JUSTICE CALLUM delivered the opinion of the court:

The State charged defendant, Guenther H. Schoening, with theunlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24--1.1(a)(West 1998)), the unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia (720ILCS 600/3.5(a) (West 1998)), and the unlawful possession ofcannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(a) (West 1998)). The trial court granteddefendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Arguingthat the trial court erroneously found that police officersexecuting a warrant to arrest defendant's companion could not askdefendant his name without first giving him the warnings requiredby Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct.1602 (1966), the State appeals. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a). Wereverse and remand.

During the hearing on defendant's motion, defendant calledKane County Sheriff's Deputy Steven Collins. Collins testifiedthat at about 12 a.m. on May 5, 1999, he and Deputy Wolf executeda warrant to arrest Colette Welch. They went to 6N531 Essex Streetin St. Charles, which, according to the warrant and informationobtained from the Secretary of State, was Welch's address. Collinsand Wolf arrived in a squad car and were in uniform. As Collinsapproached the home, he heard the voices of a man and a womancoming from the front window. Wolf covered the rear of theresidence.

Collins knocked on the front door and announced his office andthe reason he was there. Looking through the window on the frontdoor, he saw a woman approach and then walk into the hallway fromwhich she emerged. Collins knocked repeatedly, and a manapproached the door. When Collins repeated the purpose for hispresence, the person responded that Welch was getting dressed andwould be there shortly. The man went back and forth down thehallway.

After a few minutes, the man, whom Collins identifed in courtas defendant, opened the door. Collins asked for Welch, anddefendant replied that he thought she was in either the bedroom orthe bathroom. By this time, Wolf had returned to the frontentrance, and the officers entered the home. Collins testifiedthat defendant never consented to the officers' entry. Collins sawseveral rifles or shotguns stored in a display case near theentrance. The officers asked defendant to sit on the living roomcouch while they looked for Welch. Twice, defendant beganfollowing the officers as they walked toward the bedroom. Inresponse, the officers handcuffed defendant and sat him on thecouch.

The officers found Welch hiding in the back bedroom andarrested her. The officers removed the handcuffs from defendant. As the officers were taking Welch outside, they "waited a moment." They allowed Welch to kiss defendant and, for the purpose ofpreparing a report, asked defendant his name and birth date. Defendant told the officers that he was Walter H. Schoening and was born on August 3, 1966. At the time, the officers did not knowdefendant's identity. After obtaining the information, theofficers walked Welch outside.

As the officers were escorting Welch to a squad car, she toldthem that defendant's name actually was Guenther Schoening. Theofficers ran a computer check and discovered that there were twooutstanding warrants for Guenther Schoening. Welch asked for herpurse, and the officers returned to the house to retrieve it. Theofficers knocked on the door and, when defendant answered, theytold him that they had come for Welch's purse. Defendant allowed them to enter. After finding the purse near the front entrance,the officers asked defendant if he had any identification. Defendant stated that his identification was in the bedroom, anddefendant and Wolf started to walk back to the bedroom area. Afterdefendant stated that his name was Guenther Schoening, the officersarrested defendant and placed him in a separate squad car.

While he was being transported to the sheriff's department,defendant told Collins and Wolf that he had hunted with the guns inthe display case. Defendant stated that the guns belonged to hisbrother. After Collins arrived at the sheriff's department, helearned that Walter Schoening was defendant's brother and livednear the Essex Street address. Also, Collins learned that, abouttwo weeks earlier, Walter was living at the Essex Street address. While at the jail, Welch told Collins and Wolf that defendant ownedand used the weapons. A computer search revealed that defendanthad been convicted of a felony and did not have a firearm owner'sidentification card. Collins obtained a warrant to search theEssex Street residence.

Defendant testified that, on the date in question, theofficers knocked on the door for about two minutes and two or threetimes threatened to kick it down. The officers were knocking hard,and defendant could see the door moving in from the jamb. Asdefendant opened the door, the officers pushed their way in andasked for Welch. Defendant testified that, although Welchsometimes stayed overnight at the Essex Street residence, she didnot live there.

The trial court found that the officers lawfully entered theresidence to execute the arrest warrant. Also, it was appropriatefor the officers to handcuff defendant to protect their safety. The court found further, however, that the officers did not havethe right to question defendant. The court stated:

"[W]here you are arresting someone basically withoutincident on an arrest warrant, [that] does not give policeofficers [the authority] to ask questions of other memberswithin that household *** without giving them Miranda orhaving some type of probable cause that that person wasinvolved in some type of illegal activity."

Accordingly, the trial court granted defendant's motion anddenied the State's timely motion to reconsider. The State filed acertificate of impairment and a timely notice of appeal.

When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppressevidence, we accord great deference to the trial court's factualfindings and will reverse them only if they are against themanifest weight of the evidence. People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d425, 430-31 (2001). We review de novo, however, the trial court'slegal conclusions and will reverse the ruling only if the trialcourt improperly applied the law to the accepted facts. People v.Rush, 319 Ill. App. 3d 34, 38-39 (2001); People v. Nadermann, 309Ill. App. 3d 1016, 1020 (2000).

The pertinent facts here are essentially undisputed. Thetrial court found that, absent probable cause to believe thatdefendant was involved in illegal activity, the officers could notask defendant his name without first giving him Miranda warnings. The trial court erroneously found that Miranda applied here.

