JUSTICE O'MALLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

This permissive interlocutory appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 308)requires us to construe the Whistleblower Reward and Protection Act(Act) (740 ILCS 175/1 et seq. (West 2000)). Relator, JosephLevenstein, M.D., an employee of the College of Medicine-Rockford(College) of the University of Illinois-Chicago (University), fileda qui tam complaint alleging that defendant, Bernard Salafsky, aCollege dean, violated the Act by knowingly presenting false claimsto the University. Salafsky moved to dismiss (see 735 ILCS 5/2--619.1 (West 2000)), arguing that (1) the Act bars only false claimsagainst the "State," which, under section 2(a) of the Act (740 ILCS175/2(a) (West 2000)), excludes the University; and (2) if theUniversity is the State, section 4(e)(3) of the Act (740 ILCS175/4(e)(3) (West 2000)) bars the suit because it is based onallegations that are the subject of a pending federal suit.

The trial court declined to dismiss the complaint. The courtheld first that the complaint states a cause of action under theAct because the College, although not itself the "State," receivessignificant funding from the State. The court held second that thefederal suit, which alleges that Salafsky and other Universityofficers denied Levenstein his constitutional rights when theyretaliated for his "whistleblowing" by disciplining him on spuriouscharges of sexual harassment, is not based on the same allegationsor transactions as this action. The trial court denied Salafsky'smotion to reconsider but certified two questions for us to decide:

"1. Whether the University of Illinois is covered by theWhistleblower Reward and Protection Act (WRPA) *** and

2. Whether Plaintiff's claim is barred pursuant toSection 175/4(e)(3) [sic] of the WRPA."

For the reasons that follow, we answer the first question witha qualified "yes" and the second question with a simple "no."

The complaint alleges the following background facts. Levenstein has worked for the College since 1990. Salafsky hasbeen the College's regional dean since 1989 and is accountable forits financial operations. The College is funded by various means,including state appropriations. To manage the revenues thefaculty's clinical services generate, the University created a"Medical Service Plan" (MSP) per the University of IllinoisHospital Act (110 ILCS 330/0.01 et seq. (West 2000)). Undersection 5 of this act (110 ILCS 330/5 (West 2000)), the charges forsuch services must be deposited into a special fund, and thefaculty controls the billing, collection, and disbursement of themoney under a plan it has established. To satisfy this directive,the College medical faculty passed bylaws making the head of adepartment accountable for managing the department's MSP account. According to Associate Dean Terrance Duffey, the only funds thatshould flow into or out of the MSP are those the MSP has generated.

The complaint continues as follows. In September 1994, overSalafsky's objection, Levenstein and other faculty members formeda management committee to oversee how money in the MSP isgenerated, collected, and spent. They did so partly because theCollege MSP was losing money, reporting a deficit of $400,000 inApril 1995. Despite this deficit, Salafsky announced that monththat he wanted to build a clinic in Rockford. He assured themanagement committee that the College MSP's deficit was not aproblem and that the MSP could count on assistance "from Chicago." Under the heading "Salafsky Circumvents Bidding Process toBuild Clinic," the complaint alleges as follows. In June 1995,Salafsky signed a letter of intent with Illinois Health Properties(IHP) to build and lease the new clinic. IHP did not yet exist;signing for it was Brent Johnson, who owned Ringland & Johnson, aconstruction firm. Later in 1995, Johnson formed IHP, which thencontracted to "sell" the University the clinic. IHP hired Ringland& Johnson to build the clinic, thus giving Johnson's firm a no-bidcontract. Salafsky never told the trustees or the College MSPabout Johnson's interest in IHP or Ringland & Johnson.

Under the heading "The University Overpays for Land andBuilding," the complaint alleges as follows. Two weeks beforesigning the contract with IHP, the University, at Salafsky'sdirection, paid IHP $642,540 for the land for the clinic. OnDecember 18, 1995, the land was conveyed to an intermediary for$92,192 and immediately reconveyed to IHP for $432,000. AssociateDean Duffey stated that the University paid $642,540 for the landand about $1.5 million for construction. The project cost about $3million in all, but Duffey could not say what the Universityreceived for the remaining $900,000 or so.

