I. BACKGROUND

Warehouse Direct is in the office-supply business. In September 1997,plaintiff began working for Office Depot, one of Warehouse Direct's competitors. In May 1998, a manufacturer in the office-supply business invited its customersto attend a Chicago Cubs baseball game. Plaintiff, who was still employed byOffice Depot, attended the event. Also present was John Moyer, Warehouse Direct'spresident. After the game, Moyer and plaintiff discussed the benefits of workingfor Warehouse Direct. Moyer told plaintiff that Warehouse Direct offers a higherrate of commission and better customer service than Office Depot. Approximatelytwo weeks later, Moyer and plaintiff met for lunch. At that meeting, plaintifftold Moyer that he sells about $40,000 worth of merchandise each month at OfficeDepot.

On May 29, 1998, Moyer sent plaintiff a letter offering him a sales positionwith Warehouse Direct. The letter offered plaintiff a commission of 26.5% of thegross margin on all sales. In addition, the letter stated:

"TO PROVIDE INCENTIVE FOR YOU TO JOIN US AND TIME FOR YOU TO BUILD YOURSALES, WAREHOUSE DIRECT WILL PAY YOU COMMISSION + WITH A GUARANTEE ASFOLLOWS:

COMMISSION + $2000/MONTH FOR FIRST 15 MONTHS

THEN COMMISSION + $1900/MONTH FOR 1 MONTH,

THEN COMMISSION + $1800/MONTH FOR 1 MONTH,

'+' PAY DECLINES BY $100/MONTH TO 0,

AND WAREHOUSE DIRECT WILL GUARANTEE MINIMUM PAY OF $5,000/MO YOUR FIRSTYEAR."

After receiving the letter, plaintiff spoke to Moyer about extending theguaranteed minimum pay of $5,000 a month from 12 months to 18 months. Plaintiffalso asked Moyer if Warehouse Direct would reimburse him for $1,500 in businessexpenses and pay for the installation of a business telephone line in his home. On June 4, 1998, Moyer sent plaintiff a letter "clarif[ying] and superced[ing his]previous letter of May 29, 1998." The June 4, 1998, letter extended theguaranteed minimum pay of $5,000 to 18 months. In addition, Warehouse Directagreed to plaintiff's other expense requests.

Upon receiving the June 4, 1998, letter, plaintiff communicated with Moyeragain. Plaintiff told Moyer that he would start working for Warehouse Directimmediately if (1) the guaranteed minimum salary of $5,000 a month was increasedto $5,500 a month and (2) the term was extended from 18 months to 24 months. Asa result of this conversation, Moyer signed and delivered to plaintiff a thirdletter on June 8, 1998. Moyer's June 8, 1998, letter stated that it "clarifiesand supercedes [his] previous letters of May 29, 1998 and June 4, 1998." Theletter, which incorporated the changes requested by plaintiff, read in pertinentpart:

"WAREHOUSE DIRECT COMMISSION IS 26.5% OF GROSS MARGIN ON ALL ORDERS. TOPROVIDE INCENTIVE FOR YOU TO JOIN US AND TIME FOR YOU TO BUILD YOUR SALES,WAREHOUSE DIRECT WILL PAY YOU COMMISSION + WITH A GUARANTEE AS FOLLOWS:

COMMISSION + $2000/MONTH FOR FIRST 15 MONTHS

THEN COMMISSION + $1900/MONTH FOR 1 MONTH,

THEN COMMISSION + $1800/MONTH FOR 1 MONTH,

'+' PAY DECLINES BY $100/MONTH TO 0,

AND WAREHOUSE DIRECT WILL GUARANTEE MINIMUM PAY OF $5,500/MO YOUR FIRST TWOYEARS."

Plaintiff began working for Warehouse Direct on June 23, 1998.

Unsatisfied with plaintiff's sales figures, Moyer spoke to him in August1998. Plaintiff ensured Moyer that his sales volume would improve. In September,Moyer met with plaintiff to discuss his sales performance. That same month,Warehouse Direct decreased plaintiff's monthly salary to $5,000. In a letterdated September 28, 1998, plaintiff expressed his concern regarding the reductionof his monthly pay and asked Warehouse Direct to reinstate his original salary.

