JUSTICE GROMETER delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company(State Farm), appeals from a summary judgment granted by the trialcourt in favor of plaintiff, Martha Ramirez, in this declaratoryjudgment action. Plaintiff brought the action individually and asparent, next friend, and guardian of the estate of her deceasedminor son, Gamaliel Ramirez (Gamaliel), seeking a declaratoryjudgment that the uninsured motorist provisions in an automobileinsurance policy that State Farm had issued to her covered thedamages related to Gamaliel's injuries and death. Gamaliel's deathresulted from gunshots fired from an uninsured vehicle atplaintiff's car while Gamaliel was driving plaintiff's car. Forthe reasons that follow, we conclude that the uninsured motoristprovisions of plaintiff's policy did not provide coverage andreverse the summary judgment.

The material facts are not in dispute. Around midnight onNovember 1, 1997, Gamaliel was driving plaintiff's car in Rockford. Antonio Ramirez, the only passenger in the car, was sitting in thefront passenger seat. Another car, driven by Jasim MohamedAlbaiaty, began to follow plaintiff's car. There were twopassengers in Albaiaty's car, Ricardo "Ricky" Diaz and Rey Velarde. Gamaliel attempted to get away from Albaiaty's car. However,Albaiaty's car continued to follow plaintiff's car for about 40blocks.

When Gamaliel slowed plaintiff's car for a railroad crossing,Albaiaty's car pulled next to the driver's side of plaintiff's car. Velarde, one of the passengers in Albaiaty's car, then fired about10 or 11 gunshots at plaintiff's car. One of the gunshots hitGamaliel in the left arm and passed into his chest. After Velardefired the shots, Albaiaty's car briefly came into contact withplaintiff's car. Albaiaty's car then sped away.

Shortly after being shot, Gamaliel passed out and was unableto maintain control of plaintiff's car. Plaintiff's car then leftthe road, struck some property near a building, and eventually hita light pole.

Gamaliel was taken to a hospital where he received emergencytreatment. Gamaliel died at the hospital. The cause of Gamaliel'sdeath was the gunshot wound to the chest.

Albaiaty and Velarde were charged with the murder of Gamaliel. Albaiaty and Velarde each pleaded guilty to the offense. Diazpleaded guilty to related minor offenses.

Plaintiff filed a claim with State Farm for the damagesresulting from Gamaliel's injuries and death. Plaintiff soughtcoverage under the uninsured motorist provisions in an automobileinsurance policy that State Farm had issued to plaintiff. Thepolicy was in force on November 1, 1997.

State Farm subsequently determined that plaintiff was notentitled to coverage for the claimed damages under the uninsuredmotorist provisions in the policy and denied plaintiff's claim. State Farm also declined plaintiff's request to proceed toarbitration on the matter.

The uninsured motorist provisions in the policy stated, inpertinent part:

"We will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is legallyentitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsuredmotor vehicle. The bodily injury must be sustained by aninsured and caused by accident arising out of the operation,maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehicle." (Emphasisin original.)

Following State Farm's denial of her claim, plaintiff filedthis action seeking a declaratory judgment that she was entitled tocoverage for the claimed damages under the uninsured motoristprovisions of the policy. The parties filed cross-motions forsummary judgment. The trial court determined that the incident inquestion was an "accident" and that the incident "arose out of" theuse and operation of Albaiaty's uninsured vehicle. Based on thesedeterminations, the trial court ruled that the uninsured motoristprovisions in the policy provided coverage for plaintiff's claimeddamages and granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. StateFarm's timely notice of appeal followed.

On appeal, State Farm contends that the trial court erred ingranting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. State Farmacknowledges that, under the terms of the policy, Gamaliel was aninsured driver and Albaiaty was an uninsured motorist. State Farm argued in its initial appellate brief that the trial court erred indetermining that Gamaliel's death was caused by an "accident" andin determining that the accident "arose out of" the operation anduse of Albaiaty's uninsured vehicle for purposes of the uninsuredmotorist provisions in the policy. However, in its reply brief,State Farm acknowledged that the parties agree that Gamaliel'sinjuries arose by "accident." Thus, we express no opinionwhatsoever as to whether Gamaliel's death was the result of anaccident. Therefore, the only issue before us is whether the trialcourt erred in determining that the accident "arose out of" theoperation and use of Albaiaty's vehicle.

Familiar principles guide us in reviewing a grant of summaryjudgment. Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings,depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material factand that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2000). Summary judgment is adrastic measure and therefore a court should grant summary judgmentonly when the movant's right to judgment is clear and free fromdoubt. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992). We review de novo the propriety of anorder granting a motion for summary judgment. Travelers InsuranceCo. v. Eljer Manufacturing, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 278, 292 (2001).

