JUSTICE GROMETER delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Michael A. Rozborski, was convicted of misdemeanordriving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11--501(a)(2) (West 1996)) and received a year of court supervision. Defendant did not appeal that order (see 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(b)). Almost a year later, the State petitioned to revoke defendant'ssupervision. Before the trial court heard the State's petition,defendant filed a petition for relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122--1 et seq. (West1998)). The trial court dismissed defendant's petition, holdingthat he lacked standing to proceed under the Act because he was not"imprisoned in the penitentiary" (725 ILCS 5/122--1(a) (West1998)). Defendant appeals.

On appeal, defendant argues that the dismissal of hispostconviction petition was erroneous. Defendant concedes that hecould not seek relief under the Act itself. However, he arguesthat People v. Warr, 54 Ill. 2d 487 (1973), permits a defendant toseek postconviction relief from a misdemeanor conviction. TheState does not dispute that Warr makes postconviction reliefavailable to misdemeanants. However, the State urges this court toaffirm the judgment of the trial court because (1) defendant filedhis petition only after he was no longer subject to the risk ofimprisonment; and (2) defendant's petition was untimely under Warr. We agree that a defendant not eligible for relief under theAct may invoke Warr to seek postconviction relief. Nevertheless,we affirm the judgment of the trial court, although we do so on abasis other than that advanced by the State. We hold that since afinal judgment is a prerequisite to obtaining relief under Warr,defendant's petition was premature because he filed it before thecourt entered a final judgment in his DUI case.

The facts are as follows. On December 10, 1998, a jury founddefendant guilty of DUI. On February 4, 1999, the trial courtentered a written order imposing a "sentence" of one year of courtsupervision with an end date of "2/4/00" and the payment of variousfines and costs. Another written order set out the conditions ofdefendant's supervision, including that defendant would make a"FINAL appearance to the Court" at 8:30 a.m. on February 3, 2000.

On February 3, 2000, the State filed a petition to revokedefendant's court supervision (see 730 ILCS 5/5--6--4 (West 1998)). That day, the circuit court set February 25, 2000, for "status onthis Petition to Revoke." On February 22, 2000, the court enteredanother order granting defendant leave to file his "petition tovacate" on or before March 8, 2000, setting a hearing on "saidmotion" for March 22, 2000, and striking the February 25, 2000,hearing date for the State's petition to revoke defendant'ssupervision. Nothing in the record refers to any furtherproceedings on the State's petition to revoke supervision.

On March 8, 2000, defendant filed his "Petition for Post-Conviction Relief," purportedly under the Act and withoutreferencing Warr. The petition alleged that defendant was deprivedof the effective assistance of counsel at his trial. On March 21,2000, the circuit court heard the petition. The trial judgeobserved that the Act limits relief thereunder to "[a]ny personimprisoned in the penitentiary" (725 ILCS 5/122--1 (West 1998)),clearly excluding defendant. On March 22, 2000, the courtdismissed the petition because defendant lacked standing. Defendant timely appealed.

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in holding that hecould not file a postconviction petition. Defendant acknowledgesthat the Act itself extends only to those "imprisoned in thepenitentiary" and thus does not apply to misdemeanor cases such ashis. However, as defendant observes, the Warr court recognizedthis procedural void and provided those convicted of misdemeanorswith a form of postconviction relief "in the nature of a proceedingunder the Post-Conviction Hearing Act." Warr, 54 Ill. 2d at 493. Such a proceeding is governed by the Act except in certainrespects, one of these being that the defendant need not beimprisoned. Warr, 54 Ill. 2d at 493. Therefore, defendantreasons, the trial court erred as a matter of law in holding thathe lacked standing to seek postconviction relief.

We agree that under Warr defendant did not lack standing toseek postconviction relief merely because he was not "imprisoned inthe penitentiary." Rather than relying on Warr, defendant'spetition incorrectly relied on the Act. However, this formalmistake ought not deprive defendant of any right he has topostconviction relief.

The State concedes that the trial court erred in failing torecognize that, under Warr, defendant was not barred from seekingpostconviction relief merely because he had not been imprisoned. However, the State advances two other bases for affirmance. Webelieve neither has merit.

The State argues in part that, by the time defendant filed hispetition, he could not seek postconviction relief because hissupervision had ended and he was no longer in danger of beingimprisoned. Relying on the appellate court's opinion in People v.West, 209 Ill. App. 3d 1019 (1991), aff'd 145 Ill. 2d 517 (1991),the State asserts that "there is no construction of the [Act] underwhich the defendant's action could have been maintained."

