JUSTICE BYRNE delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a stipulated bench trial, defendant, Ricky E. Velez,was found guilty of resisting a police officer (720 ILCS 5/31--1(a)(West 2000)) and unlawful use of weapons (UUW) (720 ILCS 5/24--1(a)(1) (West 2000)). The trial court imposed concurrent sentencesof one year of conditional discharge for each conviction. Thewritten sentencing order further stated, "restitution paid to SAOW/I 60 days of demand." On appeal, defendant raises only twoissues: (1) whether his possession of a malfunctioning switchbladeknife supports his UUW conviction and (2) whether the trial court'srestitution order is enforceable. We affirm the convictions, butwe reverse the portion of the sentence ordering defendant to payrestitution.

FACTS

On February 24, 2000, the State filed a three-count complaintcharging defendant with (1) crossing a roadway at any point otherthan within a marked crosswalk (625 ILCS 5/11--1003(a) (West2000)); (2) resisting a police officer; and (3) "unlawful use of aweapon 'possession of a switchblade' " in that defendant "knowinglypossessed a knife commonly referred to as a 'switchblade' which hasa blade that opens automatically by hand pressure applied to abutton."

Defendant filed a motion to quash the arrest and suppressevidence. At the hearing on the motion, Aurora police officerShawn McCleary testified that, on February 22, 2000, he waspatrolling a residential area when he noticed "two kids" walking inthe area. At 4:58 p.m., McCleary was writing a ticket for anillegally parked car when "an unknown individual" approached andstated that he thought he had seen two men with an open can ofbeer. The person did not describe the two men or identify them byname, but he pointed in the direction where McCleary had previouslynoticed the two young men walking. McCleary had not noticed anyopen alcohol when he passed the two individuals before hisdiscussion with the tipster.

Based on the tip, McCleary drove his squad car in search ofthe suspected offenders. Five to six minutes later, McClearyapproached a park and encountered the two individuals he had seenbefore, one of whom was defendant. The officer did not see theindividuals carry alcohol or throw anything as he approached, buthe saw them cross the street without using a crosswalk. WhenMcCleary asked to speak with them, the individuals initially walkedaway in opposite directions but returned to McCleary when he exitedthe squad car. McCleary told defendant and his companion that hewas detaining them based on the tip. When the officer asked thetwo for identification, defendant produced a school identificationcard that showed no date of birth. McCleary saw a stateidentification card in defendant's wallet and asked him to removeit. Defendant initially protested but then produced the card,which indicated that he was 21 years old. The other individualstated that he was 14 years old and had no identification.

At McCleary's direction, defendant and the juvenile placedtheir hands on the squad car and submitted to a pat-down search,which disclosed nothing. McCleary then stated that he would issuethem citations because he saw them cross the street at a pointoutside of a crosswalk. McCleary testified that he could notrecall whether the street had marked crosswalks. McCleary tolddefendant that he was required to post bond by paying $75 orsurrendering a valid driver's license. Defendant stated that hehad neither and walked away.

McCleary attempted to arrest defendant, but he pulled away andrefused to be handcuffed. McCleary performed a "leg sweep" tosubdue defendant, and the officer's pants were ripped twice duringthe struggle. McCleary handcuffed defendant, and a second searchdisclosed a switchblade knife in a rear pocket of defendant'spants. The knife did not function properly, but defendant was"extremely belligerent and hostile" during the encounter. Afterthe arrest, McCleary searched the area for evidence of alcoholconsumption, but he found nothing. McCleary handcuffed thejuvenile and transported both suspects to the police station.

The court denied defendant's motion to quash the arrest andsuppress evidence, noting that an arrest need not be valid for aperson to be criminally liable for resisting the arrest. The courtadmitted the knife as the fruit of the search incident to a lawfularrest for resisting a police officer. Defense counsel requesteda stipulated bench trial and defendant signed a jury waiver form.The parties stipulated to McCleary's testimony and the relevantpolice reports, and the attorneys argued the case.

Defense counsel asserted that defendant did not violate thestreet-crossing statute because there was no evidence that he hadfailed to yield to any vehicle. Counsel did not address the chargeof resisting a police officer, but she contended that defendantcould not be guilty of UUW because McCleary admitted that theswitchblade knife did not have "a blade that opens automaticallywhen pressure is applied to a button."

The trial court found defendant not guilty of crossing aroadway outside of a crosswalk and conceded that defendant's knifewas broken at the time of the arrest. Nevertheless, the courtfound defendant guilty of resisting a police officer and UUW. Thecourt concluded that the statute prohibiting the possession ofswitchblade knives applies equally to functioning andmalfunctioning knives.

The prosecutor argued that defendant should pay restitution tothe City of Aurora for the damage to McCleary's pants. The courtinquired whether the officer personally paid for the pants, andMcCleary stated "I never submitted a bill to the city for that." In the sentencing order, the court wrote "restitution paid to SAOW/I 60 days of demand." The court never heard evidence of thevalue of the damaged pants or defendant's ability to pay for them. Defendant's posttrial motion was denied, and this timely appealfollowed.

ANALYSIS

Defendant initially contends that he was not proved guiltybeyond a reasonable doubt of UUW. When a defendant challenges thesufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court will reverse theconviction only if, after viewing the evidence in the light mostfavorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could havefound the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonabledoubt. People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541 (1999).