In construing an insurance policy, the primary objective is toascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties to thecontract. Outboard Marine Corp., 154 Ill. 2d at 108. Courtsshould construe an insurance policy as a whole and take intoaccount the type of insurance purchased, the nature of the risksinvolved, and the overall purpose of the contract. Crum & ForsterManagers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 156 Ill. 2d 384, 391(1993). If the words of a policy are clear and unambiguous, acourt must afford them their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning.Outboard Marine Corp., 154 Ill. 2d at 108. Conversely, if thelanguage in a policy is susceptible to more than one meaning, it isconsidered ambiguous and a court should construe it strictlyagainst the insurer that drafted the policy and in favor of theinsured. American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d 473,479 (1997). Courts should not strain to find ambiguity in aninsurance policy where none exists. Crum & Forster Managers Corp.,156 Ill. 2d at 391.

In support of its position that the trial court erred indetermining that the accident arose out of the operation and use ofAlbaiaty's vehicle, State Farm relies on a line of Illinois casesthat involved uninsured motorist provisions in automobile insurancepolicies similar to the uninsured motorist provisions in the policyin this case. The cases relied on by State Farm also involvedcircumstances that were more or less similar to the circumstancesin this case.

One of the cases relied on by State Farm is Curtis v. Birch,114 Ill. App. 3d 127 (1983). In Curtis, the issue was whether thetrial court erred in dismissing the count of a multicount complaintalleging that the uninsured motorist provisions in an automobileinsurance policy provided coverage for certain damages. Thedamages allegedly resulted from the shooting death of a passengerin an insured car which was apparently parked at the time of theshooting. The driver of an uninsured vehicle allegedly fired theshots that killed the victim.

In Curtis, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of thecount in question after noting that the purpose of uninsuredmotorist coverage is to place the policyholder in substantially thesame position he would have occupied if the wrongful driver had theminimum liability insurance required by Illinois law. Curtis, 114Ill. App. 3d at 130-31. The court stated that it had not found,and was otherwise unaware of, anything that indicated "that thelegislature anticipated or intended that the liability of aninsurer could be established by the intentional, criminal conduct,such as that involved here." Curtis, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 131. Thecourt also stated that the "few cases which have allowed an insuredto recover, under an uninsured motorist's provision of an autoinsurance policy for intentional acts of the uninsured or unknowndriver, involved injuries caused by the use of the auto as theinstrumentality of the resultant injuries." Curtis, 114 Ill. App3d at 131.

Another case that State Farm relies on is Aryainejad v.Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 278 Ill. App. 3d 1049 (1996). InAryainejad, an uninsured motorist, Duffy, had been drinking and ranout of gas on Interstate 57. Duffy left his vehicle and beganwalking to a gas station. The plaintiff, Aryainejad, was drivinghis insured vehicle on I-57 when he encountered Duffy walkingtoward him in the middle of a traffic lane. In attempting to avoidhitting Duffy, Aryainejad lost control of his vehicle, crashed, andsustained serious injuries. Aryainejad later filed a claim foruninsured motorist coverage under his automobile insurance policywith the defendant insurance company. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment agreeing that the sole issue waswhether Aryainejad's accident arose out of Duffy's ownership,maintenance, or use of his vehicle. The trial court ruled in favorof the defendant and Aryainejad appealed. Aryainejad, 278 Ill.App. 3d at 1050.

In Aryainejad, the appellate court noted that many courtsthroughout the country had examined "arising out of" language inautomobile insurance policies and had construed the terms broadlyto mean "originating from, incident to, or having a causalconnection with the ownership, maintenance or use of the vehicle." Aryainejad, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 1051. The appellate court statedthat a majority of the courts that had construed "arising out of"language held that "there must be a causal relationship between theinjury and the ownership, maintenance or use of the vehicle forcoverage to apply." Aryainejad, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 1052. Theappellate court also concluded that no uniform causation standardor test for resolving the causation question had been adopted. Aryainejad, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 1052.

In Aryainejad, the appellate court evaluated various testsused by courts that focus solely on causation. These tests includethe "substantial nexus" test and the "efficient and predominatingcause" test. The appellate court decided that such tests did notprovide an adequate analytical framework for resolving thefrequently litigated issue of construing "arising out of" language. Aryainejad, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 1054. The appellate court thenstated:

"The better approach is to eschew such tests and follow thecourts that afford coverage where the injuries resulted froman activity that is within the risk reasonably contemplated bythe parties. We therefore adopt this approach ***." Aryainejad, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 1054.

