JUSTICE BYRNE delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Betty Raethz, a student, filed a four-count complaint against defendant, AuroraUniversity, for damages based on her allegedly wrongful expulsion from the school's master's in socialwork program. The trial court granted the University summary judgment as to count IV and,following a bench trial, found for the University as to counts I and III. As to count II, the only countat issue on appeal, the trial court held that the University breached an agreement created by theUniversity's School of Social Work Handbook (Handbook) and the Field Instruction Manual, andgranted judgment to plaintiff for $31,469. We reverse because the trial court misapplied the law,which required a finding that the dismissal was based on arbitrary, capricious, or bad-faith conduct.

Plaintiff enrolled in the program in the fall quarter of 1997. According to the Handbook, astudent must successfully complete 60 credits to receive a master's degree; 18 credits must be earnedthrough successful completion of field instruction. While field instructors complete evaluations basedon a student's performance at an agency, the University is ultimately responsible for assigning a gradefor field work. Under the terms of the Handbook, "[t]wo consecutive terms of below standard workresulting in a 'no credit' grade in Field Instruction is cause for dismissal from the MSW Program."

Plaintiff chose three field work assignments. For her first assignment, plaintiff worked at theHospice of Northeastern Illinois. Plaintiff received credit for this field instruction work. Next, shechose Northwest Action Against Rape (NWAAR). Ultimately, plaintiff's supervisors could notrecommend that plaintiff receive a passing grade for her field work at NWAAR. However, she wasnot given a failing grade; instead she was given a deferred grade, an "X," which according to theHandbook is to be used when a course is not completed. Plaintiff chose to do her third field workassignment at Alexian Brothers Behavioral Health Hospital. That assignment also did not fare well. On January 26, 1999, Alexian Brothers decided to terminate plaintiff's placement due to herperformance, and she received "No Credit" for her field work.

Because plaintiff received no credit for her fall 1998 field work assignment at AlexianBrothers, she was given a letter grade of "F" by the University for that class. Because she failed tofulfill the requirements of a remediation plan and a learning agreement, which were developed afterher assignment at NWAAR, she was not given retroactive credit for her work at NWAAR. Accordingly, pursuant to the Handbook, because plaintiff had earned no credit for two consecutiveterms of field instruction, she was subject to dismissal from the program.

Pursuant to the Handbook, a review committee, consisting of faculty from the University,convened at the University to review plaintiff's situation. The committee reviewed the writtenevaluations of plaintiff's performance at NWAAR and Alexian Brothers, as well as a 12-page writtenaccount prepared by plaintiff. In addition, plaintiff appeared before the committee and presented hercase. The committee determined that plaintiff should be dismissed from the program. A letter to thateffect was sent to plaintiff on March 3, 1999.

In accordance with the Handbook, plaintiff appealed the decision of the student reviewcommittee to Dean Sandra Alcorn. Dean Alcorn reviewed materials prepared by plaintiff. In hersubmission to Dean Alcorn, plaintiff added four new pages to the materials that she had provided tothe review committee. Dean Alcorn then met with plaintiff. After considering plaintiff's appeal, shefound that plaintiff had not been subjected to capricious grading in her field work assignments andthat there was no reason to change her grades or reverse the decision of the review committee. DeanAlcorn upheld the decision of the review committee and informed plaintiff of her decision by letter. Although entitled, plaintiff did not appeal Dean Alcorn's decision.

At trial, plaintiff testified that she received the Field Instruction Manual and the Handbookwhen she started classes at the University and was familiar with the contents. In particular, sectionX of the Field Instruction Manual provides that, when a field instructor assesses a student'sperformance as unsatisfactory, a joint conference with the faculty liaison, the field instructor, and thestudent should be held to develop a written "follow-up" plan to address the unsatisfactoryperformance. Field instructors should document all verbal warnings and must notify the student andthe faculty field liaison in writing if the student's performance is not improving sufficiently to warranta "PASS" grade within sufficient time so that the student can respond to and have the opportunityto correct any deficiencies in her performance. Section XX states that the University provides afaculty advisor to explain the University's policies to the field instructors, maintain close contact withthe field instructors, review all evaluations submitted by the field instructors, and keep the academicadvisors advised of a student's problems.

