I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Between 1972 and 1974, petitioner was arrested, charged, andconvicted of multiple offenses in Du Page, Lake, and Cook Counties. On August 3, 1983, Governor James R. Thompson pardoned petitionerfor these offenses. The certificate of pardon consisted of apreprinted form with spaces to be completed with informationregarding the counties in which Thon had been convicted, the natureof the crimes in question, and the sentences for those crimes. Thepardon stated that Thon was "acquitted and discharged of and fromall further imprisonment and restored to all his rights andcitizenship which may have been forfeited by his conviction." Thepardon did not explicitly mention expungement.

On or about September 1, 1999, Thon filed various petitions toexpunge in the circuit court of Du Page County. The petitionssought to order certain Du Page County law enforcement agencies toexpunge from their records the arrests for the convictions forwhich he had been pardoned.

On October 5, 1999, the circuit court held a hearing on Thon'spetitions. Although respondent did not appear at the hearing, anassistant State's Attorney was present. The assistant State'sAttorney objected to granting the petitions. In grantingpetitioner's request for expungement, the circuit court cited twoseparate grounds. First, the court noted that the court in Peoplev. Wells, 294 Ill. App. 3d 405 (1998), outlined the factors toconsider in determining whether to grant a petition forexpungement. These factors, the court opined, weighed in favor ofgranting Thon's petitions for expungement. Second, the courtobserved that the language of the pardon restored to petitioner allof his rights of citizenship. The court reasoned that one of theserights was the right to expungement. The court explained that,"but for the conviction, had [petitioner] simply been arrestedwithout conviction, he would have been able to have these recordsexpunged." The expungement orders issued the same day and weredirected to local law enforcement authorities. The orders alsodirected the Illinois State Police, Bureau of Identification, toexpunge its files of petitioner's arrests.

Upon receiving the expungement orders, the State Policeconducted an internal audit of petitioner's arrest records. Theaudit revealed that the State Police had no record of some of thearrests. As for the remaining arrests, the State Police concludedthat it was prohibited from expunging its records pursuant tosection 5 of the Criminal Identification Act (Act) (20 ILCS 2630/5(West 1998)).

On December 21, 1999, petitioner's attorney contacted theState Police regarding the status of its compliance with theexpungement orders. James Redlich, chief legal counsel for theState Police, responded in a letter dated January 25, 2000.Redlich, in consultation with the Office of the Governor, opinedthat petitioner was not eligible for expungement. Redlich notedthat petitioner was pardoned in 1983. At that time, Illinois lawdid not allow expungement of records based upon a pardon. SeePeople v. Glisson, 69 Ill. 2d 502 (1978). Redlich acknowledgedthat, since Glisson, section 5(c) of the Act (20 ILCS 2630/5(c)(West 1998)) has been amended to recognize the Governor's authorityto "specifically authorize[] expungement" after a pardon. However,petitioner's pardon did not specifically authorize expungement. Inany case, Redlich opined that, even if Governor Thompson had wantedto authorize expungement, the statutory expungement authority wasnot available in 1983. Thus, Redlich concluded that theexpungement orders were void pursuant to section 5(f) of the Act(20 ILCS 2630/5(f) (West 1998)).

On February 23, 2000, Thon filed a petition for a rule to showcause why respondent should not be held in contempt of court forhis failure to comply with the expungement orders. On March 3,2000, respondent filed a "Combined Response to Defendant's Petitionfor Rule to Show Cause and Motion to Vacate Expungement Orders." The response reiterated that, because section 5(c) of the Act hadonly recently been amended to recognize the Governor's authority toauthorize expungement after a pardon, the power did not exist priorto enactment of the pertinent provision of the statute. Respondentcited to Glisson in support of his theory that the Governor'spardon power did not include the expungement of criminal records. Regarding the language of the pardon itself, respondent argued thatthe pardon did not "acquit" petitioner of the offenses themselves. Rather, it "acquitted" him of "further imprisonment."

Relying on People v. Holum, 166 Ill. App. 3d 658 (1988),petitioner replied that respondent's motion was untimely because itwas filed more than 30 days after the expungement orders issued. Petitioner also argued that the effect of the pardon was to"acquit" him of his crimes. Consequently, petitioner concluded, hewas eligible for expungement pursuant to section 5 of the Act.

On March 22, 2000, the parties argued the merits of theirrespective filings before the circuit court. The court concludedthat respondent's motion to vacate was untimely because it wasfiled more than 30 days after the expungement orders issued. Thecourt also rejected respondent's position that the expungementorders were void. Relying on Holum, the court noted that an orderis void if the court lacks subject matter or personal jurisdictionor if the order is based on a lack of authority. Holum, 166 Ill.App. 3d at 661. However, the Holum court noted that the lattersituation applies only in "clear-cut" circumstances. Holum, 166Ill. App. 3d at 661. The court reasoned that, at the time theexpungement orders issued, it had jurisdiction over the parties andthe subject matter. Further, the court opined that this was not aclear-cut case. The court also reiterated that the pardon gavepetitioner "all of his rights that he would have enjoyed had henever been convicted." The court opined that this language "couldnot [have been] more clear." Thus, the court found that petitionerwas entitled to expungement of his records. Respondent nowappeals.

II. ANALYSIS

Respondent asks us to determine whether petitioner is eligibleto have his records expunged pursuant to section 5 of the Act where petitioner's convictions were subject to a gubernatorialpardon. The trial court determined that it lacked jurisdiction toaddress the propriety of the expungement orders becauserespondent's motion to vacate, which was filed more than 30 daysafter the expungement orders issued, was untimely, and the orderswere not void.

Respondent does not dispute that his motion to vacate wasfiled more than 30 days after the expungement orders issued. However, he claims that the expungement orders may be attacked atany time because they are void. Respondent advances two reasons insupport of his position. First, he notes that section 5(f) of theAct (20 ILCS 2630/5(f) (West 1998)) deems "void" any order thatviolates section 5. Respondent asserts that the expungement ordersviolated section 5 because expungement is not available to anindividual, such as petitioner, who has been previously convictedof a criminal offense. See 20 ILCS 2630/5(a) (West 1998). Respondent also points out that section 5(c) of the Act (20 ILCS2630/5(c) (West 1998)) allows expungement after a pardon only whenthe pardon specifically authorizes expungement. Petitioner'spardon did not specifically authorize expungement. Second,respondent argues that because petitioner was ineligible forexpungement under the Act, the circuit court lacked the inherentpower to grant expungement to petitioner.

Petitioner counters that the expungement orders are not voidunder section 5(f) of the Act because section 5(a) permitsexpungement to those individuals "acquitted" of a criminal offense. Relying on the language of the pardoning document itself,petitioner suggests that the gubernatorial pardon "acquitted" himand "restored [him] to all his rights of citizenship which may havebeen forfeited by his convictions." For the same reason,petitioner also disputes respondent's contention that the circuitcourt lacked the inherent power to enter the expungement orders.

At the outset we note that article V, section 12, of theIllinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. V,