JUSTICE KAPALA delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Steven Sawczenko, appeals from an order of thecircuit court of Du Page County summarily dismissing his secondpostconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing. For thereasons that follow, we reverse and remand.

On September 12, 1994, defendant pleaded guilty to aggravatedbattery to a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/12--4(b)(6) (West 1992)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 5 years' imprisonment to beserved consecutively to a 20-year prison term for a separate, unrelated offense. On October 7, 1994, defendant filed a pro semotion to withdraw his plea of guilty and vacate the judgment. Subsequently, defendant appeared before the trial court andwithdrew that motion. Defendant did not file a direct appeal ofhis conviction or sentence.

On September 11, 1997, defendant filed a pro se postconvictionpetition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725ILCS 5/122--1 et seq. (West 1996)) supported by his own affidavit. In the petition, defendant alleged that he was on psychotropicmedication at the time he entered his plea of guilty; that therewas a bona fide doubt as to his fitness to stand trial due to thismedication; that he was entitled to a fitness hearing; and that theassistant State's Attorney handling his case knew he was medicated,yet failed to inform the trial court. Defendant asserted that hisright to due process of law under the United States Constitutionwas violated because he was denied a fitness hearing and that histrial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a fitnesshearing on his behalf.

After counsel was appointed, defendant filed an amendedpostconviction petition. On October 21, 1998, the State filed amotion to dismiss defendant's postconviction petition. JudgeThomas E. Callum denied the motion to dismiss on January 27, 1999,ruling that defendant was entitled to a hearing on the allegationshe raised regarding the psychotropic medication he was taking atthe time he pleaded guilty.

On February 19, 1999, the State filed an answer to defendant'spostconviction petition. On November 1, 1999, defendant appearedbefore Judge Kathryn E. Creswell with his attorney. Defendant'sattorney informed the trial court that defendant was moving towithdraw his postconviction petition "based on some legal researchthat [defendant] has done, as well as some religious beliefs." Defendant's attorney also indicated that defendant understood thatthe trial court had previously ruled that he was entitled to anevidentiary hearing on his petition. The trial court askeddefendant if what his attorney said was true, and defendantresponded, "Yes, that is correct." When asked if he was taking anytype of prescription medication at that time, defendant said, "Notat all." The trial court asked defendant if he understood that ifhe withdrew his petition he would be foreclosed from pursuing anyissues or claims of error at a future date. Defendant said, "Ido[,] your Honor." Defendant also told the trial court that heunderstood that the State's motion to dismiss his petition had beendenied and that if he withdrew his petition there would be noevidentiary hearing. Finally, when the trial court told defendantthat he would have to serve out the rest of his sentence and thatwould be the end of it, defendant said, "I understand." With that,the trial court allowed defendant to withdraw his postconvictionpetition and remanded defendant to the custody of the IllinoisDepartment of Corrections.

On August 18, 2000, defendant filed a second petition forpostconviction relief. Defendant alleged various claims ofineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. In addition,defendant alleged that, although he was not on any medication whenhe withdrew the prior postconviction petition, he was not in aproper frame of mind to make that decision. Defendant alleged that"extreme religiousism [sic]" due to insomnia led him to believethat he was to withdraw his postconviction petition "by divineprovidence." Defendant also requested the reinstatement of theclaims he made in his first postconviction petition.

On November 13, 2000, defendant appeared before Judge Perry R.Thompson at a status hearing on his second postconviction petition. The trial court asked defendant what he was asking for in hispetition and defendant said he wished to "[r]einstate the postconviction [sic] petition on the same issues that it was originallyraised and additional issues on the supplemental petition." Whenasked for the State's position, the assistant State's Attorneydeclined to participate. The trial court told defendant that hehad read defendant's first and second postconviction petitions andreviewed the file. The trial court then confirmed the proceduraldetails with defendant before concluding, "I frankly don't see abasis for relief here under the [P]ost[-][C]onviction [Hearing][A]ct, so I am going to deny it." The assistant State's Attorneythen asked the trial court if he was finding the latest pleadingfrivolous. The trial court responded that the pleading "[d]oes notstate a basis upon which a [sic] relief can be drawn upon the act. Draw an order, denied." The trial court entered a written orderstating in pertinent part:

"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: upon examination of petition by thisCourt there is a finding said petition is frivolous andpatently without merit pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/122--2.1."