Plaintiff testified that in October 1998, she complained to Dr. Fred McKenzie, her facultyliaison, about the inadequate supervision and instruction she received from her supervisors at AlexianBrothers. At Dr. McKenzie's suggestion, she told her supervisors at Alexian Brothers several timesthat she needed more supervision. Plaintiff stated that no one complained about her performance orwarned her that she was in danger of failing.

Dr. Susan Ross, the field placement coordinator, testified that section X of the FieldInstruction Manual was in full force and effect while plaintiff attended the University. She admittedthat she had never seen any proof or documentation of section X compliance at either of plaintiff'sfield placements. Dr. Ross further admitted that she never saw a written remediation plan for theAlexian Brothers field placement.

The trial court found that the University and plaintiff entered into an implied agreementwhereby the University agreed to deliver, among other things, a degree in social work if plaintiffachieved satisfactory grades. The trial court further found that plaintiff did not achieve the requisitesatisfactory grades due to her failure to successfully complete the field instruction component of thecurriculum and that the court was "not authorized to intervene in the defendant's grading functionabsent a finding of bad faith which, beyond mere suspicion, the evidence adduced does not support." This statement suggests that the trial court found that the University did not act in bad faith. In anyevent, the trial court did not find expressly whether the University's faculty or agents acted arbitrarily,capriciously, or in bad faith in dismissing plaintiff from the program.

The trial court further found that section XX of the Field Instruction Manual imposed otherrequirements that the University did not perform. In particular, the trial court noted that the evidenceshowed that the University failed to provide the following services in a meaningful way so as topermit plaintiff the opportunity to successfully complete the field instruction portion of thecurriculum: provide a faculty advisor to explain the University's policies to the field instructors;maintain close contact with the field instructors; review all evaluations submitted by the fieldinstructors; and keep the academic advisors advised of plaintiff's problems.

Additionally, the trial court found that the evidence showed that the University substantiallyfailed to fulfill the requirements of section X of the Field Instruction Manual by failing to hold a jointconference with the faculty liaison, the field instructor, and plaintiff to develop the writtenremediation plan so that plaintiff could respond to and have the opportunity to correct anydeficiencies in her performance. The court also noted that there was no evidence of a writtenremediation plan. Accordingly, the trial court held that the University breached the agreement andgranted judgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $31,469, the full refund of her tuition. Plaintiffdid not seek reinstatement. The University timely appeals.

The University contends that the trial court applied the wrong standard of law to plaintiff'sbreach of contract claim against the University for dismissing plaintiff. We agree. On appeal, theparties do not dispute the factual findings, only the application of the law to the facts. The questionof whether the trial court applied the wrong legal standard is one of law, which we review de novo. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 327 Ill. App. 3d 768, 775 (2002).

It is true that a college or university and its students have a contractual relationship, and theterms of the contract are generally set forth in the school's catalogs and bulletins (see Frederick v.Northwestern University Dental School, 247 Ill. App. 3d 464, 471 (1993)). However, therelationship between a student and a private university is unique and cannot be strictly categorizedor characterized in purely contractual terms. See Bilut v. Northwestern University, 269 Ill. App. 3d 125, 133 (1994). Moreover, courts are reluctant to interfere with the academic affairs and regulationof student conduct in a private university setting (see Holert v. University of Chicago, 751 F. Supp.1294, 1301 (N.D. Ill. 1990)). Therefore, in the student-university context, a student may have aremedy for breach of contract when it is alleged that an adverse academic decision has been madeconcerning the student but only if that decision was made arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith. SeeFrederick, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 471.