Under "Salafsky Abuses 'Official' MSP Discretionary Account,"the complaint alleges that the MSP bylaws allow Salafsky tomaintain one discretionary MSP account, funded solely by a 10%"tax" on the College MSP's revenue. Although this "tax" shouldyield about $240,000 yearly, the account was credited with $642,540a day before it paid IHP the same amount as a "down payment" on theclinic. Former University vice-chancellor Dieter Hausmann provided the money to Salafsky and was the "internal bank" pendingthe receipt of the public bond funds used to finance the clinic.

Under "Balance of Clinic May Have Been Paid More than Once,"the complaint alleges as follows. The College's former chiefaccountant, Brian Grande, stated that, after the University madethe down payment, the $2.4 million balance of the project pricecame from a bond issue " 'through the State,' " not " 'throughRockford.' " However, an official report for the discretionaryMSP account states that on December 8, 1996, a charge of $2,302,879was recorded for " 'purchase price.' " A voucher dated December11, 1996, states that this amount was paid from the discretionaryaccount to IHP for the final purchase of the clinic. Anotherofficial report states that in June 1997 the discretionary accountrecorded a transfer of $2,455,000 for "buildings acquisition" anda $2,436,695 charge for "plant expenditures." Thus, the $2.4million due on the clinic was paid not only "directly by [theUniversity] with bond money" but also from the discretionaryaccount in December 1996 and again in June 1997.

Under "University Overpays for Equipment and Furnishings," thecomplaint alleges that the University spent $504,000 to supply andfurnish the clinic. This spending included such excesses as$97,000 for computers and related items; $88,000 for officeequipment; and $4,028 for a "customized trash bin."

Finally, under "Salafsky's 'Unassigned' MSP Account," thecomplaint alleges the following. Although regulations limit him toone MSP account, Salafsky has since 1991 or earlier maintained an"unassigned" MSP account, No. 26--51876, that appears nowhere inthe College's official list of its accounts. Salafsky did not tellCollege MSP members about this account. University records showthat between July 1990 and June 1996 account No. 26--51876 had atleast $29,400,000 in credits and at least $2,900,000 in charges forvaguely described purposes. Grande said that the unassignedaccount was only a bookkeeping device, but the monthly Universityreports for the account show that it was used to transfer funds;that it had significant activity for only 18 months in 5 years; andthat the account's balance grew by about $23 million in that time.

Levenstein's complaint asserts that Salafsky is liable undersection 3(a)(2) of the Act, which applies to any person who"knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a falserecord or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid orapproved by the State." 740 ILCS 175/3(a)(2) (West 2000). Thecomplaint alleges that Salafsky (a) caused the board of trustees tobe told that the clinic building could be "purchased" for $3million, whereas the building had yet to be built and would havecost only about $1.5 million had bids been obtained as required(see 30 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 1994)); (b) executed the letter ofintent that fraudulently represented IHP as a "seller" or "lessor"of property and not as a contractor that should have bid for theproject; (c) caused an inflated $642,540 "down payment" to be madeon the land for the clinic; (d) authorized excessive spending onfurnishings and equipment for the clinic; (e) caused multiplepayments to be made on the $2.4 million balance due on the project;and (f) maintained an illegal "unassigned" MSP account that spentabout $3 million on fraudulent charges between 1990 and 1996.

