JUSTICE KAPALA delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Rene Soto, was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/5--1 (West 1996)) and was sentenced tonatural life imprisonment without parole on each count. This courtreversed defendant's conviction and remanded the cause for a newtrial on both counts. See People v. Soto, 336 Ill. App. 3d 238(2002). Our supreme court denied the State's petition for leave toappeal but, under its supervisory authority, directed this court tovacate our opinion and reconsider our judgment in light of Peoplev. Ceja, 204 Ill. 2d 332 (2003). See People v. Soto, 204 Ill. 2d679 (2003). We now vacate our prior opinion pursuant to that orderand file this opinion in its stead.

Defendant raises the following issues in this appeal: (1)whether the trial court erred in ruling that he consented to havehis conversation with a codefendant at a detention facilityelectronically monitored; (2) whether he was denied hisconfrontation rights under the state and federal constitutions bythe admission of his codefendant's statement made at the detentionfacility; (3) whether the trial court erred in admittingdefendant's refusal to provide handprinting exemplars; (4) whetherthe prosecutor made unfairly prejudicial misrepresentations andimproper comments during closing argument; and (5) whether thetrial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the offenseof conspiracy to commit murder as a lesser included offense ofmurder by accountability.

After reconsidering our judgment in light of Ceja, we nowconclude that it was not reversible error for the trial court tohave refused to instruct the jury on the offense of conspiracy tocommit murder as a lesser included offense of murder byaccountability. We also consider the other errors identified inour earlier opinion to be harmless. Therefore, we affirm thejudgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.

FACTS

Defendant and a codefendant, Raul Ceja, who was triedseparately, were indicted for the shooting deaths of RichardSanchez and Alfredo Garcia. The charges were based on a July 26,1998, incident in which the victims, who were in a LincolnContinental, were fatally shot by occupants of a Chevrolet Tahoe atthe intersection of Oak Lawn and Grand Avenues in Elmhurst. Theindictment against defendant contained five counts as to eachvictim. All 10 counts were premised on the same factual allegationthat defendant "shot [the victim] with a handgun" combined with theoperative language from the first-degree murder statute.

The evidence at trial established the following. On July 26,1998, at about 9:25 p.m., Kevin Oldaker and his wife were stoppedfor a red light at the corner of Grand and Oak Lawn Avenues inElmhurst. There are four westbound lanes at that point of GrandAvenue with two lanes going straight and an inside left-turn laneand an outside right-turn lane. Oldaker's vehicle was in the rightlane of the two through lanes. As they were waiting for the lightto turn green, there was a Lincoln Continental sitting in the leftlane of the through lanes next to the Oldaker vehicle. There weretwo male occupants in the front seat of the Lincoln.

As the light turned green, a Chevrolet Tahoe pulled into thewestbound left-turn lane next to the Lincoln. At that point,Oldaker heard glass breaking and gunshots. He observed the frontpassenger halfway out the front door of the Tahoe shooting ahandgun at the Lincoln. There was also a passenger in the rearseat of the Tahoe with his hand sticking out of the rear passengerwindow shooting a handgun at the Lincoln. Stephanie Alfano,Oldaker's wife, also testified that the passenger in the back ofthe Tahoe shot several times at the Lincoln.

After the two occupants of the Tahoe shot several times at theLincoln, the Tahoe made a U-turn so it was facing eastbound onGrand Avenue. After stopping, the driver fired several shots atthe Lincoln. The Tahoe then sped off eastbound on Grand Avenue. The Lincoln made a U-turn in an apparent attempt to follow theTahoe, but it went only a short distance before veering off theroad and coming to a stop on the grass in front of a cardealership.

Kevin Lafin, an Elmhurst police officer, responding to a radiodispatch regarding the shooting, saw a Tahoe matching the suspects'vehicle on the Eisenhower Expressway. He observed three occupantsin the Tahoe and followed it. He followed the Tahoe into an alleyin Bellwood, where it stopped in the 600 block of Marshall Avenue. Thereafter, three occupants exited and ran away. A nearby resident also saw three occupants exit the vehicle.

Officer Ackerman of the Broadview police department, alongwith his police dog, arrived at the scene where the Tahoe stopped. In the 600 block of Frederick Avenue in Bellwood, the dog beganbarking at a heavy clump of bushes. When he shined his flashlightinto the bushes, Officer Ackerman observed two individuals hiding. Officer Ackerman described both as "profusely sweating, verynervous, and [looking] like they just finished running a marathon." The two individuals were defendant and Raul Ceja, both of whom werearrested.