The burden of establishing arbitrary or capricious conduct is a heavy one. Frederick, 247 Ill.App. 3d at 471. The plaintiff must show that her dismissal was "without any discernible rationalbasis." Holert, 751 F. Supp. at 1301. In other words, a court may not override the academicdecision of a university "unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms asto demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professionaljudgment." Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225, 88 L. Ed. 2d 523,532, 106 S. Ct. 507, 513 (1985).

In this case, the trial court did not conclude that any of the University's faculty or agents actedarbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith. Nor did the trial court find that the decision to dismissplaintiff was made without "any discernable rational basis." See Frederick, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 471-72. Rather, to the contrary, the trial court found that the evidence did not support a finding of badfaith by the University. This finding is insufficient to support a judgment against the University, asrecovery for a dismissal in the student-university context is permitted only when "an adverse decisionconcerning the student, supposedly for academic deficiencies, was made arbitrarily and capriciouslyand in bad faith." Wilson v. Illinois Benedictine College, 112 Ill. App. 3d 932, 937 (1983).

Plaintiff argues that the University misconstrues the trial court's order. Plaintiff contends thatthe order states that plaintiff did not sustain her burden of proof only with regard to her gradeperformance evaluations and that the trial court made no finding of bad faith with respect to thefailure of the University to comply with sections X and XX of the Field Instruction Manual. Although plaintiff cites the absence of certain findings as justification for an affirmance, she fails torecognize that she has the burden of proof to show that the University acted with "no discernablerational basis" in dismissing her.

Plaintiff argues that the University's breach of the Field Instruction Manual constituted perse arbitrary and capricious conduct. We cannot sanction such an argument. If we did, any failure bya university to comply with the terms set forth in the university's catalogs or manuals would amountto per se arbitrary and capricious conduct. See Brody v. Finch University of Health Sciences/TheChicago Medical School, 298 Ill. App. 3d 146, 156 (1998).

Nevertheless, plaintiff argues that the evidence establishes that the University had nodiscernable rational basis to dismiss her from the program. In support of her contention, plaintiffpoints to the evidence showing, inter alia, that the University failed to adequately document thedeficiencies in her performance; failed to adequately warn her of her alleged deficiencies; and failedto advise her of these deficiencies during meetings with required University personnel. These allegedviolations of the Field Instruction Manual do not amount to arbitrary, capricious, or bad-faith conducton the part of the University's faculty or agents.

What would make the University liable for breach of contract in the student-university settingis not that the University exercised its academic judgment unwisely, by allegedly failing to properlycomply with the Field Instruction Manual, but that it did not exercise its academic judgment at all,instead acting arbitrarily or in bad faith in its treatment of plaintiff. See Regents of the University ofMichigan, 474 U.S. at 225, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 532, 106 S. Ct. at 513. This is not a case in which theUniversity withheld admission (Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 Ill. 2d 320 (1977)) or adegree (DeMarco v. University of Health Sciences/The Chicago Medical School, 40 Ill. App. 3d 474(1976)) because of a student's refusal to contribute to the school. Nor is this a situation where theuniversity reneged on a promise of admission if certain requisites were met (Brody, 298 Ill. App. 3d146). In short, there is no evidence of arbitrary, capricious, or bad-faith conduct toward plaintiff indismissing her from the program. The evidence reveals that plaintiff's failures were well documentedand the faculty and plaintiff's supervisors were concerned with allowing plaintiff to continue workingin a setting in which she would have to interact with clients. The University's faculty and agentsultimately exercised their academic judgment and dismissed plaintiff. We note that plaintiff neverpleaded that the University's faculty or agents treated her arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith, andplaintiff has failed to meet her burden of proof.

In sum, the trial court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusion. Accordingly, wemust reverse the judgment.

Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is reversed.

Reversed.

GROMETER and CALLUM, JJ., concur.