On October 1, 1998, Moyer responded to plaintiff's September 28, 1998,letter. Moyer explained that Warehouse Direct would have to terminate itsrelationship with plaintiff if plaintiff could not "produce a sales volumereasonable to [his] minimum and as represented in a reasonable period of time." In a letter dated October 7, 1998, plaintiff responded that he would "continue todo [his] best to develop sales volume for Warehouse Direct." On October 12, 1998,Moyer sent plaintiff a letter terminating his employment with Warehouse Direct.

On November 5, 1998, plaintiff instituted the instant action in the circuitcourt of Du Page County. Plaintiff's amended complaint, filed on January 14,1999, contained three counts. Count I alleged that the June 8, 1998, letterbetween plaintiff and defendant constituted a contract guaranteeing a minimumsalary of $5,500 a month for a period of two years. Plaintiff alleged thatdefendant breached the contract by first reducing his monthly pay and then byterminating his employment. Count II stated a claim for promissory estoppel inwhich plaintiff alleged that he resigned from his position at Office Depot inreliance on defendant's promise to pay him a guaranteed minimum monthly salary of$5,500 for two years. Count III of the complaint stated a claim for defamationper se. Plaintiff alleged that Moyer falsely told a Warehouse Direct employeethat plaintiff misrepresented the amount of business he could bring to thecompany. Plaintiff later agreed to dismiss count III of his complaint, and thetrial court entered an order dismissing count III with prejudice.

On July 12, 1999, defendant filed an answer and a counterclaim. Defendant'scounterclaim alleged that plaintiff owed defendant more than $17,000 in overpaidwages. In response, plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim asfrivolous and a motion for sanctions. At a hearing in August 1999, defendantrequested and was granted until September 15, 1999, to respond to plaintiff'smotion to dismiss. Defendant never responded to the motion to dismiss and, onOctober 6, 1999, defendant withdrew the counterclaim. The court granted defendant28 days to file an amended counterclaim. The court denied plaintiff's motion forsanctions. Defendant did not file an amended counterclaim within the timespecified by the trial court.

Early in November 1999, the parties filed cross-motions for summaryjudgment. On November 23, 1999, the trial court granted defendant's motion forleave to file instanter its amended counterclaim. The gist of defendant's amendedcounterclaim was that plaintiff misrepresented his monthly sales volume whileemployed at Office Depot and that defendant relied on plaintiff's representationin hiring him and paying him $5,500 per month.

On December 15, 1999, the trial court granted summary judgment inplaintiff's favor with respect to liability on counts I and II of his amendedcomplaint. On March 23, 2000, the trial court held a hearing on damages. In itsruling, the court noted that plaintiff's employment contract did not expire untilJune 2000. However, the court held that Illinois law limits damages in wrongful-discharge cases to those damages occurring up to the date of trial. The courtalso determined that plaintiff mitigated his damages. Accordingly, the courtentered judgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $31,577 plus the costs ofthe suit. The court's order contained language that it was final and appealable.

On April 18, 2000, plaintiff filed a bill of costs and a motion forsanctions against defendant pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R.137). On April 24, 2000, defendant filed a notice of appeal from the trialcourt's December 15, 1999, and March 24, 2000, orders (No. 2--00--0458). On May1, 2000, plaintiff filed a notice of cross-appeal, requesting a modification ofdamages owed to plaintiff to include interest and future damages. On May 25,2000, defendant filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 137.

On June 21, 2000, the trial court granted plaintiff's bill of costs in theamount of $241, granted plaintiff's motion for sanctions in the amount of $1,625,and denied defendant's motion for sanctions. On July 24, 2000, defendant fileda motion to reconsider its request for sanctions and a notice of appeal from theDecember 15, 1999, March 24, 2000, and June 21, 2000, trial court orders (No. 2--00--0860). On our own motion, we dismissed appeal No. 2--00--0860. On August 17,2000, defendant moved to withdraw its motion to reconsider its request forsanctions. On September 7, 2000, the trial court entered an agreed order grantingdefendant's motion to withdraw its motion to reconsider its request for sanctions.