The State's argument is somewhat obscure, as it appears tocenter on the meaning of the Act. However, defendant does not nowrely on the Act but on the supervisory order in Warr, which clearlystates that a defendant need not be imprisoned in order to seekrelief. Warr, 54 Ill. 2d at 493. Indeed, the very purpose of theorder in Warr was to create a postconviction remedy for a class ofdefendants who do not face imprisonment.

West does not suggest otherwise. In West, the defendant wasa convicted felon who sought relief under the Act. The supremecourt held that the defendant lacked standing to invoke the Actbecause he had already completed his prison term. The courtrecognized that incarceration is not a precondition to obtainingpostconviction relief. West, 145 Ill. 2d at 519. What was crucialwas not that the defendant risked no future imprisonment but thathe had completely served his sentence. West, 145 Ill. 2d at 518;see also West, 209 Ill. App. 3d 1019. This holding was consistentwith earlier authority that established that a defendant who hascompleted his sentence may not use the Act simply to purge hiscriminal record. See People v. Martin-Trigona, 111 Ill. 2d 295,299 (1986); People v. Farias, 187 Ill. App. 3d 879, 883 (1989).

Although the State phrases its argument in terms of"imprisonment" and the Act, it may be that the State intends toassert that, when defendant filed his postconviction petition, hecould no longer obtain postconviction relief because hissupervision had ended. If the factual premise of this argument istrue, its conclusion follows from West and like precedent. Ifdefendant's supervision was over by the time he filed the petition,he would have had no standing to seek postconviction relief. Notonly would he no longer face punishment, the charges would havebeen dismissed without an adjudication of guilt. See 730 ILCS 5/5--1--21, 5--6--3.1(e),(f) (West 1998); People v. Tarkowski, 100 Ill.App. 3d 153, 157 (1981).

However, the factual basis for any such argument is missing. Defendant did file his postconviction petition after his year ofsupervision was supposed to have ended. Nonetheless, before theperiod expired, the State filed a petition to revoke defendant'ssupervision. The trial court continued a hearing on the State'spetition until after the date it heard the postconviction petition. If the trial court went ahead and granted the State's petition torevoke, defendant could have received either more supervision orany sentence that was originally available. See 730 ILCS 5/5--6--4(e) (West 1998); Kirwan v. Welch, 133 Ill. 2d 163, 166 (1989).

The State asserts that defendant's supervision ended becausethe State abandoned its petition to revoke supervision. The recordcontains no reports of further proceedings on the revocationpetition. However, we hesitate to conclude anything from thatfact. Defendant has supplemented the record with the transcript ofthe hearing on his postconviction petition. Nothing from thehearing suggests that the State was no longer pursuing the petitionto revoke. The trial court and the parties did not state thatdefendant had completed his supervision successfully. Nowhere doesthe record show that defendant has completed his supervisionsuccessfully or that the charges have been dismissed. Thus, weshall not assume that defendant had completed his supervision bythe time he filed his postconviction petition.

We move to the State's other argument for affirming thejudgment. The State maintains that the trial court properlydismissed defendant's postconviction petition because it wasuntimely. Under Warr, a postconviction proceeding shall begoverned by the Act except in certain respects, the pertinent onehere being that "the proceeding shall be commenced *** within sixmonths after the rendition of final judgment following a trial upona plea of not guilty." Warr, 54 Ill. 2d at 493. The State reasonsthat defendant's petition was untimely because he did not file ituntil about 13 months after the order of supervision that followedthe jury's guilty verdict. The State reasons that, as the order ofsupervision was the final judgment in the DUI case, the petitionwas untimely and the trial court rightly dismissed the petition,albeit for incorrect reasons. We disagree.

In explaining why we reject the State's argument thatdefendant's petition was untimely, we also explain why we hold thatdefendant's petition was premature. The key to each holding isthat defendant had to file his petition "within six months afterthe rendition of the final judgment." (Emphasis added.) Warr, 54Ill. 2d at 493. Defendant did not satisfy this requirement,although not for the reasons the State suggests. We may affirm thejudgment on any ground called for by the record, even if the trialcourt did not rely on that ground. See People v. Wright, 194 Ill.2d 1, 16 (2000).