A search of the area between where the Tahoe stopped anddefendant and Ceja were found revealed a Ruger 9-millimeter handgunin some bushes. After finding the Ruger, the police questioneddefendant about the location of the second gun, and he directedthem to a Smith & Wesson handgun, which was hidden in bushes nearwhere the police found the Ruger. The police also found twodiscarded hooded sweatshirts in the same area they found the guns.

Following their arrest, defendant and Ceja were transported tothe detention facility at the Elmhurst police department. MichaelLullo, a detective with the Elmhurst police department, met withdefendant and advised him of his Miranda rights. Lullo spoke todefendant in English, defendant spoke to him in English, and hebelieved defendant understood English. Defendant admitted to Lullohe was a member of the Maywood Latin Kings street gang.

Defendant also made several statements to Detective RaymondBradford of the Elmhurst police department while in the detentionfacility. Also present was an assistant State's Attorney fromDu Page County, Jeffrey Kendall. Defendant admitted that he hadbeen in the Tahoe and had run from it after it stopped. He alsoadmitted that he was the occupant in the rear seat during theshooting and that he had accidently shot out the rear passengerwindow. Defendant also told Detective Bradford there were only twoguns, not three, used in the shooting. When Detective Bradfordsuggested to defendant they were driving around looking to stealanother vehicle, defendant responded, "We had guns with us. Wedon't take guns when we go out to steal cars." Defendant also saidhe knew one of the victims was the owner of the Lincoln and amember of a rival gang, the Imperial Gangsters. Defendantdescribed the Lincoln as one involved in previous drive-byshootings in Maywood. Defendant also admitted that all threeoccupants of the Tahoe, including himself, fired shots at theLincoln's occupants. When Detective Bradford described a drive-byshooting at Ceja's residence on July 24, 1998, defendant agreedthat Ceja was upset and that may have been what motivated Ceja toshoot at the Lincoln's occupants.

The physical evidence included 9-millimeter shell casings andfired bullets recovered from the scene, the Tahoe, and the victims'bodies. The police also recovered a 9-millimeter ammunition boxfrom the Tahoe with defendant's fingerprint on it. The bulletsremoved from the bodies of the victims were fired from the Smith &Wesson handgun found in the bushes near where defendant and Cejawere hiding. Defendant's prints were also found in several placeson the Tahoe. The fingerprint expert testified that "no twoindividuals have the same fingerprints."

Also pertinent to this appeal are several statements made bydefendant and Ceja while they were in the detention facility at theElmhurst police department that were overheard via an electronicmonitoring system. Each of the cells in the detention area has atwo-way sound system. That system includes a speaker in each cellthat is visible to the occupant. There is a panel in the controlarea that has toggle switches that allow the operator to activatethe system in any given cell. When the system is activated itemits a loud beep, or alert tone, every 9 or 10 seconds, which isaudible in each cell. Aside from the visible speaker and audibletone, there are no notices posted anywhere regarding the presenceof the system or its capability for transmitting voices from thecell to the control room. The system is not operational at alltimes and is used when there is a concern for the detainee, anofficer, or when the crime involved is serious.

Officer Jodi Bellis testified that on July 27, 1998, Ceja anddefendant were held in two separate cells in the detention area. At about 9:30 a.m., Bellis went into the detention area to telldefendant and Ceja to be quiet. She told defendant that she couldhear what they were saying even when she was not in the room andthat their conversations were being "monitored" at the front desk. She spoke in English but did not explain to defendant what shemeant by the word "monitor."

Defendant and Ceja made several statements to each other whilein the detention facility that were heard via the monitoringsystem. Because some of these statements were in Spanish, OfficerGonzalo Gomez, who understands both English and Spanish, wasbrought in to listen to and translate the conversations ofdefendant and Ceja. Gomez took notes, but no electronic recordingwas made.

Detective Bradford testified that while he was in the controlroom he heard Ceja say, "My parents sent my brother away," anddefendant answered, "Yeah." Ceja further stated, "They're afraidthey'll come after him. I hope the brothers don't get popped. They don't have any guns anymore," to which defendant said, "Yeah." Ceja also said, "The fat one, he was my sister's boyfriend. Boxer,he was from the jungle. He wasn't even banging anymore." Then bothdefendant and Ceja laughed.