Defendant timely appeals from that order.

Defendant first contends that the trial court erred bysummarily dismissing his second postconviction petition, whichsought to reinstate the first petition, where his first petitionhad been found to warrant an evidentiary hearing. The State arguesthat the second petition was properly dismissed. A briefdiscussion of the three procedural stages of the Act is warranted.

At stage one, section 122--2.1 directs the trial court todismiss the petition if the petitioner is sentenced to imprisonmentand if the court determines that "the petition is frivolous or ispatently without merit." 725 ILCS 5/122--2.1(a)(2) (West 2000). Section 122--2.1(a) requires the court to examine the petition andenter an order "[w]ithin 90 days after the filing and docketing ofeach petition." 725 ILCS 5/122--2.1(a) (West 2000). Section 122--2.1 does not contemplate any input from the State by responsivepleading or otherwise. See People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410,418 (1996). Under section 122--2.1, the trial court is concernedmerely with determining whether the petition's allegationssufficiently demonstrate a constitutional infirmity that wouldnecessitate relief under the Act. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d366, 380 (1998). At the first stage, the trial court does not ruleon the merits of the petition; rather, the trial court simplydecides if the petition on its face is frivolous or patentlywithout merit. People v. Oury, 259 Ill. App. 3d 663, 667 (1994). In order to withstand dismissal at stage one, the postconvictionpetition need only contain a simple statement that presents thegist of a constitutional claim for relief that is meritorious whenconsidered in view of the record. Oury, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 667. If a petition is not dismissed under section 122--2.1, then it isto be docketed and considered in accordance with sections 122--4through 122--6 of the Act. 725 ILCS 5/122--2.1(b) (West 2000).

At stage two, section 122--4 provides for the appointment ofcounsel if the petitioner has no means to procure counsel. 725ILCS 5/122--4 (West 2000). Also at stage two, section 122--5directs that the State shall either answer or move to dismiss thepetition. 725 ILCS 5/122--5 (West 2000). At this stage, the trialcourt must determine whether the petition and any accompanyingdocuments make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.See Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 381.

Finally, at stage three, section 122--6 gives the trial courtthe discretion to hold a hearing and provides that the court mayreceive proof by affidavits, depositions, oral testimony or otherevidence. 725 ILCS 5/122--6 (West 2000).

In this case, the trial court dismissed defendant'spostconviction petition at stage one. Our review of the trialcourt's dismissal of defendant's postconviction petition at stageone of the proceedings under the Act is de novo. People v.Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 247 (2001).

Defendant urges us to conclude that the proceedings on thesecond petition must be treated as proceedings on the firstpetition for timeliness purposes because the second petition wasintended to reinstate and supplement the earlier petition. Wecannot so conclude.

If we were to consider defendant's second postconvictionpetition a motion to reinstate his first, we would find the motionto reinstate untimely. On November 1, 1999, the trial courtgranted defendant's motion to withdraw his first petition as ispermitted under section 122--5 of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West1998)). On August 18, 2000, more than nine months later, defendantfiled his second petition. A trial court loses jurisdiction tovacate or modify its judgment 30 days after entry of judgmentunless a timely postjudgment motion is filed. Beck v. Stepp, 144Ill. 2d 232, 238 (1991). If a postconviction petitioner wereallowed to reinstate a previously withdrawn petition at any time,the Act's prescribed time limits for requesting postconvictionrelief (725 ILCS 5/122--1(c) (West 2000)) would be nullified.