In applying this "reasonable contemplation" test, theAryainejad court held that the injuries Aryainejad sustained as aresult of Duffy's conduct were covered by the uninsured motoristprovisions in Aryainejad's policy. The court determined thatDuffy's conduct in running out of gas and then walking on theinterstate to get more gas was within the risks contemplated by theparties to the policy because the conduct was incident to Duffy'susage of his vehicle. In distinguishing cases relied on by theinsurance company, the appellate court stated:

"We agree that an automobile must do more than merelytransport a person to the site where an accident occurs forcoverage to apply and that an assault by the driver of avehicle is an act which is independent and unrelated to theownership, maintenance or use of a vehicle. Regardless ofwhether a vehicle creates a condition that leads to anassault, injuries resulting from an assault are not a normalor reasonable consequence of the use of a vehicle. In otherwords, because physical altercations are not reasonablyconsistent with the inherent nature of the vehicle, they arenot risks for which the parties to automobile insurancecontracts would reasonably contemplate there would becoverage. On the other hand, walking down the highway aftera vehicle breaks down or runs out of gas is a reasonableconsequence of the use of a vehicle." Aryainejad, 278 Ill.App. 3d at 1054-55.

Another case that State Farm relies on is Laycock v. AmericanFamily Mutual Insurance Co., 289 Ill. App. 3d 264 (1997). InLaycock, an uninsured vehicle chased, cut off, and forced to a stopa car insured by the defendant insurance company and driven bySteven Laycock, an insured, after the two vehicles had nearlycollided. Jungles, the driver of the uninsured vehicle, thenexited his vehicle, and while shouting threats and obscenities atSteven, beat Steven on the face, head, neck, and eyes throughSteven's open window causing injuries to Steven. After Jungles wasconvicted of battery, plaintiffs obtained a civil judgment againstJungles in the amount of $15,000, but the insurance company refusedto pay the damages under plaintiffs' uninsured motorist claim andrefused to arbitrate. Plaintiffs then filed a declaratory judgmentaction against the insurance company.

In the declaratory judgment action in Laycock, the partiesfiled cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of whetherthe incident in which Steven was injured arose out of the use ofJungles' uninsured motor vehicle and therefore was covered by theuninsured motorist provisions of plaintiffs' policy. The trialcourt determined that the uninsured motorist provisions did notapply to the incident and ruled in favor of the insurance company. Plaintiffs then appealed.

On appeal in Laycock, this court recognized that the words"arising out of" in an automobile insurance policy have beenbroadly construed to mean, inter alia, having a causal connectionwith the use of a vehicle. Nonetheless, this court determined thatthe uninsured motorist provisions in the policy did not providecoverage for plaintiffs because "the act of leaving the vehicle andinflicting a battery is an event of independent significance thatis too remote, incidental, or tenuous to support a causalconnection with the use of the vehicle despite the fact that thevehicle was used to stop and trap another vehicle." Laycock, 289Ill. App. 3d at 268.

In Laycock, this court also applied the reasonablecontemplation test that the appellate court adopted in Aryainejad. Under the reasonable contemplation test this court concluded thatthe injuries to Steven were not among the risks that the parties tothe policy reasonably contemplated would be covered. This courtheld that the trial court correctly concluded that the policy didnot provide coverage and explained its holding by referring toAryainejad and stating:

"We agree that an assault by the driver of a vehicle is an actthat is independent of and unrelated to the use of a vehicleand is not a normal or reasonable consequence of the use of avehicle. Therefore, it is not a risk for which the parties tothe contract reasonably contemplated there would be coverage." Laycock, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 269.

Another case that State Farm relies on is State Farm Fire &Casualty Co. v. Rosenberg, 319 Ill. App. 3d 744 (2001). InRosenberg, Rosenberg, the owner of an insured vehicle, encountered a man, Tripp, in a parking lot. Tripp commandeered Rosenberg'svehicle and drove off in the vehicle with Rosenberg in thepassenger seat. On the Edens Expressway, Tripp shot Rosenberg inthe head and arm and then pushed her out of the vehicle while itwas moving. Rosenberg subsequently filed a claim with her insurerunder the uninsured motorist provisions of her automobile insurancepolicy (the vehicle was considered an uninsured vehicle while Trippwas driving it because Tripp was not an insured driver). In adeclaratory judgment action brought by the insurance company, theparties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial courtfound that the uninsured motorist provisions of the policy did notprovide coverage for Rosenberg's injuries because the injuries werenot injuries normally associated with the ownership, maintenance,or use of a vehicle and granted summary judgment in favor of theinsurance company. Rosenberg then appealed.

