JUSTICE KAPALA delivered the opinion of the court:

The State charged defendant, Colleen Ryan, via an information,with one count of enhanced retail theft (720 ILCS 5/16A-3(a)(West2000)) and one count of retail theft (720 ILCS 5/16A-3(a)(West2000)). The State subsequently nol-prossed the felony charge ofenhanced retail theft and proceeded to trial on the misdemeanorcount of retail theft. A jury found defendant guilty, and thetrial court sentenced her to 180 days in jail. On appeal,defendant argues that (1) she is entitled to a dismissal or a newtrial because the State failed to disclose that, when shown aphotographic lineup, the State's witness initially identifiedsomeone other than defendant and (2) the trial court abused itsdiscretion during sentencing by considering a statutory mitigatingfactor as an aggravating factor. For the following reasons, weaffirm.

Defendant moved to suppress in-court and out-of-courtidentification evidence. During the hearing on the motion, theState informed the court that the original photographs used in thelineup were not available and that the police officer who conductedthe lineup left the department and could not be located. All the State had was a poor-quality photocopy of the lineup. As a result,the State informed the trial court that it had "no objection tostriking the photo lineup from any further use." Accordingly, thetrial court ruled that the State could not introduce any evidenceof the out-of-court identification.

During the trial, the State's only witness was John Mehus. Atabout 2:15 p.m. on August 16, 2000, Mehus was working as themanager of a Walgreen's store in Round Lake Beach. Business wasrelatively slow. Mehus testified that, while he was on the salesfloor, he saw a woman carrying a shopping basket full ofmerchandise. About two or three minutes later, Mehus saw the womanin another part of the store and noticed that there were only twoor three items in the basket. About one or two minutes later,Mehus saw the woman exit the store without paying for anything.

Mehus followed the woman out of the store. She no longer wascarrying the basket but had a large purse. Mehus saw two cartonsof cream cheese and a quart of milk at the top of the purse andrecognized the items as goods sold in his store. Mehus called tothe woman and told her that he would call the police unless she paid for the items. The woman began to follow Mehus back into thestore. Mehus said that he had changed his mind and was going tocall the police anyway. The woman became very upset, went to hercar, and drove away.

Mehus described the car as a "blue SUV-type Blazer, Explorer." He wrote down the license plate number and called the police. During the trial, Mehus could not remember the license platenumber. Mehus testified that he did not know the woman and hadnever seen her before the incident. In court, Mehus identifieddefendant as the offender.

During cross-examination, Mehus testified that each time heobserved the woman in the store, he looked at her for only a fewseconds. The woman walked very fast as she exited the store. Immediately after the woman drove away, Mehus went back inside andcalled the police, who arrived 30 to 60 minutes later. Curiously,over the State's objection, the defense elicited testimony fromMehus that on August 18, 2000, two police officers showed him aphotographic lineup. The display included six photographs. Mehuslooked at them for about three seconds and picked out one photo,which was not of defendant.

Defense counsel Michael Conway immediately requested a side-bar conference. He told the court that the State never informedhim that Mehus initially identified someone else. Conway claimedthat he was prejudiced because, had he known, he could haveinvestigated the other person to find out whether she could havebeen the offender. Assistant State's Attorney Bolling Haxallreplied that Mehus had just informed him that morning about theinitial identification. Haxall believed that, because the pretrialidentification was not going to be an issue during the trial, itwas not necessary to inform Conway.

During continued cross-examination, Mehus testified that,after he picked out the first photo, one of the officers asked himif he was sure about the identification. Mehus took more time andselected defendant's photo. Neither of the officers suggested toMehus who they believed the suspect to be. Mehus testified that,about two months before the trial, he was in court in connectionwith this cause and saw defendant. He also saw defendant in courtthe day before the trial.

After the State rested, the court held another conference. The State argued that defendant was not prejudiced because she hadthe opportunity to cross-examine Mehus about the photo lineup. TheState, however, was amenable to a short continuance. Defendantdoubted whether a short continuance would give her enough time toinvestigate. The court stated:

"I am sitting here, my mind is not coming up with aresolution. I hate to bring in a jury and then say,okay, now take a four-hour lunch, come back.

Well, I don't like it, but I am going to--okay. Here's what we need to do to get this in the properperspective. There was a problem with discovery. Theball is in your court. Tell me exactly what you'redoing, what you want. Do you have a motion?"

Conway replied, "I would make a motion to dismiss based upon thefact that here I am in the middle of a trial learning of thisinformation, and its something that I could have obviouslyinvestigated earlier, and we're obviously prejudiced." Conwayasserted that the only remedy was a dismissal.

