue-like sweatshirt" and tan or light brown shorts. His shorts wereunzipped, and his hand was moving up and down rapidly near his genital area. Lisa got up, grabbedher telephone, and walked to the bay window so that defendant could see that she was calling thepolice. Defendant then ran away. Police officers arrived a short time later and found spots containinga "milky, creamy" substance on the right edge of her front porch. A couple of days prior to theincident, Lisa remembered seeing "a lot of different milky substances" on her porch.

Lisa went to work the next day, about three miles from her home. While outside on break,she saw defendant riding his bicycle. Defendant stopped when he saw her and "leered over at" her. Lisa ran inside and called the police.

On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Lisa questions that assumed defendant hadlooked into the house through the window. The following exchange occurred:

"Q. [Defense Attorney:] Seeing a person out on the night [sic]--seeing a person at anytime would it be fair to say looking in your window is frightening?

A. Absolutely.

Q. And on the night of the 26th when you saw a man outside your window, youdidn't know what he was going to do; correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And when you first saw him peering into your window, your first reaction was topick up the phone and call the police?

A. Correct."

Wheaton police officer Robert Miller testified that he reported to Lisa's house on the nightof the incident. Her bay window was only a couple of feet from the front step of the porch. On thestep, Officer Miller found numerous spots, some wet and some dry. The wet "creamy" substance was"off-white" or "yellowish" and was running down the edge of the step.

The defense did not call any witnesses and argued that this was a case of mistaken identity.

The jury found defendant guilty of one count of disorderly conduct. Defendant moved fora new trial, and that motion was denied. The court conducted a sentencing hearing on October 10,2003, and advised defendant that he could appeal, that he could have an attorney appointed torepresent him on appeal, and that he would be provided with a trial transcript. Defendant wassentenced to two years' sex offender probation. As a condition of his probation, defendant could notenter any school, park, or forest preserve. Defendant subsequently moved to reconsider the sentence,arguing that it imposed an "undue hardship" and was not consistent with the mitigating evidence. Based on the presentence report, the nature of the charges against defendant, and all of the evidencepresented, the court denied this motion. Defendant's timely notice of appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant first argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendantlooked into the window of Lisa's home. Under the "window-peeping" section of the statute, a personcommits disorderly conduct when he knowingly "[e]nters upon the property of another and for a lewdor unlawful purpose deliberately looks into a dwelling on the property through any window or otheropening in it." 720 ILCS 5/26--1(5) (West 2000).

Initially, we address the standard of review. When considering a challenge based upon thesufficiency of the evidence, it is not the function of this court to retry the defendant. People v. Hall,194 Ill. 2d 305, 329-30 (2000). "Rather, the relevant question on appeal is whether, after viewingthe evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have foundthe essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Hall, 194 Ill. 2d at 330. It is the trierof fact who must assess the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their testimony, resolveconflicts in the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from that evidence. People v. Ortiz, 196Ill. 2d 236, 259 (2001). Only where the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory as to createreasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt will a conviction be overturned. People v. Collins, 106 Ill.2d 237, 261 (1985).

Defendant concedes that this standard of review ordinarily applies when considering achallenge based on the sufficiency of the evidence. However, defendant contends that in this case thisissue presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Specifically, defendant contends that thisissue involves not an assessment of the credibility of witnesses but only a determination of whethera given set of facts sufficed to meet the State's burden of proof. Although the State does not contestdefendant's assertion that de novo is the correct standard of review, we decline to apply it in this case.

The question of whether defendant deliberately looked into Lisa's home through her windowwas a question of fact for the jury. Without direct evidence that defendant was looking into thehouse, the State could rely upon circumstantial evidence to create a reasonable inference ofdefendant's guilt. People v. Kelley, 338 Ill. App. 3d 273, 278 (2003). "An inference is a factualconclusion that can rationally be drawn by considering other facts." (Emphasis added.) People v.Funches, 212 Ill. 2d 334, 340 (2004). Where the evidence presented is capable of producingconflicting inferences, it is best left to the trier of fact for proper resolution. People v. McDonald,168 Ill. 2d 420, 447 (1995); see also In re Marriage of Kneitz, 341 Ill. App. 3d 299, 303 (2003)(when the facts are not in dispute their legal effect may be a question of law, but if divergentinferences could be drawn from the undisputed facts, a question of fact remains).