According to Kendall, while he was listening he heard Cejasay, "They found the guns," to which defendant responded, "Yeah.Two. They showed me one." Ceja also said, "They found a lot offingerprints in the truck. They got my prints. They got yourprints. They got Capone's prints. They had a bunch they haven'ttold us about," to which defendant responded, "Yeah." Ceja alsostated, "They say that guy is the guy that shot up our town."

Gomez testified that he heard one of the two say in Spanish,"Hey, they can hear what we say." Both Bradford and Kendall hearddefendant say in English, "Hey, we're innocent." Defendant movedto suppress the statements made by himself and Ceja. The trialcourt denied the motion.

On November 20, 1998, while defendant was being held in theDu Page County jail, a search of his cell revealed two sheets ofpaper and one envelope with gang markings and hand-printed words onthem. The hand-printed statements included, "When did ourfingerprints get in the truck?" and "What story did you give yourlawyer so I could give my lawyer the same one ***[?]" One side ofthe envelope also contained the words "Boxer Rots." Whenconfronted with these items, defendant admitted to the jailer theywere his and that he had drawn on them. Defendant was laterordered by the trial court to give a handprinting exemplar, whichdefendant refused to do. The trial court ruled that defendant'srefusal to do so could be introduced at trial to show consciousnessof guilt.

At trial, although the State did not refer to accountabilityin the indictment, it sought and received instructions onaccountability. One instruction stated, "A person is legallyresponsible for the conduct of another person, when, either beforeor during the commission of an offense, and with the intent topromote or facilitate the commission of the offense, he knowinglysolicits, aids, abets, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the otherperson in the planning or commission of the offense." Further, themurder instruction for each victim provided, in pertinent part,that "the defendant or one for whom he is legally responsibleperformed the acts that caused the death." (Emphasis added.)

Defendant sought an instruction on conspiracy to commitmurder, arguing that because of the evidence and the State's use ofan accountability theory the jury could find him not guilty offirst-degree murder but guilty of conspiracy to commit murder. Thetrial court refused to give defendant's proposed instruction. Thejury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder as to bothvictims and sentenced defendant to natural life without parole oneach count.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversibleerror when it refused to give his proposed instruction onconspiracy to commit murder. This precise issue was raised by thedefendant in Ceja and rejected by our supreme court. Ceja, 204Ill. 2d at 358-62. For the reasons set forth in Ceja, we rejectdefendant's contention and hold it was not error for the trialcourt to refuse to give the lesser included offense instruction onconspiracy.

We turn next to the remaining issues in this case. Defendantraised two issues in his appeal pertaining to statements he andCeja made while in the detention facility. As to the issue ofwhether those statements were recorded in violation of theeavesdropping statutes (720 ILCS 5/14--1 through 14--9 (West1998)), we follow the holding in Ceja that Ceja and defendant wereaware their conversations were being monitored and, therefore,consented for purposes of the statutes. See Ceja, 204 Ill. 2d at346-51.

Next, we address whether the statements by Ceja while in thedetention facility should be inadmissible as hearsay of anontestifying codefendant. The State responds that the statementsare an admissible exception because they are tacit admissions, oradmissions by the silence of defendant.

We initially note that admission of Ceja's statements andevidence of defendant's lack of denials is not a violation ofdefendant's right to confrontation if the evidence in questionmeets the requirements of the tacit-admission rule. See People v.Goswami, 237 Ill. App. 3d 532, 536 (1992). When a statement thatis incriminating in nature is made in the presence and hearing ofan accused and such statement is not denied, contradicted, orobjected to by him, both the statement and the fact of his failureto deny it are admissible in a criminal trial as evidence of thedefendant's agreement in its truth. People v. Childrous, 196 IllApp. 3d 38, 53 (1990). Assent to the statement may be manifestedby silence or by an evasive, equivocal, or unresponsive reply. Childrous, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 53. The necessary elements foradmissibility are: (1) the defendant heard the incriminatingstatement; (2) the defendant had an opportunity to reply andremained silent; and (3) the incriminating statement was such thatthe natural reaction of an innocent person would be to deny it. Goswami, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 536. Such statements need not beaccusatory, however, so long as it is evident that the defendant is"being painted or portrayed as a participant in illegal andprohibited activity." People v. Miller, 128 Ill App. 3d 574, 584(1984). Under such circumstances, an innocent person wouldnormally and naturally deny or correct such an impression. Miller,128 Ill. App. 3d at 584.