Were the State correct in assuming that the order ofsupervision was the "final judgment" that started defendant'spostconviction clock running, the State would also be correct thatdefendant's petition was untimely. However, the State's assumptionis simply incorrect. The order of supervision was not a finaljudgment. On the date that defendant filed his postconvictionpetition, no final judgment had been entered in the DUI case. Indeed, nothing shows that the trial court has ever entered a finaljudgment in the criminal case.

Although Warr does not specifically define "final judgment,"that term has a well-established meaning. In a criminal case, the"judgment" is the "adjudication by the court that the defendant isguilty or not guilty, and if the adjudication is that the defendantis guilty, it includes the sentence pronounced by the court." (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5--1--12 (West 1998). This statutorydefinition is consistent with long-standing case law. Thus, inPeople v. Woods, 193 Ill. 2d 483, 489 (2000), the supreme courtheld that the term "date of conviction" in section 122--1(c) of theAct (725 ILCS 5/122--1(c) (West 1998)) means "the date that finaljudgment including sentence was entered." (Emphasis added.) Manyopinions have stated that there is no final judgment until thedefendant is sentenced. See, e.g., People v. Warship, 59 Ill. 2d125, 130 (1974); People v. Rose, 43 Ill. 2d 273, 278 (1969). Thisconclusion flows logically from the general definition of a "finaljudgment" as one that terminates the litigation on the merits andleaves nothing to be done but to proceed to execution. Kirwan, 133Ill. 2d at 167. If a defendant has been found guilty but the courthas yet to decide on the sentence, the litigation has not beenterminated on the merits.

An order imposing court supervision does not terminate acriminal case on the merits but defers the judgment until theperiod of supervision has ended. 730 ILCS 5/5--1--21, 5--6--3.1(a)(West 1998). As a result, our courts have long recognized that anorder of supervision is not a final judgment. Kirwan, 133 Ill. 2dat 166-67; People v. Bushnell, 101 Ill. 2d 261, 265-66 (1984)(distinguishing between "sentence" of probation and "disposition"of supervision); Tarkowski, 100 Ill. App. 3d at 157. In placing adefendant on supervision, a court does not impose a sentence;indeed, it leaves open whether the defendant will ever be sentencedat all. If the defendant completes supervision successfully, thecharges are dismissed and the result resembles an acquittal(Tarkowski, 100 Ill. App. 3d at 161); otherwise, the defendant maybe found guilty and sentenced. Until these matters are resolved,there is no final judgment.

Under Warr, a postconviction petition in a misdemeanor casemust be filed "within six months after the rendition of finaljudgment following a trial upon a plea of not guilty." (Emphasisadded.) Warr, 54 Ill. 2d at 493. These words plainly state thata final judgment is a condition precedent for a postconvictionpetition. Thus, if a misdemeanor defendant files a postconvictionpetition after he is given supervision but before he is actuallysentenced, the trial court must dismiss the petition asunauthorized by Warr.

We believe this holding not only follows Warr's plain languagebut is consistent with the Act and promotes judicial economy. Toallow misdemeanor defendants to file postconviction petitions inadvance of sentencing would give these defendants greater rightsthan felony defendants enjoy under the Act. Such a proceduralscheme would also encourage the filing of needless postconvictionpetitions.

Section 122--1(c) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122--1(c) (West1998)) states in part that no proceedings under the Act shall becommenced more than "3 years from the date of conviction." InWoods, the court held that the "date of conviction" that starts theclock running is not the date the defendant was found guilty but"the date that final judgment including sentence was entered." Woods, 193 Ill. 2d at 489. The court emphasized that the Actassumes that a petitioner "will raise in one post-convictionpetition" all constitutional issues, whether these issues relate tothe trial or to the sentence. Woods, 193 Ill. 2d at 489. Apetitioner may not bring one petition immediately after he isconvicted and a second petition only after he is sentenced.

The considerations of judicial economy that Woods stresses inconstruing the Act also militate against piecemeal petitions inmisdemeanor cases. Indeed, where the trial court has gone nofurther than to give the defendant supervision, theseconsiderations are even stronger. In such a case, requiring thedefendant to wait until after sentencing may avoid postconvictionlitigation altogether. If the defendant completes his supervisionsuccessfully, nothing remains and he will not need to file apostconviction petition at all; if he does so anyway, the trialcourt may summarily dismiss it as moot. There is no reason toallow a defendant to file a postconviction petition at a time when it may well turn out that he does not need postconviction relief atall.

For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the circuitcourt of Du Page County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

McLAREN and GEIGER, JJ., concur.