In this case, it was up to the jury to accept or reject the inference that defendant looked intothe house through the bay window. See Funches, 212 Ill. 2d at 340 (an inference is merely adeduction that the fact finder may draw in its discretion but is not required to draw as a matter of law;the fact finder is free to accept or reject the suggested inference). Based on the evidence presented,the jury in this case made a factual determination that the window-peeping element was satisfied. Because defendant disputes this factual finding on appeal, the issue presented is a question of fact andnot a question of law.

Moreover, none of the cases relied upon by defendant to support de novo review involveda factual conclusion like the case at bar. Rather, the cases cited by defendant involved theinterpretation of statutory terms. See In re Ryan B., 212 Ill. 2d 226, 231 (2004) (the courtconsidered whether asking a minor to lift her shirt amounted to "enticing, coercing or persuading"under the sexual exploitation of a child statute); People v. Smith, 191 Ill. 2d 408, 412-13 (2000) (thecourt considered whether a defendant who disposed of a gun out the window prior to his arrest had"immediate access to" or "timely control over" a weapon under the armed violence statute); Peoplev. Hawkins, 311 Ill. App. 3d 418, 423 (2000) (the court considered whether the uncontested factsconstituted "a substantial step" toward the commission of a criminal sexual assault); People v.Cooksey, 309 Ill. App. 3d 839, 847 (1999) (the court interpreted the meaning of "immediatepresence" as used in the vehicular hijacking statute).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we now turn todefendant's argument that the State failed to establish the window-peeping element of the offense. According to defendant, Lisa never testified that she saw him looking into the window of her homeor that she saw his face or eyes at all. Defendant points out that while Lisa testified that he "leered"at her the day after the incident, she did not make a similar claim regarding his behavior at her house. Because Lisa never described his face or eyes or indicated that he was facing her window when shesaw him, defendant concludes that the State failed to prove that he was looking into the house. Defendant further argues that the State may not rely on Lisa's cross-examination testimony wheredefense counsel asked questions that assumed that defendant was looking into her window. TheState responds that Lisa's testimony on direct examination, without more, gave rise to the reasonableinference that defendant was looking into the house.

As previously mentioned, the State may rely upon circumstantial evidence in meeting itsburden provided that such evidence constitutes proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements ofthe crime charged. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d at 330. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the trier offact need not, however, be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to each link in the chain ofcircumstances. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d at 330. Rather, it is sufficient if all of the evidence taken togethersatisfies the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d at 330.

Based on the facts of this case, we agree with the State that the evidence established beyonda reasonable doubt that defendant was looking through the window into Lisa's home. Lisa testifiedon direct examination that she saw defendant standing directly outside her bay window about two feetfrom where she was sitting on the couch. The bay window was slightly to her left, and she markedphotos of the front of her home to indicate where defendant was standing. Specifically, defendantwas standing at the far right edge of her porch, which is very close to the left angle of the baywindow. Lisa further testified that the lights were on inside and outside of her home. Outdoor lightsincluded an overhead porch light as well as floodlights by the bushes in front of the house. From herview, Lisa not only was able to describe defendant's clothing, but also could see that his shorts wereunzipped and that his hand was down by his genital area moving up and down rapidly. Lisa's abilityto observe these details regarding defendant's appearance and conduct created a reasonable inferencethat defendant was facing the window and looking inside. See Hall, 194 Ill. 2d at 332 (the trier offact is not required to disregard inferences that flow normally from the evidence and to search outall possible explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable doubt).