On September 22, 2000, defendant filed its third notice of appeal (No. 2--00--1129). The notice of appeal stated that it was an appeal from the ordersentered by the trial court on December 15, 1999, March 24, 2000, and June 21,2000. The notice further indicated that the last order became final on September7, 2000, when the trial court disposed of defendant's motion to reconsider. OnOctober 18, 2000, we granted defendant's motion to consolidate appeal No. 2--00--0458 with appeal No. 2--00--1129.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment

1. Breach of Contract

On appeal, defendant first contends that the trial court erred in grantingsummary judgment in plaintiff's favor on count I of his complaint. According todefendant, its June 8 letter to plaintiff created nothing more than an at-willemployment relationship. Defendant argues that the pay scale communicated in theletter was a "per month floor" for plaintiff's first two years of employment thatgradually decreased until plaintiff's salary was based entirely on his commission. Relying principally on Berutti v. Dierks Foods, Inc., 145 Ill. App. 3d 931 (1986),plaintiff maintains that the June 8 letter sets forth a pay schedule thatguarantees a salary for a specified duration.

A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when there is nogenuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as amatter of law. Nila v. Hartford Insurance Co., 312 Ill. App. 3d 811, 815 (2000). Our review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo. Nila, 312 Ill. App.3d at 815. In addition, where the facts are not in dispute, the existence andinterpretation of a contract are questions of law that the trial court may decideon a motion for summary judgment and that we may review independently. Lewis-Connelly v. Board of Education of Deerfield Public Schools, District 109, 277 Ill.App. 3d 554, 557 (1996).

Where the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, they will be giventheir natural and ordinary meanings. Berutti, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 934. Acontract is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one meaning. Bishop v.Lakeland Animal Hospital, P.C., 268 Ill. App. 3d 114, 117 (1994). However, acontract is not ambiguous solely because the parties disagree upon its meaning. Foxfield Realty, Inc. v. Kubala, 287 Ill. App. 3d 519, 524 (1997). Generally,absent a contrary intention, an employment agreement without a fixed duration isterminable at will by either party. Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth HospitalCenter, 115 Ill. 2d 482, 489 (1987). In fact, as we have previously noted, ahiring at a monthly or annual salary, if no duration is specified, is consideredto create an at-will employment relationship. Jago v. Miller Fluid Power Corp.,245 Ill. App. 3d 876, 878 (1993).

We find Berutti, 145 Ill. App. 3d 931, directly on point. In that case, theplaintiff worked for one of the defendant's competitors. The defendant'spersonnel recruiters contacted the plaintiff about employment. The defendantinformed the plaintiff that it expected an increase in sales for the territory inwhich it would assign him. In addition, while the defendant normally used astraight commission to compensate its sales staff, the plaintiff and the defendantdiscussed a pay schedule that included a base weekly salary. The agreement wasmemorialized in a letter that provided in pertinent part that the defendant wouldpay the plaintiff a "[g]uaranteed salary for twelve months of $750.00 per week. ($39K per annum)." Berutti, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 933. After only a few months,the defendant terminated the plaintiff on the basis that his sales performance wasinadequate. The plaintiff then filed a complaint against the defendant allegingbreach of an employment contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in theplaintiff's favor.

On appeal, this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Berutti,145 Ill. App. 3d at 937. We determined that the defendant's letter to theplaintiff contained "clear words of guarantee" that the defendant would pay theplaintiff a guaranteed salary for 12 months. Berutti, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 936. The language contained in the letter described more than a rate of pay. Itguaranteed a salary for a specific duration. Berutti, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 936. In Berutti, the defendant also argued that it did not breach the contract becausethe plaintiff was terminated for failure to increase sales in his territory. Defendant asserted that an employer retains the right to discharge an employee forcause regardless of the duration of the employee's contract. We rejected thedefendant's contention, noting that the correspondence between the parties did notprovide that the plaintiff was required to satisfy any performance requirements. Berutti, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 937.