On appeal in Rosenberg, the appellate court construed languagein the uninsured motorist section of Rosenberg's policy thatstated, in pertinent part, that the coverage applied to an accident" 'arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of an uninsuredmotor vehicle.' " (Emphasis omitted.) Rosenberg, 319 Ill. App. 3dat 747. The appellate court discussed various cases includingCurtis, Aryainejad, and Laycock and affirmed the trial court'sgrant of summary judgment in favor of the insurance company. Theappellate court stated:

"[T]he injuries sustained by defendant were the result ofgunshot wounds inflicted by Tripp before he pushed defendantout of the vehicle. There was no direct connection betweenthe injuries Rosenberg seeks compensation for and theoperation or use of her vehicle. The 'accident' in this casedid not arise out of the manner in which the uninsured vehiclewas being driven ***." Rosenberg, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 748.

Here, plaintiff first responds to the cases cited by StateFarm by citing two Illinois cases, Dyer v. American FamilyInsurance Co., 159 Ill. App. 3d 766 (1987), and Country Cos. v.Bourbon, 122 Ill. App. 3d 1061 (1984). Plaintiff maintains thatthese cases show that Illinois courts have construed provisions inuninsured motorist policies to provide coverage for injuriesresulting from intentional criminal acts.

Neither Dyer nor Bourbon construed "arising out of" language.The policy at issue in Dyer did not even contain "arising out of"language among its uninsured motorist provisions. Rather, thepolicy allowed uninsured motorist coverage merely for injuries thatwere caused by an "accident." Dyer, 159 Ill. App. 3d at 769. Thepolicy in Bourbon contained "arising out of" language among itsuninsured motorist provisions, but the Bourbon court did notconstrue this language. Rather, the court focused on whether theincident in that case should be considered an "accident." Bourbon,122 Ill. App. 3d at 1066-67. Because neither Dyer nor Bourbonconstrued "arising out of" language, the issue that is before us inthis case, plaintiff's reliance on Dyer and Bourbon is misplaced.

Plaintiff also cites a number of foreign cases. However,these cases either did not construe "arising out of" language orare unpersuasive. Accordingly, we choose not to follow any of theforeign cases cited by plaintiff.

Based on Curtis, Aryainejad, Laycock, and Rosenberg, webelieve that the appropriate analysis for construing "arising outof" language in the context of uninsured motorist provisions of anautomobile insurance policy is the reasonable contemplation test. We will therefore apply the reasonable contemplation test in thiscase.

The cause of Gamaliel's injuries and death was a gunshot thatwas fired from another vehicle. The shot hit Gamaliel while he wasdriving plaintiff's vehicle. It is true that the other vehicle wasan uninsured vehicle. However, the instrumentality of Gamaliel'sinjuries and death was the gun that the passenger in the uninsuredvehicle fired at Gamaliel. The operation or use of the uninsuredvehicle was not the instrumentality that caused the injuries anddeath of Gamaliel. Because the uninsured motorist provisions inplaintiff's policy allow coverage only for injuries that occurredduring an accident that arose out of the operation or use of anuninsured vehicle, the plain language of the policy precludescoverage for the injuries that Gamaliel sustained as a result ofthe gunshot that struck him. Therefore, we conclude that it wasnot within the reasonable contemplation of the parties toplaintiff's automobile insurance policy that the "arising out of"language in the uninsured motorist provisions of plaintiff's policywould apply and provide coverage for the injuries that resultedfrom the situation that occurred in this case. Accordingly, thetrial court erred when it determined that the "accident" thatoccurred in this case "arose out of" the operation or use of anuninsured vehicle.

Plaintiff also contends that the summary judgment in her favorshould be affirmed because the "arising out of" language in theuninsured motorist provisions of the policy creates a latentambiguity in the policy. Plaintiff asserts that the ambiguity isshown by the inconsistent construction of similar terms by variouscourts. Plaintiff argues that we should construe the ambiguityagainst State Farm and in her favor.

We disagree. Under Curtis, Aryainejad, Laycock, andRosenberg, the terms "arising out of" are sufficiently unambiguousto be tested as to their applicability in a given set ofcircumstances using the reasonable contemplation test. Werecognize that the applicability of the terms will vary with thecircumstances. However, this does not render the terms ambiguous.

Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit court ofWinnebago County is reversed.

Reversed.

McLAREN and BOWMAN, JJ., concur.