In this case, defendant's reactions to Ceja's statements donot qualify as tacit admissions. First, defendant did not have anunencumbered choice to speak up and deny the statements. He wasunder arrest and in police custody. He had already been warnedthat anything he said could be used against him at trial. It canalso be inferred that he believed the police could hear hisconversation with Ceja because he and Ceja were shouting across thecell area, because one of the two stated "they" could hear what thetwo were saying, and Officer Bellis testified she had told the twoto be quiet because they could be heard in the control room. Knowing that anything he said could be used against him and thatthe police could hear his conversation with Ceja, it cannotreasonably be expected that defendant would feel free to respond toCeja's comments. The situation in which the statements were madein the presence of defendant in this case is so unique as to removeit from the ordinary tacit-admission case.

This conclusion is supported by People v. Bennett, 3 Ill. 2d357 (1954). The supreme court in Bennett stated that admissions bysilence should be received with great caution and only under theproper conditions. Bennett, 3 Ill. 2d at 361. When statements aremade in the presence of a defendant who is in no position to denythem, or if his silence is of such character that it does notjustify the inference that he should have spoken, or if in any wayhe is restrained from speaking by either fear, doubt of his rights,instructions given by his attorney, or a reasonable belief it wouldbe better or safer to keep silent, then standing silent does notamount to an admission. Bennett, 3 Ill. 2d at 361. We believe thecircumstances surrounding defendant's reaction to Ceja's statements are controlled by Bennett and that defendant should not be held toan admission.

Second, some of the statements Ceja made were not the typethat an innocent person would normally and naturally deny orcorrect. The statements, "My parents sent my brother away," and"The fat one, he was my sister's boy friend. Boxer, he was fromthe jungle. He wasn't even banging anymore," were not statementsthat painted or portrayed defendant as a participant in an illegalor prohibited activity. Rather, they were comments about the case. They were not the type of statements about which a defendant's lackof denial should be considered as an admission of guilt. Thus, thestatements and defendant's reactions thereto do not qualify astacit admissions.

Because all of the statements are inadmissible hearsay of acodefendant and do not meet the requirements of the tacit-admissionrule, we hold that they should not have been admitted. We do not,however, consider this error to be reversible. Errors in theadmission of hearsay evidence are harmless when properly admittedevidence is so overwhelming that no fair-minded jury couldreasonably have voted to acquit the defendant. People v. Sample,326 Ill. App. 3d 914, 924 (2001). Admission of hearsay is harmlessif there is no reasonable probability the verdict would have beendifferent had the hearsay been excluded. Sample, 326 Ill. App. 3dat 924-25.

In this case, the other evidence independent of Ceja'sstatements precludes any reasonable possibility of a differentverdict. Defendant was found hiding near where the vehicle used inthe shooting had been abandoned. He also directed the police towhere the Smith & Wesson handgun, one of the weapons used in theshooting, was located. Defendant also made several incriminatingstatements to the police. He told Detective Bradford that he hadbeen in the Tahoe at the time of the shooting and had run from itafter it stopped. He also admitted he was the occupant in the rearof the Tahoe at the time of the shooting and that he had accidentlyshot out the rear passenger window. He further admitted that allthree occupants of the Tahoe, including himself, fired shots at thevictims' vehicle. There was also physical evidence implicatingdefendant. The bullets removed from the victims' bodies were firedfrom the Smith & Wesson handgun to which defendant had directed thepolice. Defendant's fingerprints were also found in several placeson the Tahoe. In light of this overwhelming evidence ofdefendant's guilt, we hold the error in admitting Ceja's statementswas harmless.

The next issue to be addressed is defendant's contention thatthe trial court erred in admitting his refusal to providehandprinting exemplars as evidence of consciousness of guilt. Defendant admits he waived this issue by failing to raise it attrial but contends that we should consider the issue under theplain error rule. Alternatively, he argues his trial counsel wasineffective in failing to object to the State's request forhandprinting exemplars which would have precluded his refusal toprovide the exemplars.