Also instructive is Grauer v. Valve & Primer Corp., 47 Ill. App. 3d 152(1977). In Grauer, the plaintiff worked for the defendant during 1972 pursuantto an oral contract. On January 18, 1973, the defendant sent the plaintiff amemorandum which "guarantee[d him] a minimum of $22,500 in 1973--more likely$24,000 plus--because I look for $3,500,000 sales (i.e. Shipments). I review itannually based on performance." Grauer, 47 Ill. App. 3d at 154. The defendantterminated the plaintiff before the end of the year. The plaintiff then sued thedefendant, seeking damages for, inter alia, breach of an employment contract. Thetrial court entered judgment for the plaintiff, and this court affirmed.

We concluded that the January 18 memorandum, which "guarantee[d]" aspecified minimum compensation for 1973, contemplated a duration of employment forone year. Grauer, 47 Ill. App. 3d at 155. We also noted that, because thememorandum stated that the contract would be reviewed annually, there was a strongpresumption that the parties intended a one-year contract. Grauer, 47 Ill. App.3d at 155.

Similarly, in this case, defendant's June 8, 1998, letter containedunambiguous words of guarantee that specified a certain amount of compensation fora minimum period of time. The June 8 letter stated that defendant "WILL GUARANTEEMINIMUM PAY OF $5,500/MO YOUR FIRST TWO YEARS." In light of our previous holdingsin Grauer and Berutti, we find that the parties clearly intended more than an at-will employment relationship. We find further support for our position based onthe fact that plaintiff explicitly negotiated an increase in the monthly salaryas well as the term guaranteeing the salary for two years. Moreover, we notethat, as in Berutti, the June 8, 1998, letter did not indicate that plaintiff wasrequired to satisfy any performance requirements. Thus, the parties contemplatedan employment arrangement for a specified period of time.

Defendant claims that an opposite result is dictated by Orr v. Ward, 73 Ill.318 (1874), and Jago, 245 Ill. App. 3d 876. However, a review of those two casesdiscloses that defendant is mistaken.

In Orr, the defendant hired the plaintiff as a salesman pursuant to acontract for employment. The contract provided that the defendant would pay theplaintiff $2,100 for the year 1873 and $2,400 for the year 1874 as well as acommission on all sales in excess of $35,000. In June 1873, the defendant filedfor bankruptcy, and the plaintiff was subsequently discharged. Our supreme courtrejected the plaintiff's request for damages arising out of the alleged breach ofthe employment contract. The court noted that the parties' contract did notcontain a "stipulation [that the defendant would] retain [the plaintiff] for twoyears, or any other fixed period. Their undertaking is to pay him at a certainrate of compensation, if he shall discharge the duties assumed by him to beperformed." Orr, 73 Ill. at 319. In contrast, here, defendant guaranteedplaintiff a specified minimum salary for a period of two years.

In Jago, the plaintiff was hired by the defendant to manage a plant inPennsylvania. A letter from the defendant dated April 11, 1990, stated that theplaintiff would receive a base salary of $45,000 per year. The letter also statedthat the defendant's management incentive program "can contribute up to anadditional 20% of [the plaintiff's] base salary, prorated on a 7/12 ratio for thebalance of 1990. Each year thereafter, [the plaintiff] will be participating ona full year basis." Jago, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 877. The plaintiff was latertransferred to a plant in Illinois. A letter dated November 29, 1990, providedthat the plaintiff's salary would be $55,000 per year and that the plaintiff'sparticipation in the management bonus program would "remain the same." Jago, 245Ill. App. 3d at 877. The defendant also wrote that it expected the plaintiff to"report to [his] new position in Bensenville permanently on Monday, January 7,1991," and that it was confident that the plaintiff would make "a significantcontribution to help [the defendant] achieve its growth plans in the next severalyears." Jago, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 877-78. The defendant fired the plaintiff inJune 1991. The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant alleging breachof an employment contract and promissory estoppel. The trial court dismissed bothcounts.