A person commits unlawful use of weapons when he knowingly"[s]ells, manufactures, purchases, possesses, or carries any ***knife, commonly referred to as a switchblade knife, which has ablade that opens automatically by hand pressure applied to abutton, spring, or other device in the handle of the knife."(Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/24--1(a)(1) (West 2000). It isundisputed that defendant's knife had a blade that was designed toopen automatically when a button on the handle was pressed. However, the knife could not operate as designed because the bladedid not open when the button was pressed. Because the knife wasinoperable, defendant contends that it was not a "switchblade"under section 24--1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720ILCS 5/24-1(a)(1) (West 2000)). The interpretation of the term"switchblade" in section 24--1(a)(1) is a question of statutoryconstruction that is subject to de novo review. See People v.Lamborn, 185 Ill. 2d 585, 590 (1999).

This case is similar to People v. Martinez, 285 Ill. App. 3d881 (1996), in which the defendant was convicted of UUW forpossessing a stun gun pursuant to section 24--1(a)(4) of the Code(720 ILCS 5/24--1(a)(4) (West 2000)). The stun gun had a crack inthe casing near the antennae which rendered the gun incapable ofproducing an electrical current. Martinez, 285 Ill. App. 3d at882-83. A device is a "stun gun" under the UUW statute if it "cansend out a current capable of disrupting the person's nervoussystem in such a manner as to render him incapable of normalfunctioning." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/24--1(a)(10) (West2000).

The defendant argued that the statutory phrase "can send"required the State to prove the stun gun's present functionality. The Appellate Court, First District, rejected the defendant'sargument, holding that the phrase "can send" was descriptive of thedevice's design and intended function rather than its presentability to send an incapacitating charge. Martinez, 285 Ill. App.3d at 884. The court noted that "[a] stun gun, like any other toolor device, is not changed in character merely because of itspresent inability to perform." Martinez, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 884. The court affirmed the UUW conviction because the inoperable devicemet the statutory definition of "stun gun."

Here, the parties agree that defendant possessed a device thatwas designed and intended to operate as a switchblade knife. Likethe stun gun in Martinez, the character of the knife in this casedid not change merely because it did not operate properly. OfficerMcCleary testified that the knife's appearance suggested that itwould function normally at the time he seized it from defendant'spocket, and defendant concedes that the UUW statute reflects "astrong public policy to dissuade persons from carrying andbrandishing weapons or any 'objects' which have the appearance orcharacteristics" of a firearm or deadly weapon. (Emphasis added.) People v. Halley, 131 Ill. App. 2d 1070, 1073 (1971). Therefore,in agreement with Martinez, we hold that a defendant may be foundguilty of UUW if he possesses a malfunctioning or inoperableswitchblade knife. After viewing the evidence in the light mostfavorable to the prosecution, we conclude that any rational trierof fact could have found the essential elements of UUW beyond areasonable doubt. See Smith, 185 Ill. 2d at 541.

Defendant cites several cases in which the defendants arguedthat they were not guilty of possessing a gun under the UUW statutebecause the weapons were "broken down in a non-functioning state." Exemptions from criminal liability for UUW exist for "weapons thatare broken down in a non-functioning state or are not immediatelyaccessible." 720 ILCS 5/24--2(b)(4) (West 2000). The defendantbears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence hisentitlement to the exemption. 720 ILCS 5/24--2(h) (West 2000). However, the section 24--2(b)(4) exemption governs only thosedefendants charged with UUW under section 24--1(a)(4) or section 24--1(a)(10) of the Code, and defendant concedes that the exemptiondoes not apply here. Furthermore, a weapon is "broken down in anon-functioning state" under the exemption only if it isdisassembled rather than accidentally broken. Martinez, 285 Ill.App. 3d at 885. Therefore, even if the exemption governedswitchblade knives, we would conclude that defendant's knife wasnot broken down in a nonfunctioning state. However, we acknowledgethat a device may be in such a decrepit state that it ceases toqualify as a switchblade knife under section 24--1(a)(1), and sucha determination is a question for the trier of fact.

Defendant next challenges the portion of the judgment whichstates "restitution paid to SAO W/I 60 days of demand." Contraryto defendant's assertion, the written order is not inconsistentwith the trial judge's oral comments at the sentencing hearing. See People v. Allen, 109 Ill. 2d 177, 184 (1985) ("when there is aconflict between the common law record and the report ofproceedings[,] the court should resolve the conflict by looking atthe record as a whole").

Our review of the record reveals that the court intended forthe Du Page County State's Attorney's office to ascertain the valueof Officer McCleary's damaged pants and then demand defendant topay that amount. It is unclear whether the City of Aurora orMcCleary was to ultimately receive the funds, but McClearysuggested at the hearing that the city would reimburse him for hisloss if he submitted a request.

Defendant argues that the restitution order is invalid becauseit does not fix an amount to be paid. When ordering restitution,a trial court must set forth in the sentencing order a definiteamount that the defendant must pay. 730 ILCS 5/5--5--6(b) (West2000). If the court does not specify a definite amount, the causeordinarily will be remanded for the court to amend the sentencingorder to reflect the amount due. People v. Otten, 228 Ill. App. 3d305, 312 (1992).

However, a police department or government agency is notconsidered a "victim" within the meaning of the restitution statutebecause an expenditure directed to solving crimes is part of theinvestigatory agency's normal operating costs. Therefore, arestitution order should be reversed if it is intended tocompensate the agency for these expenses. People v. Derengoski,247 Ill. App. 3d 751, 754-55 (1993). Under the circumstances ofthis case, McCleary's loss qualifies as a reasonably expected lawenforcement expense and it appears that McCleary could seekreimbursement from the city. Therefore, we reverse the portion ofthe judgment that orders defendant to pay an indeterminate amountof restitution. See Derengoski, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 755.

Finally, we note that appellate counsel has failed to raisethe issue of the legitimacy of Officer McCleary's conduct at thetime of the arrest, and we decline to address this or any otherissue sua sponte. The portion of the judgment ordering restitutionis reversed, and the remainder of the judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

HUTCHINSON, P.J., and GROMETER, J., concur.