March 28, 2001

No. 2--99--1445

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

JUSTICE GEIGER delivered the opinion of the court:

In September 1991, the plaintiff, Arthur Ross, filed hisoriginal complaint for administrative review against the defendants, the City ofFreeport, the Freeport Board of Fire and Police Commissioners (Board),commissioners Reginald D. McGee, Brian Borger, Denita Morris, David Shockey,Mark Wagner, and Police Chief Donald Parker. The cause of action was eventuallyremoved to the federal district court, and, after the complaint was amended, thecause was remanded to the state circuit court in May 1999.

The amended complaint alleged that the plaintiff was employedas a police officer with the City of Freeport in May 1991. On May 8, 1991, theplaintiff had a conversation with Police Chief Donald Parker, during which theplaintiff disclosed that he had a personal medical problem and requested a leaveof absence in order to seek treatment. Although Chief Parker initially agreed togrant a leave of absence, he subsequently changed his mind. The complaintalleges that, on May 9, 1991, Chief Parker threatened and coerced the plaintiffinto resigning. The plaintiff alleged that he was misled to believe that hisresignation would be preferable to a leave of absence and that if he obtainedmedical treatment he could apply for reinstatement within one year of hisresignation.

The plaintiff then made a timely application to the Board forreinstatement after resignation and a request for a leave of absence pursuant tothe Board's rules and regulations. The plaintiff also requested a hearing by theBoard concerning his "coerced resignation under threat of disciplinarycharges." The Board refused to consider each of these requests.

The amended complaint consisted of four counts, and eachcount was directed against all of the defendants. Count I of the amendedcomplaint sought administrative review of the Board's refusal to consider theplaintiff's requests for reinstatement as a police officer, for a leave ofabsence, and for a hearing on Chief Parker's alleged coercion. The action foradministrative review was brought pursuant to the Administrative Review Law (theReview Law) (735 ILCS 5/3--101 et seq. (West 1998)). Count II sought adeclaratory judgment that the plaintiff was entitled to reinstatement andmonetary

compensation. Count III alleged fraudulent misrepresentationon the part of Chief of Police Donald Parker in purportedly promising futurereinstatement as an inducement for the plaintiff to resign. Count IV allegedthat the defendants breached their employment contract with the plaintiff. Thedefendants moved to dismiss all of the counts on various grounds. The trialcourt declined to dismiss count I (administrative review) but dismissed countsII, III, and IV, citing Dorner v. Illinois Civil Service Comm'n, 85 Ill.App. 3d 957 (1980). The trial court ruled that Dorner stands for theproposition that other statutory and common-law causes of action cannot bejoined to a complaint for administrative review

On November 18, 1999, the trial court denied the plaintiff'smotion to reconsider and entered a finding that counts II, III, and IV wereappealable pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). Theplaintiff timely appealed. The defendants have raised arguments with respect tocounts I through IV of the second amended complaint and request that this courtdismiss the complaint in its entirety. However, count I remains pending in thetrial court and has not been appealed. Since it is not properly before thiscourt, we do not have jurisdiction to review it. Stykel v. City of Freeport,No. 2--99--1446 (January 22, 2001), slip op. at 4. We therefore limit our reviewto the central question raised by the plaintiff, that is, whether the trialcourt erred in dismissing counts II, III, and IV.

The plaintiff first argues that, because there is somequestion whether the Review Law applies to his claim for reinstatement as apolice officer, he should be able to join common-law actions for declaratoryjudgment, fraudulent misrepresentation, and breach of contract, even thoughadministrative review could be obtained. The plaintiff states that the onlyreason the trial court dismissed counts II, III, and IV was that there was noauthority for the joinder of other actions with an administrative review actionunder Dorner.

In Stykel, we recently considered the questionpresented here and explained the significance and applicability of Dorner.In Dorner, the plaintiff, a correctional academy trainer, maintained thathis layoff was a subterfuge for his discharge from employment. He sought reviewof the decision of the Civil Service Commission not to offer him a voluntaryreduction in employment status and place him in a currently vacant position. Thetrial court reversed the decision of the Commission and ordered the Departmentof Corrections to offer the plaintiff the next available trainer position, butthe court denied an award of back pay, and the plaintiff appealed. As weexplained in Stykel, the Dorner court held that the power of thetrial court was limited under the Review Law to either affirm or reverse thedecision of the administrative agency or to remand the cause for additionalevidence. Dorner, 85 Ill. App. 3d at 963. The Dorner court notedin passing that there was "no provision in the [Review Law] for the joinderof a mandamus action for reinstatement to the former position or an action forback wages." Dorner, 85 Ill. App. 3d at 963. The Dorner courtconcluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order the Department ofCorrections either to offer the plaintiff the next available position, to compelreinstatement, or to order back pay; the reviewing court remanded the matter tothe Commission for further proceedings consistent with the court's finding thatthe plaintiff was entitled to a lower classified position that had becomeavailable following the plaintiff's layoff. Stykel, slip op. at 6, citingDorner, 85 Ill. App. 3d at 963.

In Stykel, this court concluded that the question in Dornerwas the scope of the trial court's power to award relief under the Review Law.Since the plaintiff in Dorner had not filed additional causes of actioninvoking the trial court's original jurisdiction, joinder was not at issue. In Stykel,this court further concluded that Dorner did not prohibit the joinder ofany and all causes of action with an administrative review action; rather, theplaintiffs should be permitted to join any additional counts that are"cognizable" when the Review Law applies to the actions of anadministrative agency. Stykel, slip op. at 7. However, as in the presentcase, this court had to examine what additional causes of action werepermissible, since the Review Law is ordinarily the exclusive remedy for thereview of a decision by an administrative agency.

In Stykel, the plaintiffs were applicants forfirefighter positions with the City of Freeport. They received a score of zeroon the written examination and were effectively rendered ineligible foremployment. The plaintiffs sought a hearing by the Board of Fire and PoliceCommissioners, which denied the request. The plaintiffs then filed in the trialcourt a complaint for administrative review, claiming they were wrongfullydenied certification as eligible for employment and wrongfully denied a hearing.The plaintiffs eventually filed an amended complaint adding counts fordeclaratory judgments, civil rights violations under federal law (42 U.S.C.