We also note that Lisa responded by grabbing the phone and walking to the bay window sothat defendant could see that she was calling the police. The fact that defendant ran away as Lisacalled the police further supports the inference that defendant was looking into the window andreacting to Lisa's behavior. If defendant had not been looking into the window, he would not haveseen her phoning the police and would have had no need to immediately run away. Furthermore, theofficers who arrived a short time later found spots containing a "milky, creamy" substance on the rightedge of the porch, the exact location where Lisa stated that defendant was standing. Viewing theevidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, this circumstantial evidence, when consideredcollectively, gave rise to a reasonable inference that defendant was looking into Lisa's house throughthe bay window. Thus, defendant was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of disorderlyconduct.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Defendant next maintains that defense counsel was ineffective for eliciting testimony thatestablished an element of the offense that had not been proven by the State's case-in-chief. Defendantrefers to defense counsel's cross-examination of Lisa where counsel asked questions that assumed thatdefendant looked into the window of the house. According to defendant, he suffered prejudicebecause, but for counsel's ineffectiveness, he could not have been convicted of disorderly conduct.

Defendant likens this case to People v. Jackson, 318 Ill. App. 3d 321, 326 (2000), where thedefendant received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel supplied evidence of anelement necessary for conviction that the State did not supply. In Jackson, the defendant was chargedwith possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Specifically, a police officer observedthe defendant receive money from an unknown person and then point to a third man, Stidham,whereupon the unknown man walked over to Stidham and then left the scene. Jackson, 318 Ill. App.3d at 322. When the officers approached the scene, Stidham dropped a brown paper bag containingseveral bags of narcotics, and $150 in cash was found on the defendant. Jackson, 318 Ill. App. 3dat 322. Since the defendant was not in actual possession of the narcotics at issue, the State did nothave a case against him without proving the fact that Stidham reached into the bag and gave an objectto the unknown person. Jackson, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 328. However, the State failed to establish thisfact in its case-in-chief, and there was no evidence linking the defendant to the narcotics. Jackson,318 Ill. App. 3d at 327, 330. Defense counsel then elicited for the first time on cross-examinationthat the officer had observed Stidham reach into the brown paper bag and transfer an object from thatbag to the unknown person. Jackson, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 323. The court determined that prejudicewas established because without the evidence elicited by defense counsel, the defendant could nothave been found guilty. Jackson, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 328.

Claims based on the ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed under the test establishedin Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). People v.Graham, 206 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (2003). "Under Strickland, a defendant must prove that defensecounsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this substandardperformance created a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of theproceeding would have been different." Graham, 206 Ill. 2d at 476. A reasonable probability meansa probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the result of the trial. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d at 476. The defendant must satisfy both parts of the Strickland test in order to establish that he receivedineffective assistance. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d at 476. Thus, if the defendant suffered no prejudice, weneed not consider whether counsel's performance was deficient. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d at 476.

While defendant asserts that he was prejudiced because the jury could not have convicted himwithout the questions asked by defense counsel on cross-examination, we disagree. Unlike thesituation in Jackson, where the State could not have established an element of its case without defensecounsel's cross-examination, defense counsel's questions in this case were not needed to establish thewindow-peeping element of the offense. As discussed above, Lisa's testimony on direct examinationcreated a reasonable inference that defendant was looking into the house through the window. Because the State had already provided sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish this elementprior to defense counsel's cross-examination of Lisa, defense counsel's questioning did not changethe outcome of the trial. Accordingly, defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's performance, andhis ineffective-assistance claim must fail.

C. Compliance with Supreme Court Rule 605(a)

Defendant also argues that the trial court's failure to comply with Supreme Court Rule 605(a)requires this court to remand the cause to the trial court for proper admonishments and to allowdefendant the opportunity to file a new motion to reconsider the sentence. While the trial courtadvised defendant of his right to appeal, his right to have counsel appointed to represent him onappeal, and his right to a free copy of the trial transcript, the court failed to advise defendantregarding the preservation of sentencing errors for appeal. Specifically, defendant was notadmonished that in order to challenge any aspect of his sentence, he had to file a motion toreconsider, and that any issue not included in the motion to reconsider would be waived for appellatereview. The State counters that a remand would serve no purpose in this case because defendant fileda motion to reconsider, thereby preserving his right to appeal.