As to the timeliness of defendant's second petition, section122--1(c) of the Act sets forth the applicable time limitation forfiling a postconviction petition:

"No proceedings under this Article shall be commencedmore than 6 months after the denial of a petition for leave toappeal or the date for filing such a petition if none is filedor more than 45 days after the defendant files his or herbrief in the appeal of the sentence before the IllinoisSupreme Court (or more than 45 days after the deadline for thefiling of the defendant's brief with the Illinois SupremeCourt if no brief is filed) or 3 years from the date ofconviction, whichever is sooner, unless the petitioner allegesfacts showing that the delay was not due to his or herculpable negligence." 725 ILCS 5/122--1(c) (West 2000).

Since defendant filed no direct appeal, the triggering eventin this case was defendant's conviction on September 12, 1994,making the filing deadline September 12, 1997. Defendantacknowledges that his second petition was not filed until almostsix years after his conviction but argues that, because the trialcourt's stage-one dismissal was not predicated upon theuntimeliness of the second petition, we cannot affirm the dismissalon that basis. Defendant concludes that any argument as to hisculpable negligence should occur at stage two, where he could beappointed counsel and permitted to amend his petition. The Stateargues that defendant's second petition was untimely and we shouldaffirm the trial court's first-stage dismissal on that basis eventhough the trial court did not, contending that we may affirm forany reason warranted by the record, regardless of the reasonsrelied on by the lower court (People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205,211 (1997)).

The trial court has the authority to dismiss a postconvictionpetition for untimeliness after its initial review under section122--2.1(a) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122--2.1(a) (West 2000)). People v. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1999); People v. Parham, 318Ill. App. 3d 818, 821 (2001). However, the issue presented here is whether a stage-one dismissal of a postconviction petition canbe affirmed on appeal on the ground that the petition was untimely,when, in fact, the trial court did not address the subject oftimeliness.

We begin our analysis of this issue by reviewing our supremecourt's holding in Wright. The trial court in Wright dismisseddefendant's postconviction petition at stage two of the proceedingson the State's motion to dismiss, which did not raise the issue ofthe petition's timeliness. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d at 5. Afterconcluding that the time limit in the Act is to be considered astatute of limitations and not a jurisdictional requirement(Wright, 189 Ill. 2d at 10), the court said:

"By not raising [the issue of timeliness] until the cause wason appeal, the State has effectively precluded defendant fromseeking to amend his petition to allege facts demonstratingthat the late filing was not caused by his culpablenegligence. While we recognize that section 122--1 requiresthe defendant to allege the facts demonstrating a lack ofculpable negligence, we do not believe that this requirementallows the State to wait until an appeal to raise anaffirmative defense that the defendant may be able to avoid byamending his petition. By failing to raise this issue below,the State has waived its right to argue that defendant'spetition is untimely.

In reaching this conclusion, we caution that we are notlimiting the trial court's ability, during the court's initialreview of noncapital petitions [citation], to dismiss thepetition as untimely. The import of our decision is simplythat matters relating to the timeliness of a defendant'spetition should first be considered in the trial court, eitherupon a motion by the State or pursuant to the duty imposedupon the trial court by section 122--2.1(a)(2)." Wright, 189Ill. 2d at 11-12.

The Wright court summed the issue up by stating, "Thus, if theState wishes to challenge the timeliness of a defendant's petition,it should raise that argument first in the trial court, where anyamendments can be made and factual disputes resolved." Wright, 189Ill. 2d at 12.

There is a split of authority in the appellate court on theissue of whether the timeliness of a postconviction petition isproperly considered on appeal where the trial court summarilydismissed the petition at stage one of the proceedings on a basisother than timeliness.

The Third District in People v. Arias, 309 Ill. App. 3d 595,597 (1999), held that if timeliness is not addressed by the trialcourt then it cannot be addressed by the appellate court. Arias,309 Ill. App. 3d at 597 (1999). In Arias, the trial courtdismissed defendant's petition at stage one without ruling on thetimeliness of the petition. Arias, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 596. Defendant argued that, because the trial court did not rule thatthe petition was late, he was denied the opportunity to allegefacts showing the lateness was not due to his culpable negligence. Arias, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 597. The Arias court accepted thisargument, concluding that the time limitation in the Act isconsidered an affirmative defense that, if not raised in the trialcourt, is waived. Arias, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 597, citing Wright,189 Ill. 2d at 11.