Supreme Court Rule 615(a) provides a limited exception to thewaiver rule and allows a reviewing court to consider plain errorsaffecting substantial rights that were not properly preserved inthe trial court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). A court will consider atrial error under the plain error exception where the evidence inthe case is closely balanced or where the error is so fundamentaland of such a magnitude as to deny the defendant a fair trial. People v. Hunter, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1027 (2002).

As we have already explained, the evidence in this case is notclosely balanced. Nor can we say any error in admittingdefendant's refusal to submit handprinting exemplars was the typethat denied him a fair trial. This was a small part of the case ona minor point which was not mentioned during closing argument. Itcannot be said that any error would be fundamental or ofsignificant magnitude. No plain error occurred in this regard;thus, the issue is waived.

As for the ineffective assistance of counsel issue, defendantmust show that his attorney's performance fell below an objectivestandard of reasonableness and that the attorney's deficientperformance prejudiced defendant. See Ceja, 204 Ill. 2d at 358. A defendant must satisfy both prongs of this test, and failure toestablish either is fatal to his claim. Ceja, 204 Ill. 2d at 358. Here, defendant failed to satisfy either prong.

For a defendant to prevail on the first prong, he must showhis counsel's performance was "so seriously deficient" that it fellbelow an objective standard of reasonableness. People v. Metcalfe,202 Ill. 2d 544, 561 (2002). In order to show prejudice, adefendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would havebeen different. Metcalfe, 202 Ill. 2d at 562.

Here, in view of defendant's willingness to admit that thewritings were his, we cannot say that his trial counsel's failureto object to a request for handprinting exemplars was so seriouslydeficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Further, defendant cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of hisineffective assistance of counsel claim. Any error in notobjecting to a request for handprinting exemplars would not haveaffected the outcome of the case in light of the overwhelmingevidence. Defendant has failed to show ineffective assistance ofcounsel.

The final issue raised by defendant concerns comments by theprosecutor during closing argument. Defendant claims the followingcomments by the prosecutor during closing argument denied him afair trial: (1) the prosecutor made a statement based on facts notin the record when he mistakenly told the jury that Kevin Oldakersaid "that's the defendant" when shown a picture of the Tahoe; (2)the prosecutor, when referring to defendant's fingerprints being onthe ammunition box, stated that "with fingerprints *** you can sayto the exclusion of everyone else on earth it was that person,"when no one testified as such at trial; (3) the prosecutorimproperly bolstered the credibility of Detective Bradford andcommented on a fact not in evidence when he referred to Bradford asa "veteran detective with a sterling record," when there was noevidence regarding Bradford's record, and said of Bradford "theydon't make [them] any better than Ray Bradford, they truly don't,"and improperly bolstered the credibility of Kendall when he said hewas a "career prosecutor" who is "out here protecting our rights,protecting the rights of people like Ricky Sanchez *** and AlfredoGarcia"; (4) the prosecutor improperly commented that defendantknew the name of one of the victims when the evidence did not showthat; and (5) the prosecutor argued that the State's witnesses whotestified defendant made certain statements should be believedbecause the court had previously ruled the statements admissible.

Prosecutors are afforded wide latitude in closing argument andmay argue facts and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. People v. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d 548, 573 (2000). Prosecutorialcomments that are invited and not prejudicial do not constituteerror. People v. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d 173, 232 (1991). Inreviewing a challenge to remarks made by the State during closingargument, the comments must be considered in the context of theentire closing argument of the parties. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d at573. Even if prosecutorial comment exceeds the bounds of properargument, the verdict must not be disturbed unless the remarkcaused substantial prejudice to the defendant, taking into accountthe content and context of the comment, its relationship to theevidence, and its effect on the defendant's right to a fair andimpartial trial. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d at 573. To warrant relief,errors in closing argument must result in substantial prejudicesuch that the result would have been different absent thecomplained-of remark. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d at 573. Further,reversal and remand are generally unnecessary where the trial courtsustains a defense objection, thereby curing the potential forimproper influences from the comment, especially where the jury isinstructed that closing arguments are not to be consideredevidence. People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 488 (2000). Finally, the regulation of the substance and style of the closingargument is within the trial court's discretion, and the trialcourt's determination of the propriety of the remarks will not bedisturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Byron, 164Ill. 2d 279, 295 (1995).