The trial court denied defendant's motion but offered acontinuance to obtain the photograph of the other person. Defendant moved for a directed verdict, and the trial court deniedthe motion. Defendant presented no evidence, and the jury founddefendant guilty.

Defendant timely moved for a judgment notwithstanding theverdict or alternatively for a new trial. One of defendant'scontentions was that the trial court "erred in denying defendant'sMotion to Dismiss (or declare mistrial) the charge *** after it waslearned of a discovery violation pertaining to the identificationprocedure involving the photo line-up." Defendant did not specifyupon what basis she was relying for her motion to dismiss or for amistrial but did refer to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed.2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), at the oral argument on her motion. During the hearing on the motion, defendant's attorney argued thatthe court should have given him "ample" time to investigate theissue. The trial court found that the discovery violation did notprejudice defendant and accordingly denied the motion.

The presentence investigation report was not included in therecord. During the sentencing hearing, it was revealed that since1982 defendant has been convicted several times of retail theft. On the most recent occasion in 1994, defendant was sentenced to 90days in jail. The evidence in mitigation in the instant caserevealed that defendant was injured in an automobile accident andwas receiving physical therapy and worker's compensation benefits. Defendant's daughter was 20 years old and a full-time student. Defendant's daughter worked part time and would have no one else tosupport her if defendant were incarcerated.

The trial court stated:

"Five years ago the defendant was sentenced to 90 days inthe Lake County jail ***. At the time her daughter was 15years old and she saw fit to commit another offense. *** Ithink it's something that militates against a person chargedwith an offense to a certain degree that they would do this totheir family members, put themselves in jeopardy of being ***incarcerated when they have someone dependent on them. Soinstead of looking at that like most people may do that [that]is a factor that should speak in her defense I find itsomething that she didn't care about when she committed theoffense. *** She had a child she left [when] she wassentenced to 90 days back in 1994 and it was not a problem[at] that time that it would keep her from violating the lawanother time."

The court sentenced defendant to 180 days in jail and stayedthe sentence pending appeal. Defendant did not object to the trialcourt's comments at sentencing and did not file a motion to reducesentence. Defendant timely appealed.

On appeal, defendant argues first that the trial court erredin denying her motion to dismiss after learning that the Statefailed to disclose that its identification witness initiallyselected someone other than defendant. We begin our analysis bynoting that in her argument on appeal defendant relies on both Rule412(c) (188 Ill. 2d R. 412(c)) and Brady for her contention thatshe is entitled to a dismissal or new trial. Discovery under Rule412 only applies to defendants who have been charged with a felony. People v. Schmidt, 56 Ill. 2d 572, 574 (1974). The requirements ofBrady, on the other hand, apply to misdemeanors. Schmidt, 56 Ill.2d at 574. Here, defendant was charged with both a felony andmisdemeanor even though the felony was subsequently nol-prossed. Thus, we consider the obligations under Rule 412 to apply. Even ifthey did not, because Rule 412(c) is coextensive with theprotections of Brady (see People v. Brown, 151 Ill. App. 3d 446,449-50 (1986); 188 Ill. 2d R. 412, Committee Comments), and thesame standard applies under both Rule 412(c) and Brady (see Peoplev. Lann, 194 Ill. App. 3d 623, 632 (1990)), our analysis underBrady necessarily would apply to Rule 412(c).

Under Brady, the State has an affirmative duty to discloseevidence favorable to a defendant. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d366, 391 (1998). Regardless of a request by a defendant, favorableevidence is material, and constitutional error results from itssuppression by the State, if there is a reasonable probability thathad the evidence been disclosed the result of the proceeding wouldhave been different. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 393, citing UnitedStates v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 494, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383 (1985). Put another way, the materiality inquirydepends on whether the suppressed evidence undermines confidence inthe outcome of the trial. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 393, citingKyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490, 506, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1566 (1995).

Here, defendant has not shown the failure to disclose the factthat Mehus picked another photograph out of the photo lineup beforeselecting defendant's photograph undermines the confidence in theoutcome of her trial. Defendant had ample opportunity to cross-examine Mehus concerning his initial selection of the otherphotograph. She was also able to highlight the selection of theother photograph during closing argument. Thus, she had ameaningful opportunity to attack the identification by Mehus. Defendant has not pointed to any other advantage she might have hadas to cross-examination of Mehus or bringing the initial selectionof the other photograph to the jury's attention if the State haddisclosed the fact to her earlier.

Defendant also contends that the State's failure to discloseundermined the confidence in the verdict because had she known thatMehus had initially selected a photograph other than hers she couldhave attempted to identify the other person and develop evidencethat the other person was the perpetrator. This contention istenuous at best.