On appeal, this court affirmed. Jago, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 877. We foundthat the November 29 letter did not contain an express durational term. Jago, 245Ill. App. 3d at 879. We reiterated the well-established principle that thereference to an annual salary does not convert a contract at will into a contractfor a specified duration. Jago, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 879. We also held that thefact that the plaintiff's bonus was to be calculated on a yearly basis did notevince an intent to establish a yearly term of employment. Jago, 245 Ill. App.3d at 879. Similarly, this court noted that a contract's reference to "permanent"employment is considered to be indefinite and terminable at will and thatreferences to defendant's growth "in the next several years" is merely considereda statement of expectation, and not a guarantee of employment for a specific term. Jago, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 879-80.

In Jago, as in Orr, the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendantdid not contain any language guaranteeing a specified salary for a specifiedduration. In fact, in Jago, we rejected the plaintiff's reliance on Grauer andBerutti precisely because the Jago plaintiff's employment agreement did not referto a "guaranteed salary" for a specific period of time. Jago, 245 Ill. App. 3dat 880. In the instant case, the June 8, 1998, letter contained a "guaranteedsalary" for a specific period of time.

Defendant also contends that the June 8 letter outlines a compensationstructure, not an employment schedule. Defendant reasons that the fact that theletter contains a "commission + with a guarantee" according to a sliding scaleindicates that the letter was not intended to constitute a contract of a minimumduration. We disagree. We read the passage referenced by defendant as intendingto give plaintiff time in which to develop sales.

In sum, we find that the trial court properly granted plaintiff's motion forsummary judgment on count I of his complaint.

2. Promissory Estoppel

Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in granting summaryjudgment on plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim. To prevail on a motion forsummary judgment with respect to a cause of action for promissory estoppel,plaintiff must prove (1) defendant made an unambiguous promise to plaintiff; (2)plaintiff relied on this promise; (3) plaintiff's reliance was expected andforeseeable by defendant; and (4) plaintiff relied to his detriment. Jago, 245Ill. App. 3d at 880. In this case, defendant insists that the June 8, 1998,letter did not make an unambiguous promise to employ plaintiff for a particularperiod of time. We need not revisit this issue. We have already rejected thisargument in holding that the trial court properly granted summary judgment oncount I of plaintiff's complaint.

B. Mitigation of Damages

Next, defendant argues that the trial court's determination that plaintiffused reasonable efforts to mitigate his damages was against the manifest weightof the evidence.

At the hearing on damages, plaintiff testified that, after defendantdischarged him, he began looking for a job in the mortgage banking industry. Plaintiff interviewed with about 10 companies before accepting a position withAccubanc. Plaintiff began working for Accubanc as a wholesale mortgage accountrepresentative late in December 1998. Plaintiff worked for Accubanc until August15, 1999, earning a monthly salary of $5,000. On August 16, 1999, plaintiff beganworking for Worldwide Capital as vice-president of sales. Worldwide Capital isinvolved in the retail sector of the mortgage industry. Plaintiff earned amonthly salary of $3,750 at Worldwide Capital.

Plaintiff testified that he left Accubanc because the wholesale mortgageindustry was down about 50% from the prior year, Accubanc had decided todiscontinue its guaranteed salary base in favor of paying its employees on astraight commission basis, and the threat of layoffs existed at the company. Moreover, plaintiff stated that he accepted the position at Worldwide Capitalbecause, if the company were to go public, there was a possibility that he wouldreceive stock options.

According to defendant, plaintiff's decision to leave Accubanc to work forWorldwide Capital was per se unreasonable because plaintiff could have earnedsubstantially more by remaining with Accubanc. Defendant also claims that thetrial court applied the wrong legal standard when it determined that plaintiff'sdecision to quit his job at Accubanc was made "free from any evidence suggestingbad faith or intent to increase damages in this case."

A party injured by a breach of contract is required to use all reasonablemeans to mitigate his damages. Harmon Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Thorson, 226 Ill.App. 3d 1050, 1053 (1992). In breach-of-employment-contract cases, the dischargedemployee must act to mitigate his damages by seeking similar employment. Arnesonv. Board of Trustees, 210 Ill. App. 3d 844, 851 (1991). The burden of proof thatthe injured party has failed to mitigate his damages is on the party that hasbreached the contract. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co. v. Seiko Sporting Goods, U.S.A.Co., 184 Ill. App. 3d 783, 790 (1989). The trial court's finding with respect tothe mitigation of damages will not be overturned unless it is against the manifestweight of the evidence. See JMB Properties Urban Co. v. Paolucci, 237 Ill. App.3d 563, 567 (1992).

