School district boundary changes are governed by section7--01 et seq. of the School Code (Code) (105 ILCS 5/7--01 et seq.(West 1998)). Plaintiffs filed their petition under section 7--1 of the Code,which provides for the alteration of school district boundaries lying entirelywithin any educational service region. 105 ILCS 5/7--1 (West 1998). Section7--6(i) of the Code provides that, at a hearing on a petition for detachment andannexation filed under section 7--1, the regional board of school trustees

"shall hear evidence as to the school needs and conditions of the territory in the area within and adjacent thereto and as to the ability of the districts affected to meet the standards of recognition as prescribed by the State Board of Education, and shall take into consideration the division of funds and assets which will result from the change of boundaries and shall determine whether it is to the best interests of the schools of the area and the educational welfare of the pupils that such change in boundaries be granted." 105 ILCS 5/7--6(i) (West 1998).

The parties seeking annexation and detachment have the burdenof proving that "the overall benefit to the annexing district and thedetachment area clearly outweighs the resulting detriment to the losing districtand the surrounding community as a whole." Carver v.Bond/Fayette/Effingham Regional Board of School Trustees, 146 Ill. 2d 347,356 (1992). Petitioners must prove their case by a preponderance of theevidence. See 5 ILCS 100/10--15 (West 1998). The party bearing the burden ofproof retains throughout the proceedings the burden of persuasion as to thefacts underlying its claim. Ambrose v. Thornton Township School Trustees,274 Ill. App. 3d 676, 680 (1995). The party also bears initially the burden ofproduction, which it satisfies by presenting sufficient evidence on each elementof its cause of action to establish a prima facie case. Ambrose,274 Ill. App. 3d at 680. A prima facie case is made by evidence thatwould enable the trier of fact to find each element of the cause of action moreprobably true than not. Anderson v. Department of Public Property, 140Ill. App. 3d 772, 778 (1986). If the opposing party produces no evidence thatcontradicts or impeaches this evidence, the trier of fact must rule for theburdened party. Anderson, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 778.

A regional board of school trustees' decision on a petitionfor detachment and annexation is an administrative decision for purposes of theAdministrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3--101 et seq. (West 1998)). See105 ILCS 5/7--7 (West 1998). A reviewing court considers the factual findings ofan administrative agency to be prima facie true and correct. 735 ILCS5/3--110 (West 1994). The reversal of an administrative agency's factual findingis warranted only where the finding is against the manifest weight of theevidence and it is clearly evident that the agency should have reached theopposite conclusion. City of Freeport v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board,135 Ill. 2d 499, 507 (1990). Decisions of an administrative agency on questionsof law, such as the interpretation of a statute, are reviewed de novo. Cityof Freeport, 135 Ill. 2d at 507.

In balancing the benefit to the annexing district and to thedetachment area against the detriment to the detaching district and to thesurrounding community as a whole, regional boards and the courts reviewing theiractions should consider the following factors: the differences between schoolfacilities and curricula; the distances from the petitioners' homes to therespective schools; the effect detachment would have on the ability of eitherdistrict to meet State standards of recognition; and the impact of the proposedboundary change on the tax revenues of both districts. Carver, 146 Ill.2d at 356. The mere absence of substantial detriment to either district is notsufficient to support a petition for detachment and annexation. Carver,146 Ill. 2d at 358. However, petitioners need not demonstrate a particularbenefit to the annexing district as long as the overall benefit to the annexingdistrict and the detachment area considered together outweighs the resultingdetriment to the losing district and the surrounding community as a whole. Carver,146 Ill. 2d at 358, citing Board of Education of Golf School District No. 67v. Regional Board of School Trustees, 89 Ill. 2d 392, 400-01 (1982). In theabsence of substantial detriment to either school district, some benefit to theeducational welfare of the students in the detachment area is sufficient towarrant the granting of a petition for detachment. Carver, 146 Ill. 2d at358.

The Carver court provided some admonitions on how thebalancing test and relevant factors should be applied. The loss of revenue isnot a determinative factor in detachment proceedings and alone will not preventa boundary change if the district subject to detachment is not levying at themaximum tax rate. Carver, 146 Ill. 2d at 356. Whether a detachingdistrict can remain financially viable and able to comply with statutorystandards for recognition is more important than the size of the loss of taxrevenues and assessed valuation. Carver, 146 Ill. 2d at 356-57. Althoughfinancial loss to the detaching district is not irrelevant, it cannot serve asthe basis for a denial of detachment unless it is serious. Carver, 146Ill. 2d at 357.

