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JUSTICE BYRNE delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Michael Stehman, was arrested for unlawfulpossession of drug paraphernalia (720 ILCS 600/3.5(a) (West 1998)). Defendant moved to suppress evidence and quash his arrest. Thismotion was granted. The State now appeals pursuant to SupremeCourt Rule 604(a)(1) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604 (a)(1)). We affirm.

At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress evidence andquash his arrest, defendant testified that he was working at apizza restaurant in Sandwich on January 13, 2000. Defendant wasreturning to the restaurant at around 5 p.m. after makingdeliveries. As defendant pulled into the employee parking lot ofthe restaurant, he saw a police squad car sitting in a parking lotthat was across the street from the restaurant. Defendant parkedhis car in the restaurant's parking lot, exited his car with thepizza delivery bags, and walked towards an entrance to therestaurant. Defendant left his car keys and the money he collectedfrom the pizza deliveries in his car. Defendant testified that hiscar's windows were up.

When defendant was 7 to 10 feet away from his car, he heardsomeone call his name. Defendant turned around and saw OfficerThomas Richardson calling him. Defendant also observed thatOfficer Richardson's squad car was parked right behind defendant'scar. Defendant gave the delivery bags he was carrying to hisbrother, Ron Stehman, who also worked for the pizza restaurant, andwalked towards Officer Richardson. Officer Richardson askeddefendant if his name was Mike Stehman, and defendant said yes. Officer Richardson then told defendant that he had a warrant fordefendant's arrest. The warrant was issued because defendantmissed a scheduled court date. Defendant agreed that he had failedto appear on a scheduled court date, but he did not remember why hewas required to appear in court.

Officer Richardson performed a pat-down search on defendantand did not find anything during the search. Officer Richardsonthen placed defendant in handcuffs and put defendant in thebackseat of the squad car. All the doors and windows to the squadcar were closed. Defendant then saw Officer Richardson walktowards defendant's car. Defendant never gave Officer Richardsonpermission to search defendant's car. When Officer Richardson wasthree to four feet away from the squad car, defendant yelled fromthe backseat of the squad car that he did not want OfficerRichardson searching defendant's car.

Defendant told Ron, who was standing in the parking lot, totell Officer Richardson that the officer could not searchdefendant's car. Defendant saw Ron approach Officer Richardson,and Officer Richardson motioned for Ron to go inside therestaurant. Defendant then saw Officer Richardson proceed tosearch defendant's car. During the search of defendant's car,Officer Richardson found a pipe that is used to smoke marijuana. Ron Stehman's testimony was consistent with defendant's. Rontestified that when defendant was in the squad car, he approachedthe squad car to hear what defendant was yelling. Ron hearddefendant tell him that Officer Richardson did not have permissionto search defendant's car. Ron approached Officer Richardson andtold the officer that the officer did not have permission to searchthe car. Officer Richardson said, "I don't give a f--- what he hasto say." The officer then told Ron to get away from the squad car,and Ron went to go stand on the sidewalk.

Officer Richardson's testimony was, for the most part,consistent with defendant's and Ron's. Officer Richardsontestified that at 8 p.m. on January 13, 2000, he was aware thatthere was an outstanding warrant for defendant's arrest. Thewarrant was issued because defendant failed to appear in court. Officer Richardson's dispatcher told Officer Richardson thatdefendant worked at the pizza restaurant. The dispatcher toldOfficer Richardson what type of car defendant drove and gave theofficer the car's license plate number. Officer Richardson went tothe pizza restaurant and waited for defendant in a parking lot thatwas across the street from the restaurant.

Officer Richardson testified that he pulled in behinddefendant when defendant was still in his car. Both defendant andOfficer Richardson exited their cars at the same time. OfficerRichardson testified that the only reason he approached defendantwas to arrest defendant on the outstanding warrant. The warrantwas issued because defendant violated the conditions of his bailbond, but the officer could not remember on what type of chargedefendant posted bail. Officer Richardson verified that defendantwas Michael Stehman and then placed defendant under arrest. Officer Richardson agreed that he did not have a warrant to searchdefendant's car and that he never asked defendant for permission tosearch defendant's car. Officer Richardson stated that he searcheddefendant's car incident to defendant's arrest and pursuant to thepolice department's tow policies. Officer Richardson later decidednot to tow defendant's car and allowed Ron to take defendant's car. The details of the tow policy were not made part of the record onappeal. Officer Richardson stated that he suspected there wassomething in defendant's car because Ron was making noise andtelling the officer not to search the car. Officer Richardsontestified that he was concerned for his safety because Ron wasbeing "mouthy." However, Ron never threatened Officer Richardson.

The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppressevidence and quash defendant's arrest. In granting the motion, thecourt made the following statements:

"[F]irst of all, [Officer] Richardson, you come here tocourt and you tell a story while you're searching thatvehicle. I don't find anything of that to be true. You'researching the vehicle because you think you have the right tothe incidental to arrest [sic].

When you come here and start making up stories *** well,you thought your safety and all, that is absolutely nonsense. There's nothing about this that gives any indication of anysafety issues.

This is a case where you didn't stop this vehicle. Thisvehicle was already stopped. This defendant was walkingacross a parking lot when you first put him under arrest. That was his testimony. That was his brother's testimony andyou don't know. *** There's nothing about a failure to appearin court that has anything to do with the car. *** I think yoususpected something might be [in the car] ***, but the searchincidental to arrest is not a wide open situation where everytime an officer makes an arrest that gives him the right tothen invade other property that belongs to somebody just tosee what the officer can find and that's what happened here. You looked in that vehicle having nothing to do with towingand you come here and you want to testify in this court thatthis had something to do with towing and then you say, well,I don't even know what the towing policy is. *** I don'tfind that this is incidental to an arrest at all."

This timely appeal followed.

The State argues that the search was proper pursuant to NewYork v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 101 S. Ct. 2860(1981). The State claims that a police officer may search adefendant's car incident to the defendant's arrest when thedefendant was a recent occupant of the car. Defendant argues thatthe search was improper because he was not an occupant of his carwhen Officer Richardson first made contact with defendant. Defendant claims that there must be some nexus between the arrestand the car in order for the search to be deemed proper.

We must first address the standard of review that applies inthis cause. In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion tosuppress evidence, the appellate court must first review the trialcourt's findings of fact under a manifestly erroneous standard. People v. Nadermann, 309 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 1020 (2000). Underthis standard, a trial court's findings will be reversed only ifthe findings are arbitrary, unreasonable, and not based on theevidence. Nadermann, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 1020.

Here, the testimony was fairly consistent amongst thewitnesses. However, there were some variations, and the trialcourt made some findings of fact based on these variations. Forexample, the trial court found that Officer Richardson was not acredible witness. The court also did not believe that OfficerRichardson was in danger when the search was conducted. The courtstated that defendant had stopped his car and was walking acrossthe parking lot when he was arrested. We determine that thesefindings of fact were not manifestly erroneous. We now review denovo the legal conclusions that the trial court reached. SeeNadermann, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 1021.

Both the United States Constitution and the IllinoisConstitution protect every person from unreasonable searches andseizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,