The fifth amendment to the United States Constitutionguarantees that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal caseto be a witness against himself." U.S. Const., amend. V. Tosafeguard the right against self-incrimination, the Miranda Courtheld that any person subject to a custodial interrogation must bewarned before any questioning that he has a right to remain silent,that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him,and that he has a right to counsel, either retained or appointed. Incriminating statements obtained before these warnings areadministered are inadmissible at trial. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444,16 L. Ed. 2d at 706-07, 86 S. Ct. at 1612.

A custodial interrogation is "questioning initiated by lawenforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody orotherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significantway." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 706, 86 S. Ct. at1612; People v. Kolakowski, 319 Ill. App. 3d 200, 215 (2001). Therelevant inquiry is whether, under the circumstances, a reasonableperson would have felt that he was not at liberty to terminate theinterrogation and leave. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112,133 L. Ed. 2d 383, 394, 116 S. Ct. 457, 465 (1995). A custodialsituation can occur in the home, and the relevant inquiry iswhether a reasonable person would believe he was expressly orimpliedly bound to remain in the presence of the officials. Peoplev. V.S., 244 Ill. App. 3d 478, 484 (1993).

Although defendant was detained while handcuffed and seated onthe living room couch, any custodial setting that may have existedhad terminated by the time the officers asked defendant his name. When the officers asked the question, they had removed thehandcuffs, allowed Welch to kiss defendant, and were in the processof taking Welch outside. The encounter between defendant and theofficers essentially had concluded, and a reasonable person indefendant's position would not have believed that he was incustody.

Moreover, the question did not amount to "interrogation,"defined as both express questioning and any words or actions on thepart of the police, other than those normally accompanying arrestand custody, that the police should know are reasonably likely toelicit an incriminating response from the suspect. People v.Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d 382, 391-92 (1995). Here, the officers merelyasked defendant his name and birth date so that they could includethe information in their report. This falls within the scope ofgeneral on-the-scene questioning that routinely occurs during theexecution of a warrant and therefore does not require Mirandawarnings. See People v. Maiden, 210 Ill. App. 3d 390, 396-97(1991); People v. Kilfoy, 122 Ill. App. 3d 276, 287-88 (1984)(during execution of search warrant, officers asked defendant ifshe lived at residence to be searched).

Alternatively, defendant contends that, because there was evidence that Welch did not reside in the home, this court canaffirm on the ground that the officers' entry was not lawful. SeePeople v. Cope, 299 Ill. App. 3d 184, 190 (1998) (although arrestwarrant is sufficient to allow police to enter home of person namedin warrant if they have probable cause to believe the person isinside, police would need a search warrant to enter a thirdperson's property to apprehend the same suspect). Althoughdefendant testified that Welch did not reside in the home, DeputyCollins testified that he relied on information contained in thewarrant and the Secretary of State's records. Defendant'scontention fails because the trial court found that the officersproperly entered the residence to execute the arrest warrant. Therefore, the court decided this factual issue adversely todefendant.

Relying on People v. Coleman, 194 Ill. App. 3d 336, 340-41(1990), defendant also argues that the officers' conduct violatedhis fourth amendment rights. In Coleman, this court recognizedthat, just as a seizure reasonable at its inception may becomeunreasonable as a result of its duration, so may a lawful entrybecome an unlawful intrusion if the police remain beyond the timereasonably necessary to complete the purpose of their originallawful entry or engage in other unlawful conduct that renders theintrusion unreasonable. Coleman, 194 Ill. App. 3d at 340-41.

In Coleman, officers went to the defendant's home to executea warrant to arrest his roommate. The officers arrested theroommate and saw in plain view what appeared to be drugs and drugparaphernalia. A field test of the substances revealed thepresence of cocaine. The officers collected and inventoried theitems found in plain view. The roommate stated that the defendantwould return in about an hour. One of the officers called inadditional officers who searched the home. When the defendantarrived, the officers arrested him and seized a paper bag that hewas holding.

On appeal, the court stated that the officers were properly inthe defendant's home to execute the arrest warrant. Also, it wasnot unreasonable for the officers to seize the items found in plainview and to take the steps necessary to secure them. The courtconcluded, however, that the police remained within the defendant'sresidence well beyond the time reasonably necessary to accomplishtheir lawful purpose and therefore violated the defendant's fourthamendment rights. Coleman, 194 Ill. App. 3d at 341-42.

Here, the officers did not remain longer than necessary toexecute the arrest warrant. When the officers asked defendant hisname, they had not yet removed Welch from the home. They delayedtheir exit for only a moment. We fail to see how it wasunreasonable for the officers to attempt to ascertain the identityof an occupant so that they could document the circumstancessurrounding the execution of the warrant. Defendant no longer wasbeing detained, and the officers were not investigating him. Cf.,People v. Bailey, 314 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1063 (2001) (suppressionof evidence required where, while detaining defendant duringexecution of warrant to arrest defendant's roommate, officer askeddefendant if he had anything illegal on his person). Just as theofficers in Coleman were justified in remaining long enough tosecure the items found in plain view, the officers here werejustified in remaining briefly to ask for information reasonablyrelated to their lawful purpose for being present in the home.

Defendant has not challenged the officers' conduct after theyentered the home the second time. Briefly, we note that returningto the home to retrieve Welch's purse was reasonably related to theexecution of the warrant. Also, asking defendant if he hadidentification is analogous to the steps the officers in Colemantook to secure the items found in plain view. The officers heremerely were following up on information they obtained legally andtherefore did not remain longer than reasonably necessary toaccomplish their lawful purpose.

Because the trial court improperly granted defendant's motionto quash arrest and suppress evidence, we reverse the judgment ofthe circuit court of Kane County and remand the cause for furtherproceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

O'MALLEY and BYRNE, JJ., concur.