The Fourth District in the case of People v. Boclair, 312 Ill.App. 3d 346, 350 (2000), appeal allowed, 189 Ill. 2d 690 (2000),concluded differently. In Boclair, like this case and Arias,defendant's petition was dismissed at stage one of the proceedingsand the State, therefore, had no opportunity to raise thetimeliness issue in the trial court. Boclair, 312 Ill. App. 3d at350. The Boclair court simply held:

"It is our responsibility to make a de novo assessment ofthe petition (People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 387-89, 701N.E.2d 1063, 1075 (1998)), and nothing in Wright precludes usfrom considering whether the defendant's petition comportswith the requirements of the Act." Boclair, 312 Ill. App. 3dat 350.

In Parham, this court concluded that the holding in Arias"adhered to the Wright mandate by concluding that timeliness cannotbe addressed for the first time on appeal" (Parham, 318 Ill. App.3d at 824), and that the holding in "Boclair failed to comport withWright because the timeliness objection was raised and decided forthe first time on appeal" (Parham, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 825). Wecontinue to believe that Arias is the better-reasoned opinion.

The unfairness identified in Wright, brought about byconsidering the timeliness of a postconviction petition for thefirst time on appeal, is that it denies petitioner the opportunityto amend his petition to allege facts demonstrating a lack ofculpable negligence. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d at 11. Several recentappellate court decisions contemplate a petitioner's ability to amend a postconviction petition to plead a lack of culpablenegligence in response to a dismissal based upon untimeliness. SeePeople v. Stewart, 326 Ill. App. 3d 933 (2001)); People v.Scullark, 325 Ill. App. 3d 876 (2001).

In Scullark, the First District concluded that "Wright thus indicates that if the petition is unsuccessful due to a failure toinclude allegations of a lack of culpable negligence, thepetitioner must be given an opportunity to amend." Scullark, 325Ill. App. 3d at 881. The Scullark court reasoned as follows:

"[E]ven if it is necessary for the allegations to beincluded in the petition, petitioner need not allege a lack ofculpable negligence at the outset, as the petition may belater amended to include such allegations. Wright, 189 Ill.2d at 11, 723 N.E.2d at 237. The Act provides that the 'courtmay in its discretion make such order as to amendment of thepetition *** as shall be appropriate, just and reasonable andas is generally provided in civil cases.' 725 ILCS 5/122--5(West 1998). Generally, when a party asks to amend acomplaint, leave to do so is freely given. 'A circuit courtabuses its discretion if it refuses to allow a plaintiff toamend his complaint when a cause of action can be stated ifthe complaint is amended.' [Citation.] " Scullark, 325 Ill.App. 3d at 880.

In this case, the trial court dismissed defendant's secondpetition at stage one without considering the petition'stimeliness, including whether defendant alleged a lack of culpablenegligence in filing the petition late. In adherence with theholding in Wright, and because the amendment of a postconvictionpetition after a stage-one dismissal is appropriate, we concludethat we cannot consider the timeliness of defendant's secondpostconviction petition for the first time on appeal. Our holding,however, does not preclude the State from raising the timeliness ofdefendant's second petition at stage-two proceedings on remand.

Defendant calls our attention to the fact that his secondpetition could be considered an improper successive postconvictionpetition, but argues that we should not construe it in that way. The State makes no argument as to the successiveness of defendant'ssecond petition. Although the trial court did not articulate the successiveness of defendant's second postconviction petition as abasis for dismissal, we are not precluded from affirming on thatbasis in the way we are with respect to untimeliness. SeeCaballero, 179 Ill. 2d at 211 (generally, a reviewing court mayaffirm for any reason warranted by the record, regardless of thereasons stated by the lower court). At any rate, we conclude that,in this case, a stage-one dismissal on successiveness grounds wouldbe improper.