In this case, the trial court's finding that plaintiff used reasonableefforts to mitigate his damages was not against the manifest weight of theevidence. The court accepted plaintiff's testimony that he left Accubanc to workfor Worldwide Capital because he was offered the position of vice-president ofsales and the possibility of acquiring future stock options. The court concludedthat plaintiff's explanation was reasonable. Based on the evidence presented atthe hearing on damages, we cannot say that the trial court's determination wasagainst the manifest weight of the evidence.

Defendant suggests that plaintiff was required to accept the highest-payingposition available. However, defendant cites no case law for this proposition. As plaintiff correctly notes, Illinois courts require the discharged employee onlyto make reasonable efforts to mitigate his damages. See Harmon, 226 Ill. App. 3dat 1053. The trial court found that plaintiff's efforts were reasonable, and wehave concluded that such a finding was not against the manifest weight of theevidence.

Nevertheless, defendant insists that if plaintiff had remained in the employof Accubanc he could have continued to earn $5,000 per month. However, defendantpresented no evidence that plaintiff would have continued to earn a monthly salaryof $5,000 had he remained in the employ of Accubanc. Indeed, we note thatplaintiff testified that Accubanc had decided to discontinue its salary base infavor of compensating employees on a straight commission basis. Defendantpresented no evidence to the contrary. Further, plaintiff cited Accubanc'sdecision to change its method of compensation as one of the reasons he decided towork for Worldwide Capital. Such a change, if implemented, would constitute asubstantial alteration of the terms under which plaintiff accepted employment atAccubanc. See Bang v. International Sisal Co., 4 N.W.2d 113, 116 (Minn. 1942)(salesman who was hired at a monthly salary and later discharged was not requiredto mitigate his damages by accepting employment on a straight commission basis). Thus, defendant's contention with respect to plaintiff's salary had he remainedwith Accubanc finds no support in the record.

Moreover, contrary to defendant's contention, the trial court did not employthe wrong legal standard in deciding whether plaintiff mitigated his damages. Thecourt specifically recognized that in breach-of-employment-contract cases theemployee must use all reasonable means to minimize his damages. The court alsonoted that in such cases the employer has the burden of proving that the employeefailed to mitigate his damages. With these principles in mind, the courtcommented that it would determine whether plaintiff's efforts to mitigate damageswere reasonable. The court then stated that plaintiff's decision to transfer fromAccubanc to Worldwide Capital "was a reasonable and proper business decision, freefrom any evidence suggesting bad faith or intent to increase damages in thiscase." (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, we reject defendant's position that thetrial court used the wrong legal standard.

The material in this section is unpublishable under Supreme Court Rule 23.

[Unpublishable material under Supreme Court Rule 23 omitted here.]

D. Cross-appeal

Plaintiff has filed a cross-appeal in which he argues that the trial courtimproperly determined that Illinois law does not permit damages beyond the dateof trial. He urges this court to modify the trial court's order to include futuredamages for the term of the contract. We decline plaintiff's invitation.

In Mount Hope Cemetery Ass'n. v. Weidenmann, 139 Ill. 67 (1891), our supremecourt held that, in breach-of-employment-contract cases, the discharged employee'sdamages are limited to the damages incurred from the date of the breach until theend of trial. Mount Hope, 139 Ill. at 80. Damages beyond the date of trial aredisallowed because they are considered too speculative or uncertain. Lewis v.Loyola University, 149 Ill. App. 3d 88, 95 (1986). As the Lewis court noted, theemployee may earn more than the contract price following trial, the contract mayhave been properly terminated by either party subsequent to the date of the trial,or the employee may become incapable of performing the duties before theexpiration of the contract. Lewis, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 95. Plaintiff has notcited any case from our supreme court that expressly overrules Mount Hope. Infact, courts interpreting Illinois law still cite Mount Hope as precedentialauthority that, in a breach-of-employment-contract action, a plaintiff cannotrecover damages beyond the date of trial. See, e.g., Maier v. LucentTechnologies, Inc., 120 F.3d 730, 735-36 (7th Cir. 1997); Munoz v. ExpeditedFreight Systems, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1181, 1186-87 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Lewis, 149Ill. App. 3d at 95; Corby v. Seventy-One Hundred Jeffery Avenue Building Corp.,325 Ill. App. 442, 457 (1945). Thus, we hold that plaintiff is not entitled tocollect damages accruing after the close of trial.