Educational welfare is to be broadly interpreted. Carver,146 Ill. 2d at 359. Students' educational welfare is bettered not just throughimproved educational programs or facilities. Carver, 146 Ill. 2d at359-60. Betterment may also occur by way of a shortened distance betweenstudents' homes and their school. Carver, 146 Ill. 2d at 359-60; see alsoGolf, 89 Ill. 2d at 400 ("Students from the detachment area wouldbenefit by improved safety conditions in traveling to and from school"); Burnidgev. County Board of School Trustees, 25 Ill. App. 2d 503, 509 (1960)("In addition to the savings in transportation costs, and diminution intime spent daily by children riding a bus, there would be a certain safetyfactor by reason of diminution of exposure and certainly a lessening of fatigueaccompanying a long bus ride to and from school"); Board of Education ofJonesboro Community Consolidated School District No. 43 v. Regional Board ofSchool Trustees, 86 Ill. App. 3d 230, 234 (1980) (benefit of shorterdistance to school "would be reflected in time, safety, effort, andexpense"). A reduction in travel time, however, is not sufficient by itselfto justify a boundary change. First National Bank v. West Aurora SchoolDistrict 129, 200 Ill. App. 3d 210, 217 (1990); Fixmer v. Regional Boardof School Trustees, 146 Ill. App. 3d 660, 665 (1986). Although relevant, thepersonal preferences of the petitioners as to shopping, banking, et cetera,are not a sufficient basis for granting a petition. Carver, 146 Ill. 2dat 356, 358.

Students' educational welfare can also be improved through anincreased identification with their "natural community center," whichwould increase participation in school and extracurricular activities. Carver,146 Ill. 2d at 360. In Burnidge, the court observed that a student'sclose proximity to his school can foster an identification with his naturalcommunity center and that the resulting increased participation in schoolactivities "cannot but result in an improvement in the educational pictureof the entire area." Burnidge, 25 Ill. App. 2d at 509-10. Bycontrast, "an unnatural identification with a school district would have anopposite result with a corresponding loss of participation and resulting poorereducational picture." Burnidge, 25 Ill. App. 2d at 510.

We conclude that the Regional Board's decision denyingplaintiffs' petition was against the manifest weight of the evidence.Specifically, we determine that plaintiffs made a prima facie case fordetachment and annexation that defendants did not contradict or impeach. We notethat there is no factual dispute with respect to three of the four Carverfactors. First, the parties agree that the curricula and facilities of District79 and District 96 are not significantly different. Second, defendants adducedno evidence that detachment and annexation of Cobblestone would prevent eitherdistrict from complying with state standards. Third, it is undisputed thatCobblestone students currently undergo a significant commute to District 79elementary and secondary schools. It is also undisputed that District 96 hasboth an elementary school and a secondary school located on the lot contiguousto Cobblestone and that Cobblestone students are the only Long Grove residentswho attend school in District 79 rather than District 96.

There was testimony that travel to and from Fremont can beextremely onerous when traffic is heavy and that the duration of the commute ispreventing some students from participating in after-school activities. Therealso was testimony that some Cobblestone children have had trouble coping withtheir friends' attending a different high school from theirs upon graduationfrom Fremont. Cobblestone students, the parties agree, would all attend the samehigh school if Cobblestone were annexed to District 96. There also was testimonythat the distance from Fremont is creating a sense of isolation in Cobblestoneand that Fremont events and activities are not covered in the Long Grovenewspaper.

We find that Cobblestone's presence in District 79 hascreated a situation, contemplated by Burnidge, in which students, forcedto commute to a school well outside their neighborhood, are suffering from anunnatural identification with a school district that is not within theircommunity center. See Burnidge, 25 Ill. App. 2d at 510. We believe thatpermitting Cobblestone children to attend the District 96 schools in theirneighborhood would facilitate their participation in extracurricular activities,thereby making them more fulfilled students. Moreover, District 96 clearly wouldbe benefitted by the contributions of Cobblestone students.

Ironically, the benefits of Cobblestone children attendingthe District 96 schools contiguous to their subdivision was at one timerecognized by District 96 itself. Plaintiffs introduced evidence that the desireto foster a sense of community between Cobblestone and Country-Woodlawn wasreciprocal. In light of the obvious advantages of children attending a schoolonly a short distance from their homes, we hardly are surprised that we cannotfind another case in this state dealing with a situation in which a schooldistrict has opposed a petition to annex a subdivision located literally nextdoor to a school in that district. It is as much the distance betweenCobblestone and Country-Woodlawn as it is the distance between Cobblestone andFremont that makes plaintiffs' petition compelling.

As for the remaining factor--the financial impact ofannexation and detachment-- plaintiffs presented evidence that District 79currently is running a deficit in the education of Cobblestone students andwould benefit financially if relieved of the cost of educating these students.Indeed, that District 79, with an enrollment of 1,400, would be financiallyharmed in a significant way by the loss of 22 students is manifestlyimplausible, especially in light of its projected growth of 300 students peryear.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that plaintiffs produceda prima facie case that granting their petition clearly would benefitCobblestone and District 96 more than that it would harm District 79 and thesurrounding community. Defendants did not contradict this prima faciecase. They presented no evidence that Cobblestone residents generally would notbenefit from inclusion in District 96. Kolb and Rieder, who testified that thedistance between Cobblestone and Fremont has not prevented their children fromparticipating in Fremont activities and that they could think of no significantbenefit that annexation to District 79 would confer on Cobblestone children,spoke for no one but themselves and their own families. Moreover, Rieder did notindicate how he, a resident of Hawthorne Woods, could be taken to represent theviews of Cobblestone residents.