The Act contemplates the filing of one petition. Caballero,179 Ill. 2d at 211. A petitioner is to get one completeopportunity to show that his constitutional rights weresubstantially denied. People v. Lieberman, 186 Ill. App. 3d 277,280-81 (1989). However, the trial court may allow the filing ofsuccessive petitions when proceedings on a petition were deficientin some fundamental way. Lieberman, 186 Ill. App. 3d 281.

Nothing in the record indicates that the proceedings ondefendant's first postconviction petition were deficient. However,in defendant's second postconviction petition, he alleges thatcounsel appointed to represent him on his first petition wasineffective for allowing him to withdraw his petition withoutconferring with him sufficiently. We believe that thissufficiently alleges a deficiency in the proceedings on defendant'sfirst postconviction petition.

Having determined that we cannot consider the timeliness ofthe second petition and that it is not an improper successivepetition, we turn to the merits of defendant's second petition. Inreviewing the trial court's stage-one dismissal, we must determinewhether the allegations in defendant's second petition, taken astrue and liberally construed, present the gist of a constitutionalclaim. See Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 244.

Defendant contends that his second postconviction petitionshould have survived stage one of the proceedings because itincorporated the allegations in his first postconviction petition.Defendant argues that his first postconviction petition contained allegations sufficient to raise the gist of a constitutional claim,i.e., that there was a bona fide doubt as to his fitness when heentered his guilty plea; that he was denied the fitness hearing hewas entitled to pursuant to section 104--21(a) of the Code ofCriminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/104--21(a) (West 1994)); andthat his attorney was ineffective when he failed to invoke hisright to a fitness hearing. The State responds by contending thatour supreme court in People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312 (2000),announced that a defendant receiving psychotropic medication doesnot have a constitutional right to a fitness hearing.

At the time defendant pleaded guilty, section 104--21(a)provided in pertinent part:

"A defendant who is receiving psychotropic drugs or othermedications under medical direction is entitled to a hearingon the issue of his fitness while under medication." 725 ILCS5/104--21(a) (West 1994).

The legislature has since rewritten the statute to remove thatentitlement:

"A defendant who is receiving psychotropic drugs shallnot be presumed to be unfit to stand trial solely by virtue ofthe receipt of those drugs or medications." 725 ILCS 5/104--21(a) (West 1996).

It is true that in Mitchell our supreme court held that thedenial of a section 104--21(a) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par.104--21(a)) fitness hearing is not in and of itself aconstitutional deprivation because the administration ofpsychotropic medication is not equivalent to a bona fide doubt asto the accused's fitness to stand trial. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d at327-31. The holding in Mitchell, however, did not alter the factthat, when a bona fide doubt of defendant's fitness is raisedoutside the context of section 104--21(a), the court should rule onthe issue before proceeding further and the failure to conduct aninquiry concerning competency violates the accused's constitutionalright to due process of law. See Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d at 326-27. The allegations in defendant's first postconviction petitiongo beyond the bare allegation that he was taking psychotropicmedication at the time of his guilty plea and was therefore denieda fitness hearing under the former section 104--21(a). Defendantalleged other facts that could support a bona fide doubt of hisfitness, such as his attempted suicide two days before he pleadedguilty. Defendant also alleged in his first petition that he wasdenied his constitutional right to the effective assistance ofcounsel when his trial counsel failed to request a fitness hearing. We believe that these allegations are sufficient to raise the gistof a constitutional claim. See Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 244. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in dismissingdefendant's second postconviction petition pursuant to section122--2.1(a)(2) of the Act.

Defendant's last contention on appeal is that Public Act83-942 (Pub. Act 83-942, eff. November 23, 1983), which amended theAct to allow summary dismissals of postconviction petitions afterinitial review by the trial court, violates the single subject ruleof article IV, section 8, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. IV,