Plaintiff, however, claims that in Doherty v. Schipper & Block, 250 Ill. 128(1911), the supreme court abrogated Mount Hope. Plaintiff interprets Doherty asimplying that a litigant who sues for breach of contract prior to the expirationof the contract term may receive future damages. We disagree. In Doherty, thesupreme court merely held that a discharged employee who files a complaint forbreach of an employment contract must recover all damages resulting from suchbreach in one action, thus rejecting any suggestion in Mount Hope that a party maybring multiple actions to recover damages. Doherty, 250 Ill. at 134. Nowhere inthe Doherty opinion does the court write that a discharged employee may recoverdamages accruing after trial. Accord Munoz, 775 F. Supp. at 1187 n.4 (noting thatthe Doherty court implicitly rejected Mount Hope to the extent that it permittedsuits for installment of wages). Indeed, we note that, while the Doherty courtcited Mount Hope, there is no language in the case overruling Mount Hope impliedlyor otherwise.

Citing to Gasbarra v. Park-Ohio Industries, Inc., 655 F.2d 119 (7th Cir.1981), plaintiff claims that the Seventh Judicial Circuit has held that theDoherty court rejected the holding in Mount Hope regarding future damages. Wedisagree with plaintiff's interpretation of Gasbarra. The Gasbarra court merelyexplained that in Doherty our supreme court held that all damages resulting fromthe breach of an employment contract must be recovered in one action, thusnegating language in Mount Hope that a wrongfully discharged employee may sue forbenefits from time to time as they accrue. Gasbarra, 665 F.2d at 122. In anyevent, we are not bound by federal cases interpreting Illinois law. Bernot v.Primus Corp., 278 Ill. App. 3d 751, 755 (1996). Plaintiff also claims that 27other states allow employees to bring a breach-of-contract action for the entirecontract term. However, as with federal case law, we are not bound by thedecisions of sister states. Bernot, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 755.

In addition, plaintiff cites numerous other cases in support of his requestfor future damages. Those cases, however, are readily distinguishable. In noneof those cases was the court asked to determine whether the discharged employeewas entitled to damages beyond the date of trial. Moreover, the cases aredistinguishable on other bases as well.

In both Reinneck v. Taco Bell Corp., 297 Ill. App. 3d 211 (1998), andHeldenbrand v. Roadmaster Corp., 277 Ill. App. 3d 664 (1996), the future damagesawarded to the plaintiffs were based on retaliatory-discharge claims, not breach-of-employment-contract actions. Stringham v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 181Ill. App. 3d 312 (1989), involved a wrongful death action in which the plaintiff,the administrator of the decedent's estate, received an award based on the valueof the decedent's future wages. In Jabat, Inc. v. Smith, 201 F.3d 852 (7th Cir.2000), the defendant-counterplaintiff was awarded future damages. On appeal, theplaintiff-counterdefendant argued that the award of damages beyond the trial datewas improper. Besides the fact that Jabat is a federal case, the Seventh JudicialCircuit never reached the merits of the issue. Rather, the court held that theplaintiff-counterdefendant waived its objection to the award of future damages byfailing to object to a jury instruction authorizing such damages. Jabat, 201 F.3dat 856-57. Consequently, under Illinois law, a plaintiff in a breach-of-employment-contract case is not entitled to damages beyond the date of trial.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of DuPageCounty is affirmed.

Affirmed.

McLAREN and GEIGER, JJ., concur.