Defendant here failed to object at trial or raise in aposttrial motion any objection to the first four allegedly impropercomments; thus they are waived. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d176, 186 (1988). He argues, however, that he should be excusedfrom the waiver rule because these alleged improper commentsconstitute plain error. As we have already discussed, the evidencewas overwhelming. Therefore, the closely balanced evidence prongof plain error does not apply.

Nor are the alleged errors of such magnitude as to have denieddefendant a fair trial. Comments in closing argument must beconsidered in the context of the entire closing argument of boththe State and the defendant. Ceja, 204 Ill. 2d at 357. Here, theobjected-to comments are isolated remarks, only a brief portion ofa rather extensive closing argument, and, in view of the extensiveevidence in this case, pertained to minor points. The claimederrors are not fundamental or of great magnitude; thus, defendantwas not denied a fair trial. As plain error is inapplicable here,defendant has waived any challenge to the propriety of thesecomments.

Waiver aside, the challenged comments did not causesubstantial prejudice to defendant and, thus, do not warrant areversal. The first objected-to comment is characterized by theState as an obvious misstatement by the prosecutor. There isclearly no evidence to support the prosecutor's statement thatOldaker said "[T]hat's the defendant" when shown a picture of theTahoe. This comment by the prosecutor, while not proper, does notconstitute reversible error because it did not affect the outcomeof the trial. Such a statement was an isolated remark and wouldhave made little sense to the jury considering the tenuousconnection between a person and a photograph of a vehicle.

The second complained-of comment about the fingerprints wasnot improper, as the State's expert, Sergeant Robert Wojcik,testified that "no two individuals have the same fingerprints." The State's characterization that a fingerprint match excludes allothers but the matched person is a fair use of Sergeant Wojcik'stestimony. At most, it was simple hyperbole and not inappropriate. Moreover, any error was not substantial enough to have affecteddefendant's right to a fair trial. See Williams, 192 Ill. 2d at573.

The third point is the prosecutor's bolstering of Bradford'sand Kendall's credibility and his reference to a fact not inevidence when he described Bradford as having a "sterling record." We note that defendant, in his closing, attacked the credibility ofthese two witnesses. While the State may reply to comments made bydefense counsel (People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 445-46 (1993)),the prosecutor cannot interject his personal views and improperlybolster a witness's credibility (People v. Rogers, 172 Ill. App. 3d471, 476-77 (1988)), nor can he make comments based on matters notin evidence (People v. Roman, 323 Ill. App.3d 988, 999 (2001)).

While it was not proper to state that Bradford had a sterlingrecord because there was no evidence of that, it was an isolatedremark on a minor point that did not substantially prejudicedefendant. The same can be said for the prosecutor'sunsubstantiated personal view that they do not make them likeBradford anymore.

We also do not find error in the prosecutor's remark thatKendall was a "career prosecutor," as the evidence shows thatKendall had been an assistant State's Attorney for many years. Thecomment was a fair characterization of the evidence and a fairresponse to an attack on Kendall's credibility. The same is truefor the comment about Kendall protecting the rights of the victimsand the public, as that was a fair description of one of Kendall'sduties as a prosecutor.

Defendant's fourth complaint is that the State improperlyargued that defendant knew the name of one of the victims. Thiswas not error, as the conversation between defendant and Ceja inthe detention facility supported such an inference.

Defendant alternatively argues that his trial counsel wasineffective for failing to object to the alleged improper comments. As we have noted earlier, an ineffective assistance of counselclaim can be disposed of on the ground that the defendant sufferedno prejudice from the alleged error. Metcalfe, 202 Ill. 2d at 562. In order to show prejudice, a defendant must show that there is areasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the resultof the proceeding would have been different. Metcalfe, 202 Ill. 2dat 562. We reject defendant's ineffective assistance of counselclaim in this regard because, in view of our discussion above, wecannot conclude that the outcome of the trial would have beendifferent absent the challenged remarks.

Defendant's final contention regarding closing argument isthat the prosecutor improperly mentioned that the trial court hadearlier ruled that certain statements of defendant were admissible. Defense counsel objected to this comment, and the trial courtsustained the objection. Any error was harmless in light of theoverall evidence in the case and the amelioration via the sustainedobjection. See Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d at 488. Further, the trialcourt instructed the jury that they were not to consider closingargument as evidence. See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions,Criminal, No. 1.03 (4th 2000); Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d at 488.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant's convictionson counts I and II.

Affirmed.

HUTCHINSON, P.J., and BOWMAN, J., concur.