Also inconsequential were defendants' attempts to show thatCobblestone residents do not consider Long Grove their community of interest.Kolb and Rieder testified that their families have little to do with Long Grove.However, Kolb testified only for herself and her family and expressly admittedthat she was unable to speak for Cobblestone generally. She certainly did notspeak for Helen Pochopien, a resident of Cobblestone who testified that sheregularly shops in Long Grove. Rieder, a resident of Hawthorne Woods, did notestablish how he could represent the views of Long Grove residents, much lessCobblestone residents. Dr. Friker testified that, as a member of the RotaryClub, he thought that Kolb's description of the "shopping trends" inCobblestone was "essentially accurate." Kolb, however, did not testifyabout general Cobblestone shopping trends. Nor, quite obviously, is amunicipality's sense of community built only on shopping.

Defendants did not rebut plaintiffs' evidence concerning thefinancial detriment the districts would suffer if Cobblestone were detached.Blake, the sole witness to address plaintiffs' financial impact statement,testified that it showed District's 96's "revenue as opposed toexpenses," but he did not develop this bare comment enough to show whatweight it might have. Blake criticized the financial impact statement forindicating that District 96's costs would not increase between 1997 and 1998,but he conceded that he was not certain that costs would not remain static.Also, Blake made no comment at all on the accuracy of the financial data forDistrict 79.

Defendants presented evidence that the detachment ofCobblestone would deprive District 79 of $102,000 in revenue, but we are unableto understand the significance of this figure because defendants did not produceevidence of District 79's total yearly revenue to place the figure inperspective. Defendants cite no cases giving us the authority to deem District79's projected loss of revenue as serious without our knowing what portion ofDistrict 79's total yearly revenue this loss would comprise. Defendants'opposition to the petition is weakened further by the complete absence from therecord of evidence that this loss would preclude District 79 from complying withstate standards. See Carver, 146 Ill. 2d at 356-57. Lastly, District 79'sclaim that the loss of the 22 Cobblestone students would cause significantrevenue loss is countered by its admission that it projects growth at the rateof 300 students per year with a corresponding increase in revenue.

Defendants also presented no evidence that the annexation ofCobblestone would deleteriously affect District 96. Dr. Many testified that theonly foreseeable change might be an increase in part-time teachers, which woulddepend on where the students were assigned and on the final enrollments. Blaketestified that District 96 had extended its existing debt in the expectationthat its boundaries would remain constant, but he did not explain how thisreliance would translate into a financial detriment to District 96 if annexationoccurred. Most significantly, defendants failed to explain what negative effectannexation would have on District 96's ability to comply with state standards.See Carver, 146 Ill. 2d at 356-57.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that defendants not onlyfailed to rebut plaintiffs' calculation of the financial consequences of theproposed boundary change but they also generally failed to present evidence thatthe boundary change would result in serious financial detriment to either schooldistrict or would prevent either district from complying with state standards.Thus, defendants have failed to prove financial detriment sufficient to supportthe denial of plaintiffs' petition. See Carver, 146 Ill. 2d at 356-57.

We are mindful of Dr. Many's testimony that there is noguarantee that Cobblestone children would be able to attend Country Meadows andWoodlawn if the petition was granted. However, Dr. Many did not support thisassertion with a reference to an extrinsic source. Although we cannot discernthe attendance boundaries for Country-Woodlawn from the record, we findincredible the suggestion that Cobblestone children would not be within theattendance boundaries for these schools after annexation.

We also recognize that annexation to District 96 would forceCobblestone students to compete for positions on athletic teams whereas, inDistrict 79, every student is guaranteed a position. A school's athleticprograms, of course, are only one element of its educational mission. Moreover,it is far better for a student to undergo tryouts than to be unable toparticipate in an athletic program simply because his school is too far awayfrom his home, as is happening currently to some Cobblestone students.

Finally, we recognize that Cobblestone kindergarten studentswould be bused to a school in the southern portion of District 96 wereCobblestone annexed. These students, however, would each have to endure only oneyear of commuting as opposed to the several years of commuting currently enduredby each elementary and middle school child from Cobblestone. Moreover, there isno evidence in the record that the commute to District 96's kindergartenfacility would be any longer than the commute to District 79's kindergartenfacility.

In conclusion, defendants have failed to counter plaintiffs' primafacie showing that the significant distance between Fremont andCobblestone has hindered Cobblestone children's opportunity to participate inschool activities and caused them to feel isolated from their school. Plaintiffsalso have shown that annexation to District 96 would eliminate these problems byplacing Cobblestone students in a school located within their natural communitycenter. Defendants also failed to counter plaintiffs' prima faciecase by demonstrating a level of financial impact that would hinder eitherdistrict's ability to comply with state standards. We conclude that plaintiffsclearly demonstrated that the benefits of detachment and annexation outweigh anydetriments. Accordingly, we hold that the Regional Board's denial of plaintiffs'petition was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is reversed.

Reversed.

McLAREN and RAPP, JJ., concur.