Admonishments regarding the preservation of sentencing errors for appeal were added to Rule605(a) in 2001. People v. Henderson, No. 98887, slip op. at 5 (August 18, 2005). The newadmonishments are set forth in subsection (3) of the amended rule, which states:

"(3) At the time of imposing sentence or modifying the conditions of the sentence, thetrial court shall also advise the defendant as follows:

A. that the right to appeal the judgment of conviction, excluding the sentenceimposed or modified, will be preserved only if a notice of appeal is filed in the trialcourt within thirty (30) days from the date on which sentence is imposed;

B. that prior to taking an appeal, if the defendant seeks to challenge thecorrectness of the sentence, or any aspect of the sentencing hearing, the defendantmust file in the trial court within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed awritten motion asking to have the trial court reconsider the sentence imposed, orconsider any challenges to the sentencing hearing, setting forth in the motion all issuesor claims of error regarding the sentence imposed or the sentencing hearing;

C. that any issue or claim of error regarding the sentence imposed or anyaspect of the sentencing hearing not raised in the written motion shall be deemedwaived; and

D. that in order to preserve the right to appeal following the disposition of themotion to reconsider sentence, or any challenges regarding the sentencing hearing, thedefendant must file a notice of appeal in the trial court within 30 days from the entryof the order disposing of the defendant's motion to reconsider sentence or orderdisposing of any challenges to the sentencing hearing." Official Reports AdvanceSheet No. 21 (October 17, 2001), R. 605(a), eff. October 1, 2001.

We note that while this case was pending, the supreme court decided Henderson, whichconsidered whether strict compliance with Rule 605(a) is mandatory. Henderson, slip op. at 7. Inparticular, the question presented was whether any departure from the admonishments regardingpostsentencing motions automatically requires a remand, regardless of whether the defendant sufferedprejudice as a result of the inadequate admonishments. Henderson, slip op. at 7. The Hendersoncourt concluded that a trial court's failure to give proper admonishments does not necessarily requirereversal in every instance. Henderson, slip op. at 13. Rather, the court held that where the defendantis given incomplete Rule 605(a) admonishments regarding the preservation of sentencing issues forappeal, remand is required "only where there has been prejudice or a denial of real justice as a resultof the inadequate admonishment." Henderson, slip op. at 13.

Despite the trial court's inadequate Rule 605(a) admonishments in this case, defendant fileda motion to reconsider, arguing that the sentence imposed an "undue hardship" and was not consistentwith the mitigating evidence. While defendant asserts that this "bare bones" motion was too vagueand general to preserve his sentencing claim on appeal, which is that the probation conditionrestricting him from entering any school, park, or forest preserve is unreasonable and overly broad,we disagree. Again, we find Henderson instructive. In Henderson, the supreme court determinedthat the defendant was neither prejudiced nor denied real justice as a result of the inadequateadmonishments because he raised no sentencing issues on appeal. Henderson, slip op. at 16. In otherwords, unlike defendant here, the defendant in Henderson presented no specific sentencing issues thathe was precluded from raising because of improper admonishments. Henderson, slip op. at 15. Thecourt noted:

"If defendant had presented actual sentencing challenges in his appeal, the appellate courtwould at least have been alerted to the existence of these issues. The court then could havetaken whatever actions it deemed appropriate, including hearing the challenges itself orremanding them to the trial court." (Emphasis in original.) Henderson, slip op. at 15.

Because we consider on appeal defendant's challenge to the probation condition imposed by the trialcourt, defendant has shown neither prejudice nor a denial of real justice and there is no need forremand.

D. Reasonableness of Probation Condition

We next consider defendant's challenge to the probation condition prohibiting his "entry toany school, park or forest preserve." At the outset, we note that defendant was sentenced to twoyears' probation on October 10, 2003, and that the two-year period has expired. While we coulddecline to address this issue on the grounds of mootness, there is an exception to the mootnessdoctrine that allows this court to resolve an otherwise moot issue if the issue involves a substantialpublic interest. See In re J.G., 295 Ill. App. 3d 840, 841-42 (1998) (although term of probation hadexpired, the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied); People v. Battershell, 210Ill. App. 3d 883, 885 (1991) (despite expiration of probation term, the court declined to find the issuemoot as it concerned a substantial public interest). The criteria for applying the public interestexception are the public nature of the question, the desirability of an authoritative determination forthe purpose of guiding public officers, and the likelihood that the question will recur. In re J.G., 295Ill. App. 3d at 842. Because this issue involves a substantial public interest, we address the meritsof defendant's claim.