The trial court was open to granting a short continuance toallow defendant's attorney an opportunity to determine the identityof the person shown in the photograph first selected by Mehus.Foregoing this opportunity, defendant's attorney insisted on adismissal of the charge. We find it rather disingenuous fordefendant now to complain that the State's miscue deprived her ofan opportunity to gather evidence that someone other than herselfcommitted the theft. Defendant argued that a short continuancewould not allow her enough time to investigate the other person. A short continuance, however, most likely would have alloweddefendant at least to determine whether the identity of the otherperson could be ascertained. The record does not contain thephotocopy of the lineup. Because the photocopy was of poor qualityand the officer who conducted the lineup was no longer available,it was possible that the identity of the other person could nothave been determined. After a short continuance, defendant couldhave returned to court with a progress report and provided thecourt with additional information about whether a longercontinuance was warranted. Moreover, the court allowed defendantto cross-examine Mehus extensively about the pretrialidentification. Because defendant rejected a continuance andelected to proceed with the trial after the court denied her motionto dismiss, we are left to speculate about the significance of anyadditional information that might have been discovered.

Mehus's testimony provided compelling evidence againstdefendant. While he was the only State witness, he positivelyidentified defendant in court. Also, he had ample opportunity toobserve the shoplifter both inside and outside the store. Helooked at her on two occasions in the store for three seconds eachas well as watched her as she exited the store and went to hervehicle. He also escorted her back into the store afterconfronting her in the parking lot. This extensive opportunity toobserve the shoplifter strengthens Mehus's in-court identification.

Also, we cannot say that the fact of the initialmisidentification strongly favored defendant. Although Mehusinitially selected someone else from the photo lineup, he explainedhow he selected the first photo after viewing the lineup for aboutthree seconds. After taking more time, he selected defendant'sphotograph. He persisted in his identification of defendant andtestified that no one tried to influence his identification.

In light of the strength of Mehus's in-court identification,it has not been shown that had defendant known about Mehus'sinitial selection of another photograph in the photo lineup therewas a reasonable probability that the outcome of her trial wouldhave been different. Thus, we hold the materiality of the State'slack of disclosure as required by Brady has not been established.

Defendant's second contention on appeal is that when itimposed the sentence, the trial court improperly considered amitigating factor as an aggravating factor. The trial court mayconsider in mitigation that the imprisonment of the defendant wouldentail excessive hardship to her dependents. 730 ILCS 5/5--5--3.1(a)(11) (West 2000). Defendant claims that the trial court improperly rejected this factor and instead faulted her forchoosing to put her daughter in jeopardy of such hardship bycommitting another offense.

Although defendant did not object to the trial court'scomments during the sentencing hearing and did not move toreconsider the sentence, we may review as plain error a court'sreliance on an improper factor in aggravation in sentencing becauseit affects a defendant's fundamental right to liberty. People v.Bennett, 329 Ill. App. 3d 502, 518 (2002).

A reviewing court will disturb a sentence only if the trialcourt abused its discretion. People v. Rogers, 197 Ill. 2d 216,223 (2001). The trial court cannot ignore pertinent mitigatingfactors. People v. Burnette, 325 Ill. App. 3d 792, 808-09 (2001). It is well settled, however, that a trial court is not limited toconsidering statutory aggravating factors but may consider anyfactor consistent with the statute that would tend to aggravate theoffense. People v. Helm, 282 Ill. App. 3d 32, 34 (1996); People v.Williams, 275 Ill. App. 3d 249, 258 (1995). Moreover, a newsentencing hearing is not required where the record reveals thatthe weight placed on an allegedly improper factor was soinsignificant that it did not lead to a greater sentence. Peoplev. Knowles, 315 Ill. App. 3d 600, 602 (2000).

When the challenged comments here are read in context, it isclear that the trial court focused on defendant's recidivisminstead of summarily rejecting a statutory mitigating factor. Acareful reading of the trial court's comments reveals that it didnot rely on a mitigating factor in aggravation. While it referredto defendant being sentenced to 90 days in jail when her daughterwas 15 years old, it did so merely to exemplify that defendant hadnot been rehabilitated or deterred by such a situation and that asentence of less duration would likely be ineffective. Further,although the circumstances of defendant leaving a 15-year-olddependent child would have qualified as a mitigating factor in theearlier case in which she was sentenced to 90 days in jail, it wasnot relevant to mitigation in the present case. For these reasons,we conclude that defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trialcourt abused its discretion.

The judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

McLAREN and BYRNE, JJ., concur.