After the State declined to intervene (see 740 ILCS175/4(b)(4)(B) (West 2000)), Salafsky moved to dismiss thecomplaint (see 735 ILCS 5/2--619.1 (West 2000)) on two grounds. Heargued first that the complaint did not state a cause of actionbecause it did not allege that Salafsky had caused any false claimto be paid or approved by the State (see 740 ILCS 175/3(a)(2) (West2000)). The Act defines the "State" as:

"[T]he State of Illinois; any agency of State government;and any of the following entities which may elect to adopt theprovisions of this Act by ordinance or resolution, a copy ofwhich shall be filed with the Attorney General within 30 daysof its adoption: the system of State colleges and universities***." (Emphasis added.) 740 ILCS 175/(2)(a) (West 2000).

Salafsky's motion attached a copy of an affidavit of MicheleThompson, the secretary of the board of trustees and secretary ofthe University. She stated that as of September 14, 2000, theUniversity had not passed a resolution adopting the Act.

Salafsky asserted second that even if the University is the"State," the suit is barred by section 4(e)(3) of the Act, whichreads:

"In no event may a person bring an action undersubsection (b) [permitting qui tam suits] which is based uponallegations or transactions which are the subject of a civilsuit or an administrative civil money penalty proceeding inwhich the State is already a party." 740 ILCS 175/4(e)(3)(West 2000).

According to Salafsky, the "allegations or transactions"underlying this suit were already the subject matter of a pendingfederal case, Levenstein v. Salafsky, No. 97--C--3430 (N.D. Ill.). There, Levenstein sued Salafsky and two other University officersindividually and in their official capacities, alleging that theydenied him due process and equal protection while investigatingcharges that he committed sexual harassment. Levenstein's federalcomplaint alleged that Salafsky and his codefendants prejudgedLevenstein, suspended him without a fair hearing, arbitrarilydenied him privileges, and treated him more harshly than they didother faculty similarly situated. Levenstein claimed that Salafskywas retaliating for Levenstein's attempts to investigate theCollege's finances. In moving to dismiss this suit, Salafskyargued that Levenstein's fraud charges were the basis of thefederal suit.

Levenstein's response argued first that, although theUniversity itself is not the "State," the complaint still allegedthat Salafsky knowingly presented the State with false claims. Levenstein noted that, under section 3(c) of the Act (740 ILCS175/3(c) (West 2000)), a request or demand for money or property isa "claim" if the State provides any part of the money or propertyrequested. Thus, Levenstein reasoned, a person is liable under theAct if he causes fraudulent payments to be made with State money,even if the State does not pay him directly.

Levenstein's response argued second that section 4(e)(3) ofthe Act does not bar this suit because, even if the University isthe State, the allegations here are not the subject of the federalsuit; there, Levenstein need prove only that he was denied hiscivil rights and not that Salafsky actually submitted false claims.

The trial court denied Salafsky's motion to dismiss. Thecourt reasoned that, although the University has not opted into theAct (see 740 ILCS 175/2(a) (West 2000)), the alleged fraudulentclaims are within the Act because the University receives Statemoney to fund a significant portion of its operations. The courtalso held that the pending federal suit is not based on allegationsor transactions that are the subject matter of this suit. Afterdenying Salafsky's motion to reconsider, the court certified twoquestions of law for interlocutory appeal. We allowed the appeal.

In deciding an appeal under Supreme Court Rule 308, we limitourselves to answering the certified questions. Sassali v. DeFauw,297 Ill. App. 3d 50, 51 (1998). Because we decide questions of law(155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)), our review is de novo. See In re LawrenceM., 172 Ill. 2d 523, 526 (1996).

Both certified questions ask us to construe the Act. Thisrequires us to ascertain the legislative intent. People v. Latona,184 Ill. 2d 260, 269 (1998). The statutory language is the bestguide to this intent, and unambiguous language must receive itsplain meaning. Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996). Where language is ambiguous, we may consider the evils thelegislature sought to remedy, and we may look to the legislativehistory. People v. Shanklin, 329 Ill. App. 3d 1144, 1146 (2002). Also, the Act, which took effect in 1992 (Pub. Act. 87--662, eff.January 1, 1992), is modeled closely on the federal False ClaimsAct (31 U.S.C.A.