According to defendant, the probation condition is unreasonable and overly broad becauseit fails to provide for permission by his probation officer to enter the off-limit areas. In addition,defendant asserts that the condition is not related to the disorderly conduct offense because theoffense did not take place in any school, park, or forest preserve, and did not involve children.

At the sentencing hearing, the State requested that the trial court impose probation with acondition that prohibited defendant from entering schools or forest preserves. According to the State,the presentence report, which contained multiple arrests for disorderly conduct and public indecency,an arrest for retail theft, three arrests for criminal trespass, and one arrest for aggravated battery,demonstrated that defendant had "severe problems in terms of psychology and sexuality." Defensecounsel responded that, despite defendant's criminal history, he was found not guilty of most of thecharges and the focus should be narrowed to the disorderly conduct offense. The trial court agreedand sentenced defendant to two years' sex offender probation, a sex offender evaluation, a polygraphexamination, and any counseling deemed appropriate by the probation officer. In addition, the courtprohibited defendant from having any contact with Lisa or entering her property. Defendant thenasked the court about the status of his prior bond restrictions, and the court decided to incorporateinto the sentence the bond restriction prohibiting defendant from entering any school, park, or forestpreserve. The court noted that it was concerned about the nature of his offense and that defendantdid not have any children and thus had "no business at a school." The court went on to say that parksand forest preserves were "just kind of spinoffs" from schools, that the restriction was not limited toDu Page County, and that it was trying to prevent defendant from going where "little girls and boysplay."

Section 5--6--3(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) lists 16 permissible probationconditions that the trial court may impose "in addition to other reasonable conditions relating to thenature of the offense or the rehabilitation of the defendant as determined for each defendant in theproper discretion of the Court." 730 ILCS 5/5--6--3(b) (West 2002); People v. Meyer, 176 Ill. 2d372, 377 (1997). Specifically, the court may require that the person:

"(14) refrain from entering into a designated geographic area except upon such termsas the court finds appropriate. Such terms may include consideration of the purpose of theentry, the time of day, other persons accompanying the defendant, and advance approval bya probation officer, if the defendant has been placed on probation or advance approval by thecourt, if the defendant was placed on conditional discharge[.]" (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS5/5--6--3(b)(14) (West 2002).

The purpose of probation is to benefit society by restoring a defendant to useful citizenship,rather than allowing a defendant to become a burden as an habitual offender. Meyer, 176 Ill. 2d at379. Probation simultaneously serves as a form of punishment and as a method for rehabilitation. Meyer, 176 Ill. 2d at 379. One of the goals of probation is to protect the public from the type ofconduct that led to a defendant's conviction. Meyer, 176 Ill. 2d at 379. A trial court generally isgiven wide discretion in determining the probation conditions imposed upon a defendant. People v.Harris, 238 Ill. App. 3d 575, 579 (1992). Nevertheless, the wide latitude given to courts in settingprobation conditions is not boundless. In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50, 77 (2003).

The court's discretion must be exercised in a reasonable manner and is limited by theconstitutional rights of the probationer. In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 77. To be considered reasonable,a probation condition must not be overly broad when viewed in light of the desired goal or the meansto that end. Harris, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 581. When assessing the reasonableness of a condition, it isappropriate to consider whether the restriction is related to the nature of the offense or therehabilitation of the probationer. In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 79. "In evaluating whether a probationer'srights should be restricted, courts determine whether (1) the condition of probation reasonably relatesto the intended purpose of the legislature, to foster rehabilitation; (2) the value to the public of theimposition of this condition manifestly outweighs any impairment of a probationer's constitutionalrights; and (3) there are any alternative means that are less subversive to the probationer'sconstitutional rights that would still comport with the purposes of the legislation conferring thebenefit of probation." In re J.G., 295 Ill. App. 3d at 843.

A case cited by defendant, People v. Pickens, 186 Ill. App. 3d 456 (1989), was apparently thefirst case to evaluate banishment as a condition of probation. See Harris, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 579. In Pickens, the defendant was convicted of prostitution and, as a condition of probation, "banished"from entering a 50-block area of downtown Champaign without first receiving the written permissionof her probation officer. Pickens, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 459. The defendant argued that the conditionwas unreasonable under the statute and therefore an abuse of discretion. Pickens, 186 Ill. App. 3dat 459.⁽¹⁾

In Pickens, the court noted that courts in other jurisdictions had used geographic travelrestrictions to achieve rehabilitation and deterrence goals. Pickens, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 459; seeOyoghok v. Municipality of Anchorage, 641 P.2d 1267 (Alaska 1982) (probation condition restrictingentry into four-block area known for street prostitution was not unreasonable); State v. Morgan, 389So. 2d 364 (La. 1980) (probation condition directing the defendant convicted of attemptedprostitution to remain out of the French Quarter in New Orleans was reasonable as it restricted onlya relatively small geographic area of one city). In contrast, the Pickens court distinguished the 50-block geographical restriction in that case from the restrictions found unreasonable in other states. See People v. Beach, 147 Cal. App. 3d 612, 620, 195 Cal. Rptr. 381, 385 (1983) (probationcondition banishing the defendant from the community where she had lived for 24 years wasunreasonable and unconstitutional); In re White, 97 Cal. App. 3d 141, 147, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 566(1979) (blanket prohibition against being in designated area at all times was an unnecessarily broadprobation condition).

Rather than imposing "absolute" probation conditions or blanket prohibitions, the Pickenscourt made clear that efforts should be made to define the area of restriction with specificity and tolimit the area so that it is not unnecessarily broad. Pickens, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 461. Adopting theguidelines set forth in Oyoghok, the court also stated that provision should be made to allow lawfultravel through and access to the restricted area when the need exists. Pickens, 186 Ill. App. 3d at461. In particular, the court stated:

"A court may, as a condition of probation or other sentence short of incarceration, bar adefendant from certain areas if the penalty is reasonably related to the offense, provided that,if the defendant has a legitimate and compelling reason to go to that area or place, he mayapply to a specified authority for specific permission, as here to the probation officer.

We find the proviso to the condition imposed, permitting the defendant to obtainspecific written permission from her probation officer to enter the restricted area if she hada legitimate reason to go there, removes the taint of banishment from the restriction andsubstitutes in its stead supervised guidance for permissive entry to the area." (Emphasis inoriginal.) Pickens, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 461-62.

Consistent with Pickens, the Code allows a court to impose, as a condition of probation,certain restrictions on a defendant's ability to be present within a designated geographical area "exceptupon such terms as the court finds appropriate." (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5--6--3(b)(14)(West 2002). The language "except upon such terms as the court finds appropriate" mirrors theconstitutional requirement that the probation condition be narrowly drawn. See In re J.W., 204 Ill.2d at 81, quoting 705 ILCS 405/5--715(2)(r) (West 2002) (identical language in the Juvenile CourtAct of 1987 that authorizes the court, as a condition of probation, to require a juvenile to " 'refrainfrom entering into a designated geographic area except upon terms as the court finds appropriate' "mirrors the constitutional requirement that the probation condition be narrowly drawn (emphasisomitted)).

Unlike the condition in Pickens, however, the probation condition in this case does not containany terms or exceptions to its application. Rather, it is a blanket prohibition on defendant's entry intoschools, parks, and forest preserves. Moreover, this restriction extends even beyond the borders ofthe county in which defendant's offense occurred. Indeed, the probation order prohibits defendantfrom entering any school, park, or forest preserve, at any time of day, for any purpose. It isconceivable that children are not always present in such areas, or that an occasion would arise wheredefendant had a legitimate purpose for entering a school, park, or forest preserve. However, theprobation condition fails to comply with the probation statute in that it makes no provision forlegitimate access. As a result, the condition is not narrowly drawn and is unconstitutionallyoverbroad. See In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 80-81 (although probation condition banishing minor fromentering South Elgin served a valid purpose, it was not narrowly drawn and was an unconstitutionallyoverbroad restriction because it failed to make any provision for the minor to enter the area forlegitimate purposes).

Because the trial court in this case failed to conform the probation condition to therequirements of the statute, the condition is overly broad and unconstitutional. Accordingly, wevacate the portion of the trial court's probation order prohibiting defendant from entering into anyschool, park, or forest preserve.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed in partand vacated in part.

Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

GROMETER and CALLUM, JJ., concur.

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